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ABSTRACT
The thesis Lithuania: the Rebirth of a Nation, 1991-1994
examines the first years of the rebirth and regeneration of 
Lithuania in the face of the legacy of the Soviet Occupation. It 
studies the essential components of rebirth: the creation of
domestic, foreign and security policies and the revitalising of 
the economy as Lithuania broke away from the USSR. The Soviet 
Occupation grafted the mentality of homo sovieticus onto the 
Lithuanian people and its effect is charted when observing the 
processes surrounding Lithuania's rejuvenation. An additional 
chapter examines the evolution of homo sovieticus itself, 
studying bureaucratic societies, such as the Habsburg Empire and 
the USSR. The chapter also shows the manifestation of homo 
sovieticus in works of literature, art, music and humour and 
explores the concept of 'internal exile'.
The thesis commences with a condensed history of Lithuania, 
as this history has created the distinct national identity which 
sustained the Lithuanian people during the decades of occupation. 
After the chapter on the evolution of homo sovieticus, its legacy 
is studied in a survey of Lithuania's domestic politics between 
1991-1994. This chapter, however, extends until 1996 to 
demonstrate the changing political fortunes during the first 
post-Soviet years.
Interlinking chapters on foreign and security policy appraise 
Lithuania's attempts to rejoin the international community and 
acquire an effective security guarantee. The influence of the 
presence of homo sovieticus is again noted both here and in the 
final chapter, devoted to Lithuania's transition to a market 
economy.
The thesis concludes that while enormous strides were taken 
between 1991-1994 to return Lithuania to her pre-Occupation 
status, the damage caused by fifty years of the Soviet Occupation 
had created unforeseen obstacles which led to complications in 
the process of rebirth, many of which will be unsurmountable in 
the immediate future.
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INTRODUCTION
'Lithuania, our motherland, From the past may your sons 
Draw their strength. . . May they work for your good 
And the good of your people.'
V. Kudirka, 1898^
Lithuania is in a unique position. Unlike the other two Baltic 
States of Estonia and Latvia, which have only known independence 
in the twentieth century, Lithuania has twice lost and regained 
her independence. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
Lithuania had shared with Poland a vast Empire, stretching from 
the Baltic to the Black Sea. This Empire, however, collapsed 
during the seventeenth century as the Russian and Prussian states 
expanded. Despite its fall, the Grand Duchy remained of great 
inspirational value to the people of Lithuania, as it provided 
a basis for the demands for independence made at the start of the 
twentieth century. Independence was finally achieved in 1918 but 
was then lost again in 1940. An independent Lithuania was only 
reborn 5 0 years later.
To analyze the situation in modern Lithuania, the integral 
components in the rebirth of any state have been studied: the 
establishment of domestic, foreign, security and economic 
policies. These components are also essential when examining the 
actual birth of a new state, but for a rebirth these policies are 
influenced by historical precedents, for example in the 
implementation of foreign policy. The current situation in 
Lithuania is echoed in the majority of the former Soviet 
republics and states which fell into the Soviet sphere of 
influence after 1945, which share similar problems in creating 
(or recreating) independent government structures.
In the course of research, the existence in Lithuania of a 
phenomenon referred to by Alexander Zinoviev as the mentality of 
homo sovieticus^ became increasingly apparent. The rebuilding of 
domestic political life, the creation of a new foreign policy and
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the regeneration of the economy in particular appear to have been 
significantly influenced by this mentality, which was grafted 
onto the Lithuanian psyche after 50 years of Soviet rule. Antanas 
Smetona, grandson of the last pre-war President of Lithuania, has 
also become aware of this after visits to Lithuania: 'there are
now totally different attitudes [compared to inter-war 
Lithuania]...the habits of the Soviet times have eaten deeply 
into one's blood.This thesis therefore highlights the impact 
of the legacy of the Soviet Occupation on the re-emerging 
Lithuanian state.
Lithuania, however, is not alone in this respect. The burden 
of the mentality of homo sovieticus is one shared by her former 
Soviet counterparts. A preliminary evaluation of the effects of 
its existence lays the foundations for further research in this 
field, as insufficient time has elapsed for a full investigation 
to be undertaken. It would, however, have been a significant 
error of judgement to ignore the impact of this phenomenon merely 
because of a lack of time having passed.
The chapter on homo sovieticus is a counter-point to the rest 
of this thesis. It examines the evolution of the mentality and 
its manifestation in Soviet society. To demonstrate this most 
effectively, a multi-media approach has been used: the text is 
based not only on standard historical documents but also 
literature, art, music and humour.
No study of modern Lithuania, however, should be undertaken 
without a solid understanding of Lithuania's history, as it is 
that history which has so influenced recent events. Therefore, 
while 1991-1994 is the main period of focus, as those years 
covered an equal period of the first two post-Soviet Governments, 
the first chapter is an encapsulation of Lithuania's past. In 
contrast, it is inevitable that later chapters highlight the 
contemporary nature of this thesis by the inclusion of 
developments which occurred after 1994.
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Chapters III-VI deal with the physical components of rebirth. 
The chapter on Lithuania's domestic politics is subtitled "The 
Pitfalls of Incumbency",* a phrase which characterises the 
shifting fortunes of Lithuania's political elite in the first 
years of independence. This chapter in particular extends forward 
to 1996 to draw comparisons between the differing governing 
parties from 1991. The chapter on foreign policy examines the 
practicalities of re-establishing such a policy and re­
integrating into the international community. It illustrates the 
challenges which faced the Lithuanians in areas such as selecting 
personnel to staff the reconstructed Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the complications inherent in reopening Embassies and 
rebuilding international relations after a 50 year period in 
political isolation.
Security is closely linked with Lithuania's foreign policy. 
Chapter V therefore concentrates on Lithuania's struggle to 
achieve a formal guarantee of her defence from Western security 
structures and how Lithuania reconstructed her armed services 
after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from her territory in 1993. 
Potential threats to Lithuania are also identified and discussed.
The chapter devoted to the reconstruction of Lithuania's 
economy is undertaken from an historical perspective. Lithuania's 
success in achieving the transition to a market economy is 
examined, including the réintroduction of Lithuania's own 
currency and the process of privatisation. The legacy of Soviet 
rule is again highlighted as the concept of land reform is 
investigated. Failure to achieve a successful policy of land 
reform has influenced so many aspects of Lithuania's 
regeneration, not least in the economic, domestic political and 
foreign policy sectors.
All of the chapters have lengthy endnotes. Contained in these 
notes are often detailed statistics tables and specific case 
studies. To clarify them, separate appendices have been created. 
Appendix I contains the individual case studies; Appendix II,
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data tables and Appendix III, illustrations.
The Bibliography is subdivided into a number of different 
categories: Speeches and Constitutional Documents, which were so 
important in the construction of this thesis, secondary sources, 
reference works, newspapers, periodicals and television 
documentaries. Certain background works, for example, those on 
nationalism by Hans Kohn and Eugene Kamenka, were invaluable as 
a study of the rebirth of the Lithuanian nation could not have 
been undertaken without a grounding in the concepts of 
nationalism. Of the reference works in English, the most useful 
were the two volumes of Jane's Sentinel edited by Paul Beaver and 
Felix Corley.
Reflecting the contemporary nature of this thesis, the 
Bibliography was less essential than the Oral Sources to whom I 
had access. A list of my Oral Sources therefore follows the 
Bibliography. Interviews were conducted either in person, over 
the telephone, by e-mail, facsimile or letter. They occurred 
either in formal settings or on a more casual basis. Those who 
contributed to the thesis are listed, accompanied by a short 
biographical detail: some of my sources are widely-known figures, 
others are known only to a few. If particular sources had to be 
selected for their supreme usefulness, it would have to be Vice 
Foreign Minister Rokas Bernotas, who of all the Lithuanians with 
whom I worked in Lithuania, has the best understanding of the 
issues facing the reborn nation. Outside Lithuania, Joné 
Brazauskaite duplicates that understanding and, with the benefit 
of a western mentality, offers sound analysis of the progress of 
national rebirth. I spent a period of time in Lithuania 
interviewing my sources in person in 1994, but an accident 
prevented my returning again before this thesis could be 
completed. Therefore it was the telephone interviews which proved 
extremely valuable.
While great attention has been devoted to the restitution of 
Lithuania's independence,^ little academic work has yet been
undertaken on Lithuania's more recent history. It is an imbalance 
which this thesis begins to redress. Despite Lithuania's unique 
historical position compared to the other Baltic States and the 
states of Central and Eastern Europe, there are some common 
experiences, especially regarding the omnipresent legacy of the 
Soviet occupation but also in the area of ensuring security, 
which unite them all. Therefore a study of any Central or Eastern 
European state can benefit from a knowledge of events in 
Lithuania.
Although, like the former Czechoslovakia, Lithuania had always 
been for many people a 'far away country',® the events of 1989- 
1991 captured the imagination of the western public. Now that the 
goal of independence has been achieved, Lithuania does not 
deserve to slip out of the public eye, not least because in a 
post-Soviet era the Baltic region provides, according to Swedish 
Prime Minister Carl Bildt, 'the critical test of the relationship 
between Russia and the West.'”' This relationship has dominated 
twentieth century history and, by virtue of her size and 
geographical position, the maintenance of Lithuania's 
independence and her evolution as an independent state will be 
determined solely by its nature and progression. The Soviet 
occupation of Lithuania has left deep mental and physical scars 
on both country and nation which will take many years to heal. 
It is this legacy which has overshadowed all of the processes 
encompassing Lithuania's rebirth and it will continue to do so 
for the foreseeable future.
1. Lietuvos Himnas, the Lithuanian National Anthem, written by V. Kudirka in 1898, translated by J. Brazauskaite, 1988.
2. Zinoviev, A. Homo Sovieticus Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1985
3. Interview with Antanas Smetona, Lietuvos Aidas, 15 March 1997
4. M. Kaminski in The Financial Times 18 October 1996
5. For example the work of Erich Senn, such as Lithuania Awakening University of California Press, 1990
6. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, in a radio broadcast, 27 September, 1938 .
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CHAPTER I 
HISTORY
Part I :
"The coloured garment of the world changes, the Weak rise and the 
Strong fall."
Jonas Maironis (1862-1932)^
On March 11, 1990, in the wake of the collapse of Communism
across Eastern Europe, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet declared the 
restitution of Lithuania's independence, which had been 
unwillingly surrendered in 1940. On September 17, 1991, Lithuania 
accepted her seat at the United Nations, the ultimate indication 
of international recognition of an independent state. The years 
that followed were to prove challenging for the Lithuanians as 
they set about reconstructing the infrastructure of their state 
and re-emerging into the international community: a community to 
which access had been denied for fifty years.
Yet Lithuania had not always been merely a diminutive corner 
of the colossal Russian or Soviet Empire and therefore any study 
of the first years of independence in the 1990s must take into 
account Lithuania's lengthy history in order that one may 
understand the origins of so many of the attitudes that were to 
influence Lithuania's development post-1991. In particular, the 
rationale behind the February 16, 1918 Declaration of
Independence needs to be examined. A number of similarities exist 
between the prelude to independence in 1918 and the prelude to 
independence in 1990, especially regarding the attitude of the 
Lithuanian people and their determination to win their liberty. 
On gaining independence in both 1918 and 1990, Lithuanians were 
to face similar hurdles as the process of reconstruction began.
According to the German Quendlinburg yearbooks^, from AD 
1009, Lithuanians were recognised as a distinct ethnic group 
among the Baltic peoples and resided in an area roughly 
conforming to modern Lithuania's borders, lying on the South­
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea in the territory of the Nemunas 
delta and along the Nemunas and Neris rivers.
In the 123 0s and the 1240s, Duke Mindaugas united lands 
occupied by Lithuanians into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 
1251 he adopted Christianity and in 1253 was crowned King, 
although he was murdered in 1261 by Treniota, a member of the 
neighbouring Samogitian tribe. The formation of the Grand Duchy 
was an attempted defence against the Teutonic Knights who, under 
the auspices of spreading Christianity, attempted to conquer 
Lithuania during this period. Despite Lithuanian victories at 
Siauliai in 1236 and Durbe in 1260, the Teutons were to finally 
retreat only after the 1410 Battle of Zalgiris, when a united 
Polish-Lithuanian army under the command of the Lithuanian Grand 
Dukes Jogaila and Vytautas temporarily halted the Germans' Drang 
nach Osten^.
An attempt to force all Lithuanians to adopt Christianity and 
thus end the feeling of isolationism from the Christian states 
of Europe had been made by Grand Duke Gediminas, who reigned from 
1316-1341, but popular belief in Pagan gods (a belief which still 
exists in a very limited form in the 20th Century^) remained too 
strong for this to occur until 1387. The Dynasty founded by Grand 
Duke Gediminas was to survive until 1572 and this period saw an 
unprecedented expansion of Lithuanian territory.
In 1386 Lithuania united with Poland when Jogaila, Grand Duke 
of Lithuania, married the Polish Queen Jadvyga. The reign of his 
successor. Grand Duke Vytautas, from 1392-1430, saw Lithuania 
develop into one of the most powerful states in Europe, with 
territory extending as far as the Black Sea. But this was only 
to last until the Russian State expanded in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries, when the Lithuanians were forced to retreat to within 
the ethnographic boundaries of their homeland.
The Union of Lublin of 156 9 united Poland and Lithuania in an 
official Commonwealth in an attempt to provide a credible defence
against the expanding Russian state. In this Commonwealth, the 
highest elected body was the Seim, composed of the nobility, who 
in turn elected a King, who was also Grand Duke of Lithuania. 
During the 16th Century, Lithuania underwent agricultural reform, 
economic growth and was affected by humanism and the spread of 
the Reformation. But by the end of the 18 th Century, this
Commonwealth had been divided by the far stronger states of
Prussia, Russia and Austria, with most of Lithuania being 
incorporated into the Russian Empire^.
Attempts were made to regain independence in 17 95, 1830-31 and 
1863, but these were suppressed and resulted in the 
implementation of an intensive policy of repression and 
Russification. This policy included the strengthening of a police 
regime, the closing of Vilnius University, which had been founded 
in 1570, in 1832 and the banning of books printed in the 
traditional latin script in 1864. The Lithuanians were, however, 
to benefit from Alexander II's serf emancipation policy of 1861. 
A market economy gradually developed in the state and, with the
growth of an urban population and the spread of literacy, it
contributed to the increasing number of intellectuals who were 
from peasant origins. This in turn led to the rise of a formal 
Lithuanian national movement led at the end of the 19th Century 
by Jonas Basanavicius, commonly referred to as the "Father of the 
Lithuanian People"®. One of the movement's main activities 
during this period of russification was the organisation of the
printing of books and newspapers in Lithuanian, which was
undertaken in the German-governed Lithuania Minor and then
smuggled into Lithuania by Vincas Bielskus, among othersh.
From 1905, following the Revolution in Russia, the nationalist 
movement grew from strength to strength, with demands firstly for 
regional autonomy and then later for independence being publicly 
stated. Lithuanians were particularly receptive to the 
revolutionary literature and propaganda being circulated by 
Russian activists, partly because of the exceptionally high
literacy rate in Lithuania (52 per cent of the Lithuanian
population, as opposed to only 29 per cent of Russians)®. In the 
face of growing nationalist sentiments and fearing a further 
revolution, the Russian authorities stationed in Lithuania 
abandoned their positions and fled the Lithuanian territory, 
allowing the Lithuanians to gain control of local administration 
and schools.
In accordance with this new tide of independence and 
increasing nationalism, a group of Lithuanian intellectuals 
gathered in Vilnius in October 1905 and drafted a memorandum to 
the Russian Minister, Sergei Witte. This demanded far-reaching 
autonomy, equal rights for all aliens within Russia, (an 
innovative method of enlisting support for the Lithuanian cause 
from other non-Russians whose territory had also been 
incorporated into the Russian Empire), recognition of Lithuanian 
as the official language in Lithuania, the construction of 
Lithuanian schools, freedom of worship and the attachment of the 
Suvalki region to the Lithuanian territory. (Previously, it had 
been under Polish administration.) Many of the demands made 
within this memorandum were to be echoed in the late 1980s when 
the Sajüdis movement announced its demands for regional autonomy. 
With its anti-Polish sentiment, this memorandum received a 
surprisingly favourable reception in Russia and was even 
published in the Russian Government journal Pravitelstvennyi 
Vyestnik.
In an attempt to harness the outbreak of patriotic fervour 
which increased following the publication of the Vilnius 
Memorandum and to demonstrate to the St. Petersburg authorities 
that it was not merely a few nationalistic fanatics who had been 
responsible for its drafting, Lithuania's Peasant Union Leader, 
J. Gabrys, together with Dr. Basanavicius, decided to convene the 
First Vilnius Conference, which met on 4 December 1904. The 
Conference attracted 2,000 delegates, representing all sectors 
of Lithuanian society: members were from every class and every 
profession, as every government district and commune had sent at 
least one representative. There were also representatives from
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clubs, societies and from Lithuanians abroad.
The Conference adopted a three-point "Historic Resolution" 
which supported the Revolutionaries in Russia, demanded autonomy 
and advocated the use of Lithuanian as the national language.® 
The cries for autonomy expressed in the Historic Resolution were 
reflective not only of the Lithuanians, but also of other 
nationalities contained within the boundaries of the Russian 
Empire, including Poles, Ukrainians, Georgians, Estonians, Finns, 
Livonians and Tartars. The influence of the 1905 Revolution had 
not been confined merely to the urban centres of Moscow and St 
Petersburg, but was also apparent in the urban areas of the other 
nationalities incorporated into the Empire. It was felt that if 
all the individual nationalities united in their demands for 
regional autonomy, it might be more effective than single 
nationalities petitioning the Czar, especially because of the 
small size of some of the national groups in comparison to the 
size of the indigenous Russian population.
Lithuanian demands were not, in 1905, for complete 
independence. Instead, great emphasis was placed on the 
acquisition of autonomy within Lithuania's distinct ethnographic 
boundaries. This was far more possible than in other areas of the 
Russian Empire because of the homogenous nature of the Lithuanian 
population. Vilnius was declared to be the capital of the 
autonomous province, which was to lead to tensions in 1918 
following the attainment of independence, when Poland, which had 
been granted independence in 1917, subsequently laid claim to and 
managed to gain Vilnius and the surrounding territory. Also 
demanded in the Historic Resolution was universal suffrage, which 
was an advanced idea in comparison to many west European states 
at the time. The Lithuanian leaders also advocated passive 
resistance in the face of Russian reaction to the Historic 
Resolution: a tactic which was to be repeated in the majority of 
Lithuanian demonstrations against Russian and, in later years, 
Soviet regimes.
The emphasis on the third clause of the Resolution on the use 
of Lithuanian as the official language was a direct reaction to 
the period of russification which had dominated the latter half 
of the C19th. The imposition of Russian as the official language 
during that time had been greatly resented by most Lithuanians, 
especially as Russian bears no resemblance to Lithuanian: an
indo-european language whose closest link lies with the ancient 
Sanskrit. This anti-Russian sentiment was also re-asserted in the 
emphasis on Lithuanian culture within the education system, which 
was to be taught by teachers appointed on the basis of merit as 
opposed to being appointed by the State.
The Historic Resolution was an unambiguous demand for autonomy 
and a boost for the development of Lithuanian culture, which 
flourished after 1905. Most importantly, however, the Resolution 
emphasised the unique nature of the Lithuanian population: its 
ethnic homogeneity, which was to resurface in the post-World War 
II years as one of the many reasons for arguing for independence 
from the USSR.
The Russian reaction to the Vilnius Conference, however, was 
not at first as punitive as had been feared. In fact a key 
Czarist official, the Governor of Kaunas, publicly acknowledged 
the justification of the Lithuanian demands, endorsing the need 
for reform. He urged the Lithuanians to make use of the newly- 
convened Duma in St. Petersburg to obtain their requests. In 
Vilnius, the Governor General of Vilnius, Kaunas and Grodno, 
General Freze, granted the use of the mother tongue in schools. 
This spirit of tolerance was not to last, however, and 
simultaneously with the imposition of restrictions on the Ouma 
in Russia, Stolypin, the Czar's Chief Minister, launched a 
renewed assault on the Lithuanians and other non-Russians. But 
by this stage, it was too late: the only effect renewed
repression had on the people of Lithuania was to strengthen their 
resolve to demand independence and to intensify their feeling of 
patriotism towards their motherland of Lithuania and their 
hostility towards the St. Petersburg regime.^
with the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the disastrous 
performance of the highly-over-rated Russian military machine^, 
which suffered a series of unprecedented defeats at the hands of 
the German army, the Lithuanians realised that there was likely 
to be a real possibility of achieving not only autonomy but 
perhaps even independence. Unfortunately Lithuania was to provide 
a battleground for much of the heavy fighting between the 
Russians and the Germans, including the Battle of Tannenberg, and 
by March of 1915 had been occupied by Germany. During the course 
of the War, Lithuania became fully integrated into the German 
economic area and had been completely divorced from her Russian 
master. Under a single administrative unit. Das Land des 
Oberbefehlshabers Ost or Land Oberost as it was commonly referred 
to, the economic, judicial and education systems were completely 
re-organised along German lines, as were communications and the 
health service. An indigenous labour force was conscripted by the 
German occupiers to ensure that the Germans had adequate supplies 
of food, timber and horses.
In charge of the Land Oberost was Major General M. Hoffmann, 
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front. 
The occupation of Lithuania was not instantaneous and it was 
Hoffmann's responsibility to incorporate each territory, as it 
was seized, into the administration of the Land Oberost. The 
incorporation of Lithuania during World War I was seen as being 
the start of a permanent situation. Lithuania had an 
historical relationship with Germany dating back to the Teutonic 
invasion of Lithuania, and in more recent times the port of 
Klaipeda/Memel had been a Hanseatic League Port. In any case, 
Lithuanians traditionally looked West for their culture and 
trade, having no cultural affinity with their dominant Slav 
neighbour, Russia. Many Lithuanians actually perceived the German 
occupation as being infinitely preferable to occupation by Russia 
and hoped that the German occupation was merely a prelude to 
gaining autonomy or independence. Lithuania Minor, the territory 
around Klaipeda, had fallen under the East Prussian 
administration by the end of the 18th Century and it was hoped
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by the inhabitants of Lithuania Major that the two Lithuanias 
might be reunited after the War.
In reality, however, the German occupation was to prove to be 
a real burden on the Lithuanian people. 'For one hundred years
the people will not forget what they had to suffer from the 
Germans!' exclaimed J. Statauskas, in August 1 9 1 7 . The 
activities of the Land Oberost have been described as being an 
'intensely purposeful striving to destroy the local economy as 
quickly as possible... to suppress and terrorise the 
pop ulation.In  an attempt to bleed the country white, the 
Germans felled forests and inaugurated a policy of 
requisitioning, especially for food and horses. The damage done 
to Lithuania proved to be especially severe.
In the course of the occupation, 92,000 out of Lithuania's 
214,000 farms were destroyed; 63,000 hectares of forests were 
also destroyed; 150,000 hectares of land were damaged in some 
form; 42,000 buildings were razed and 90,000 horses, 140,000 head 
of cattle and 767,000 sheep were requisitioned by the German 
occupiers. 1® Heavy industry was also affected by the occupation: 
235 mills in Vilnius, 144 mills in Kaunas and a further 87 mills 
in the Suvalki region were destroyed beyond repair.But the 
Germans were not solely responsible for destroying the Lithuanian 
economy and infrastructure: the Russians were also guilty.
'"Strategical considerations" inspired the Russian commanders 
with the truly brilliant idea of destroying everything they could 
not carry with them in their retreat. . .and evacuating all men of 
military age into the i nte rio r.I n other words, the Russians 
implemented a scorched earth policy, a tactic which was to be 
repeated during their retreat against the advancing Nazi German 
forces during World War II, to the great detriment of Lithuania, 
which once again would be trampled by marauding armies.
The long-term policy of the occupying German Land Oberost, 
however, was to by some means unite all of Lithuania, not just 
the Prussian-governed Lithuania Minor, with Germany. Therefore
the German authorities began to influence Lithuanian nationalist 
movements by encouraging them to support German interests. This 
was mostly done by infiltrating the media, both inside Lithuania 
and abroad, a concept which was repeated in the struggle for 
independence in the late 1980s and 1990s. A further attempt to 
encourage pro-German sentiment was made by the Land Oberost 
administration by fostering anti-Polish beliefs and ideas, which 
were to find receptive audiences given the historic antipathy 
toward the Poles on the part of so many Lithuanians which dated 
back to the 13 86 Union of the two states.
Concurrent with the Lithuanian drive for independence, the 
Poles had also been demanding self-determination, and what was 
to be termed the Polish Question had been brought to the 
forefront of Russian affairs. Shortly after the outbreak of World 
War I, on 14 August 1914 Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaevich, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces had issued an appeal 
which promised to unite the Polish nation "under the sceptre of 
the Russian Emperor" and to create a Poland which enjoyed 
"freedom of religion, language and autonomy". He expressed the 
hope that the Poles would fight in the War on the side of the 
Russians against the Germans with great effectiveness: 'The sword 
which struck down the foe at Grünwald has not r u s t e d . '^ o Despite 
these patriotic words, the Poles, like the Russians, were unable 
to defend themselves against the German army and by November 1916 
Poland was completely occupied by German and Austrian forces.
A Russian-Polish Commission was established to debate the 
process by which Poland could be given autonomy, but any effects 
of this were pre-empted by the announcement made on behalf of the 
Austrian and German Emperors on 5 November 1916, proclaiming the 
creation of an hereditary and constitutional Kingdom of Poland. 
This manifesto had far-reaching repercussions, even though it was 
merely a statement of intent, as opposed to an official Act 
establishing the new state. It attracted immediate enthusiasm 
from many Poles, who were inspired by the suggestions of the 
rebirth of an officially recognised state, although this
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enthusiasm was to wane within a few days of the proclamation as
the belief that the Austrians and Germans wanted the Poles purely
for cannon-fodder against the Russians began to circulate.
In response to the Austro-German manifesto, Stürmer retaliated 
on behalf of the Czar by declaring that an autonomous Poland 
located within ethnographic borders would be free and remain in 
indivisible union with Russia, which was perceived by some Poles 
as being preferable to being a German pawn. This sentiment was 
echoed in Czar Nicholas II's Christmas Day Speech of 1916, in 
which he announced that Russian war aims included 'the creation 
of a free Poland composed of all three now-divided p a r t s . H e  
envisaged a Poland with her own Parliament, Government and Army. 
This official position, though not echoed in private at the 
Imperial Court in St. Petersburg, was supported by President
Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America on 22 January
1917, when he announced to the Senate in Washington D.C. the 
'Statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, 
independent and autonomous Poland.
Following the February Revolution of 1917 and the overthrow 
of Czar Nicholas, Poland was to receive further statements of 
intent regarding future autonomy and independence from the newly- 
installed Provisional Government. On 28 March 1917, the Petrograd 
Soviet 'recognised the right of the Poles to national self- 
determination and to complete independence in international 
affairs.This was echoed by the Provisional Government on 30 
March in a statement by Prince Lvov: 'Poles! The Old Political
System in Russia, source of our common bondage and our disunity, 
is now overthrown for ever. Free Russia. . .hastens to send you her 
fraternal greeting, she calls you to new life, to freedom...the 
Russian nation, having won its freedom, concedes to its brother 
Polish nation the full right to determine its own life as it 
wishes...the Provisional Government will assist in the forming 
of an Independent Polish State, composed of all territories where 
the Poles are in a majority as a pledge of enduring peace in a 
newly organised E u r o p e . T h e  importance of Lvov's declaration
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lay in the fact that not only was it a recognition of the full 
sovereignty of Poland, but that it renounced all Russian claims 
to territories which were historically Polish. Lvov's declaration 
received the approval of the French, Italian and British 
Governments.
But before its overthrow, the Czarist Government was unwilling 
to grant Lithuania similar concessions as had been awarded to 
Poland. Although the Government had allocated financial reserves 
for the support of the 300,000 Lithuanian refugees who had fled 
to Russia, no official declaration regarding the political future 
of Lithuania was issued. Therefore the German authorities staged 
an elaborate charade to convince the Russians to grant Lithuania 
autonomy. In 1916 the Director of the Land Oberost staged 
negotiations with Lithuanian politicians regarding the 
establishment of an independent Lithuanian state and requested 
a delegation of Lithuanians from abroad to attend these 
discussions. In December 1916, one such representative, fron the 
Swiss Lithuanian Centre, Rev. Antanas Steponaitis, arrived in 
Lithuania to take part in these discussions, but as soon as he 
reached Lithuania he realised that they were merely a 
"comedy".^® The Russians also realised the farcical nature of 
these talks and the Lithuanian Question remained unresolved as 
the Russian Government made clear that an independent Lithuania 
was not in Russian interests. In 1917, when debating the Polish 
Question, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, N.N. 
Pokrovskii, advocated hindering the growth 'of the political 
consciousness of the Lithuanians'^® as the only method of 
resolving the situation. But the February Revolution, which was 
to overthrow the Monarchy and install a Provisional Government 
in its place, rekindled the hopes of the Lithuanians and the 
Germans.
The Lithuanians hoped that in accordance with the principles 
of liberty, equality and fraternity espoused by the French 
Revolutionaries in 1789, which appeared to be being echoed by 
revolutionaries in Petrograd, Lithuania would be released from
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the now-extinct Imperial Empire^ "^ . The Germans hoped that with 
the apparent success of the Revolution, the Russians would 
withdraw from the War and renounce their interests in the Baltic 
as part of their surrender. No party involved in the debate on 
the resolution of the Lithuanian Question, however, was prepared
to immediately renounce its position and in the months that
followed the February Revolution, there appeared to be no 
imminent solution to the issue.
By the Summer of 1917 it appeared as if the question of 
Lithuanian independence was seriously in jeopardy because of
increasing hostility to the issue on the part of the Russian
Provisional Government. It had refused to allow the matter to be 
brought before an inter-allied conference held in Paris in July. 
According to the new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M.I. 
Tereshchenko, 'The Lithuanian Question is entirely a Russian 
Q u e s t i o n . when news of this refusal reached Lithuania, a 
widespread nationalist guerilla movement erupted, with 
"Lithuanian Freedom Fighters" combatting both Russian and German 
troops. Their successors in the 1940s, the "Forest Brothers", 
were to wage a lengthy and vigorous campaign against occupying 
Soviet forces following the end of World War II.
In the struggle to achieve autonomy and independence, however, 
it was not just the activities of the Lithuanians inside 
Lithuania that should be considered. The role of the Lithuanians 
abroad should not be u n d erestimated.^ Lithuanians had begun 
emigrating during the period of russification in the C19th, 
mostly to the United States of America. The closing of Vilnius 
University by the Russians in 1831 had led to many Lithuanians 
pursuing their studies in Western Europe, in particular in France 
and Switzerland. But it was the Lithuanians in the USA who were 
the most numerous, with over 800,000 residing there in 1914, and 
it was these emigres who were traditionally the most active in 
championing any cause related to their homeland. A conference 
convened in Chicago, the centre of the Lithuanian community in 
the USA, between 21-23 October 1914, had declared itself to be
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in favour of an independent Lithuanian state, a state which 
should incorporate Lithuania Major and Minor as well as the 
Suvalki region.
By 1916, the well-organised Lithuanian community in the USA 
had become a serious political factor in the US Presidential 
campaign. The Lithuanians had formed a number of influential 
organisations, such as the Union of Lithuanian Workers, with a 
125,000-strong membership and the Union of Lithuanian Catholics, 
which numbered 100,000 members. These organisations were able to 
lobby effectively in Washington D.C., their success illustrated 
by President Wilson's decision to proclaim 1 November 1916 a day 
for collecting donations for the benefit of Lithuania throughout 
the USA.
In May 1916, two members of the American-Lithuanian Council, 
Juozas Bielskis and Rev. Vincas Bartuska, visited Lithuania with 
the purpose of establishing an official link between the states 
of Western Europe, the USA and Lithuania. Although the visit was 
not to prove fruitful, the American Lithuanians were undeterred 
by this and continued to campaign vociferously for independence. 
Their actions inspired many of the European Lithuanians, who held 
a series of conferences throughout Europe to promote this cause.
The First Berne Conference on 3-4 August 1915 drafted a 
resolution emphasising the intellectual superiority of the 
Lithuanians over so many of the other subjects of the Russian 
Empire and providing a reminder of the great history of the 
Lithuanian state and its mastery in Eastern Europe in the late 
middle ages. Publication of this Resolution in Lithuania led to 
demands for independence being made to the Russian Duma by the 
Lithuanian Deputy Januskevicius, who pleaded for the Russian 
authorities to 'come to the aid of our unhappy country and give 
us the assurance that our just demand for national autonomy will
be fulfilled.'32
The Lausanne and Hague Conferences of February and the Second
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Berne Conference of 1-5 March 1916 concentrated on reaffirming 
Lithuania's commitment to independence in a state created in 
reflection of Lithuania's ethnographic boundaries. At these 
conferences, however, the issue of an independent Poland as a 
significant security threat to Lithuania surfaced, because of the 
belief that the Poles considered Lithuania to be little more than 
a Polish province. This concern was to be justified when the 
Poles seized Vilnius and the surrounding territory in 1 9 2 2 .
The Hague Conference of 25-30 April 1916 focused on the havoc 
wreaked on Lithuania by the Russian occupation over the 
centuries, ranging from the suppression of the Lithuanian 
national identity and culture and religious persecution to the 
destruction of Lithuania's economic footing due to the spoils of 
war. The treatment of Lithuania during the first two years of the 
war was highlighted: hundreds of thousands of Lithuanian men had 
been conscripted into the Russian army, but despite this the 
Russians had not spared the Lithuanians during the evacuation. 
It was alleged that Russian troops were responsible for the 
massacre of many Lithuanian people and of deporting conscription 
evaders. But the ultimate grievance against the Russians and a 
key motive for demanding independence was the fact that the 
Russians had granted the Poles (whose claim for independence was 
no stronger than that of the Lithuanians') political autonomy, 
while not making good her promises to Lithuania.
After the Hague Conference, the Lithuanian independence 
seekers, both in Lithuania and abroad, became divided (as they 
were to become again in the late 1980s) over the course that the 
drive for independence should follow. A small group of activists 
decided to settle for an autonomous region under a Russian 
protectorate, but the far larger and ultimately successful 
faction remained committed to achieving total and unequivocal 
independence. In Lausanne, a High National Council was created 
to represent Lithuania's people in all matters concerning their 
country.
15
The Lithuanians resident in Russia were also inspired by the 
activities of their counterparts in Europe and the USA. The focus 
for Lithuanians in Russia was in St. Petersburg, centred around 
Martynas Yeas, a Lithuanian Deputy in the Duma and Rev. 
Laukaitis, who both headed the St. Petersburg branch of the 
Lithuanian Relief Association for War Victims. Early in 1917 Yeas 
established a Lithuanian National Council to petition the Duma 
for autonomy and, later, independence. This Council, however, was 
also to become divided over the question of demanding outright 
independence or settling for a Russian protectorate, but when it 
was suppressed following the Bolshevik October Revolution, the 
radical faction, demanding outright independence, covertly re­
established itself in Voronezh. It continued to demand the union 
of Lithuania Major and Minor and the evacuation of the German 
occupying forces.
Fuelled by the enthusiasm of the Lithuanians abroad, those in 
Lithuania also increased their activities during the course of 
1917. A group of five influential Lithuanians, A. Smetona, Dr. 
J. Saulys, Rev. Stankevicius, S. Kairys and P. Klimas, 
established a Committee, which drafted and submitted two 
memoranda to the Land Oberost and participated in the joint 
appeal of the League of Subject Nations of Russia to President 
Wilson. They also represented Lithuania at the League's 
conference, which was held in L ausanne.^
In an attempt to reduce the guerilla attacks on the German 
occupying forces which had increased in Lithuania during the 
course of the German occupation, both as a result of this 
occupation and in an attempt to thwart any Polish plans for 
annexation, the Land Oberost proposed the formation of a 
"Trustworthy Council" made up of leading Lithuanians to work in 
conjunction with the Land Oberost. This was rejected by 
Basanavicius and Smetona on the grounds that the Lithuanians 
desired 'a representative body elected by the people to voice the 
interests of the S t a t e as opposed to a puppet council. After 
lengthy negotiations, the Germans consented to the Lithuanians
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holding a conference, but refused to permit public elections to 
be held to appoint its delegates.
An Organising Committee was therefore created, composed of the 
Vilnius Group and 17 popular local dignitaries. This Committee 
was tasked with preparing the agenda for the Second Vilnius 
Conference and in selecting the method of providing delegates for 
the Conference, given that elections had been prohibited by the 
ruling German administration, the Organising Committee decided 
to allow between three and five persons from each district in 
Lithuania 'on the strict understanding that all classes and 
parties should be represented
The Second Vilnius Conference met in closed session without 
the presence of any representative of the German Government 
between 18-22 September 1917. Its 214 delegates passed a 
Resolution of Independence and the Organising Committee elected 
delegates to create a Taryba (Council). The Resolution emphasised 
Lithuania's natural interests as 'being in the direction of the 
West, rather than in the East or South' . The Declaration 
recognised the Lithuanian State as conforming to Lithuania's 
ethnographic boundaries, but stressed tolerance of ethnic 
minorities. It also called for the creation of a Constituent 
Assembly, 'elected in conformity with democratic principles by 
all the inhabitants of Lithuania.' The possibility of Lithuania 
entering into an economic relationship with Germany was also 
hinted at and it was this compromise which the German 
administration was, reluctantly, forced to accept.^
Kaiser Wilhelm II and his Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg were 
unwilling to abandon Lithuania, although pro-Lithuania activists 
in the Reichstag, such as Matthias Erzberger, were promoting 
withdrawal from Lithuania. On 11 December 1917, the Reichstag was 
informed that the German Government was preparing to recognise 
Lithuania's sovereignty and on the same day, the Taryba^ meeting 
in Vilnius, proclaimed the restoration of the Independent State 
of Lithuania, with its Capital City of Vilnius. A further, and
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perhaps more official Declaration of Independence was signed on 
16 February 1918, although independent Lithuania was only 
formally recognised by Germany on 23 March
The Paris Peace Conference, which convened in 1919, proved at 
first to be less encouraging for the acquisition of further 
international recognition of Lithuania's independence. Although 
a Lithuanian delegation headed by Voldemaras was present at 
Versailles, it was not admitted into the Paris Peace Conference 
itself. The clause of the Treaty of Versailles which was directly 
relevant to Lithuania: the ceding of the Klaipeda/Memel Territory 
by Germany, failed to provide immediate benefit to the 
Lithuanians as the territory was transferred to the control of 
a French-led Allied Commission and not to the Lithuanians 
directly, because 'the status of the Lithuanian territory has not 
yet been d e t e r m i n e d . A further clause of the Treaty 
designated the Nemunas/Memel River as an international waterway. 
This was to provide problems in the future as relations between 
Lithuania and Poland deteriorated.^
Nonetheless, the Paris Peace Conference was to prove 
reasonably fruitful for the Lithuanians. The Treaty of Versailles 
and the other minority treaties embodied the spirit of National 
self-determination and granted Lithuania grounds for demanding 
international acceptance of her sovereignty on this basis. On 23 
May, 1919 the Council of Foreign Ministers asked for a German 
military withdrawal from Lithuania as soon as the Lithuanians 
could be seen to provide suitable r e p l a c e m e n t s ^ ^  and the 
Lithuanian delegation at the Conference seized this chance to 
lobby vigorously for international recognition.
Permission to commence the process of preparing for 
independence had only been granted by the Germans, however, on 
condition that when independence was attained, Lithuania would 
establish a monarchical form of government, with Urach, Prince 
of Württemberg as the elected Monarch. Although he was 
formally elected on 4 June 1918, this decree was repealed by the
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Taryba on 2 November. (Lithuanians favoured republicanism and 
were opposed to the idea of a monarchy because it was reminiscent 
of their union with the Poles in the Middle Ages. At the same 
time, the Basic Law of the Provisional Constitution of the 
Lithuanian State was passed, which was responsible for creating 
the highest state organisations: the State Council (the
Legislature) and the Presidium of the State Council (the 
Executive). These two bodies were to head the Provisional 
Government whose main task was to pass laws for elections to the 
Seimas.^G On 11 November, the first Government was formed under 
Professor Augustinas Voldemaras. On 4 April 1919, Smetona was 
elected the first State President by the members of the State 
Council.
The years immediately following independence were 
characterised by frequent changes of personnel in the senior 
ministerial appointments and by loose-knit coalition governments. 
Nonetheless a great deal of legislation was passed during these 
years affecting all aspects of Lithuania's development as an 
independent state. Legislation was passed on citizenship, local 
administration, the legal system, the introduction of Lithuania's 
currency and land reform, as well as on the re-establishment of 
Vilnius University.48 The civil servants responsible for 
drafting this new legislation were poorly paid, yet the mood of 
exhilaration prevailing throughout Lithuania as a result of 
achieving independence, meant that they were prepared to suffer. 
According to Yeas, by this time Finance Minister, 'They 
experienced great patriotism, suffered patiently and performed 
their deputies with great sacrifice and conscientiousness 
...working not so much for the money as from a sense of duty to 
their nation.
On 14-15 April 1920, elections to the heralded Constituent 
Assembly were held. Of the 112 deputies, the Christian Democrats 
received an absolute majority, taking 59 seats. The next largest 
group was the Peasant Union and Socialist Populist Bloc, with 28 
seats. The composition of the Constituent Assembly reflected the
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political climate of Lithuania. The Christian Democrats were 
strongly supported by the Clergy and were to remain in power for 
several years. The Peasant Union and Socialist Bloc was never 
socialist in the strictest sense of the word: they were left-of- 
centre liberals. Echoed by Sajüdis, over 70 years later, the 
party of the two figureheads of Lithuania during its first year 
of independence, the National Progress Party of Voldemaras and 
Smetona, performed disastrously and did not return a single 
deputy to the Assembly.
Two years later, on 10-11 October 1922, elections to the 
Seimas were finally held. The Christian Democrats again received 
the most votes, but failed to win a clear majority. Aleksandras 
Stulginskis was elected President of Lithuania. The first Seimas 
concentrated on reforming Lithuania's infrastructure, which had 
been devastated following the six years of war and conflict. Land 
reform continued, which was to have a great impact on the 
development of Lithuania's economy. But despite passing of 
successful reforms, the Christian Democrats were unable to govern 
effectively and further elections were held in May 1926, which 
produced a government composed of a left-wing alliance between 
the Social Democrats and the Peasant Unionists with Dr. Kazys 
Grinius as President.^ This coalition, however, was unable to 
attract sufficient other parties to form a majority and therefore 
also failed to govern effectively.
On the night of 17 December 1926, a band of officers seized 
key government buildings in a bloodless coup d'etat, handing 
power back to Smetona and Voldemaras. The coup marked a 
significant development in Lithuania's h i s t o r y . a  new era 
began, with the birth of an authoritarian regime. By doing so, 
Lithuania emulated Poland, a state which also failed to remain 
a true democracy during the inter-war period.^ The Seimas was 
dissolved on 12 April 1927, but no further elections were held. 
Opposition was gradually restricted as Smetona increased his 
control over Lithuania. He was to remain in power until the 
outbreak of World War II.
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Although a key figure in Lithuania's struggle for 
Independence, Smetona had been a committed Marxist as a young law 
student. He did not implement this philosophy because he 
believed, rightly so, that Lithuania was ill-suited for Marxism, 
as the preconditions for a Marxist society (including 
industrialisation and the presence of a proletariat) were not 
present. Smetona identified his contribution to the struggle for 
Lithuania's independence as being in the spirit of liberalism and 
admitted to being influenced by the ideas of Plato, whose works 
he had translated into L i t h u a n i a n . focused on the
philosophies of nationalism, believing wholeheartedly that his
vocation was to be Tautos Vadas (Leader of the People) and that
Lithuanians were advised to trust in the wisdom of his
authoritarian leadership.George von Rauch highlights his 
demand for 'frequent celebrations to glorify Lithuania's past and 
revive the spirit of the great medieval period.'^ Like his 
Latvian and Estonian counterparts, Karlis Ulmanis and Konstantin 
Pats, Smetona reorganised his Nationalist Party, according to 
John Hiden and Patrick Salmon, 'along Nazi lines' . Unlike 
Hitler, however, all three leaders offered a benign form of 
dictatorship, more comparable to that of Salazar in Portugal than 
to that of Hitler h i m s e l f .
During the inter-war years, Lithuania's economy was to perform 
much better than many other European economies. The first few 
years, however, were to prove difficult because of the 
devastation caused by the War. There were two major issues 
needing immediate attention: the question of land reform and the 
introduction of an independent currency.
The land reform issue was particularly pressing because 
Lithuania was a predominantly agricultural state. Until
independence, much of the land had been owned by a few Lithuanian
or Polish nobles. The Land Question had complex social and
political aspects. Although 76 per cent of the Lithuanian
population worked in agriculture, the productivity rates were low 
and agricultural methods primitive.^ Coupled with demands for
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independence was the desire to transfer Lithuania's land to the 
villagers and small-holders. During the attempted Bolshevik 
invasion immediately following independence, some estates were 
seized as Russian forces attempted to implement their own method 
of land reform.
During the first years of independence, a number of decrees 
were passed by the Lithuanian Provisional Government, which 
offered land to those soldiers and their families who had fought 
to procure and then defend Lithuania's independence. The 
Constituent Assembly promulgated the introductory Land Reform Law 
on 4 August 1920. According to this law, forests and timber 
stands of over 67 acres were nationalised, as were swamps, peat 
bogs, rivers, lakes and natural resources. Estates granted to 
Nobles as the personal gift of Russian Czars and all property of 
the former Russian state were nationalised without any 
compensation, as were estates which had been given to absentee 
landlords by the Russian government. On 15 February 1922 the 
Constituent Assembly passed the Land Reform Law, which was to lay 
the legal foundations for all subsequent land reform measures. 
In the inter-war years, Lithuania's farms were to flourish.
Lithuania's currency, the Litas, was introduced on 1 October 
1922. It was valued at US$l:LtlO, but after the devaluation of 
the US$ in 1934 this changed to US$1:Lt6. With tight control by 
the Bank of Lithuania, the Litas kept its value until the Soviet 
occupation and was one of the most stable currencies in the 
inter-war years; years which were characterised by world-wide 
depression.
With the healing of Lithuania's war wounds and the success of 
land reform, Lithuania's export markets flourished, More than 
able to supply themselves, Lithuanians exported their produce to 
western Europe, in particular Germany, which in the 1920s was 
still ravaged by shortages.^ Bacon was one of Lithuania's chief 
exports: by 1936 she could produce 1,000,000 cwts of bacon per 
a n n u m .  Lithuania's chief markets for bacon were Great Britain
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and Germany. On 4 August 1936, Germany signed a trade agreement 
with Lithuania, under which Germany agreed to take pigs to the 
value of Rmks 3,360,000.^4 p^iry products and timber were also 
valuable exports from Lithuania during the inter-war period.®^ 
By 1935 Great Britain took 45 per cent of Lithuania's total 
exports and supplied 37 per cent of Lithuania's imports.By 
1939 Lithuania's economy may be estimated as being on a par with 
Denmark®"^  and it was Denmark who would usurp Lithuania's export 
role following the Soviet invasion of Lithuania and her 
subsequent forced detachment from Western Europe.
On achieving international recognition on 20 December 1922, 
Lithuania concentrated on establishing diplomatic relations with 
those states considered to be important in ensuring Lithuania's 
security and beneficial for trade. Lithuania, along with Latvia 
and Estonia, entered the League of Nations on 22 September 1921. 
Lithuania's membership was productive and active: not only did 
she devote herself to supporting minority causes, she used the 
international arbitration of the League in attempting to resolve 
the Vilnius dispute with Poland.®®
Legations were established in the USA, Great Britain, France, 
Japan, Italy, the USSR and Germany as well as in other smaller 
states, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed the 
American, British and French postings to be the most important 
and prestigious.^ There were close links, including the signing 
of a formal Entente with the other two Baltic states of Latvia 
and Estonia, which had ben created following the Russian 
surrender to Germany at Brest-Litovsk in 1918 and by the 
development of a post-Versailles Eastern Europe, but these links 
should by no means be exaggerated. The concept of the Baltic 
States as a unified group is a western perception: Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania were and still are dissimilar states united 
by geography rather than by a common cultural heritage. Estonia 
was and is still often perceived as "Finland Minor" by the rest 
of the world, while Latvia emerged out of the old Russian 
province of Livonia, Only Lithuania could trace back her history
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as a specific entity over 1,000 years.
Lithuania was a great supporter of international events. 
Lithuanian teams began competing in the Olympic Games in 1924, 
and, as the power of flight improved in the inter-war years, 
Lithuanian pilots joined their European and American counterparts 
in pioneering transatlantic ventures. Saulius and G-fr'^ '/7^ s were 
one of the first teams to successfully fly across the Atlantic 
in 1928, but unfortunately crashed and were killed in Germany.
During the inter-war years there were three areas of foreign 
policy which were to be of serious concern to the Lithuanian 
Government; Lithuania's relations with Russia, Poland and 
Germany. "%he Russian problem, in the inter-war years, was the 
most easily resolved. On 5 January 1919 Soviet troops entered 
Vilnius. Fortunately the Lithuanian governmental administration 
had been moved to Kaunas, where it was to remain, days before. 
The Soviet forces remained on Lithuanian territory, advancing 
towards the Baltic Sea and seizing several key towns such as 
Siauliai, but Kaunas was never taken and, with German assistance, 
the Soviets were forced out of Lithuania by October 1919.
On 12 July 1920 a Peace Treaty was signed between Lithuania 
and the USSR. The first article of the Treaty was the most 
significant for it reaffirmed Lithuania's independence from 
Russia: 'Basing itself upon the declaration of the USSR's
Assembly that each nation has the right of self-determination, 
and becoming entirely independent from the state which it is now 
part of, without any reservations Russia recognises Lithuania's 
independence and self-government with all its due jurisdictional 
rights, and with good will renounces for all times, all rights 
of Russian sovereignty which she had over the Lithuanian nation 
and its territories.in 1926 this Treaty was supplemented 
with the signing of a non-aggress ion pact on 22 December. 
Lithuanian-Soviet relations were to remain cordial until the 
outbreak of World War II.
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Relations with Poland, however, were not to prove as 
harmonious. Even before independence had been declared, the Poles 
had made no secret of the fact that they wished to claim parts, 
if not all of Lithuania's territory. Intervention by the League 
of Nations failed to halt skirmishes between Lithuanian and 
Polish forces and in 1922 diplomatic relations as well as 
communications links were fractured and not restored until 1939. 
On 9 October 1922, the Polish Army, commanded by General 
Zeligowski, seized Vilnius and its surrounding territory. This 
was a great blow to many Lithuanians as Vilnius had always been 
considered to be Lithuania's capital and the seat of power of 
Lithuania's great dynastic leaders. 'Ei, pasauli; mes be Vilniaus 
nenurimsim!' (Hark World; we will not rest without Vilnius!) 
wrote Petras Vaiciunas, a contemporary poet, on hearing the news 
of Vilnius' seizure.^ Relations with Poland remained frozen 
until the atrocities inflicted on both Poland and Lithuania 
during the course of World War II bound the two states together 
against a common foe. Following the restoration of independence 
in 1990, however, the age-old differences and conflicts began to 
re-emerge.
Relations with Germany were far more complex in the inter-war 
period. Whilst Lithuania depended heavily on Germany as an export 
market for Lithuanian produce, there was a major territorial 
dispute which jeopardised the relationship between the two 
states. This was over the port and hinterland of Klaipeda, known 
to the Germans as the Hanseatic port of Memel/?® This territory, 
referred to as Lithuania Minor, had been incorporated with 
Konigsberg into East Prussia, with Klaipeda itself under French 
jurisdiction, as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, which had 
divided Germany to grant Poland access to the Baltic Sea. On 24 
March 1919 the Lithuanian Government made a formal demand for the 
union of Klaipeda with the rest of Lithuania, basing the demand 
on the oft-quoted principle of national self-determination. On 
11 November 1921, with no resolution having been reached to the 
problem, the Constituent Assembly of Lithuania demanded 
Klaipeda's union with Lithuania.
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On 9 January 1923 Lithuanian rebels seized towns and villages 
in the south of the Klaipeda district without encountering any 
resistance and by 15 January had taken the port itself. Notes of 
protest from German and French authorities were presented to the 
Lithuanian Ambassadors' Conference held in February in an attempt 
to resolve the dispute and on 16 February the Conference decided 
to formally turn the district over to Lithuania. 'Klaipeda and 
the regions adjoining it were more closely linked to Lithuania - 
both ethnically and economically - than they were to Germany.'^ 
Klaipeda was to remain under Lithuanian control until 1939, when 
Hitler occupied the district, claiming that the population was 
being discriminated against and desired to be "reunited" with the 
Reich.^ The Lithuanian Government had been presented with an 
ultimatum on 19 March 1939 forcing it to return the region or 
face an invasion and occupation of all of Lithuania.The 
Government had no choice but to relinquish the territory in the 
vain hope that this concession would curtail Hitler's ambitious 
plans for eastward expansion in the guise of Lebensraum. In the 
inter-war years, Lithuania had 'found...a niche in the European 
security system established at Versailles,'^ but when this 
system was annulled by Hitler's actions, Lithuania and the other 
Baltic States were left defenceless.
Part II :
"Lithuania has not lost her independence. Lithuania's 
independence has only temporarily been put aside."
Franklin D. Roosevelt. 15 October 1940.®°
Membership of the League of Nations was to prove insufficient 
in protecting Lithuania from the territorial ambitions of both 
Hitler and Stalin. Hitler wanted Lebensraum, while Stalin wanted 
to expand the borders of Soviet Russia and/or to create a buffer 
zone against the advancing Nazi onslaught. The Secret Protocols 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed on 23 August 193 9, 
originally put Lithuania, unknowingly, in Hitler's sphere of 
influence. An additional protocol signed a month later, however, 
moved Lithuania into the Russian zone. ®^ A Communist-enforced
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declaration of the Seimas declared that the Lithuanian people 
desired to join the USSR and in June 1940 Soviet officials and 
troops moved in. President Smetona fled to Germany and later 
to the USA, where he was to die inafire on 9 January 1944.
Justas Paleckis, a Communist sympathiser, assumed the power 
of Prime Minster and in August 1940, the man who was to remain 
First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) until 
1974, Antanas Snieckus, assumed power. He was to prove to be such 
a hard-line Stalinist that although First Secretaries in the 
Soviet Republics' Communist Parties were traditionally Russian 
in the post-war years, Moscow felt this to be unnecessary in 
Lithuania because of the enthusiasm for orthodox Communism 
demonstrated by Snieckus.®3
The immediate result of the Soviet occupation was the 
deportation to Siberia of those Lithuanians considered to be 
bourgeois, imperialist, fascist, or indeed anything that could 
possibly be interpreted as being anti-Soviet. Included in the 
deportations were women and children. Those Lithuanians able to 
do so, fled the country.
Operation Barbarossa, however, the Nazi invasion of the USSR 
launched on 17 June, 1941, was to halt the deportations 
temporarily. The Nazi occupation of Lithuania was to be as brutal 
as any occupation in Eastern Europe for the Jewish population of 
Lithuania: atrocities committed during 1942-1944 were as horrific 
as any of the more notorious reports of the Holocaust.®® But 
with the German retreat in full swing by 1944, Soviet forces re­
occupied Lithuania and the deportations continued, this time with 
all those who had in any way co-operated with the Nazis also 
targets for deportation. The sentences were not only for salt 
mines or labour camps : merely surviving in Siberia for periods 
of up to 3 5 years was to prove hard enough. With one third of the 
entire population of Lithuania deported, there is not one family 
in Lithuania that has been unaffected by the deportations of the 
1940s. The German retreat also witnessed the last period of mass
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emigration, as many people, knowing that they were targets for 
deportation or arrest, also desperately fled the country.®®
Resistance to the Soviet occupation continued on a partisan 
basis until 1953 with the Forest Brothers in particular being 
extremely active.®^ On the surface it appeared as if the 
Lithuanians had been subdued by their Soviet occupiers, but the 
Lithuanian national identity continued to be maintained. 
Lithuanian was spoken at home, despite the imposition of Russian 
as the official language, and Lithuanians continued to attach 
great importance to symbols such as their national flag: yellow 
(representing the sun) , green (for Lithuania's land) and red (for 
the blood of Lithuania's patriots through the ages). Lithuanian 
national costumes remained at home and amber jewellery, 
traditionally Lithuanian, was worn by most women.®®
Religion continued to be observed at home, although it was 
severely condemned by the Communist authorities, with the closure 
of all but one of Lithuania's seminaries and widespread 
persecution of clerics. Many churches, including Vilnius' 
cathedral, were either turned into museums or galleries or were 
closed and allowed to fall into a state of disrepair. The 
authorities, however, were unable to suppress many Lithuanians' 
religious fervour. Numerous samizdat publications continued to 
appear, advocating the maintenance of the catholic faith. Some 
were published in the USA and smuggled into Lithuania at great 
risk to those who did so. These included the Chronicle of the 
Catholic Church in Lithuania, published by the Lithuanian Roman 
Catholic Priests' League of America, which not only continued to 
uphold Catholicism, but was a source of news about those 
incarcerated in Soviet jails or camps for their religious 
beliefs.®® Archbishop Steponavicius was Lithuania's only 
remaining Archbishop throughout the Soviet occupation and he was 
exiled to a remote part of Lithuania for 20 years.®® Despite 
such persecution, Catholicism in Lithuania received a significant 
morale boost in 1978 when Pope John Paul II, a Pole with a 
Lithuanian mother, assumed power. He sent active and frequent
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messages of support to Lithuania's Catholics but was constantly- 
prevented from visiting Lithuania by the Soviet authorities.^
There were also periodic explosions of nationalism, such as 
in 1972 when a young student by the name of Romas Kalanta 
committed an act of self-immolation on the main street of 
K a u n a s .  ®2 Nonetheless, there was always a strong Communist 
presence in Lithuania and any of these public nationalist 
outbursts were quickly suppressed. After Snieckus' death in 1974, 
he was replaced by another ardent Communist, Petras Griskevicius, 
who lived until 1987. He made no concessions to the unspoken 
demands of Lithuanians for restoration not only of their 
independence, but also their history and cultural heritage, which 
had been erased and replaced by Soviet propaganda.®®
During the course of the Soviet occupation, the exiled 
Lithuanian communities worldwide, particularly in the USA, Canada 
and Australia, the traditional refuges for emigre peoples, never 
gave up hope that they would be able to return to Lithuania: many 
of the ex-Government officials residing in the UK and the USA 
would hold fantasy cabinet meetings allocating each other 
ministerial portfolios for their eventual return, convinced that 
the Lithuanians would want the restoration of what was left of 
their inter-war Government.®* There were constant public demands 
by emigres and exiles for the restitution of Lithuanian 
independence, including at the 1964 World's Fair in New York 
City.
It was not until 1987, with increasing tolerance being shown 
to foreigners under the new regime of Mikhail Gorbachev, that 
many Lithuanian exiles and emigres thought it would be safe to 
return, if only for a visit, even though they were accompanied 
by KGB agents posing as tour guides and had to conform to a rigid 
Intourist itinerary,®® No one on these trips dreamed that 
independence would be a reality within four years.
In Lithuania at this time, academics were debating ways of
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achieving economic autonomy, a far more plausible goal than
independence. It was felt that the Soviet Occupation and the 
ensuing policies of centralisation and collectivisation were 
directly responsible for the collapse of Lithuania's economy.^ 
Many believed that if Lithuania were not forced to export the
majority of its produce to supply the rest of the USSR,
Lithuanians would be able to supply themselves more than
adequately and thus avoid the shortages that were characteristic 
of the Soviet regime .
While the leader of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL), 
Rindaugas Songaila, who had succeeded Griskevicius in 1987, was 
in power, there was little realistic chance of this happening. 
Songaila, too, was a zealous supporter of the Soviet regime. 
Until 1988 the equally unpopular Aleksei Mitkin held the post of 
Second Secretary. He had not been born in Lithuania and had no 
familial ties with the Republic. It required the presence of a 
far less authoritarian leader for there to be a realistic chance 
of economic autonomy.
This leader was to come in October 1988 when Songaila was 
replaced by Algirdas Brazauskas. Although Brazauskas himself had 
grown up with and advanced through the Communist Party hierarchy 
to its highest echelons, he comes from a very large, intensely 
nationalistic family and despite conforming to Soviet ideals, he 
always remained a Lithuanian nationalist at heart.®®
Also allowing Lithuanian grievances to be openly aired was the 
new political climate in the USSR. This was the direct result of 
the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, which was to 
have far-reaching consequences for Lithuania. Gorbachev unleashed 
a reform programme that was to (although not intentionally) bring 
about the collapse of the USSR and the restitution of Lithuania's 
independence. The reforms carried out under the ethos of Glasnost 
and Perestroika were designed primarily to restructure the 
economy in a new era of openness after the repressive regimes of
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former Soviet leaders. ^°°
Gorbachev's reforms had active support in Lithuania. Many 
Lithuanians by 1988, when Perestroika and Glasnost really began 
to take hold, did not believe that total independence would be 
possible, yet the reforms were welcomed in the belief that they 
offered the best chance for gaining regional autonomy, the best 
alternative to independence. As in many western states, such as 
the UK or the then West Germany, Gorbachev enjoyed great 
popularity among the Lithuanian people, some of whom, being 
deeply religious, offered daily prayers for his health and 
safety. 3°^ There was constant trepidation that an assassin's 
bullet could terminate the reform programmes, given the continued 
existence of authoritarian "old guard" opponents to Gorbachev's 
liberal policies.
At first, however, it looked as if the Lithuanians would not 
benefit as much as had been hoped from Gorbachev's policies, for 
they suffered two major setbacks during the course of 1987-1988. 
The first was during a debate on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the 
clauses of which were a long-standing Lithuanian grievance. When 
it came up for discussion in the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev 
insisted that the past had to remain in the past and that it was 
more important to look to the future and at new directions for 
the development of the USSR.®®®
The second setback was related to the drafting of a bill which 
would give economic sovereignty to the Baltic States. The actual 
debate on the economy in the Supreme Soviet, however, was 
diverted from the subject of decentralisation and the benefits 
of a European-style common market by hardliners and the debate 
turned instead into an attack on the Baltic States for what was 
being seen in Moscow as an attempt to break away from the USSR. 
As a result of this, the proposed bill was temporarily discarded 
by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. ®°®
These two moves, combined with the effect of Glasnost,
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contributed to the radicalisation of the attitudes of many 
Lithuanians, which continued to increase as it became apparent 
that Gorbachev was incapable of fulfilling his original promises. 
In the press and on the streets, Lithuanians were far more 
outspoken than ever before in their criticism of Gorbachev's 
regime.
The 7 0th anniversary of Lithuanian independence was marked in 
16 February 1988 by small demonstrations in Vilnius and Kaunas, 
even though leading Lithuanian dissidents had been arrested days 
before in an attempt to prevent such events from o c c u r r i n g . ®°4 
From that day on, there was increasing pressure for the renaming 
of many main streets in Lithuania: the main street in Vilnius had 
been renamed Lenin Prospect, from Gediminas Avenue as part of the 
policy of soviétisation which had been rampant throughout 
Lithuania following the Soviet occupation. In the first few 
months of 1988 a number of small organisations sprang up with the 
purpose of debating topical issues, perhaps most importantly the 
future of Ignalina Nuclear Power station.
Ignalina was to become a major focus of activists' 
demonstrations, because it was built to the same design as the 
Chernobyl reactor which had exploded so disastrously in 1986. 
Lithuania had been badly affected by the Chernobyl disaster, 
although this had never been publicly admitted by the 
authorities. Many of those people who were outside for prolonged 
periods of time in Lithuania on the day the radioactive cloud 
passed, unknown to them, overhead, are now experiencing health 
problems due to high exposure to radiation. There was, and still 
is, the fear that a similar disaster was capable of occurring in 
Lithuania itself, when the consequences would be 
catastrophic.
These discussion groups also spent increasing amounts of time 
debating Lithuania's history as an independent state, discussions 
which 5 or 10 years earlier, would have been prohibited. There 
was a general consensus among Lithuania's academics that the
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obliterating of Lithuania's achievements as an independent state 
was a travesty and that more attention should be paid to 
Lithuania's illegal incorporation into the USSR.®°®
At the beginning of June, a new force entered into the life 
of the Republic; Sajüdis, which simply means "Movement". It was 
actually formed as a result of Gorbachev's decision to call the 
19th Party Congress in Moscow, to which delegates from all the 
republics were invited. Public meetings were held in Lithuania
to debate which issues should be debated at the Congress and
these were sanctioned by the CPL.
Sajüdis drew up a significant list of demands, which were 
basically a manifesto for the movement. Socially, Sajüdis wanted 
an ending of the privileges of the Nomenklatura, to raise 
standards of living, to improve healthcare, to increase
investment in industry and to hold officials accountable for
their decisions. The Cultural Commission of the Movement wanted 
to gain increased support for saving and restoring Lithuania's 
cultural heritage and to remove "blank spots" from the Sovietised 
version of Lithuania's h i s t o r y . T h e  National Relations 
Commission presented demands for the return of Lithuania's 
history to her people, the recognition of Lithuanian as the 
official language of the Republic and the resolution of any 
minority problems in Lithuania. The Economics Commission called 
for economic and political self-sufficiency for Lithuania, price 
reform, limitations on inter-republic migration and the 
development of trade. The use of the word "self-sufficiency" was 
deliberately chosen to avoid any direct mention of autonomy or 
independence, for at this stage Sajüdis had no political agenda. 
Spokesmen for the movement agreed that it was purely a 'commonly 
agreed sense of reform' with no intention of becoming a permanent 
organisation. They repeatedly insisted that once the CPL had 
committed itself wholeheartedly to Perestroika the movement would 
dissolve itself.®®®
At this time Sajüdis had no real links with the Catholic
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Church but the church, too, was re-emerging from the shadows, 
with the public practising of religion becoming more widespread 
as the persecution of both clerics and believers eased.
The kernel of Sajüdis, which was responsible for proposing 
policy, was the Initiative Group. This was composed predominantly 
of intellectuals, but perhaps more importantly, 17 of the group 
were card-carrying members of the CPL, who justified their 
membership by saying that they were working to bring the CPL in 
line with the ideals proposed under Perestroika To spread 
the Sajüdis message to all parts of Lithuania, young Lithuanians 
organised a bicycle tour around Lithuania in the Summer of 
1988.®®° Until July, however, the Lithuanian Government paid the 
movement little real attention in the hope that it would 
disappear if ignored.
The first Sajüdis-sponsored rally was held in Vilnius on 14 
June, the day traditionally held in the Lithuanian calendar for 
remembering those deported to Siberia. The forbidden national 
flag was raised for the first time in public by some of the 
demonstrators, which surprised many of the participants and 
emboldened Sajüdis members.®®®
On 23 June Sajüdis members demanded formal recognition from 
the CPL as a movement designed to advocate Perestroika. This was 
not granted, but at this meeting, a Secretary of the CPL, 
Algirdas Brazauskas, announced that he was personally requesting 
Moscow to halt construction of the fourth unit of Ignalina power 
station, which won him great support. He also announced that he 
would be attending the Sajüdis rally scheduled for the following 
day.
An estimated 20,000 people assembled in Gediminas Square in 
the heart of Vilnius on 24 June. Brazauskas spoke of the 
programme that was being presented at the 19th Party Congress and 
then Vytautas Landsbergis, a man whose name would become 
synonymous with Lithuania's drive for independence, took to the
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stage. He recounted the grievances of the majority of 
Lithuanians, but in an attempt to appease the Communist 
authorities, called also for restraint and sobriety on the part 
of the audience. Alcoholism was and still is a major problem 
within Lithuanian society and since his election as General 
Secretary, Gorbachev had spearheaded a major temperance drive 
throughout the USSR. Despite gaining rapid support, however, 
Sajüdis was still faced with the problem of the authorities' 
refusal to recognise the movement of publicise any of its 
activities.
But many Lithuanians were determined to bring the activities 
of Sajüdis to the attention of the public and on 9 July an 
estimated 100,000 people assembled in Vingis Park, the main park 
of Vilnius. The key point of this meeting was to force the 
Lithuanian authorities to recognise the validity of the three 
Lithuanian national flags. Besides the tricolour, a white knight 
on a red background, the Vytis and a schematic outline of 
Gediminas' Castle on a tricoloured background were also flown in 
the inter-war years. These were flown again that afternoon. The 
Soviet flag was not to be seen amidst a sea of yellow, green and 
red. The participants were informed that Lithuania's official 
Soviet flag had been due to be raised, to appease the 
authorities, but somehow its ropes had been tampered with.®®® 
The participants were also told by the rally's organisers that 
if there was any force used against them by the Soviet monitors, 
they were to offer only passive resistance, but the meeting 
proved to be orderly.
Brazauskas took to the stage and informed the audience that 
the Lithuanian authorities would begin too make preparations for 
the legalisation of the national flag, which he later admitted 
was a spur of the moment decision which he actually had no 
authority to make®®^ , but nonetheless it was never retracted. 
Sajudis officials had circulated copies of Independent 
Lithuania's national anthem, Lietuva, Tévyne Musi} (Lithuania, our 
Motherland)®®® and this was sung in public for the first time
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since it was banned in 1940. After this, again, in an 
unprecedented move, Brazauskas took the microphone and announced 
that he would be making enquiries in Moscow regarding the 
restoration of Lithuanian as the country's national language. 
Many people could not believe their ears and public support for 
Brazauskas soared.®®® Following the rally, the Lithuanian 
Supreme Soviet recognised as null and void the decision made by 
the Seimas in 1940, affirming Lithuania's request to join the 
USSR.
On 2 8 September there was a confrontation between Sajüdis 
activists and the authorities; demonstrators hurled rocks and 
bottles at the Militia, who responded with clubs and truncheons. 
This was the most violent demonstration to have been held in 
recent years and the aggressive handling of it by the Militia 
severely discredited Songaila.®®’' He was not to remain in power 
for much longer: Songaila was ousted from Office in October as 
a result of Sajüdis pressure. Mitkin went with him. They were 
replaced by Brazauskas as First Secretary and Vladimir Berezov, 
a Russian born in Lithuania, as Second Secretary.
Mitkin, already disliked by most Lithuanians, had made himself 
even more unpopular shortly before his removal from office, by 
giving a television interview on 18 October, during the course 
of which he warned that 'democracy and Glasnost do not mean 
anarchy and permissiveness.' He also told the Lithuanian people 
that the USSR needed their agricultural output : this was
acerbicly summarised by the Lithuanians as meaning 'You have to 
work harder so that We have meat.'®®® On 19 October, Songaila 
and Mitkin were forced by growing CPL pressure, combined with 
pressure from Moscow, to resign in an attempt to preserve 
stability in Lithuania. 1988, therefore, had been a momentous 
year for the Lithuanians. Lithuanian had become the official 
language of the Republic, Songaila and Mitkin had been ousted and 
the popular Algirdas Brazauskas had become the First Secretary 
of the CPL.
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1989 was to prove a significant year for both the history of 
Lithuania and for the world. In Lithuania, the main focus of 
national interest was the pending 50th anniversary of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and it was that to which most political 
attention was devoted to. Simultaneously, to confront the
growing tide of nationalism sweeping through the USSR, Gorbachev 
announced the calling of a new Parliament, the Congress of 
People's Deputies. Almost all of the Lithuanian deputies came 
from Sajüdis. When Gorbachev asked the Congress to vote on an 
increase in his powers, the Lithuanian delegates publicly walked 
out of the chamber, making clear their opposition to this 
request.
During the course of 1989 Sajüdis continued to hold mass 
rallies as forums for developing policy. At one such rally, on 
20 August, three days before the anniversary of the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact was due to be commemorated, the desire for actual 
independence from the USSR was first publicly stated, which 
attracted great support.®®®
On 23 August one of the most prominent and telegenic 
demonstrations ever to be held within the Soviet Union took 
place, when Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians managed to form 
a human chain, three people deep in some places, across the 
length of the Baltic States, protesting at the invalidity of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Moscow condemned the action, but there 
was no physical retaliation against the demonstrators, which had 
been feared by the participants. ®®° This action attracted 
international attention to the situation in the Baltics for the 
first time on a major scale and alerted those in the West to this 
nationalist sentiment re-emerging in Eastern Europe. Erich 
Honnecker, leader of East Germany and Nicolae Ceaucescu of 
Romania both offered Gorbachev use of their forces if he wished 
to quell the demonstrators, but the offer was refused.^®
Then on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall, the ultimate 
physical embodiment of the Iron Curtain that had 'been drawn
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across Europe'following the end of World War II, came 
tumbling down. With it, and remarkably bloodlessly, with the 
exception of Romania, fell the Communist regimes of the Eastern 
and Central European Soviet Satellite states.
This proved to be a nail in the coffin of the USSR. As Yegov 
Ligachev expressed it in a television documentary interview 
several years later, 'We lost the Warsaw Pact while NATO got much 
s t r o n g e r .'^3 None of the former Warsaw Pact states expressed 
the remotest interest in remaining allied with the USSR: their 
main concern was to be accepted into the European Union and NATO 
as quickly as possible. Fuelled by the success of the Eastern and 
Central European states, coupled with the passing of a resolution 
by the USSR's Congress of People's Deputies denouncing the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as the justification for Lithuania's 
incorporation into the USSR, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet voted 
overwhelmingly for independence on 22 December 198 9 and, as the 
conclusion of months of internal debates, in an unprecedented 
step, Algirdas Brazauskas broke the CPL away from the Communist 
Party of the USSR.
The CPSU and Gorbachev in particular were thoroughly 
displeased by this move. Brazauskas was summoned to Moscow on 
Christmas Eve, where he justified the events that had taken place 
in Lithuania by saying that 'We can not separate events in 
Lithuania from those in Eastern Europe.' He described Lithuania 
as being like a car: 'this car had no reverse gear. We had to go 
forward.Gorbachev expressed his opposition to the events of 
the previous weeks, but said to both Brazauskas and his own aides 
that 'the main aim is to avoid a shootout...otherwise it is all 
over.'^s He recognised that the traditional Soviet method of 
repression would no longer be tolerated by the Governments of the 
Western states whom he was courting in an attempt to gain 
economic assistance.
Gorbachev paid a visit to Vilnius in January 1990 to further 
rebuke Brazauskas (who had not reversed his decision to break the
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CPL away from the CPSU) and to see for himself the situation in 
Lithuania. He was greeted at Vilnius airport by Landsbergis, the 
Professor of Musicology who was by now recognised as the leader 
of the Sajûdis movement, in the manner that one would greet a 
visiting head of state, which Gorbachev found to be completely 
u n a c c e p t a b l e . Although at every stage of the visit Gorbachev 
was met with demands for independence, his underlying message to 
the Lithuanians was that any form of secession would be met with 
Soviet reprisals.It is, however, possible that Gorbachev was 
already resigned to the loss of Lithuania from the USSR, for it 
was later revealed that he bid farewell to Landsbergis' deputy, 
Kazimiera Prunskiene, with the words 'Well Kazimiera, maybe we'll 
meet on the international c i r c u i t .
The majority of the breakaway CPL initially accepted a social- 
democratic manifesto. The name of the party was first changed to 
the Social Liberal Party and finally to the Lithuanian Democratic 
Labour Party (LDLP). Its aim was to reform the Communist Party 
into a genuine left-of-centre party for a democratic and 
independent Lithuania. The LDLP actively supported a transition 
to a market economy and the improving of social conditions for 
the Lithuanian population.
A small part of the CPL, however, being orthodox Communists, 
remained a part of the CPSU. They strongly opposed any idea of 
an independent Lithuania, declaring their allegiance to Moscow 
and after the original CPL changed its name to the LDLP, this 
faction retained the CPL name.
The first free elections for 50 years were held in February 
1990. The majority of public support was given to those 
candidates who would agitate for an independent Lithuania. 
Sajudis gained nearly 70 per cent of the votes cast, while the 
LDLP gained nearly 3 0 per cent. Both Brazauskas and Landsbergis 
were rated extremely highly by the voters.
In Moscow, however, in an attempt to bolster his crumbling
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position, Gorbachev campaigned to be granted the powers of an 
Executive President, that is, to be given the ability to make 
decisions without requiring the approval of the Congress. On 10 
March, the deputies of the Supreme Soviet convened in Moscow to 
vote on the authorization of Gorbachev's increased powers. 
Although the Lithuanians refused to be present for the vote, it 
was felt that a result in favour of Gorbachev would greatly 
jeopardise their chances of gaining actual independence. 
Therefore on 11 March, at the first meeting of the Lithuanian 
Supreme Soviet in Vilnius, the legislature adopted an act 
declaring the formal restitution of Lithuania's independence. 
This move was almost unanimously supported by the LDLP, 
especially by Brazauskas. According to Prunskiene, the 
Lithuanians felt that their hand was forced by what was happening 
in M o s c o w . T h e r e  was a general consensus both in the 
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and among the people as a whole, that 
this was a now or never chance for independence. A new 
Government, with Vytautas Landsbergis as Chairman was formed to 
lead the Republic.
Opposition from Moscow to this move was predicted by the 
Lithuanians, but it was felt that it would take the form of a 
legal decision annulling, invalidating or postponing the 
Lithuanians' decision. There was even the fear that force would 
be used, given the dramatic and radical nature of the situation. 
Instead, Gorbachev reacted by punishing Lithuania with the 
imposition of an economic blockade during the Spring of 1990. Oil 
supplies from the USSR through the only pipeline to Lithuania's 
oil processing plant were cut off and the supplies of commodities 
and manufactured goods were reduced. Nonetheless, the Lithuanian 
Government refused to rescind the Declaration of Independence and 
by the Autumn of 1990 the blockade petered out, although it was 
never formally lifted. Access to Lithuania from the West was 
possible by November.
The blockade failed for several fundamental reasons: firstly, 
the resolve of the Lithuanian people. For a short period of time.
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many Lithuanians were so relieved to have won back their desired 
independence, that they were prepared to suffer shortages in 
their determination to rid themselves once and for all of the 
USSR. This was made easier, however, by the fact that Spring and 
Summer were much easier seasons to tolerate than Autumn or 
Winter: most Lithuanians had small plots of land on which they 
grew ample quantities of fruit and vegetables, so that they could 
feed themselves and these two seasons were naturally much warmer 
than Autumn or Winter, when the fuel and hot water shortages 
would have created far greater discomfort. It was later to be 
argued that had the blockade actually been imposed for a longer 
period, Lithuanians would have greatly benefited from it. Had 
they been forced to ally together to combat hardship and 
deprivation, they would, in all probability, have been better 
equipped mentally to withstand the numerous problems' and 
challenges that they would face in the first few years of 
independence as the transition to a market economy was to prove 
harder than ever imagined.
In spite of the blockade, the Lithuanian legislature and 
Government spent 199 0 attempting to restructure the state and 
transform the economy. The new law on citizenship granted it to 
every person living in Lithuania at the time, including minority 
Russians, Poles and Belorussians.There was a high expectance 
of international recognition of the republic of Lithuania, given 
that throughout the Cold War, the Western Allies had stated 
frequently that they had never recognised the legality of 
Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR and had allowed 
Lithuanian embassies to remain in the UK, USA and the Vatican. 
These embassies, however, provided no practical function during 
the post-war years except to serve as a reminder of Lithuania's 
unwillingness to remain in the USSR.
The much longed-for international recognition, however, was 
not forthcoming, except from Iceland^^. This disturbed the 
Lithuanians, many of whom felt betrayed by the Governments they 
had believed to be their allies. Yet until the fall of Gorbachev
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in August 1991, the UK, USA and Germany in particular were far 
more concerned about maintaining and improving their 
relationships with Gorbachev than risking his alienation by 
supporting a seemingly insignificant little state.
Tension remained high throughout the course of 1990, as most 
Lithuanians could not believe that they would not face some sort 
of repression from Moscow, as had happened in Hungary in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and more recently in Georgia. The 
anticipated clampdown finally materialised on 13 January 1991. 
With the eyes of the western media on them, Soviet troops, led 
by KGB and CPL activists, used tanks and firearms to crush 
unarmed civilians trying to passively defend the television tower 
and other civilian buildings in Vilnius. During the night, 14 
people were killed and approximately 8 0 0^ ®^ injured as the 
Lithuanians defended their capital city. The Parliament was 
barricaded and the Government remained within it, broadcasting 
to the nation and advocating passive resistance. At the same 
time, plans were made to establish a Government-in-Exile, which 
was to be led by Stasys Lozoraitis, who had been Lithuania's 
Ambassador to the Vatican and the USA throughout the Soviet 
Occupation and whose Father had been Foreign Minister in the 
inter-war years, as it seemed more than likely that the 
Parliament building and the Government within it would be seized 
by Soviet troops.
From the occupied television tower, CPL and KGB authorities 
broadcast programmes described by Bridget Kendall of the BBC 
World Service as "Breathtaking Lies", claiming that Lithuanians 
had turned, without provocation and fired on the Soviet troops 
stationed in Vilnius.Although Gorbachev denied his personal 
involvement in the action taken by the Soviet troops, at one 
stage even claiming to have been asleep, he must, if only by 
virtue of being President, bear some of the responsibility for 
their actions. Although the Parliament building was not attacked, 
partly because of the massive amount of western media attention 
{even though the Gulf War was being fought at the same time) and
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western Governments' condemnation of the actions of the Soviet 
troops^^, the events of 13-14 January served to finally sever 
Lithuania's links with M o s c o w .
The situation in Lithuania throughout the Spring of 1991 
remained tense. Whilst the Council was creating new, independent 
republican bodies, Moscow was simultaneously maintaining and 
reinforcing the old Government structures. For example there were 
two General Prosecutors and their respective staffs, one pro­
independent Lithuania, the other managed by Moscow. Although 
Lithuania had established her own Police Force, under Alvydas 
Makstalé, the Special Soviet Task Militia (OMON) remained active 
throughout the Republic. Former orthodox Communists, operating 
under the Yedinstvo banner were also actively encouraging a 
return to Communist rule. Tension increased in late Spring 1991, 
when 6 Lithuanian customs officials were murdered on the 
Lithuanian-Belorussian border. An investigation by the Lithuanian 
General Prosecutor pointed the finger of suspicion at OMON 
forces, although there was no conclusive proof.
Until August 1991, Lithuanian-Soviet relations appeared to 
have reached an impasse, with neither Gorbachev nor Landsbergis 
prepared to compromise. With increasing hostility to the 
continued presence of OMON forces in the Republic, it seemed as 
if it were only a matter of time before the events of 13-14 
January would be repeated. Unforeseen events in Moscow, however, 
were to alter the situation.
It took the coup of 19-21 August, the failure of which toppled 
Gorbachev and installed Boris Yeltsin as the leader of what 
remained of the USSR, for Lithuania to be internationally 
accepted as an independent Republic, once the West finally 
realised that Gorbachev was a spent force. On 6 September, the 
USSR publicly recognised an independent Lithuania and shortly 
thereafter the three Baltic States were admitted into the United 
Nations. The serious work of reconstructing the Lithuanian state 
was now to begin. Lithuanian political, economic and social life
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began to be regenerated in the following three years. It would, 
however, take far longer for the wounds inflicted on Lithuania 
by the fifty year Soviet Occupation to be healed.
1. Maironis, "the most outstanding poet of Lithuania's national rebirth," according to the Baltic Reference Book, laid the foundations for modern Lithuanian poetry with his anthology entitled "Pavasario balsai" (Voices of Spring), written in 1895.
2. Jakstas, J. Lithuania to World War I in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania: 700 Years Manyiand, 1984 p43
3 . The Baltic States; A Reference Book Lithuanian Encyclopedia Publishers 1991 pl79
4 . The traditional pagan festivals were subsumed into the Catholic faith after Christianisation; the most important pagan feast of Midsummer is now St. John's Eve: a day of great, mass celebration throughout Lithuania The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a return to the old traditions with many children being named after mythological or ancient Lithuanian historical figures, such as the Princess Biruté. Lithuania's pagan antecedence has also been used to promote the idea of cremation (opposed by the Catholic church), as Lithuania's cemeteries are expanding too far. The newspaper Gimtasis krastas called for "a return to our pagan heritage" as a means of promoting this idea. 
{Gimtasis krastas 16 December 1996)
5. The Baltic States: A Reference Book op cit, pi79
6. Basanavicius lived from 1851-1927. Due to the policies of repression and russification practised in the C19th, he lived in Bulgaria for 25 years and also in East Prussia, from where, in 1883, he published the first Lithuanian language newspaper "Ausra" (Dawn). He used this paper, and later others, as a forum for airing grievances about Russian oppression and the Lithuanians' desire for freedom and independence. Basanavicius chaired the 1905 Vilnius Conference and he remained a popular figure in Lithuania until independence was declared in 1918, liked by all of the main political units. When independence was declared, many Lithuanians wanted him as their first President, but he declined, taking instead the unofficial title "Tautos Tevas" ("Father of the Nation"), (Source: Petras Varkala, interview, 8 February,1997)
7. The importance of these so-called "book leggers" should not be underestimated. Following the restitution of Lithuania's independence in 1990, a number of monuments were erected to honour their achievements, the body of Vincas Bielskus, one of the chief book leggers, was exhumed from his grave in Siberia, to where he had been deported in 1941 and returned to the family estate at Balsupè in 1992, where he was reburied with full ceremonial honours.
8. Harrison, E. Lithuania Past and Present Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1922, p88
9. Historic Resolution, reprinted in Harrison, ihid p68
10. This was a trait also held by the activists for independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s; repression by Soviet forces served to merely inspire the Lithuanians to continue with their demands, rather than to subdue them.
11. See Seton-Watson, H. The Russian Empire 1801-1917 or Stone, N. The Eastern Front for accounts of the disastrous performances of the Russian armed forces.
44
12. Strahaz, A. in Vardys, V./Misiunas, R. The Baltic States in Peace and War Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978, p57
13. ibid, pp43-49
14. ibid, p54
15. ibid
16. Harrison, E. Lithuania, 192 8 Hazell, Watson & Viney Ltd, 1928, p33
17. Harrison, E. Lithuania Past and Present op cit, p78
18. Harrison, E Lithuania, 1928 op cit, p34
19. Supporters of Lithuanian independence actively used the western media for the dissemination of information. This was mostly done in Great Britain, where some Lithuanian exiles used professional connections with newspapers such as 
The Independent and The Financial Times to either plant articles, make introductions to leading members of Lithuanian nationalist movements or merely to encourage or develop an interest in Lithuanian or Baltic affairs. These helped to keep Lithuania at the forefront of peoples' consciousness, even ata time of international crisis, such as during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.
20. Henderson, N. Final Report p7
21. Wandycz, P. Soviet-Polish Relations 1917-1921 Harvard University Press, 1969, p34
22. Wandycz, P. The Lands of Partitioned Poland: 1795-1918 University of Washington Press, 1974, p352
23. ibid, p354
24. Konovalov, S. Russo-Polish Relations The Cresset Press, 1945, p33
25. Strahaz, A. op cit, p54
26. ibid
27. ibid, p57
28. ibid
29. More information on the "Forest Brothers" appears later in this chapter.
30. This was also the case after World War II, where the 4-5 million Lithuanians living outside Lithuania in the West, either emigres or exiles, never ceased in their campaign to restore Lithuania's independence.
31. Strahaz, A. op cit, p57
32. Harrison, E. Lithuania Past and Present op cit, p86
33. ibid, p84
34. Historic Resolution as reprinted in Harrison, E. Lithuania Past and Present op cit, p89
35. Von Rauch, G. The Baltic States C. Hurst & Co., 1974, p40
45
36. Harrison, E. Lithuania, 1928 op cit, p34
37. ibid, p35
38. ibid, p36
39. ibid
40. The Taryba was composed of the following delegates: Dr. J. Basanavicius, M. Birziska, S. Banaitis, H. Bizauskas, Pr. Dovydaitis, St. Kairys, P. Klimas, D. Malinauskas, Doyen Mironas, S. Narutowicz, Petrulis, A. Smetona, J. Smilegevicius, J. Staugaitis, A. Stulginskis, Dr. J. Saulys, K. Saulys, J. Sernas, J. Valokaitis, Dr. J. Vileisis.
Despite the initial Resolution on Independence being passed in December 1917, from its signing and thereafter, 16 February 1918 is taken as being Lithuanian Independence Day. The declaration itself was buried on an estate outside the village of Balsupè, in the South West of the country prior to the initial Soviet occupation. Although the buildings on the estate were removed, divided and then rebuilt in the village, it is believed that the Declaration may have survived as it was buried away from the main buildings. The pre-war owners of the estate are in the process of attempting to reclaim the land and will then begin a more comprehensive search for the document as they have a memory of hearing about the location of both the Declaration and with it, as so many fleeing Lithuanians tried to do, numerous family heirlooms. Until the land can be reclaimed (or at least the area in which the Declaration is believed to be), the family is reluctant to undertake a more comprehensive search for fear that, if discovered, the missing items would be seized by and held in the wrong hands.
41. Gerutis, A. Independent Lithuania in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania: 700 Years op cit, pl77
42. von Rauch, G . The Baltic States Hurst & Co. 1974, pl04
43. ibid, pp63-64
44. Gerutis, A. Independent Lithuania in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania 7 00 Years op cit, pl58
45. Petras Varkala, interview, 3 March 1994
46. ibid, pl87
47. Petras Varkala, interview, 8 February, 1997
48. von Rauch, G. The Baltic States op cit, p91
49. Gerutis, A. in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania 7 00 Years op cit, pl5 8
50. ibid, p214. Smetona and Voldemaras suffered from the fact that the majority of their natural supporters would have come from the intelligentsia, many of whom had emigrated during the period of russification and were therefore not eligible to vote. The majority of Lithuanians were either Christian or Social Democrats and these political orientations were reflected in the composition of the Assembly.
51. Gerutis, A in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania 700 Years op cit, p217
52. ibid, p221
46
53. Josef Pilsudski had become the recognised leader of Poland after its independence following the Paris Peace Conference, but post-war Polish politics were extremely unstable and in 1926 Pilsudski seized power in a coup d'etat. Although the only official post he held continuously in his Non-Party Bloc For Co-operation With the Government from the date of the coup until his death in 1935 was that of Minister of War, Pilsudski was also Prime Minister from 1926-1928 and in 1930. After his death, Ignacy Moscicki, President of the Republic and Eduard Rydz-Smigly, Commander of the Army, became the two dominant figures in Polish politics until the invasion by Germany in September 1939.
54. Gerutis, A. in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania: 700 Years op cit, p223
55. The philosophies which drove Smetona were explained to me by one of his colleagues and acquaintances, Petras Varkala, in an interview on 2 9 October, 1994 .
56. von Rauch, G. The Baltic States op cit, pi64
57. Hiden, J./Salmon, P. The Baltic Nations and Europe Longman, 1991, p54
58. ibid, pp54-55
59. Kriksciünas, J. Agriculture in Lithuania Lithuanian Chamber of Agriculture, 1938, p4
60. The backbone of Lithuania's farm network by 1935 was the 64.87 per cent of Lithuania's farms which had between 5-100 hectares. They constituted 83.31 per cent of the total agricultural land in Lithuania and kept the largestamount of livestock and produced the largest quantities of meat, grain, milkand eggs. ibid pp34-35.
61. The legacy of this stability was to prove most useful when it came to re­introducing the Litas after the restitution of independence. Unlike states such as the Russian Federation, where the exchange rate was many thousands of Rubles to the US$, Lithuania had an extremely reasonable rate of Lt4:US$l. (see economics chapter)
62. Lithuania exported produce to the following states: in Europe: Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and the UK; in Africa: Congo, Egypt,Morocco, Tunis; in Asia: Indo-China, Japan, Palestine, Syria; in America :Panama, the USA. Gineitis, K. Lithuanian Quality Products K. Gineitis, 1938, p2 9
63. Report of the British Chamber of Commerce plO. Lithuania's five meat export factories could each handle 6 00 pigs per day: they were "the most modern and best planned and equipped meat export factories in Europe." Gineitis, K. Quality Lithuanian Products op cit p5. In 1938 Lithuania had 1,3 00,000 pigs: she was second only to Denmark in numbers of pigs per capita of Lithuanian inhabitants.
64. ibid, pll
65. Lithuania had imported cows while still part of the Russian Empire: from Denmark, Scotland, Switzerland and Holland. Although there was limited beef production, the majority of Lithuanian cows were for dairy produce. After independence, selective breeding processes amalgamated the Dutch and Danish strains to form a hybrid then mated with native stock. This was an extremely successful process, as Lithuanian butter and other dairy produce became one of Lithuania's principal exports. Kriksciünas, J. Agriculture in Lithuania op 
cit, p78. In 193 6, Lithuania exported 15,070.1 tons of butter and cheese, amounting to US$5,998.3 million, {ibid, p88)
47
66. Anglo-Lithuanian Trade December 1937 p8In 1938, Lithuania exported the following products: horses, cattle, pigs and pork products, beef, mutton, goose lard, poultry, game, fish and lake lobsters, butter, cheese, eggs, milk powder, tinned milk, honey, potatoes, confectionaries, mushrooms,onions, apples, cranberries, syrups, medicinal plants, malt, rye, wheat, barley, oats, lentils, peas, linseed, fur, hides, feathers, timber, flax, hemp, cardboard, turpentine, yeast, liqueurs, beer, amber.Lithuania imported: coal, coke, petroleum, iron, tin, lead, copper, aluminium, sulphur, zinc, cement, textiles, wool, cotton, silk, rubber goods, drugs, mineral oils, locomotives, cables, combustion engines, electrical machinery, steam boilers, agricultural and dairy machinery, tractors, motor vehicles, bicycles, scientific instruments, tools, wire, sewing machines, coffee, salt, cocoa, tea, spices, citrus fruits, grapes, herring, sports goods, wireless apparatus, musical instruments, linoleum, optical articles, clocks, paraffin, cork, asbestos, tobacco, china, perfume, wallpaper, asphalt and chalk. (Kineitis, G. Quality Lithuanian Products op cit, p64)
67. Minister A. Hugau, interview, 15 February, 1994
68. Petras Varkala, interview, 8 February, 1997
69. Interview with Petras Varkala, who was posted to the legation in London in 1936, 29 Qctober, 1994.
70. As emphasised repeatedly by Algirdas Saudargas, Foreign Minister 1991- 1992, interview, 22 June 1993.
71. Lithuania in the World Vol.2, No.2 pp8-10
72. Gerutis, A. in Gerutis, A.(ed) Lithuania 700 Years op cit, pl64
73. Vaiciunas was one of the best known poets during the inter-war years, in a country which sets great store by literature and the arts.
74. See later chapters.
75. Many of the German people believed Memel to be a part of Germany. The first verse of the version of the German National Anthem (originally written in 1641) sung during the Nazi era contained the line 'von der Maas bis an dieMemel, von der Etsch bis an den Belt ' Although only the third verse iscurrently used, in a letter to Chancellor Kohl in 1991, President von Weizacker emphasised that 'the total, whole song, historically, reflects German unity in all of its verses.'
76. Ambassadors' Conference Report February 1923
77. Documents on German Foreign Policy Vol. V. See 23 March 1939 Telegram from Ribbentrop, on board the Battleship Deutschland, to Hitler: 'I report the signing of the Treaty with Lithuania reuniting Memel with the Reich.'
78. Qn 20 March 1939, Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Juozas Urbsys, was received in Berlin by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. He was given the alternative of a solution to the Klaipeda/Memel problem by agreement or by force. "On his return to consult his Government, he was pursued by scarcely veiled threats telephoned by Weizacker." Thorne, C. The Approach of War Macmillan, 1967, pl08. Klaipeda was signed away on 23 March, which was to be "the Führer's last bloodless triumph." (Thorne, C. ibid pl09) See Documents on German Foreign Policy Nos. 399,400,403
79. Hiden, J./Salmon, P. The Baltic Nations and Europe op cit, p75
48
80. Response by Franklin D. Roosevelt to a delegation of Lithuanian-Americans, 15 October, 1940, reprinted in Budreckis, A. in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania : 700 Years op cit, p3 8 9
81. The 23 August 1939 Pact signed between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia was used by Stalin as a defence mechanism: an attempt to prevent, or temporarily stall, the German invasion of the USSR. Hitler, meanwhile, had forged the alliance to prevent him becoming embroiled in an two-front war. He always intended to invade Russia, which he saw as the natural Lebensraum for the Aryan race at the expense of the Slavs. Although the main terms of the pact were that of a co-operative alliance, it was the secret protocols which were responsible for the carving up of Poland and the Baltic States.
82. von Rauch, G . The Baltic States op cit, p226
83. Joné Brazauskaite, interview, 21 January 1996. Snieckus did do Lithuania one favour however. He emphasised the agricultural nature of the state, rather than demanding that Lithuania become a centre of heavy industry. By doing so, he was able to limit the number of ethnic Russians who were settled in Lithuania, which preserved the ethnographic identity of Lithuania, unlike other Soviet Republics such as Estonia, where, as the state industrialised, a large number of Russians were resettled there, forming a sizeable minority.
84. Asta Reklaite (deportee), interview, 14 July, 1988. Over fifty years after the mass deportations, their legacy remains ever-present in Lithuanian society. Both Lithuanians within Lithuania and those abroad still commemorate the deportations annually. In London, for example, there is always a service, held jointly with Latvians and Estonians in either the church of St. Martins- in-the-Fields, Trafalgar Square, or St. James' church, Piccadilly.
85. The 9th Fort, on the perimeter of Kaunas, the inter-war Lithuanian capital, was one of the principal killing fields for the Jews of Eastern Europe. Only following the restitution of Lithuania's independence was this officially recognised and a memorial constructed. The Jewish population of Lithuania was virtually eradicated, as 180,000 (94 per cent) of the Lithuanian Jews were exterminated in Lithuania or deported West to the concentration camps in Poland and Germany. 50 per cent of the Jewish population of Lithuania emigrated after 1991 and in 1994 there were only 6,000 Jews resident in Lithuania (0.5 per cent of the total population of Lithuania) . There are but two synagogues, in Vilnius and Kaunas in operation in 1993. The Jewish Quarter in Vilnius Old Town has been renovated and turned into an exclusive residential and commercial area. The Jews who were able to emigrate after 1940 travelled principally to Israel, the USA, Argentina and to the UK, where the descendants of some Lithuanian Jewish emigres have risen to political prominence: Nigel Lawson, Malcom Rifkind, Leon Brittan and Edwina Currie have all held Cabinet posts in the 1980s and 1990s.
86. Joné Brazauskaite, interview, 14 June, 1987. She and her immediate family were fortunate enough to be able to flee with the retreating German army as her family knew that they were on a list for deportation to Siberia to join other family members who had been deported in the first wave. She and her parents spent four years living in Austria and Germany before being able to emigrate to the USA. Many Lithuanians were able to escape because the Soviet officials were notoriously bureaucratic: if the person wasn't at his/her given address when the Soviets came to arrest him, they were extremely slow about chasing up the fugitives.
87. The Forest Brothers were highly active in all three Baltic States. The movement in Latvia surrendered first, but those in Lithuania and Estonia lasted until 1953 and 1956 respectively. See Laar, M. War in the Woods The Compass Press 1992 for the best account of the Estonian fighters. All three states' Forest Brothers benefitted from the topography and forestation of their states. The density of the forests was (and is still) so great that they were able to hide from the Soviet forces while waging their guerilla campaign. Even though the Forest Brothers were eventually and inevitably overpowered by
49
the Soviet forces, they had become a great symbol of the Baltic States' desire to oppose their occupation by the USSR and were seen as the heroes of Cold War Lithuania. See Appendix I for a detailed example of the activities of one helper of the Forest Brothers.
88. An unusual demonstration of resistance to the Russian occupation was demonstrated by many Lithuanian women: they refused to have their ears pierced, unlike the majority of Russian women. And while young Russian girls wore their hair tied back with organza ribbons, Lithuanian children did not follow their example, deliberately differenting themselves from their Russian counterparts.
89. Alvidas Seduikis was one of many ordinary people imprisoned for openly wearing a metal crucifix around his neck. He had received one caution from the authorities in 1972, but the second time he was apprehended a lengthy prison sentence followed and he died shortly after his release in 1987. Interview with his widow. Counsellor Aldutè Seduikiene of Palanga Town Council, 3 0 June, 1994 .
90. Misiunas, R./Tagperaa, R. The Baltic States. Years of Dependence Hurst & Co. 1993, pl99. The Archbishop was exiled to Zagaré in January 1961 "apparently because he expelled two policemen who had infiltrated the seminary in Kaunas and refused Soviet demands to issue orders contrary to canon law."
91. ibid, p297. Pope John Paul II was finally able to visit Lithuania in 1993. His visit demonstrated his immense popularity among the people of Lithuania. On visiting Lithuania shortly after his visit, I found it remarkable that many of the young people I met had posters of the Pope on their walls in preference even to western rock or film stars. Some of the older generation of Lithuanians I met on that trip said that seeing the Pope finally on Lithuanian soil was such a memorable occasion, second only to the restitution of independence in 1990.
92. Despite opposition from the Communist authorities, a plaque marking the spot of Kalanta's death was placed on Laisvès Allé, where it still remains, nowadays often adorned with flowers as a tribute to those who died in protest against the occupation.
93. This can be best exemplified by reading Maniusis, J. Soviet Lithuania, achievements and prospects Mintis Publishers, 1977.
94. Sadly many of them were not to live to see the restitution of independence, although their children continued to work on behalf of Lithuania. I personally witnessed many evenings with Jonas Vileisis, son of the member of the original Taryba and Stasys Lozoraitis, among others, in the town of Waterbury, Connecticut, USA in the 1970s, where their return to power was planned. Lozoraitis campaigned for President in 1992, but failed to attract mass support and died in 1957^ |
A similar situation was to happen in the late 1960s-early 1970s when the remains of the Batista regime of Cuba in exile in the USA, the Bahamas and the UK would hold similar meetings around the dinner table, where ministerial portfolios would be handed around, as they were all convinced it was but a matter of time before Castro was overthrown. Many of them also died while at the present time (1997) Fidel Castro remains in power.
95. The Lithuanians had a large stall at the Fair run by members of the emigre population of New York and Chicago. It attracted numerous visitors and distributed propaganda in the form of leaflets and "Freedom for the Baltic States" badges to raise public awareness of the situation in Lithuania.
96. A group of 11 Lithuanian emigres returned for the first time in June 1987. The only way of seeing Lithuania at this time was through a tour arranged by 
Intourist, which meant spending two days in Moscow, then being flown to Vilnius for six days and then returning to Moscow for a further three days.
50
The time spent in Lithuania was carefully structured, with planned visits to Kaunas and Trakai, an historic castle renovated throughout the 1980s. The tourists were also encouraged to visit the Lenin Museum in Vilnius, a mere stone's throw from the hotel where the tourists were billeted, but none of the original group ever did. The visitors were accompanied at most times by a non- Lithuanian speaking Intourist guide, plus a Lithuanian interpreter. Free time was very restricted, but those visitors returning to see family were able to see them briefly. It was absolutely forbidden to journey to the coast. One member of this original party who wanted to see an aged Aunt was able to evadethe Intourist guide for a day and in a complex series of car swapping andstaying at "safe houses" managed to get there.
In 1988, when the same group returned for a second visit, the guide was more flexible and more time could be spent visiting family (which was the main reason so many of the tour were returning) and permission was given to go to the coast, although those travelling had to be accompanied by the same guide. On this second visit, however, the group was joined by a young Lithuanian activist from England. He and his wife were subject to continuous KGB harassment, beginning at Leningrad airport, where they were detained for no apparent reason, to being disturbed nightly by frequent telephone calls, to monitor their presence and to cause harassment.
It was not until 1990, however, that it was possible to travel directlyto Lithuania, without having to pass through either Moscow or Leningrad.
97. A theory expounded by Dr. Miskinis, Director of Macro Economics, interview, 23 June, 1994.
98. White, S. Gorbachev and After Cambridge University Press, 1992, ppl27-8, 138-9, 246
99. Butautas, R. MQsû Saknvs Amzius, 1994. This book details the history of the Brazauskas family. On a visit to the UK in April 1993, Brazauskas confided to his interpreter, who happened to be a distant relative, how overjoyed he was that Lithuania had managed to break away from the USSR and declare independence.
100. Perestroika, in Gorbachev's own words, involved the "démocratisation of all public life and a radical economic reform," (White, S. Political Reform in Historical Perspective in Merridale, C./Ward, C.(eds) Perestroika Edward Arnold, 1991, p3. Gorbachev never believed that this would lead to a loss of power by the CPSU, but realised that reforms were vital to prevent total economic collapse. As this thesis is not concerned solely with the events which caused the fragmentation of the USSR, more detailed descriptions and explanations of Perestroika may be found in the numerous texts on the subject published since 1988, not least in Gorbachev's own work. Perestroika William Collins Sons & Co., 1988
101. A. Seduikiene, Deputy of the Palanga Council, interview, 1 July, 1994
102. Gorbachev, M. Memoirs Doubleday, 1996 pp301-302, Misiunas,R ./Taagepera,R. The Baltic States, Years of Dependence op cit, p32 9
103. Although it was incorporated into legislation discussed in the Supreme Soviet in the winter of 1989 and came into effect on 1 January 1990. Senn, E. Lithuania Awakening op cit, p2 52
104. Senn, E. Lithuania Awakening University of California Press, 1990 p35
105. Zigmas Brazauskas, environmentalist, interview, 8 July, 1988.
106. Senn, E. Lithuania Awakening op cit, p51
51
107. See Maniusis, J. Soviet Lithuania op cit, which completely omits the Declaration of Independence of 1918 from its list of significant dates in Lithuanian history, as a good example of this.
108. Senn, E. op cit pp6l-63
109. ibid, p70
110. The bicycle tour was held between 20 June-2 July and was actively supported by the Communist Youth League of Lithuania.
111. A number of Lithuanian flags dating back to the inter-war years had been carefully hidden and preserved. It would have meant punishment, if not imprisonment had they been discovered by Soviet authorities, but some people were prepared to take that risk as their symbol, of resistance to the occupation. Other flags were quickly home-made, most being designed simply to be fitted over a pole, rather than having the more complicated system of halliards fitted to enable it to be run up a flag staff. It proved harder than expected to manufacture one's own tricolour, for in traditional Soviet style it was often impossible to find all three colours of material : one could always purchase red fabric, and quite often green, but it could prove extremely difficult to find the yellow. Nonetheless, the Lithuanians were not daunted and on 14 June the tricolour proudly flew on the streets of Vilnius.
112. Sakwa, R. Soviet Politics Routledge, 1991 pp97, 267. It actually made Gorbachev more unpopular as Vodka, in particular, was considered to be one of the few luxuries available to the common person and a means of escape from the harsh realities of every-day Soviet life.
113. Senn, E. Lithuania Awakening op cit, p87
114. As said to his interpreter, 11 April, 1993.
115. It was written by V. Kudirka in 1898 and first performed in 1905.
116. The author was present at the Vingis park rally. It was an incrediblyhighly-charged and emotional experience. It was plain to see how thisoutpouring of nationalism affected Brazauskas: it immediately inspired him to make decisions in areas in which he had no authority.
117. Senn, E. Lithuania Awakening op cit, ppl83-184 on the actual events of the riots in Vilnius.
118. ibid, p209
119. During speeches debating what Lithuania would be able to achieve if given autonomy within the USSR, an anonymous voice in the crowd called out that it was not autonomy within the USSR that Lithuanians actually wanted, but complete independence. Other members of the audience echoed this refrain and the chant of "We want an independent Lithuania!" resounded around the rally.
120. One of the people who formed the human chain voiced the sentiments of many of the participants by telling me that they really thought that there was a realistic chance of physical opposition or retaliation by the Soviet authorities, as had been demonstrated in Tblisi, but that the desire to publicly show the invalidity of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was strong enough to supersede those concerns. All of those who took part in the formation of the chain found it an exceptionally emotional experience. On the morning of the 23rd, people from all parts of Lithuania drove to the proposed path of the chain, which roughly followed the main road linking the Baltic States and began to assemble. At first there were doubts that the chain would be unbroken, but as the day went on and more people arrived, the chain was, in fact, duplicated and triplicated along certain stretches. It was a highly successful move on the part of Sajûdis, Tautas Fronte and the Latvian Way,
52
which attracted a significant amount of international media coverage.
121. B.B.C. Television The Second Russian Revolution: Breaking Ranks 1991
122. Churchill, W. in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, 6 April 1946. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has been drawn across Europe."
123. B.B.C. Television The Second Russian Revolution: Breaking Ranks 1991
124. ibid
125. ibid
126. ibid
12 7. As said to demonstrators on Lenin Prospect.
128. B.B.C. Television The Second Russian Revolution: Breaking Ranks 1991
129. See Appendix II for the results of the February 1990 elections. Although Landsbergis was the Chairman of Sajûdis, in terms of popularity, he was only "first among equals". (Lieven, A. The Baltic Revolution op cit, p231)
130. B.B.C. Television The Second Russian Revolution: Breaking- Ranks 1991
131. One of the first (non-media) westerners who returned in November found that life was proceeding as normally as possible. There was limited heat and only hot water on occasional days, but the people were at this stage still determined not to return to the USSR.
132. The view of a number of Lithuanians, in a private debate during July 1994 .
133. Law on Citizenship, 1990
134. The Government of Iceland formally recognised Lithuania on 23 August 1990 .
135. See The Financial Times, 24 and 25 April 1990, for example. 'The US has wanted to avoid any...action which would...affect the current wide-ranging arms control talks between the US and the Soviet Union.' (25 April 1990)
136. Official Lithuanian statistics from the Ministry of Information, Vilnius.
137. Bridget Kendall, interview, 8 February, 1994. Her views were also supported by Ben Brown, of the BBC, Adrian Bridge and Tony Barber of The 
Independent, Leyla Boulton and John Lloyd of the Financial Times and Joseph Joffe of Süddeutsche Zeitung in interviews throughout 1994-1996.
138. Government statements. Secretary of State Cheyne told Shevarnadze "Please remember, the President can't handle too many dead Lithuanians." 16 January, 1991. This was a demonstration of the special status of Lithuania. While massacres in Georgia were disapproved of, there was never any forcible action taken against Moscow. With Lithuanians, in contrast, who were perceived to be European, such behaviour would not be tolerated. There was the feeling that if Gorbachev was prepared to use force on seceding Lithuanians, there was the danger that equal force might be used on the former satellite states which had also broken away. The US Government in particular, was also conscious of the feelings of its significant Lithuanian population. In some urban areas, such as around Boston, New York or Chicago, American citizens were far more concerned with events in the Baltic than with the Gulf War and the US Government had to take those sentiments into account.
53
139. There was also a military suppression of the Latvian independence seekers on the nights of 14-15 January. Six were killed and scores injured as Soviet forces attempted to seize power. As in Lithuania, the presence of the western media may well have prevented further bloodshed, and the events were capturedon film, which served to discredit Gorbachev still further, as it was alsosuggested that the Latvians had provoked the Soviet troops.
140. Report of the General Prosecutor. July 1991.
54
CHAPTER II
"HOMO SOVIETICUS" IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY
'A World in which centralised state planning is a euphemism for 
shortages, inefficiencies and bureaucratic bedlam'^
'What goals can a worm have when it's attached to a hook?
Fifty years of Soviet occupation have left what appears to be 
an indelible mark on Lithuania. This is not so much in the 
physical sense, although Lithuania clearly bears the scars of the 
occupation, but more a stain on the Lithuanian psyche. The 
imposition of an alien bureaucratic structure onto Lithuanian 
society was sufficient to impose (albeit unwillingly and perhaps 
even unknowingly) the mentality of homo sovieticus, a 'fairly 
disgusting creature'^, on to the Lithuanian population. This 
all-pervading ethos has affected every aspect of Lithuanian life, 
a fact which has only become obvious as Lithuania struggles to 
re-emerge as an independent state. The essential political, 
economic, industrial and social reforms implemented since the 
restitution of independence were all influenced by the existence 
of homo sovieticus. It is therefore necessary to determine what 
lies behind the evolution of this phenomenon and to identify its 
characteristics which have had such an influence on several 
generations of the Lithuanian people.
The influence of homo sovieticus is all the more remarkable 
because Lithuania has an exceptionally powerful sense of a 
distinct national identity and culture, a fact which has 
sustained her throughout centuries of occupation. A zealous 
religious belief, now a noted feature of the Lithuanian 
character, was a late addition to one which had already developed 
a clear singularity. The homogeny of the people, the use of such 
a common language and the knowledge and practising of a common 
culture within definite ethnographic boundaries was unusual in
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Central and Eastern Europe, which has always had an extremely 
multi-national population. This provided Lithuanians with a 
particular sense of unity and nationhood, which is being 
illustrated throughout this thesis. A widely-recognised enemy, 
for example Poland or Russia, created the existence of "the 
other", or "out group" versus "in group", a further foundation 
or pillar of national identity.
In 1910, Marija Peckauskaitè, a noted author of the time, 
romantically characterised the Lithuanian soul as follows: 'it
is like the Lithuanian landscape, in which there are no cloud- 
scraping mountains, no awesome abysses, no broad endless plains, 
no powerful rivers which defy all barriers. The landscape of 
Lithuania expresses peacefulness and moderation. The Lithuanian 
character is the same. There is no violence, no excess of desire, 
no false pose in it. The Lithuanian feels deeply but quietly. He 
rejoices and weeps, loves and hates, but without show. There is 
much of resignation in his outlook on life.''* Uniting this soul 
with the already identified sense of nationhood created a 
distinct homo lituanicus^.
To examine the effect, therefore, of homo sovieticus on homo 
lituanicus and on Lithuania herself, one must first ascertain 
what exactly is meant by it. The term has been used since the 
1980s to describe the Soviet people en masse.^ Although a 
theoretical definition of the ideal Soviet person was produced 
by the Communist Party of the USSR (CPSU) and shall be examined 
in greater depth within this chapter, one may safely assume that 
homo sovieticus in theory and homo sovieticus in reality were far 
from similar creatures. Nor may homo sovieticus be perceived as 
being a uniform being: the varying strains of these phenomena and 
their locations within different strata of Lithuanian society 
will also be studied, as the term homo sovieticus appears to 
indicate an extremely wide range of character attributes. As 
Aleksandr Zinoviev asserted, 'there are different species of 
Homsos [homo sovieticus] within the single genus of Homsos.'^
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In order to understand the importance and significance of the 
existence of homo sovieticus in the rebirth of modern Lithuania, 
one must first chart the evolution of this character. It may be 
argued that what is referred to today as homo sovieticus may be 
little more than a development of a person living in any 
bureaucratic society which has existed throughout the course of 
history. Homo sovieticus 'is the product of history...[and] is 
generated by the conditions inseparable from...society. He is the 
carrier of that society's principles of life.'® Studies of 
Habsburg and Imperial Russian societies appear to show distinct 
similarities with the bureaucratic regime of the former USSR.^ 
But it is the former USSR which merits the greatest attention, 
by virtue of Lithuania's incorporation within the Soviet 
monolith.
It is debateable, however, whether aspects of homo sovieticus 
has always been present in Lithuanian society and indeed, whether 
certain characteristics which combine to comprise homo sovieticus 
are present in many societies. What should also be considered are 
the consequences of the imposition of a totalitarian order and 
of the presence of an occupying power on the emergence of such 
a phenomenon. To do so, one must not merely examine key political 
or historical events: an analysis of such situations may also be 
gleaned from "alternative" sources, such as contemporary music 
or literature. Over the centuries these have proved to be sources 
of public opinion often more revealing than official 
pronouncements, despite the frequent existence of Government 
censorship. The situation in Lithuania in recent years has 
certainly not been unique and thus comparisons with states in a 
similar position, such as Poland or the Czech Republic, become 
particularly useful when examining the existence of homo 
sovieticus.
A characteristic of homo sovieticus which appears to have been 
prevalent throughout the Soviet sphere of influence post 1945 is 
the (sub)conscious adoption of a policy of internal exile, or, 
in the words of Vaclav Havel, a policy of "living the lie"*-® by
57
a segment of the population. Both the features of this policy and 
the subsequent consequences of its implementation require study, 
as it is possible that the impact of long-term internal exile 
could create and possibly is already creating difficulties in 
reconstructing former Soviet societies.
The final portion of this chapter dwells on whether the 
Lithuanians themselves are aware of the existence of such a 
phenomenon as homo sovieticus. If they are not, one must question 
why this is. But if they are, one must examine what is or is not 
being done to counteract it. In The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being, the Czech author Milan Kundera, living in exile, wrote: 
'Is a fool on the throne relieved of all responsibility merely 
because he is a fool?'*-*- This chapter will identify homo 
sovieticus as a similar "fool". It remains to be seen in the 
following chapters of this thesis just how the Lithuanians are 
relieving their own "fool" of responsibility for actions which 
appear to have had such a devastating impact on their state.
Homo sovieticus in theory and the homo sovieticus at large in 
Lithuania between 1991-1994 are clearly extremely different 
species. According to the Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii of 
1986*-^ , the ideal Soviet man or woman*-* possessed 'the all-round 
developed, socially active personality which combines spiritual 
richness, moral purity and physical perfection.'*-'* He or she was 
expected to conform to certain standards of behaviour covering 
all areas of society. In the economic sphere, homo sovieticus was 
expected to 'respect work as the main basis of the communist 
personality' and to observe the "collectivist moral", which is 
'incompatible with egotism, selfishness, and self-interest and 
combines national, collective and personal interests.' In the 
political sphere, he or she was requested to take 'an active role 
in the life of the collective... and reject everything that 
contradicts the socialist style of life...to follow the 
prescription of the Communist morality as based on collectivism, 
humanism, and activity, and observe Soviet laws.' *^
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In dealing with the international sphere, homo sovieticus was 
defined as being patriotic, ready to defend the homeland at all 
costs, being politically vigilant and proud of being part of the 
state which had achieved the first Socialist society. S/he was 
supposed to be capable of evaluating social phenomena from a 
class perspective, able to empathise with those who struggled 
against suppressors and to be quick to defend the ideas of 
socialism*®.
In the private life of homo sovieticus, the Communist code of 
honour based on the 'rules of behaviour which emerged in the 
struggle for socialism' had to be adhered to. The family was 
considered to be an invaluable unit as the 'agent responsible for 
the health of new generations.,.the place where the character of 
the individual with his... attitudes towards work, moral, 
ideological, and cultural values is moulded.' Homo sovieticus 
should 'assert genuine human relations among people; comradeship, 
friendliness, honesty, and modesty in personal and social life.' 
S/He should also possess the skills needed to communicate with 
different ethnic groups and to be able to show intolerance 
towards nationalism and chauvinism.
But even Soviet leaders such as Andropov or Gorbachev were 
aware that this species of homo sovieticus was nothing but a 
myth. In many of their speeches, homo sovieticus was portrayed 
in highly unflattering but also realistic terms. The Soviet 
people were accused of 'absenteeism, botching, pilfering, 
alcoholism, lying and many other flaws.'*® Already in 1985, the 
Editor-in-chief of Questions of Philosophy, V. Semenov, expressed 
his view that 'a certain proportion of the people... seriously 
deviate from the...moral norms [of socialist society] and are 
involved in behaviour which has been termed "negative 
phenomena"...with the ensuing retreat from social collectivist 
ideals...and with a concentration on only individualistic. 
egotistic inclinations. The life based on high spiritual values 
is being replaced by the hunt for consumer goods and for wealth, 
and the principles of decency, conscience, nobility and honesty
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are being replaced with egotism, cynicism and often cruelty.'*®
Although the use of the word "chauvinism" in the Programma 
Kommunisticheskoi Partii was most likely in its original sense, 
that is, a form of foreign jingoism or bellicose patriotism, 
"chauvinism" in its more modern sense was also practised by the 
average Soviet male despite the fact that this was in breach of 
the dictated "etiquette". It was accepted, as part of daily life, 
that although women could rise to senior positions in most 
sectors of employment, especially manufacturing, medicine or even 
(most unlikely in the West) the defence industry, outside the 
workplace they were still expected, in accordance with 
traditional Russian customs, to be responsible for the running 
of the household, including the shopping, cooking and cleaning. 
The Russian attitude towards women can perhaps best be expressed 
by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who in 1995 informed a British 
television audience that women should 'stay at home and sew and 
knit and cry their eyes out. '
The homo sovieticus currently found in Lithuania clearly bears 
many of these shortcomings. But s/he is a multi-faceted 
character, with various properties emerging in different stratum 
of Lithuanian society. It is somewhat ironic that the 
implementation of Communism, which promised mass equality after 
the autocratic Imperial reigns, was responsible instead for 
cementing firm social and cultural divisions within Lithuanian 
society and, indeed, within Soviet society as a whole: 'all
animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others,' 
wrote George Orwell in Animal Farm, his noted allegory.^* 
Following the Revolution of 1917, the Soviet people became 
inextricably divided between the higher echelons of the Party 
faithful: the Nomenklatura and the apparatchiks and the rest of 
the population: the masses identified by Lenin as the proletariat 
and the peasants. Homo sovieticus emerges in different ways in 
each of these levels of society.
The Nomenklatura were traditionally the Party elite, having
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risen to power predominantly by virtue of their connections 
rather than by their own merit. Members of this group have been 
nicknamed SRAPPS (Slavic-stock, Russian-born apparatchiks) by 
Brzezinski. Being a member of the Nomenklatura was an 
automatic passport to an escape from the omnipresent petty 
difficulties which were an inherent part of Soviet daily life. 
A member of the Nomenklatura was entitled to, among other things, 
more comfortable and spacious apartments, often complemented by 
a rural dacha, access to special, restricted shops stocking 
better (in some cases western) foodstuffs, clothes and other 
commodities and entry to special hospitals and other medical and 
dental facilities.**
Members of the Lithuanian Nomenklatura, while not in general 
Russian-born or of Slavic stock, were therefore members of the 
Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) which changed its name in 
19 90 to the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP). A change 
of name, however, may only prove to be a cosmetic alteration: the 
elite of the Party when re-elected to office in 1992 were, with 
few exceptions, the same people who had occupied that role during 
the years of Soviet occupation.*® Peter Bod, former Trade 
Minister in Hungary between 1992-1994, attributed the success of 
the former Communist regimes which were re-elected throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe to the existence of the Nomenklatura. 
'They all knew each other. . .had gone to University together. . .and 
were able to present a far more cohesive body to the electorate 
as opposed to the fragmented post-Soviet "independence" 
parties. ' *®
Although by 1992 Lithuania was a recognised democracy, the 
former Communist ruling elite appeared reluctant to jettison the 
privileges that they had become used to enjoying under the 
authoritarian regime. But this did not mean that all of the 
Lithuanian Nomenklatura were of the same opinion when it came to 
devising the reforms that were so necessary following the 
attaining of independence. Instead, the Nomenklatura may be split 
usefully into two groups: those bureaucrats who were advocates
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of reform versus those vehemently opposed to any change.
Those bureaucrats who had a vested interest in the 
continuation of the reform process inaugurated upon the 
restitution of independence were those who had benefitted more 
from the new opportunities afforded to them by the transition to 
a market economy than any other sector of society. This was 
because they alone, suggested Partos, had the 'necessary network 
of contacts, access to capital and credit and the permits 
required to start up in business - particularly during the early 
and largely unregulated phases of privatisation.'*® The economic 
advantages of continuing along the path to a full market economy 
clearly outweighed the disadvantages of incurring hostility and 
opposition from those in less favour of reform: those included, 
for example, the workers made redundant as labour became 
intensified, or those who could not keep up with the pace of 
soaring inflation during the 1991-1994 period. This is, however, 
an example of how homo sovieticus acted not only out of 
generosity to the nation in the interests of preserving 
independence, but also out of self-interest.
In the elevated ranks of the Nomenklatura, however, it was the 
other variant of homo sovieticus which has proven to be most 
detrimental to Lithuania's evolution since independence. This 
type may best be described as a bureaucrat who had been in charge 
of state-owned companies during the Soviet occupation and had 
remained in that position following independence. S/he had no 
interest in promoting any type of privatisation if that meant 
relinquishing control over his/her "empire". S/he, too, had the 
necessary network of contacts and the supplies of capital (for 
bribes, in some cases) to have the ability to impede progress 
towards reform to suit his/her personal advantage. One may argue 
that by hindering reform, it is this ilk of homo sovieticus who 
had the most damaging effect on the development of Lithuania in 
the years immediately following independence.
It is more difficult to define precisely the facets of homo
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sovieticus apparent in the lower stratum of Lithuanian society: 
Lenin's "work e r s , who constituted the majority of the 
population. It is unclear exactly how many of the "workers" have 
permanently inherited the traits of homo sovieticus, but from a 
personal overview of Lithuanian society, it would seem to be a 
significant proportion of the population.^" From a first 
examination, one may see three distinct varieties: the "sheep", 
that is those who displayed no individuality and demonstrated a 
complete lack of initiative; the "believers", who saw no evil in 
the Soviet regime and were unable to usefully criticise or, 
again, to show initiative. These were complemented by a third: 
those who had an excess of initiative ~ they appeared to go about 
their regular work, but paid it only superficial attention, while 
conducting their own (business) affairs often in somebody else's 
time and at somebody else's cost. This was a form of internal 
exile, to which more attention will be devoted below. All of 
these characters were able both to hinder reform and to distort 
any picture of an overview of Lithuanian society through their 
( in) actions .
The Lithuanians who were unable to show initiative were a 
serious problem version of homo sovieticus. In an era when the 
economy, in particular, had gone through such a radical 
transformation, the reluctance and unwillingness to show any 
initiative seriously impeded progress in all sp h e r e s . ^
Those Lithuanians incapable of seeing any evil in the Soviet 
regime played a crucial role in returning the former Communists 
to office, a trait which was echoed around the former Soviet 
satellite states of Eastern Europe^. The difficulties 
experienced during the first years of transition to a market 
economy, including spiralling inflation, unemployment and 
widescale shortages, have led in some areas of Lithuania, 
according to Partos, to 'a wave of nostalgia for the Communist 
era. . .people recall with approval a time when there was job 
security, price stability and a better functioning network of 
social-security, health care and educational provisions.'^
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From a western perspective, it is remarkable that the 
Lithuanians, Poles and Hungarians'^ were able to forget so 
easily about the limitations of a Communist regime which affected 
all aspects of their lives: the restrictions on movement and
dissemination of information, censorship, the terror of the KGB 
and the existence of a network of informers as well as the 
economic constraints which opposed private ownership and which 
tried to stifle (and often succeeded in stifling) any form of 
private initiative. For a Lithuanian, however, this phenomenon 
is more understandable. Having what was for fifty years a stable 
and relatively uncomplicated way of life (as long as one adhered 
to the prescribed codes of behaviour) thrown into turmoil and 
uncertainty by political and economic change, a significant 
proportion of Lithuanians, especially those belonging to post-War 
generations, indeed yearned for a return to what was, for them, 
the norm. (This, of course, was totally opposed to the western- 
style capitalist society which had been the norm for their 
parents and grandparents.)
An inability to criticise hindered the average homo sovieticus 
still further because it prevented him/her from being able to 
learn from the mistakes of others. Many Lithuanians looked to the 
USA for solutions to the problems of restructuring an entire 
society but, as Adelman indicates, 'the growing tendency to 
glorify the experience [of the USA] is often unrealistic and 
lacks deep analysis, awareness or real information. 
Throughout the course of the Soviet Occupation, successive 
generations of Lithuanians appeared to forget that the merits of 
capitalism as practised in the USA had to be earned: despite the 
mythological propaganda, it was not a land where the streets were 
paved with gold.
Those Lithuanians who were fortunate enough to be able to 
emigrate to the USA often arrived at Ellis Island or a similar 
threshold with very little and, in many cases, had to
settle for far more menial levels of work than they would have 
undertaken in Lithuania, having to eke out a living for
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themselves and their families. In some cases, especially those 
who fled at the time of the start of the Soviet occupation, they 
were never able to match the standard of living or social status 
they had enjoyed in Lithuania, but they felt that the merits of 
being in the USA during this time far outweighed the material 
losses suffered. Albina Brazauskas, for example, a fully 
qualified dentist in Lithuania, could only find employment as a 
manual worker in a wristwatch factory in Waterbury, Connecticut, 
USA. Her husband traded large estates in Lithuania for a small 
house in an insalubrious part of the town. But both of them, 
unlike so many of their relatives, were spared the horror of 
deportation and, in some cases death, at the hands of the Soviet 
occupying forces. To their last days, they never regretted 
fleeing from the advancing Red Army in 1944, despite the material 
losses they suffered.
Those who remained in Lithuania, however, continued to view 
the USA as the land of plenty, but failed to comprehend that hard 
work was necessary to earn this plentitude. It was this group of 
people who found the transition to a market economy most 
difficult, because the concept of working for personal gain had 
become so alien after fifty years of occupation. They were in 
need of re-education to learn that material rewards were not a 
natural entitlement, but had to be deserved.
It was the failure of the overall Soviet system, however, that 
led to the evolution of the third aspect of homo sovieticus, as 
best defined by Vladimir Shlapentokh^: 'with the strong
deviation of real Soviet life from the official model, the Soviet 
people have developed a mentality that allows them to ignore 
public interests and to absorb themselves in private or illegal 
activity in the workplace while preserving a surface allegiance 
to the Soviet system. This mentality operates on a mythological 
level, which helps ordinary people deal with public figures, and 
on a pragmatic level, which determines their private 
b e h a v i o u r . '38 This character proved to be an obstacle to the 
development of Lithuania in the years following the ending of the
65
Soviet occupation, because this sector of society had become so 
used to working for purely personal gain and could not, 
therefore, be relied upon collectively to restart the economy. 
This difficult process required absolute dedication, which was 
impossible to achieve in an environment where allegiances were 
uncertain.
A further type of homo sovieticus was found within all levels 
of society: from the highest ranks of the Nomenklatura to the
lowest rank of manual worker. This was the "decent bloke", as 
described by Aleksandr Z i n o v i e v . He 'does all the same things 
the others do, but he does them in a way that against the 
background of the others he looks like the incarnation of 
goodness.' He (possibly unwittingly) displayed all the virtues 
of Communism while at the same time hiding the 'most unpalatable 
phenomena of Communist life from the eyes of the general public.' 
By being in every organisation and elected to every bureau he 
could infiltrate all levels of society, working as an 
advertisement for Communism and acting as a role model for other 
people.
A person aware that he had been earmarked by the Authorities 
as a "decent bloke" could use this position to gain a degree of 
power; he could become embroiled in the web of informers which 
characterised totalitarian societies: in Communist society 'even 
virtues are special functions of people and not innately noble 
qualities. Moreover virtue often pays better than vice. And its 
hidden role is sometimes more disgusting than the open behaviour 
of evil men. ' This "decent bloke" has also been identified as 
present in the former Czechoslovakia by Vaclav Havel, as being 
'always disguised in the cloak of inconspicuousness and silent 
participation...diligently trying never to be publicly 
compromised in any way.'^^
All of the above attributes comprise the character of homo 
sovieticus, a character not unique to Lithuania, but one rampant 
throughout the former USSR and associated satellite states.
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The term homo sovieticus, however, may now be seen to describe 
not just a specific type of person, but instead a variety of 
greatly differing individuals born from the same circumstance. 
Through time and over generations, the type of homo sovieticus 
most obviously apparent in these states has changed. Immediately 
after the start of the Occupation, the desire for self- 
preservation would still be coupled with the capitalist mind, 
with an instinct for using initiative for personal gain. But as 
the Occupation continued and people became sovietised, this will 
have shifted with far greater emphasis being placed on self- 
preservation and less on personal, capitalist initiative. But how 
and why did homo sovieticus evolve: what was it about Soviet 
society which created such a phenomenon? To examine the origins 
of homo sovieticus, one must look at the characteristics of any 
bureaucratic society.
As early as 1813, Campe depicted a bureaucracy as 'the 
authority of power which various Government departments and their 
branches arrogate to themselves over fellow c i t i z e n s . Max 
Weber, who undertook a detailed study of bureaucracy, identified 
the concept of "Power and Domination"^ in which he emphasised 
that in a bureaucratic society a great amount of discipline was 
exerted by a chosen few to ensure critical and unresisting mass 
obedience. Weber also underlined the importance of "domination 
through knowledgewith decisions being taken by an 'elite 
stratum of professionally trained individuals, who carry out 
their specialised functions in a strictly detached and rule-bound 
fashion.'46 He argued that the evolution of a bureaucratic 
society was perhaps inevitable, resulting from the increasing 
complexity of civilisation and 'the increasing need felt by a 
society grown accustomed to stable and absolute peace for order 
and protection in all areas.
Thus the bureaucratic society envisaged by Weber would be one 
dominated by a strong leader, free to pursue goals which are 
'uncompromising, far-reaching, and not subject to every-day or 
material circumstances'^ supported by a network of bureaucrats
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to govern according to their best judgement. In a bureaucratic 
society, however, this automatically entails the increasing 
centralisation of authority and the creation of a hierarchy of 
offices. As may be seen especially in a study of Soviet 
bureaucracy, this then leads to the 'loss of value-oriented 
behaviour and its replacement with purely formal...calculations 
of how to achieve given ends by the most efficient means, 
with the resulting negative consequences for a society which 
demands complete subordination and impersonality from the 
populace. Writing in 1936, Mannheim suggested that this would 
turn all the problems of politics into problems of 
administration, 3° thereby shielding the leader of a society from 
the consequences of his actions.
In such a bureaucratic state, one of the principal roles of 
the "masses" would be to vote in elections that would be held in 
order for them to publicly express their confidence and belief 
in the authority of the leader, thus accentuating their
subjugation to one person's will. Those persons employed within 
the bureaucratic structure would, argued Weber, inevitably 
concern themselves primarily with advancing upwards through the 
structure, attempting to become evermore powerful: the
'dictatorship of the official...on the advance.'
Although Weber was writing at the turn of the nineteenth to 
twentieth centuries, one of the best examples of a bureaucratic 
society may be found by examining the Habsburg Empire, which 
dominated Europe in the previous centuries, where 'the
bureaucracy...worked as an instrument of the state and an
appendix of the D y n a s t y .
Habsburg bureaucratic government displayed four basic
characteristics. Chief among these was the innate sense of 
authority and superiority displayed by those persons who had 
reached the highest echelons of Government structure over those 
who had failed, or had never intended, to do so. But despite 
displaying such obvious pride in having reached such a position.
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the typical Habsburg bureaucrat demonstrated a steadfast dislike 
and refusal to shoulder responsibility, often disguising his 
participation in administrative actions in order that he could 
disassociate himself from them should the need arise. The 
Habsburg bureaucrat clung steadfastly to the concept of the 
hierarchical spirit, being aware of everyone's rank in the 
structure. Such a fixed structure ensured the continued obedience 
and loyalty of every bureaucrat. It was this devotion to the 
bureaucratic structure which was responsible for the origin of 
the fourth characteristic of the Habsburg bureaucrat: the
'tendency to resent, as a sort of lese-majesté, all attempts to 
criticise the working, to curtail the power, or to reform the 
organisation of the bureaucracy i t s e l f .
The composition of the bureaucratic structure of the Habsburg 
Empire evolved slowly through the reigns of Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II. Under Maria Theresa the bureaucracy was to all intents 
and purposes the old aristocracy trying, in many cases 
unenthusiastically and unsuccessfully, to perform a new role. It 
was 'cumbersome and inefficient,...producing less satisfactory 
results than the old system, which although crude. . .had at least 
been based on local k n o w l e d g e During the reign of Joseph II, 
commoners were brought into the bureaucratic structure for the 
first time and advancement up the hierarchical structure became 
dependent not solely on favouritism and connections, but on merit 
and competence. The bureaucrats were, however, restricted from 
showing any initiative by the presence of the watchful eyes of 
the Emperor's secret police: the bureaucrats were thus forced to 
adhere to the political beliefs of the Emperor, which gave the 
bureaucracy "poodle" status^®, a situation not entirely 
dissimilar from the Communist bureaucracy which spawned homo 
sovieticus.
By the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Habsburg 
bureaucracy had reached a certain level of notoriety. As had been 
the case during the reign of Maria Theresa, almost 200 years 
later it was the bureaucracy's powers of obstruction which were
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attracting the most attention. 'Red tape exists the world over,' 
wrote Henry Wickham Steed in May 1914, 'but the extent to which 
it impedes freedom of movement in the Habsburg monarchy should 
be a warning to all countries that lightly propose to add new 
wheels to the bureaucratic m a c h i n e . He felt that despite its 
need, there was very little hope of reforming the structure 
because nepotism and favouritism were still rife: 'every official 
appointed becomes a kind of vested interest.
The creation of these vested interests were also a key feature 
of Imperial Russian bureaucracy. During the reign of Peter the 
Great (1672-1725), 'the whole nobility was an instrument of the 
Government.'58 By the reign of Nicholas I, bureaucracy had 
caused Habsburg-like obstructions in central and local 
administration. Russia was divided into provincial Governments 
and these were controlled by the Governor. These Governors were 
often corrupt and oppressive, such as the 'jolly rogue...General 
Bronevsky.. .effective Monarch of Eastern Siberia.Bureaucracy 
in Imperial Russia was further complicated by the system of 
landowners working as the Czar's direct representatives on their 
estates outside the bureaucratic structure, as the bureaucracy 
tended to be composed of the poorer or less competent nobles, who 
lacked grand country estates. Nicholas I, however, was determined 
that the land-owning nobles would be responsible only for the 
affairs of their serfs and should play no role in the affairs of 
their local districts.^
Nicholas I was aware of the failings of and corruption within 
the bureaucracy and in 183 3 a new system was introduced to reduce 
the volume of paperwork in the Ministry of the Interior and to 
create a strict, centralised Government, keeping individual 
Ministries ignorant of the affairs of the others.^ This was to 
prove impossible to run effectively, as the Czar became swamped 
with trivia and therefore, as Crankshaw indicates, 'each separate 
Ministry was thus a bureaucrat's paradise.'^ But corruption, 
idleness, mental dishonesty and ' a preference for flattering 
euphemisms over factual description'“ remained rife throughout
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the Imperial bureaucratic system, a condition which was to 
continue and increase with the establishment of the USSR. P. A. 
Valuyev, Minister under Alexander II, reported in 1855 that 'The 
variety of administrative forms outweighs the essence of 
administrative activity, and ensures the prevalence of the 
universal official lie. Glitter at the top, rot at the bottom. 
In the creations of our official verbosity there is no room for 
truth. It is hidden between the lines; but who. ..is., .able to pay 
attention to the space between the lines?
By the latter half of the 19th Century, the Imperial 
bureaucracy had evolved from being noble-based to one composed 
of members of the quickly-growing, urban-dwelling middle class. 
Their ethos was one of strict obedience to the Government in 
return for numerous political favours. The formation of elected 
local zemstvos following the emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 
created new local administrative positions and distributed wider 
powers among the bureaucracy. But an increase in powers led to 
an inevitable increase in duties for and numbers of the 
bureaucracy and therefore still greater inefficiency. Under the 
reign of Alexander III, bureaucratic administration was combined 
with a policy of russification and religious conformity, as he 
sought to raise Russia's national consciousness. This caused 
further administrative chaos as well as igniting nationalist 
passions among the non-Russians in the Empire, especially the 
Lithuanians, which continued through the reign of Nicholas I I . ^  
By the time of the 1917 Revolution, the Imperial bureaucracy was 
almost as cumbersome and unwieldy as its Habsburg parallel.
It was the four fundamental traits apparent in the Habsburg 
bureaucracy which were to resurface in the Soviet version which 
developed after the 1917 Revolution and which were to dominate 
Soviet and therefore Lithuanian society. The innate sense of 
authority and superiority, the dislike of responsibility, the 
hierarchical spirit and the resentment displayed towards reform 
were all to characterise a system which adversely affected all 
aspects of life under the Soviet regime.
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Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, was entirely aware of 
the problems inherent in succumbing to a bureaucracy along the 
lines of the Habsburg structure. Prior to 1917 he had, in fact, 
tried to redefine what was meant by bureaucracy, eliminating its 
pejorative and elitist connotations. He aimed to replace a 
Habsburg-style bureaucracy with the concept of a "proletarian 
administrative apparatus", basing it on lessons learned by Marx 
from the Paris Commune in 1871.56 His efforts, however, were 
criticised by one of his theoretical supporters, Rosa Luxemburg: 
the lack of the right to freedom of speech and the absence of 
elections and a freely elected assembly after 1917 already 
indicated at an early stage in the history of the USSR that 
Lenin's proletarian administrative apparatus would prove to be 
just as unwieldy and elitist (in its own way) as the Imperial 
civil service had been in the past.
Luxemburg's disapproval of the new system was echoed by 
others: one of the foci of the 1921 Krondstadt Sailors' revolt 
was the opposition to Lenin's new bureaucratic structure.^ As 
in any totalitarian society, however, this opposition was 
suppressed and the post-Revolution bureaucracy began to 
ingratiate itself into all areas of society. It was this which 
may be held primarily responsible for the spawning of hoiuo 
sovieticus. Despite having promised the masses an "El Dorado" 
based on universal equality; in its place and 'with frightening 
urgency, principles of deviation began to work which inexorably 
created such differentials in the actual renumeration of workers 
and officials of high standing as would never have been 
possible ... in the West.'^
There was a distinct split within Soviet society between the 
Nomenklatura, who were to staff the bureaucratic machine, and the 
rest of the population. Nonetheless, the traits apparent in the 
Soviet bureaucracy were not entirely dissimilar to those 
displayed by those outside the bureaucratic system. The 
principles employed by the bureaucracy affected every form and 
aspect of communal behaviour, communal relations, management of
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businesses or industries, the issue of responsibility, careerism, 
property and ownership and the freedoms, powers and personalities 
of individuals.
As with the pre-Revolution Imperial regime, Lenin's Communists 
quickly established a social order which grouped the majority of 
the Russian people in a single societal bracket. This was 
emphasised by the enforcing of more or less standardised living 
conditions, salaries and (a lack of) privileges. Any attempt to 
extricate oneself from this system was met by forcible repression 
from a branch of the highly-developed internal security 
structure, a Directorate of the KGB. Aleksandr Zinoviev argued 
that this was responsible for the creation of the behavioural 
stereotype which he defined as homo sovieticus. Generations 
living in such a communal environment began to adapt and to 
forget that it was an unnatural way of life and even, at most 
times, to forget about its oppressive n a t u r e . ^
Zinoviev argued that the USSR succeeded in existing as long 
as it did partly because of this emphasis on communal relations 
and their impact on an individual's behaviour, expanding on this 
concept in The Realitv of Communism: 'The group tries to put the 
individual in a position in which he is dependent on it for 
everything he receives from society, and for everything he 
contributes to society. The group tries to control the 
individual's rewards and punishments, his productive activity and 
his personal life. And the group has the basis and obvious means 
of so doing, because it is the group which pays the individual 
for his participation in society as a member of the group and not 
as an individual person.While Zinoviev was examining small 
groups of people, one may feasibly contend that this was an 
equally good analysis of the Soviet system as a whole, fostering 
a climate of dependency on the regime on the part of the Soviet 
population. As Andrei Sakharov suggested, one of the reasons for 
this dependency was the ability of the Soviet state to 'swallow 
each of them without choking.
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The fear which ensured subjugation had also been a feature of 
Imperial Russia and was continued by Lenin. The Cheka (secret 
police) had been established under the command of Felix 
Dzerzhinsky on 2 0 December 1917 and had enforced its power by the 
instigation of a Terror in 1919, but Sakharov in particular 
indicates that it was the widespread and random purges beginning 
in 193 5 which really embroidered the image of mass fear onto the 
minds of the Soviet people. They were notorious because of the 
impact they had on the Soviet population and on the population 
structure itself: 20 million victims, for most of whom no
rational reason could be found for their arrest and execution, 
Stalin's purges taught the average Soviet person of the need to 
ensure their individual survival. It seemed as if the only way 
to do that was to capitulate to the system: 'He is subjected to 
the same kind of training as a horse; and he submits to the 
training in order to survive. He deceives himself,' said 
Sakharov.
Therefore behind the active role of mass participation, both 
the specialised bureaucrat and the individual Soviet citizen were 
forced to embark upon a policy of self-preservation. Key to this 
method of survival was the subconscious adherence to the traits 
inherited from previous bureaucratic regimes. Awareness of one's 
own and others' authority was essential for this survival. It 
often led to a degree of sycophancy, more commonly referred to 
as "toadying" and according to Zinoviev, 'toadying quickly 
becomes a habit. But even when he has toadied a thousand times, 
the Toady will be perfectly aware of the reality of his 
t o a d y i n g . '73 As Medvedev noted, 'officials stopped taking the 
feelings and opinions of ordinary people into account and became 
accustomed to commanding those beneath them and fawning upon 
their s u p e r i o r s . Power was entangled in all branches of 
Soviet society, which was inevitable in a world where its 
citizens assumed office by virtue of their relationships with 
their superiors and subordinates and where the Communist Party 
itself stood at the head of the whole power system.
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Inherent in Soviet society, especially during the last years 
of the Gorbachev regime, was the visible dislike of 
responsibility demonstrated by all sectors of society. Being 
aware of the precariousness of their position, individuals 
frequently attempted to take credit for the positive results of 
the work of others and to shift their own negative results onto 
someone else's shoulders. This policy was not just adopted by the 
Soviet people, but was also often practised by the Soviet 
Government, which took all the credit for any of its successes, 
but blamed the people themselves for anything that appeared to 
be a mistake.
The flexibility of the leaders of the Communist Party was 
remarkable: throughout the years of the USSR's existence, the
party leaders demonstrated a 'ready ability to change 
direction... Communism knows neither mistakes nor defeats. 
Medvedev admitted that during Stalin's rule, 'inconvenient facts 
were juggled, distorted, or simply ignored.Supported 
subconsciously by the people themselves, the Government made use 
of ideological resources, by creating an enemy: a scapegoat to 
take the blame for all their failings. Medvedev stated that 'no 
proofs were given, only invective and labels: "Trotsky-
Bukharinite outlaws",..."Fascist lackeys", "the dregs of the 
human race" and so on.'^? The imposition of such ideological 
morality served to justify the Soviet Government's every failing, 
its every crime. Even the millions of victims of the purges were 
able to be excused in this respect. Widespread ideological 
education taught the Soviet people, above all, how to live in an 
atmosphere of deceit and hypocrisy and that this needed to be 
adhered to purely for self-preservation.
Acceptance of a social hierarchy was also a fundamental 
characteristic of Soviet life. People were thoroughly aware of 
their immediate superiors and subordinates. This can be separated 
into both a practical and a theoretical awareness of the social 
ladder. The most physical indication of the cemented class 
structure within the USSR may be seen by examining the
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Nomenklatura. This elite had its own clearly-defined social 
status, reflected in its housing, clothing and schooling. To 
outsiders, the Nomenklatura also appeared to have its own way of 
thinking, communicating and doing business. This inspired a 
significant degree of resentment but, embroiled in the grip of 
a totalitarian regime, there was nothing that could be done to 
right what appeared to be such an obvious wrong.
Andrei Sakharov was able to identify the more theoretical 
awareness of class differences within the USSR in his ironic view 
of Soviet life: 'although the radio daily informs the ordinary
Soviet citizen that he is the master of his country, he realises 
very well that the real masters are those who. . .speed through the 
deserted... streets in their armoured limousines... He knows that 
his personal fate depends wholly upon the state: upon his
immediate or remote superiors; upon the chairman of the housing 
committee, upon the chairman of the trade union committee... and 
possibly on the KGB informer working next to him. ' ^8 one can 
suggest that it was people's attempts to either rise out of this 
mire or merely to stay afloat in it and not to be entirely broken 
by the system which spawned the network of corruption and deceit 
that permeated not only the bureaucratic structure, but also life 
in general.
What has now become, therefore, synonymous with Soviet 
bureaucratic society is the network of connections for illegal 
purposes (the mafias^) which sprang up. Inside the official 
structures of Soviet bureaucracy, connections between various 
apparatchiks were established in order to provide mutual support. 
These were copied in all ranks of society. Eradicating corruption 
was the target of some of Gorbachev's most ambitious reforms in 
the late years of the 1980s®° but it was easier said than done. 
Corruption had reached the highest echelons of Soviet life: 
Shchelokov, Minister of Internal Affairs; his First Deputy, 
Churbanov (Leonid Brezhnev's son-in-law) and Pekunov, Procurator 
of the USSR, were all implicated in one of the largest corruption 
scandals ever known in the USSR, which discredited the ruling
76
elite. 5^
As Medvedev commented, 'the lack of effective controls, the 
passivity of the masses and bureaucracy inevitably generated 
corruption.'*2 Carrere d'Encausse concurred: 'the political
system... encouraged abuses, trafficking and corruption.'^ its 
spread from the 1970s until the collapse of the USSR in 1991 
contributed to whole sectors of Soviet life falling into the 
control of the so-called "second economy"Regions, such as 
the Caucuses and Central Asia were riddled with corruption to an 
unprecedented extent : ' in Uzbekistan everything was corrupt : not 
only had the economy been sabotaged, but the whole system of 
access to jobs was undermined by criminal practices.'^ Armenia 
was in a similar situation. The construction industry in 
particular was affected by corruption, a fact revealed by the 
Yerevan earthquake of 1988, where the poor construction of many 
buildings, as a result of corrupt workers and suppliers 
contributed to the high scale of loss of life and injury.^ Yet 
the local mafias which had been established in these regions had 
such a firm grip on the reins of power that Gorbachev was forced 
to turn a blind eye.
Corruption in some form began to be seen by many people as a 
relatively simple way to raise their income to be able, in some 
cases, to afford to bribe those officials who had the ability and 
the power to make day-to-day living slightly easier. It had 
reached such a magnitude by the 1980s that the ordinary, honest 
worker was absolutely unable to attain similar levels of wealth 
as those who had abandoned whatever principles or scruples they 
might have once possessed and had embraced the mafia culture with 
open arms. By 1991 there was no longer any prestige in being seen 
to be an honest, conscientious worker: instead, such people
incited feelings of pity. In the USSR it could be said that 'to 
make use of one's office for private gain isn't really an abuse, 
but rather something quite natural.'S? Under Communism, the 
Soviet people became adept at exploiting whatever there was 
available to be exploited, without the merest blemish on their
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conscience.
With no credit being awarded for honest achievement, this led 
to the inevitable decline in professional enthusiasm within the 
USSR, which continued to be felt in the first years of 
independence in Lithuania. What was 'especially ominous... [was] 
the slackening of technological progress and the deterioration 
in the quality of [home made] goods and [professional] 
services. ' This was to prove to be serious problem not only 
for the Lithuanians but for all of the former Soviet republics 
as they began to compete in the international market. At a time 
when increasing emphasis should have been placed on improving 
both domestic goods and services, failure to do so adversely 
affected the transition to a market economy. Homo sovieticus, 
however, failed to recognise the importance of the need for 
quality in international competition.
The decline in professional enthusiasm in the USSR may be 
seen, however, to be just one manifestation of a "policy" of 
internal exile during the Soviet era. This encompassed the 
withdrawal of human energy and emotion from all work for the 
state, coupled with a total absorption in one's own private 
interests®^. A more detailed study of the causes and effects of 
this concept will be undertaken later in this chapter, but at 
this point it should be implied that it was the development of 
such a policy that had a thoroughly detrimental impact on Soviet 
society, Soviet bureaucracy and on the evolution of homo 
sovieticus because of the legacy it bequeathed to the post-Soviet 
world.
Soviet society was therefore highly complex, although to the 
outsider it created a facade that was extremely difficult to 
penetrate until the relaxation of restrictions on foreign travel 
within the USSR. Shrouded in parades, festivities and 
celebrations of the great Communist ideal, Soviet society may 
more accurately have been described by the noted dissident Andrei 
Sakharov as being despondent, grey and boring: 'a sea of human
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misery, difficulties, animosities, cruelty, fatigue and 
indifference - things that have accumulated for ages and are 
undermining the foundations of society.'®® Although these words 
were written in 1975: the USSR still having over 15 years of
existence before imploding, their accuracy should not be 
underestimated. It was all aspects of Soviet society reflected 
in this passage, once again indicating the strength of the 
integration of the bureaucracy in all strata of Soviet life and 
it was inevitable that a bureaucracy which epitomised this "sea 
of human misery" would require reform. Absent from all levels of 
Soviet society was the 'personal interest in the speediest and 
best solutions of problems: what is present is the personal
effort to avoid risk and responsibility. ' Nowhere was this 
more prevalent than in the bureaucratic structure.
The above features of homo sovieticus create a distinct 
character. It may be argued, however, that some of these 
properties may have already been in evidence before the evolution 
of homo sovieticus, in fact may always have been in evidence. 
They exist 'wherever a large enough people are compelled to live 
together and where there is a complicated economic and government 
system.'^ It was, however, specific elements of communist 
society which allowed the aforementioned characteristics to 
become dominant. The legacies of the socialisation of the means 
of production throughout the whole country, the liquidation of 
the classes of private owners and entrepreneurs and the 
centralised direction of all aspects of life were suddenly 
grafted onto a new economic and government system, rather than 
one which had evolved slowly. As a direct result, these 
tendencies, now recognised as constituting part of the makeup of 
homo sovieticus, rose to the surface.
The question remains, however, whether it was purely the 
Soviet regime or totalitarian regimes in general which were 
responsible for the creation of such a phenomenon. There were 
certainly traits of homo sovieticus which were apparent in the 
population of Germany under Hitler's domination. The fundamental
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difference between the person who developed in the USSR as homo 
sovieticus and the person who lived under Hitler's regime (or 
indeed any other totalitarian regime) was that Communism created 
an entirely new structure and social order: basing this social 
order on connections and suitability rather than on merit or 
inherited status. Despite the accepted similarities between the 
products of the Soviet and Nazi eras, such as the acceptance of 
the leaders' personal overwhelming power and the phenomenon of 
mass repression, German totalitarianism occurred without 
drastically changing the existing social order of the state: it 
occurred 'within the context of western civilisation...one could 
cast aside totalitarianism... and preserve the social order of 
the country.'®®
One may argue that Nazism, on a superficial level, exaggerated 
certain Germanic tendencies which had always been present 
throughout Germany's history. These could be seen to include a 
genuine love of militarism, a belief in the power and ability of 
the Fatherland, an inherited dislike of Germany's historical 
foes, an innate sense of superiority over other European states 
and a love of discipline and order.®* Karl Zuckmayer's 1931 play 
'Der Hauptmann von Kopenick', an outstanding satire of Prussian 
obedience to the military, epitomised these tendencies. Hitler 
was elected to office in 1933 partly on the strength of his 
stance as the bastion against Communism, coupled with his 
determination, which won him mass support and acclaim, to reverse 
the terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, perceived by so many 
Germans as being unduly harsh and humiliating. Lenin's Communism, 
however, installed in power by the process of two revolutions in 
1917, with only the faintest semblance of democratic intentions, 
was a social rather than a political phenomenon: when the power 
of Communism was removed in 1991, the entire social order of what 
had been the USSR began to fragment and started to collapse.
Nonetheless, the impact of the imposition of any form of 
totalitarianism onto an existing social or political order could 
not fail to affect the population of that state. The process of
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the imposition of Communism extended not only throughout the 
former Russian Empire but also throughout the zones of Central 
and Eastern Europe which fell under Soviet influence after 1945. 
In these zones, one may contend, the installation of Communism 
had a more severe impact than on the people of the Russian 
Federation because not only was it the introduction of an 
unwelcome totalitarian regime, but it was also the introduction 
of an occupying power, which brought with it the associated 
difficulties, not least the need to overcome the conflict between 
kow-towing to the new regime and inherent nationalism, which was 
utterly incompatible with an Occupation: 'behind all occupations 
and invasions lurks a more basic, pervasive evil and...the image 
of that evil was a parade of people marching by with raised fists 
and shouting identical syllables in unison.'®® Lithuania was not 
alone in having to adapt unwillingly to this new regime. Certain 
distinct similarities may be found if one compares Lithuania to 
what was until 1993, Czechoslovakia, for example, or Poland.
In all of the states which became "Sovietised" in the years 
following 194 5, it quickly became obvious that it would be 
impossible to physically resist the Soviet occupation. Even what 
were essentially puny attempts to either overthrow or reform the 
system, such as in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
were met with fierce, military repression. For the majority of 
people there was little alternative but to carry on with day to 
day living as best one could, which meant adapting, at least in 
some form, to the new system. There were historical precedents 
for dealing with a Russian occupation. The Poles had demonstrated 
this in 1794 after the partition of their country, when it 
appeared virtually impossible that they would be able to maintain 
any semblance of their life and culture in the face of Russian 
imperial rule. They managed to do so by adopting a conciliatory 
atmosphere and by staying passive, thereby being able to extract 
as many concessions from Russia as possible and arguably 
succeeding in preserving some of the mainstays of Polish culture 
'until the situation changed for the better.'®® The ability to 
do this was a skill which was to prove invaluable in the years
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of Soviet domination following World War II. 'Those who 
fought. . .often came to see the futility of their actions and 
returned to passive co-existence or even collaboration.'
Why does one conform in such cases, when the regime to which 
one is conforming blatantly contradicts one's ideals? The 
natural, human instinct for self-preservation tends to overpower, 
at least for the majority of people, whatever feelings of 
nationalism or a related emotion one possesses. There are, of 
course, people who do not tolerate an infringement of what they 
perceive as being their natural rights: there were a few people 
who did martyr themselves in the name of nationalism as a protest 
against the Soviet domination of Eastern and Central Europe in 
the post-war era. Names such as Romas Kalanta of Lithuania or Jan 
Palach of Czechoslovakia may be grouped into this category. Then 
there were those who suffered arrest and imprisonment in defence 
of their ideals. These were far more numerous and often more 
familiar: names such as Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel®®. And then 
there were many others whose names would be unrecognisable to few 
but their immediate families or associates, but who were brave 
enough to stand up for their ideals and who paid the penalty.®®
Most people, however, lack this courage. The natural desire 
for self-preservation has traditionally fostered conformity. This 
conformity however, is for the most part only on the surface. 
Many people have learned how to go into "internal exile". 
Internal exile may best be described as pseudo-conformity: paying 
lip-service to the regime in power, while at the same time 
retreating inside one's mind and sharing one's real thoughts only 
with those who are entirely trustworthy. This is a natural 
reaction to being forced to live in society riddled with 
informers: as the population of the former German Democratic
Republic discovered when the Stasi files were opened after 
reunification, one could never tell for certain exactly who was 
employed by the internal security forces.
By withdrawing all emotions away from their official lives and
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duties, people in internal exile were able to preserve their 
sanity. What makes internal exile possible is the hope that 
eventually things will get better. It is this faith which has 
historically sustained people in this predicament. Conforming was 
the easiest way of living in a society which made everything 
difficult, be it living, working, eating, recreation, 
entertainment, advancement in all spheres and even thinking or 
speaking. Every little thing had to be fought for and the 
individual was 'enmeshed by difficulties.'^"® This feeling was 
cultivated by the ruling elite who felt that individuals were 
better suited to mass manipulation if they were otherwise 
occupied with having to struggle to fulfil even the most basic 
daily chores. The Communist Governments of Central and Eastern 
Europe may even have deliberately encouraged these difficulties 
in an effort to demoralise and de-personalise the state, for the 
creation of individual persons was the complete antithesis of the 
essence of Communism.
Human nature has proven over the course of centuries to be 
remarkably adaptable and resilient in the face of such 
difficulties. Under the yoke of Soviet occupation in Lithuania, 
as in other Central and Eastern European states, this was 
certainly the case. As Milosz pointed out, 'Ultimately people 
grew accustomed to everything; to obligatory parades, mandated 
friendships, a special language that was diametrically opposed 
to what they really meant to say. Later there was conformity and 
relative peace. People, the educated stratum in particular, feel 
that the daily lying is the tribute one must render unto Caesar 
in order to have a more or less bearable life and they do not see 
a moral problem in this. Perhaps this is precisely what the 
authorities want. ' 3®®
One could argue that this demonstrates that the Soviet 
authorities succeeded in their goal of demoralising the 
population of Lithuania (and other states). In Lithuania, a 
highly religious state, the population could historically have 
been described as "moral" : moral in that the majority of the
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population lived according to what could be termed "Christian" 
values. Fifty years of Soviet occupation, however, meant that 
many Lithuanians no longer felt any guilt when lying about their 
whereabouts, their thoughts or their pursuits.
A spirit of conscientiousness prevalent before the Soviet 
occupation was replaced by a lack of care, pride or ambition. 
Indeed, in the fifty years of Soviet rule, many of the Lithuanian 
people succumbed to the traits of homo sovieticus as denigrated 
by Gorbachev.3®3 By the time of the restitution of Lithuania's 
independence in 1990, conformity was often on a thoroughly 
superficial level for a population that had gone into internal 
exile. Lithuanian people would work at their specific jobs, but 
were unconcerned about exploiting the system by, for example, 
pilfering from the workplace or by having no compunction about 
absenteeism. According to Medvedev, 'bureacuracy and corruption 
[led to] a blunting of the feeling of responsibility for 
everything going on around them.'®®^
Lithuanians' lack of commitment to their employers was an 
obvious manifestation of the spirit of internal exile. In the 
years 1987-1990, it was amazing how many Lithuanians suddenly 
became ill and required sick leave from work just as western 
relatives arrived. They often thought nothing of taking a 
fortnight off work to be able to spend time with their family. 
The re-introduction of private enterprise following independence, 
however, came somewhat as a shock to many Lithuanians, who 
suddenly realised that if they took too much time off work, they 
would not be paid and could therefore no longer afford to take 
unscheduled leave.
The instinctive and inescapable desire for self-preservation 
was, however, rampant throughout the Soviet sphere of influence. 
This meant that despite certainly being guilty of flaws such as 
absenteeism, few people would dare to be political non­
conformists. In his open letter. The Power of the Powerless. 
Vaclav Havel illustrated how and why people conformed. He
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described how a shopkeeper always displayed a sign in his shop 
window which said "Workers of the World, unite!", despite neither 
believing in or caring about the slogan. Havel's theory was that 
he did so 'simply because it has been done that way for years, 
because everyone does it, and because that's the way it has to 
be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble...He does 
because these things must be done if one is to get along in life. 
It is one of the thousands of details which guarantee him a 
relatively tranquil life in harmony with s o c i e t y . T h i s  was 
Havel giving a fine example of someone in internal exile: 
conforming on the surface, but for no love of society and purely 
for self-interest, or more realistically self-preservation. At 
the same time, it was highly symbolic: slogans could fill the 
space in the shop window left empty by lack of saleable produce 
caused by the inefficiency of the regime.
Retreating into one's mind whilst adhering to this pseudo­
conformity was a common practice during the Soviet occupation of 
Central and Eastern Europe among all strata of society: 'Keeping 
one hand on Marx's Writings, he reads the Bible in private.' 
wrote Milosz in his poem "Mid-Twentieth Century Portrait". 
This was a highly accurate description of life during the Soviet 
occupation and was especially applicable to Lithuania, where 
Milosz was born, and Poland, both of which were strict Roman 
Catholic states.
Although striving to impose Communist atheism onto the 
populations of both these states, the Soviet authorities failed: 
despite the authorities closing churches and seminaries and 
arresting, imprisoning or exiling clerics, the Catholic faith 
sustained the populations throughout their period of internal 
exile. The existence of the Hill of Crosses, north of Siauliai 
is one of the most visible examples of the continuation of 
adherence to Catholicism during the Occupation; although the hill 
was razed by the Soviet authorities on numerous occasions, 
crosses always returned, left by the Lithuanian people on that 
specific site in defiance of the Soviet regime and it remains to
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this day a site of commemoration of those who suffered during 
that time. One of the most poignant crosses was that left by 
members of the Deportees' Association, which depicts Christ with 
his hands and feet bound. Religious devotion was also covertly 
promoted in Lithuania by the existence of a samizdat publication. 
The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, which was 
smuggled into the country and widely d i s t r i b u t e d .
It did not require merely samizdat publications to sustain 
those in internal exile, however. Great attention was paid to 
culture, as in a number of cases this was not suppressed by the 
Soviet authorities. 3-®® The advantage of music was that it could 
be listened to in the security of the home and that the purely 
instrumental pieces could not, in theory, be seen as being 
opposed to the regime. Yet music conveys numerous sentiments and 
can be subject to many interpretations and these were often 
sufficient to provide sustenance to those in internal exile.
The works of Lithuanian composer Mikalojus Ciurlionis, the 
founder of Lithuanian symphonism, who wrote at the turn of the 
nineteenth to twentieth centuries, continued to be performed 
throughout the Soviet occupation and in 1961 a string quartet 
bearing his name, the Ciurlionis String Quartet, was founded and 
played throughout the USSR. While the quartet was promoted by the 
Soviet authorities as an example of what Soviet music teaching 
methods could achieve, it received great support in Lithuania 
because so much of its repertoire was Lithuanian music: 
Ciurlionis had been a staunch Lithuanian nationalist and hearing 
his music played during the years of occupation was yet another 
physical reminder of Lithuania's individual national identity, 
an identity separate to that of the USSR.
Lithuania's history and folklore were also the basis for works 
by Eduardas Balsys, whose most famous works were the ballet 
"Eglè, the Queen of Grass Snakes", after a well-known folk tale 
and the opera "The Journey to Tilsit", a reflection of 
Lithuania's turbulent history. Balsys composed throughout the
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Soviet occupation of Lithuania and following independence he was 
(posthumously) honoured for his work by his former students who 
composed the "Dedication to Eduard Balsys", a chamber work, in 
his memory.
To protect their national identity, Latvians also resorted to 
Music. Because their language was also under threat from the 
process of russification enforced after World War II, 
nationalists began collecting Livonian folk songs of the 19th 
Century in order to preserve their cultural heritage. This was 
extremely important because of the significant Russian minority 
in Latvia. Although composers such as P. Dambins, I. Kalnins and 
I. Zemzaris continued to produce works during the Soviet 
Occupation, greater emphasis was placed on choral works and song 
festivals because of the importance of maintaining the language.
Although the Czech language was not under threat during the 
post-war era, similar situation could be found in Czechoslovakia, 
where throughout this period, great emphasis was placed on her 
prominent composers, such as Dvorak, Suk, Janacek or Smetana. 
Perhaps the best example of how Czechoslovak music reflected 
national identity was Bedfich Smetana's "Ma Vlast", a cycle of 
six symphonic poems first performed in 1882. The six movements 
reflected the spirit, history and traditions of Bohemia, 
incorporating traditional Bohemian culture and folklore, 
geography and political aspirations, as in the fifth movement, 
Tabor, based on the traditional Czech hymn "Kdoz jste Bozi 
bojovmlci" ("Ye who are God's Warriors").
Although "Ma Vlast" was written over 6 0 years before the
Soviet domination of Czechoslovakia began, the lands which 
comprised modern day Slovakia and the Czech Republic were at that 
time components of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus the same 
nationalist sentiments which were incompatible with the ruling 
regime can be found, whether in the 1880s or in the post World
War II years. Under Communism, Smetana's music could be "hi­
jacked" and exploited by the authorities to demonstrate
87
Czechoslovakia's {and therefore Communism's) cultural superiority 
over the capitalist West. Simultaneously, however, "Ma Vlast" 
provided an assurance that one day the situation would improve: 
that the Communist regime was not permanent and that 
Czechoslovakia would return to "normality".
This was also the case in Finland, where, in 1899, after the 
first performance of Jean Sibelius' great tone poem Finlandia, 
(first called "Finland Awakes") a law was passed forbidding 
people to whistle its melodies in public places.Sibelius was 
accepted as being the cultural figurehead of Finnish nationalism. 
All of Sibelius' music, such as the "Karelia Suite" reflected his 
staunch Finnish identity. This once again re-emphasised the 
importance of music for demonstrating nationalist sentiments 
during a period of occupation.
Literature was a less subtle form of demonstrating nationalist 
sentiments as it was far more prey to the censorship which was 
rife throughout Soviet society. Lenin himself had admitted that 
'it is self-evident that literary work is least of all amenable 
to mechanical uniformity...[there must be] great scope for 
individual initiative... thought and fantasy.Nonetheless, 
Eastern and Central European authors, poets and playwrights 
risked arrest and imprisonment to publicise their beliefs. 
Widespread underground networks meant that despite injunctions 
being placed on these works, many copies were able to be 
circulated. During the years of the Soviet occupation of the 
region, exiles and emigres also continued to write and express 
nationalist sentiments.
National sentiments had traditionally been expressed in poetry 
in the course of Lithuania's history. A. Baranauskas' lyrical 
romantic poem of 1860-61 "Anyksciij. silelis" ("The Anyksciai Pine 
Forest") was closely linked with the national liberation movement 
which was emerging during this period of intensive Russification 
and repression, as was "Pavasario balsai" ("Voices of Spring") 
written in 1895 by Maironis, who laid the foundations for modern
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Lithuanian poetry in this anthology expressing patriotic 
aspirations. On attaining independence in 1918, Lithuania's 
authors, including V. Mykolaitis-Putinas, K. Boruta, V. Krèvé and 
I. Simonaitytè, used this medium to comment on political, social 
and religious matters, most importantly, on the issue of 
possession of the Klaipeda and Vilnius territories.
During the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, however, many of 
Lithuania's authors fled abroad, most notably B. Brazdzionis, and 
continued to write prolifically according to the pre-war 
traditions, emphasizing Lithuania's lengthy history. Novels by 
M. Katiliskis and A. Skèma, among others, focused on life in 
exile, as did playwrights K. Ostrauskas and A. Landsbergis. Some 
of their works were smuggled into Lithuania along with other 
samizdat publications. Within Lithuania, however, the situation 
was extremely different, with the mass deportations and the 
imposition of censorship all but halting Lithuania's literary 
output in the first decade of occupation. Many of those writers 
who remained in Lithuania, such as Mykolaitis-Putinas, kow-towed 
to the Soviet authorities and this was reflected in their work, 
which was for the most part devoid of any nationalist sentiments.
In other Soviet-dominated states in Central and Eastern 
Europe, people were more outspoken, and therefore paid a heavier 
price. In Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel was arrested shortly after 
the first performance of his play The Memorandum in 1965, which 
contained lines such as:
"It may be partly because I belong to an odd, lost 
generation. We've given ourselves out in small change, 
we invested the best years of our lives into things 
which turned out not to be worth it. We were so busy 
for so long talking about our great mission that we 
quite forgot to do anything great. In short, we were 
a mess.
The Memorandum is but one of a number of critiques and attacks 
on the Soviet system written by the man who, following the 
overthrow of Communism in Czechoslovakia in the "Velvet
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Revolution" of 1989, was elected President of the state whose 
national identity he had helped to preserve.
Some authors, however, were even blunter than Havel in their 
criticism of the Soviet system and in the defence of their 
national identity. Zbigniew Herbert chronicled the post-War years 
in Poland in his poetry. After the Poznan uprising of 1956, his 
verses condemned those who had collaborated with the authorities :
"I saw impostors joining sects of flagellants 
butchers disguised in sheepskin.
After the imposition of Martial Law in 1982 by General 
Jaruzelski, Herbert wrote "Report From the Besieged City", his 
anthem of Polish nationalism;
"...cemeteries grow larger the number of defenders is 
smaller
yet defence continues it will continue to the end 
and if the City falls but a single man escapes 
he will carry the City within himself on the roads 
of exile
he will be the City.
Herbert echoed the belief, widely-held throughout Poland, that 
it felt as if no-one, in any age, was prepared to accept Polish 
independence :
"...the siege has lasted a long time the enemies must 
take turns
nothing unites them except the desire for our 
extermination
Goths the Tartars Swedes troops of the Emperor 
regiments of the Transfiguration 
who can count them
the colours of their banners change like the forest on 
the horizon
Art was also able to convey nationalist sentiments and give 
relief to those in internal exile. Abstract paintings in 
particular were more likely to escape censorship because of the
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impossibility of accurately defining their meaning. In Lithuania 
the work of Fr. Pius Brazauskas, who fled to the USA in 1944 is, 
since the restitution of Independence, being interpreted as a 
chronicle of 2 0th Century Lithuanian history. Before World War 
II, he was a noted painter of traditional Lithuanian landscapes, 
depicted in such works as Bagotoji, painted in the 193 0s, but 
following his exile, his paintings began to assume abstract 
tendencies, with a vivid use of sharp colours and brush strokes, 
expressing his horror of the suffering caused to the Lithuanian 
people by the Soviet o c c u p a t i o n .
The artists who remained in Lithuania were affected by the 
atmosphere of Stalin's cult and forced to adopt the method of 
socialist realism. Most art at this time appeared in the form of 
portraits, as drawn by J. Vienozinskis, or as landscapes, such 
as the work of A. Petrulis, book illustrations, as created by J. 
Kuzminskis or in the form of monumental sculpture, as moulded by 
J. Mikénas. Due to the repressive nature of the Soviet 
occupation, very little art produced in post-War Lithuania could 
be used as a representation of Lithuania's national identity.
More difficult to chart is the importance of political humour 
(including cartoons) during a period of occupation. This is 
primarily because political humour tends to be transmitted by 
word of mouth. Cartoons have played a strong role in reaffirming 
the national identity of those states incorporated into the 
Soviet sphere of influence after World War II. In Lithuania, the 
work of A. Gudaitis is especially memorable. Lithuanians, and 
indeed, other Soviet-bloc states, also appreciated the work of 
western cartoonists which was sent to their states as Glasnost 
took hold.^ ®^ The trend for cartoons to express political 
humour, one also apparent in the West, continued after the 
restitution of independence. The work of Adolfo Uzos, in 
particular, graced the pages of the Lithuanian press, especially 
Gimtasis krastas.^?
One of the more obvious manifestations of a population in
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internal exile was particularly apparent in Lithuania: the
determination to maintain the use of Lithuanian as the primary 
language. In Lithuania, as in many of the states incorporated 
into the Soviet sphere of influence after World War II, the 
authorities placed increasing emphasis on the use of the Russian 
language, which was taught in schools and was the official 
business tongue. This had happened in Lithuania on previous 
occasions throughout her history, however, and the Lithuanian 
people were, for the most part, geared to protecting their 
language and ensuring its survival.
Although Russian was indeed used in business circles, little 
or no attempt was made to use the language in the confines of 
one's own home. During the period of occupation, great importance 
was attached to a sculpture in the city of Kaunas entitled "The 
Lithuanian School" cast by Rimsa. It was and remains a visible 
reminder of how the Lithuanian language was preserved in the 19th 
Century. After the restitution of independence in 1990, the 
statue was moved to greater prominence in the centre of the 
city."^
Czeslaw Milosz has argued that the preservation of Lithuania's 
national identity, language and culture was the most important 
aspect of the underground Lithuanian nationalist movement during 
the O c c u p a t i o n . This could only be achieved, however, by 
keeping a low profile, by not attracting the attention of the 
authorities. Thus Lithuanian continued to be the language used 
away from the workplace, whilst at a superficial level it always 
appeared as if the Lithuanian people were adhering to the demands 
of the Soviet authorities for the Russification of their 
language. The same was true in Latvia and Estonia, although as 
both states had a far greater Russian-speaking minority, Russian 
was a far more widely used language. Nonetheless, the existence 
of Latvian and Estonian as separate, distinct languages was 
preserved despite the attempts at Russification in the years 
following the end of World War II.
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The continued use of the Lithuanian language was a clear 
example of how a population functioned when in the mode of 
internal exile. As Milosz indicated, in Lithuania this 
"spiritual" form of resistance to the Occupation was the only- 
effective way to do so: 'A nation can not acquiesce to being
broken, having its face spat upon, and being ordered to joyously 
offer up thanks for this treatment. It is impossible to eradicate 
normal human reflexes, especially when it is a question of the 
proverbial Lithuanian obstinacy and endurance, which has been a 
tradition for a good 700 y e a r s . T h e  use of the Lithuanian 
language was a way in which people in internal exile could 
survive: it was a tangible reminder of better times in the course 
of Lithuania's history and provided the essential ray of hope 
that things would eventually return to normal.
Internal exile did not, however, merely manifest itself in 
cultural spheres. In the workplace, internal exile was rife. 
There was a lack of thought given to one's work: many people
tended to operate robotically and with little care or attention 
in an effort to meet one's target quota as easily as possible: 
by the late 1980s aspirations to Stakhanovism played no role in 
the majority of Lithuanian workers' productivity. This was due 
to a variety of reasons: partly, of course, because of the lack 
of interest or pride in work for which no direct benefit would 
be received, but partly because one wished to conform in a 
society of mass apathy.
It was in the workplace that the proliferation of a population 
made up of homo sovieticus in internal exile was to have its most 
dramatic impact. With only token allegiance being paid to the 
regime, economic stagnation and a decline and slackening of 
technological progress was inevitable as increasing amounts of 
attention focused on the second economy and other illegal 
spheres: 'The withdrawal of human energy, emotions and interests 
from activity controlled by the socialist state...undermines the 
political and economic system which is dominant in the Soviet 
Union...It hurts the economy especially, retards technological
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progress, spreads corruption, demoralises people, creates a new 
stratification and indeed threatens the whole structure of 
socialist society.
The precise impact on Lithuania of the different components 
of homo sovieticus can be shown by examining specific aspects of 
Lithuanian history in the years which followed the 1991 
recognition of independence, as it is in those years, when people 
were attempting to repair the damage caused by a 5 0-year 
occupation, that the effects of the proliferation of homo 
sovieticus have proven to be the most visible. Studies in the 
remainder of this thesis will evaluate the impact of homo 
sovieticus on society, the economy and the cultivation of foreign 
relations: all crucial factors in the re-birth and re-integration 
into the international community of any nation.
The question remains, however, to what extent Lithuanians were 
aware of the evolution of homo sovieticus and to what extent they 
had either contributed to or participated in its development. In 
1995 I discussed this concept with a number of Lithuanians who 
had been unable to flee to the West at the start of the Soviet 
occupation, I asked them what they thought was meant by the term 
"homo sovieticus" and what impact such a phenomenon might 
possibly have on the rebirth of their state. Although these 
questions were asked to people from a variety of different 
backgrounds, including civil servants, academics, architects and 
dentists, their answers were surprisingly similar. For the most 
part, they were unable to identify any precise character which 
could be termed homo sovieticus and could not understand what 
effect such a creation could have on their state.
One diplomat tentatively suggested that it was not "homo 
sovieticus" which should be studied, but "homo balticus". But 
when asked to expand on what he thought was meant by "homo 
balticus", the attributes he listed were concerned more with the 
physical rather than the mental/psychological descriptions. 
There was, however, a general consensus of opinion that one of
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the most powerful legacies of the Soviet occupation had been the 
fostering of a climate of distrust, suspicion, corruption and 
laziness which was to have such a detrimental impact on the 
Lithuanian population. Yet these were not seen as the character 
of a specific type of person, that is "homo sovieticus". Instead 
they were perceived as being rampant throughout the Lithuanian 
population.
Outside Lithuania, however, people have been more than able 
to define the characteristics of "homo sovieticus". Milosz 
identified him clearly in 1992: 'There exists, and in large
numbers, a bourgeoisifled homo sovieticus who modestly (and also 
immodestly) is acquiring wealth, is entertaining (with his heart 
on his sleeve) relatives from abroad, and even, at times, is 
beginning to travel abroad himself. He nurtures a silent hatred 
of Russians, but he hates them as Russians: he finds the system 
comfortable, he wouldn't know what to do without the system, at 
least for a w h i l e . T h i s  indicates that it is only possible 
to define such a phenomenon if one is slightly removed from it 
and can study it from a distance, with the benefit not only of 
hindsight, but also with the benefit of a western mentality. In 
the UK, for example, since the collapse of Communism and the 
USSR, students have begun to learn about the phenomenon of homo 
sovieticus, but in the former USSR and its associated satellite 
states, this idea remains either unheard of or only reluctantly 
discussed.
One must then conclude that the Lithuanian people at the time 
were unaware of the evolution of this character. This could also 
run parallel to the belief that many people were unaware of the 
evils of the Communist regimes which had spawned homo sovieticus. 
It would require a sociologist to determine to what extent people 
were ignorant of the evils lurking around them. Kundera, basing 
his views on Czechoslovakia, suggested that many people were 
indeed oblivious to the evils of Communism and supported the 
regime wholeheartedly. 'Anyone who thinks that the Communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe are exclusively the work of criminals
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is overlooking a basic truth: the criminal regimes were made not 
by criminals but by enthusiasts convinced they had discovered the 
only road to paradise. They defended that road so valiantly that 
they were forced to execute many people. Later it became clear 
that there was no paradise... then everyone took to shouting at 
the Communists: You're the ones responsible for our country's 
misfortunes... for its loss of independence... And the accused 
responded: We didn't know; we were deceived: we were true
believers !... In the end it narrowed down to a single question: 
Did they really not know or were they merely making believe? ' 
For Lithuanians, lack of awareness of the existence of homo 
sovieticus, however, is detrimental to the rebirth of the nation 
in the post-Soviet era. If the majority of people are unaware of 
the problems arising from the existence of such a mentality, it 
becomes harder for them to be alleiviated.
There is no denying that the various components of homo 
sovieticus owed their development to the character of the Soviet 
bureaucratic society, and therefore to the Imperial bureaucracies 
which preceded it. The singular feature of homo sovieticus, which 
differentiated it from its imperial predecessors, was that the 
characteristics it displayed were done so in 'specifically 
Communist forms and proportions'^^. Yet homo sovieticus has 
been shown to come in a variety of different moulds, with 
different traits apparent in different sectors of society. 
'Different functions of the Communist collective are incarnated 
in different members of it who become preponderantly the bearers
of those functions.'^ 9
The common thread which bound these individual characters 
together to form homo sovieticus was the interest in self- 
preservation and self-enhancement. The desire for self- 
preservation on the part of those people who were not integrated 
into the bureaucratic structure was fundamental to the concept 
of internal exile, needed in order to make their day-to-day life 
more bearable. In contrast, members of the higher ranks of the 
bureaucratic network used their connections and other assets for
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personal gain and an improved lifestyle. 'Many,' suggested 
Medvedev, 'wanted not only power, but ostentatious luxury, a 
clear demonstration of their elevation above the people.
Despite offering so many different facades, the impact of homo 
sovieticus remains its detrimental effect on Lithuanian and post- 
Soviet society as a whole. It is one of the most serious legacies 
of the Soviet regime both in Lithuania and in other states in the 
region. Unlike other bureaucratic societies, such as those of the 
Habsburgs or Imperial Russia, every single aspect of Lithuanian 
society was affected by the Communist bureaucracy imposed upon 
it following the Soviet occupation and this could not be 
disregarded immediately upon regaining independence.
Soviet society, as David Lane suggests, materialised out of 
a 'common citizenship of the Soviet state, subscription to a 
unifying ideology (Marxism-Leninism), a common political goal 
(Communism), shared beliefs in patriotism to the Soviet 
motherland; and a common language (Russian) . ' Such a 
description of the characteristics of Soviet society, however, 
merely reinforces the hypothesis that Lithuania was an unwilling 
member of the Soviet Union: her population shared none of these 
'defining characteristics'.^^^ Therefore the product of that 
society, homo sovieticus, was naturally alien to Lithuania and 
owes its presence to the incorporation of the country into the 
USSR between 1944-1991. The general passivity of the Lithuanian 
people, enabled the mentality of homo sovieticus to be grafted 
easily onto that of homo lituanicus. And its presence, as 
demonstrated in the following chapters, was to hinder Lithuania's 
rebirth and re-integration into the international community.
In this chapter the main characteristics of homo sovieticus 
and their origins have been outlined. Unlike other chapters of 
this thesis, however, this study on the origins of homo 
sovieticus is simultaneously theoretical yet contains 
suppositions and generalisations. It is therefore inevitable, 
although unfortunate, that there may be flaws within it. This is
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primarily because insufficient time has elapsed since the 
collapse of the USSR for the impact of this phenomenon to be 
assessed accurately.
In 1985 there was a growing belief that Zinoviev's concept of 
homo sovieticus 'lacked convincing argumentation...[because] an 
absolute type of homo sovieticus is a gross
o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . ' ^" 3 But the collapse of the USSR has
revealed that the traits identified as components of this 
mentality are still present in the former Soviet Union. It is 
indeed a 'gross oversimplification' to suggest that there is a 
single type of homo sovieticus, and that it alone is responsible 
for developing the attributes displayed by the peoples of the 
former USSR. There are, however, common characteristics shared 
by the differing varieties which were not present before the 
Soviet occupation, but exist now, not only in Lithuania but in 
all former Soviet republics and satellite states. Because of this 
the significance of homo sovieticus should be neither 
underestimated nor ignored, but only time and further research 
will tell if the importance assigned to it is, indeed, justified.
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CHAPTER III 
LITHUANIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS 1991-1994
"The Pitfalls of Incumbency"^
In the elections of October 1992 the Lithuanian Democratic 
Labour Party (LDLP), the former Communists headed by Algirdas 
Brazauskas, won a resounding victory over Sajüdis, the party 
which had demanded and achieved independence from the USSR.^ It 
was a victory which the majority of Lithuanians could not have 
foreseen or contemplated when the restitution of independence had 
been declared in March 1990. Yet four years after this electoral 
triumph, the LDLP was also voted out of office to be replaced by 
a coalition government of those who had been so comprehensively 
defeated by it in 1992.
The post-Independence government led by Vytautas Landsbergis, 
vilified in 1992, had been re-elected. The first years of 
independence were thus characterised by a constant shift in 
public attitudes towards the government and politics. As ordinary 
Lithuanians struggled to cope with the economic and social 
difficulties of post-Soviet transition, their political 
allegiances rested with whoever, it was believed, would provide 
the means of government that would be to their greatest 
advantage, rather than with whoever's political ideology was 
closest to their own.
During the inter-war years, prior to the 1926 coup, many 
Lithuanians had supported right-wing, conservative groups, which 
were allied with the Catholic Church, such as the Christian 
Democratic Bloc, and the authoritarian rule of Smetona had also 
been right-wing in persuasion. In the first elections to the 
Constituent Assembly in 1920, the second most represented group 
had been the Peasant Union and Socialist Populist Bloc, which, 
despite its name was a left-of-centre liberal faction. Third was 
the Social Democratic Party.^ During the occupation, however, 
these factions were united against a common enemy and the inter­
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party differences were put aside. After independence, many of 
those who had been alive in the inter-war years, those who held 
small plots of land and members of the Church supported Sajüdis, 
which had assumed the mantle of the inter-war right-wing parties. 
Those who had known nothing but Communism, continued to advocate 
Brazauskas and the LDLP.^ But when Sajüdis failed to deliver its 
promises of economic prosperity and the restitution of property, 
political allegiances were abandoned.
With the re-election of the LDLP, the former Communist Party, 
in 1992, Lithuania set a trend which was to be echoed throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe. As well as in Poland and Hungary, the 
electorates in a majority of the states created by the breakup 
of the USSR had voted back into power former Communists by 
1994.  ^ To many western observers this concept seemed peculiar, 
as they had fought so hard and for so long to be rid of 
Communism. However, to Lithuanians and, indeed, to the people of 
the other states which followed this trend, it was an attempt to 
elect, democratically, an effective government which could 
alleviate some of the hardships resulting from the breakup of the 
USSR; it was to be, according to the Economist, 'a return, but 
not a rerun' of Communist power.®
The election of the ex-Communists was not, generally, a call 
for the loss of Lithuania's independence and the restoration of 
the USSR but it was hoped that the former Communists, many of 
whom were professional, experienced politicians with 
administrative experience, would offer more efficient government 
than a cabinet composed of well-intentioned academics and 
enthusiasts. 'When Communism collapsed and free elections 
followed, democrats could offer what most voters wanted at the 
time : untarnished pasts. Since then purity has come to look like 
mere inexperience,indicated the Economist in 1994.
And it was experience in government, so lacking in members of 
Sajüdis, which was offered by Brazauskas' LDLP in the Autumn of 
1992. The members of the LDLP, largely former Communists, had
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advanced through the echelons of Communist party bureaucracy, in 
the course of which they had learned the techniques of 
administration and how to operate the levers of power. Some, such 
as the senior Foreign Ministry official Justas Paleckis, formerly 
Ideology Chief of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL), had 
held high positions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) in Moscow for many years. Others, such as Brazauskas 
himself, had remained in Lithuania and had advanced through the 
local party structure. But regardless of where their formative 
years in the party structure had been spent, members of the LDLP 
had often developed connections with senior bureaucrats in Moscow 
and had maintained these connections after Lithuania's 
independence had been restored.
These bureaucrats had learned how to create and implement 
policy, how to run Government departments and how to work with 
the officials in Moscow. This is not to say that their methods 
were always effective, in fact the inherent characteristics of 
a bureacratic society ensured that often these methods were 
thoroughly ineffective and counter-productive. This was due 
either to the degree of self interest, the dislike of
responsibility, the reluctance to use one's initiative or the 
loss of one's critical faculties which typified bureacratic 
societies.® But some experience in dealing with Soviet and 
Russian functionaries was, in this case, better than no
experience whatsoever. The only administrative experience of some 
of the Sajüdis Ministers had been in liaising with different 
faculties of the universities from where they had often been 
recruited, or from working with numerous, small opposition 
groups.®
Sajüdis had swept to victory in February 1990 on the platform 
of total independence from Moscow and the USSR^° but within 
months of the unequivocal recognition of Lithuania's
independence, many Lithuanians began to realise that it would be 
neither possible nor feasible to break away completely from the 
Russian Federation. Lithuania was still too reliant on it for its
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energy, fuel, food-stuffs and trade^^ and there were still 
Russian troops on Lithuanian soil. Furthermore, western Europe, 
and the European Union in particular, towards whom Lithuania was 
turning, was not^  as had been hoped prior to the restitution of 
independence, yet ready to welcome Lithuania with open arms.
Brazauskas and members of the CPL were able to highlight their 
years of experience in dealing with Moscow in their election 
campaign. On election night Brazauskas was recorded as saying 'I 
have thirty years of experience in dealing with the Moscow 
bureaucracy- I know how things work there. I won't get lost in 
those Moscow c o r r i d o r s M a n y  Lithuanians were reluctantly 
forced to admit that despite their dislike and distrust of 
Moscow, they could not afford to alienate the Russians or abandon 
all links with the former USSR. Therefore they voted for the LDLP 
as the party which could best deal with Moscow without 
relinquishing Lithuania's independence.
Landsbergis' adamant refusal to negotiate with Moscow, despite 
the election of Boris Yeltsin, (who had campaigned for an 
independent Lithuania in 1990-1991“ ) following the collapse of 
the USSR, led to a critical stalemate in the first two years of 
independence. It contributed little to the development of 
Lithuania and merely served to turn voters away from him and his 
party towards Brazauskas and the LDLP. Landsbergis was perceived 
as 'inexperienced and inept in domestic a f f a i r s a n d  in his 
dealings with Russia. The election of Brazauskas signified 
'disappointment with Sajüdis [and Landsbergis in particular] for 
unfulfilled hopes and expectations.'^®
Voting for the LDLP in 1992 was also an expression of desire 
on the part of some Lithuanians (mostly those born post 1945 and 
who had never known independence or capitalism) to return to the 
old, familiar system of government practised by the USSR. The 
worsening economic situation in Lithuania and the upheavals 
caused by the breakup of the USSR led to increasing discontent 
among the electorate^'' and took support away from Sajüdis.
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Throughout 1992 there was a growing public perception of the LDLP 
as the 'party to ease the trauma of economic collapse'.'-® Even 
those Lithuanians who did not want a return to the old Communist 
regime felt more comfortable supporting Brazauskas than many of 
the Sajüdis candidates because of his commitment to continue 
along the path towards a market economy.
The LDLP was further advantaged because of the fragmentation 
of the Sajüdis movement after the recognition of Lithuania's 
independence. With the benefit of hindsight this was an 
inevitable occurrence. The members of Sajüdis had been united 
behind a single goal: the unequivocal restoration of Lithuania's 
independence, but once it had been achieved, the diversity of the 
Sajüdis membership became apparent. This was typical of 
"umbrella" movements. Similar organisations such as Civic Forum 
in Czechoslovakia and Neue Forum in East Germany, also collapsed 
once their main goal had been achieved. Individual members of 
Sajüdis had different ideas about the actual process of 
Government and had contrasting priorities which were to lead to 
the infighting which characterised the years of the Sajüdis 
Government. Thus numerous small parties were created by 
disaffected Sajüdis members. In the first flush of enthusiasm 
after independence had been restored, many members of the Seimas 
wanted their exact, particular views reflected by Sajüdis. When 
this was not done, the members often created a new political 
party, even if their differences of opinion were only slight. 
These parties became so abundant that it was inevitable that none 
of them could, individually, gain a sufficient majority in the 
19 92 elections to remain in Government.'-®
Unlike the fractured and disintegrating Sajüdis movement, the 
LDLP presented a cohesive and familiar front to the Lithuanian 
electorate. The party made use of the connections developed under 
the Soviet regime to campaign effectively throughout Lithuania 
and capitalise on the factors which brought them increasing 
popularity even among conservative, nationalistic Lithuanians who 
might naturally have been thought of as Landsbergis supporters.
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With clear policy statements concerning the economy and social 
issues, the voters knew what they could expect by electing a 
united LDLP. The Party pledged to continue policies to 
'strengthen Lithuania's full independence,...concentrate on the 
economic situation... especially agriculture, and would not 
reverse Lithuania's free market reforms. Democracy was not 
endangered. '
It is highly probable, however, that without the charismatic 
Algirdas Brazauskas at its head, the LDLP would not have provided 
the effective opposition to Sajüdis which resulted in its 
election in 1992. Many other members of the LDLP were the 
ultimate "grey men" - Communist apparatchik bureaucrats lacking 
in the western-style public personae which would attract the 
electorate. A key reason for the LDLP' s victory in 1992 was 
because the election campaign placed great emphasis on the 
personalities of the two main leaders. Many Lithuanians voted for 
the LDLP because of the presence of Brazauskas, and they did not 
vote for what remained of Sajüdis because of its identification 
with Landsbergis.^'
Although Brazauskas, by 1988, had risen through the ranks of 
the Communist Party of Lithuania to its highest possible level. 
First Secretary and Chairman of the Supreme Council, it was his 
commitment to Lithuanian nationalism which won him popular 
support. He offered a benign, practical form of nationalism, 
advocating independence (and post-1990 the maintenance of this 
independence). At the same time, however, he refused to 
jeopardise Lithuania's economic development and political rebirth 
by completely alienating those opposed to Lithuania's departure 
from the USSR and the Russians who supplied Lithuania with both 
the goods she required and by far the largest market for her 
exportable produce.
A son of a large, nationalistic family, Brazauskas used this 
identity to portray himself as the best candidate to guide his 
country through the period of transition: as one who was
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determined to ensure the continuation of independence yet was the 
best suited to govern and develop the necessary international 
relations. Throughout the period under discussion, Brazauskas' 
popularity remained high even as the popularity of his party and 
of some of its leading members eventually declined. He was a 
charismatic, populist orator, unlike the professorial 
Landsbergis, and instinctively appealed to most sectors of 
society.
It was this popularity which also ensured Brazauskas' 
Presidential election victory in February 1993. There was only 
one other candidate, Stasys Lozoraitis, an emigre who had only 
ever spent a few weeks in Lithuania. Lozoraitis was unable to
convince the Lithuanian electorate that he would make a better
President with a greater knowledge of Lithuanian affairs and the 
problems to be faced during her rebirth than the incumbent
Brazauskas. He did, however, play on the sense of continuity he 
could bring to independent Lithuanian history: his father, also 
named Stasys Lozoraitis, had been Foreign Minister until 1940 and 
Lozoraitis Jnr. took over his father's mantle as the 
representative of the legitimate Lithuanian Government (in exile) 
upon his father's death. He was accredited to both the Vatican 
and the USA until his own death in 1994. But in an era of
economic hardship and transition, this did not win him any extra 
votes^® and Brazauskas' popularity earned him 60 per cent of the 
popular vote to Lozoraitis' respectable 38 per cent.
Loss of his own popularity was one of many reasons for the 
defeat of Vytautas Landsbergis' party in 1992, for although 
Brazauskas should be given some of the credit for winning the 
election, Landsbergis and Sajüdis most definitely lost popular 
support and therefore government. Apart from widely-publicised 
media attacks on some leading Sajüdis members, such as former 
Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, which greatly influenced the 
electorate, there were some significant policy failings, which 
are discussed below. There was also the continuing presence of 
the legacy of homo sovieticus: the Soviet occupation had spawned
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the growth of corruption in Lithuania and also made post-Soviet 
Lithuanians unnaturally impatient. They instantly wanted 
everything they had been denied for 5 0 years and grew 
increasingly dissatisfied at the delay in achieving this.
All of these components influenced Lithuania's post­
independence evolution. It was unfortunate for Sajüdis that they 
were also held responsible for all the intrinsic difficulties 
(such as unemployment and job insecurity, inflation, loss of 
markets for Lithuanian products) encountered by the Lithuanian 
people during their first years in government and many of the 
electorate expressed their dissatisfaction with these problems 
and therefore with Sajüdis in the ballot box. This, however, was 
a practice seen throughout the first years of Lithuania's 
rebirth: dissatisfaction with the progress of reform also led to 
the defeat of the LDLP in 1996.^®
Landsbergis himself, however, must take much of the blame for 
the defeat of his party. On the achievement of recognised 
independence, Landsbergis was in a position to consolidate his 
popularity and use it to the country's best advantage. He had 
been lauded in the West, by the global media, and also by the 
Lithuanian people as the architect of Lithuania's drive for 
independence. But upon the restitution of this independence, it 
may be argued that Landsbergis allowed this sense of importance 
to overpower him and distract him from proceeding along a path 
to reform as he tried to increase his power and his prestige and 
became increasingly radical in the process.
Throughout the 1991-1992 period he tried to portray himself 
as the sole restorer of Lithuania's independence, recalling the 
illustriousness and prominence of his ancestors who had been 
responsible for the codification of the Lithuanian language. 
Although feted by western governments, who accepted him certainly 
as one of the key players in Lithuania's rebirth, by doing so, 
Landsbergis managed to alienate not only the majority of the 
people, but also some of his original political allies. To cement
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his image as both Lithuania's political and spiritual leader, 
Landsbergis used the media^^ to depict him as such: there were
frequent pictures of him in national dress in his attempt to be 
seen, like previous figures before him, such as Jonas 
Basanavicius, as the Father of the Lithuanian People and thus 
ensure his place in Lithuanian culture and history.
Landsbergis' personal vanity therefore, was to contribute to 
his downfall. His stubborn refusal to listen to others' advice, 
whether in Lithuania or abroad, lost him support and created 
distinct factions opposed to him. After the restitution of 
independence, Landsbergis aimed to be elected President, but many 
Lithuanians were hostile to his idea of a President because of 
the corruption of this office by the authoritarian Smetona during 
the inter-war years. Thus opposition to the idea of an extremely 
powerful Presidency became directly connected with opposition to 
Landsbergis, yet Landsbergis himself refused to recognise this.
As this opposition grew, and increasing numbers of supporters 
were alienated, Landsbergis was forced to ally with some of the 
far-Right Wing political factions, such as the Liberty League. 
This created a vicious circle as even more Centrist supporters 
turned against him. Further support for Landsbergis was lost as 
his post-Independence style of government involved denouncing his 
political opponents as being in the employ of Moscow and the 
K G B . This was an unpleasant and unprofessional style of 
operation which continued throughout his period in Opposition, 
but it was a tactic not approved of by the majority of the more 
pragmatic Lithuanians. They felt that in most cases the Communist 
past was entitled to remain in the past and that it was more 
beneficial to look to the future.
Both the 1992 and 1996 elections were influenced by unspoken 
thoughts and feelings which were widely shared by the 
populace.29 In the case of the 1992 election, the underlying 
feeling was of resentment of the attitudes of Landsbergis and his 
supporters and widespread disappointment in the atmosphere that
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they had created. Landsbergis' conservatives campaigned on moral 
grounds, taking the attitude that only those who had actively 
crusaded against the Soviet regime were true Lithuanian 
nationalists and everyone else was a sympathiser or supporter of 
the Communist ruling party. They appeared excessively 
nationalistic and radical and were eager to blame those who had 
lived as normal human beings under the Soviet regime for the 
mistakes of the past and to glorify the dissidents who had been 
more outspoken.2°
This policy did not take into account the actions of those 
people in mental internal exile, as discussed in Chapter II. The 
majority of Lithuanians were certainly highly nationalistic, as 
reflected in the votes awarded to Sajüdis in the February 1990 
elections^! and the vocal support for the restitution of 
Lithuania's independence from 1988. In the face of Soviet 
repression, however, most Lithuanians had, like the populations 
of the other former Soviet republics and satellite states, 
conformed with the regime in order to survive. They were, 
therefore, extremely hurt by the accusations of Landsbergis and 
his supporters that they were, to all intents, collaborators with 
the Soviet authorities. This type of sentiment was rarely voiced 
in public during the run-up to the 1992 elections, (this 
i also being a legacy of the Soviet years of occupation) 
but in the privacy of people's homes, it was an opinion which was 
frequently offered.
In a further effort to regain some of the mass support he had 
enjoyed in 1990-1991, Landsbergis made a number of foreign trips 
abroad. Some were necessary, such as his visit to New York in 
September 1991 on the occasion of Lithuania's admission into the 
United Nations, or his visit to the UK in April 1992 to ensure 
the return of Lithuania's gold held since before World War II by 
the Bank of England. By making these journeys, Landsbergis' 
popularity in Lithuania was indeed boosted, as it was felt by 
many Lithuanians that he was raising Lithuania's profile, which 
would encourage and benefit investment from abroad and continue
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to retain foreign interest in the country. Landsbergis was also 
seen, suggests Joné Brazauskaite, who accompanied him on his 
visit to the UK, as 'the acceptable face of Lithuania' in much 
the same way as Gorbachev had been the acceptable face of 
Communism in the West.^^
Other overseas visits, however, such as to Japan, South Africa 
or Italy received less support from the Lithuanian electorate. 
The visits were perceived by both Lithuania's politicians and the 
public as being entirely unnecessary, overly expensive and of 
little benefit to Lithuania. While Landsbergis continued to 
receive warm welcomes from the states which he visited, as he was 
hailed as the leader of the Lithuanian independence movement, the 
visits were to do little to raise his popularity at home. A 
direct parallel may be drawn with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
who, in the last years of the existence of the USSR was 
infinitely more popular abroad than at home.
In Lithuania, a highly religious nation, a traditional method 
of bolstering popularity throughout the course of her history had 
been by allying with the Church. In the 1920s and 1930s the 
Church had formed an influential faction in the political arena 
and had played a key role in supporting the Government. After the 
restitution of independence, many clerics wanted to take a 
similar role in politics. Yet Landsbergis increasingly tried to 
link the church purely with Sajüdis. Many priests became too 
actively involved in Landsbergis' campaigns and this alienated 
the electorate still further. They felt there was undue pressure 
on them to support Landsbergis, just as they were beginning to 
become used to the idea of democracy and a free vote.^ The 
LDLP, in contrast, emphasised the vital role for the Church in 
Lithuania but supported the 'principle of separateness of the 
State and Church.
Yet perhaps Landsbergis could have been forgiven for wanting 
to strengthen his power had he proved himself to be a truly 
worthy leader of newly-independent Lithuania. But whilst he had.
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without question, made an excellent commander during the period 
of repression by Moscow, offering a calm and solid resistance, 
when it came to government, his background as a Professor of 
Musicology left him ill-equipped for the process of running 
Lithuania. Landsbergis' principal intention was to irreversibly 
destroy the Communist structures within Lithuania. Under his 
leadership Sajüdis had few defined policies, except on the 
environment, even running for the 1992 elections with no clear 
policy manifesto.27 In the critical first two years of 
independence, therefore, Lithuania floundered and the hopes of 
the people for prosperity and not just an independent democracy 
were dashed.
For upon the assumption of independent statehood, the Sajüdis 
government needed to implement policies that would aid in the 
reconstruction and rebirth of an independent Lithuania. But the 
situation in Lithuania in 1991 was dire. Most critically the 
economy had to be restructured and transformed from a centralist, 
planned structure to a market system. One of the most crucial 
aspects of this was to inaugurate a policy of land reform^®. But 
Sajüdis also had to tackle the unemployment that would be an 
inevitable part of economic transition, and grapple with other 
social issues such as healthcare. The increase in crime and 
corruption which had characterised the dying years of the USSR 
also required attention. For Sajüdis to govern, Lithuania's new 
constitution needed to be approved and passed by the Seimas as 
a replacement for the now inapplicable Soviet code. Failure to 
complete any of these tasks was a core reason for Sajüdis' 
downfall in October 1992.
Sajüdis' failure to produce the constitution needed so 
desperately to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the 
USSR was a dreadful mistake. After the first independent 
elections in 1990, the Supreme Soviet re-established the 
Constitution of 1938. Immediately afterwards they adopted the 
Provisional Fundamental Law as an interim measure until a new 
constitution could be promulgated. As the party became dominated
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by petty infighting after independence was restored, no consensus 
was reached on what, exactly, should be in the constitution, or 
on which nation's constitution it should be modelled. In the new 
constitution, Landsbergis tried to give the President great 
powers over foreign affairs and defence, but this caused 
dissention among the politicians working on the new constitution. 
They felt that the constitution was being created for him 
personally and therefore they managed to delay it until after the 
October 1992 elections. As a direct result, Lithuania remained 
without a modern Constitution until the election of Brazauskas' 
LDLP. 2^
The restitution of property to its pre-Soviet occupation 
owners and the introduction of a policy of land reform was also 
a definite priority. It was, however, an extremely complicated 
process and these complications were to hinder the creation of 
any workable policies. Agricultural land which had been 
confiscated during the Soviet Occupation had been either 
subdivided into smaller lots or turned into collectives. Under 
Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika, workers on the collectives had 
been allowed to farm individual plots for their own benefit. At 
the start of the Soviet Occupation, many Lithuanians were 
resettled on large agricultural properties, the owners of which 
had frequently fled to the West, been deported to Siberia, 
imprisoned or murdered. The Occupation lasted 5 0 years and this 
was sufficient time for at least two generations to have settled 
on the land and in certain properties.
It was to come as a great shock, therefore, when after the 
restitution of independence and the Government's announcement of 
its commitment to returning Lithuania to a market economy, former 
owners of many of Lithuania's individual properties resurfaced 
and demanded either the restitution of their property or ample 
compensation for its loss. In some cases, the former owners no 
longer held actual title deeds to the property, having lost their 
possessions during World War II and the Occupation. Some 
fortunate people did, however, manage to retain these deeds and
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they expected that their property would be returned to them.‘^°
Decisions needed to be made on the resettlement of the Soviet- 
era tenants, which would be inevitable, and how to award 
compensation to the title-holder if the land could not be 
returned. This would not only encompass actual places of 
residence, but also, in the case of farming communities, 
provision of alternative labour for the Soviet tenants if the 
previous owners were to decide to farm their property themselves, 
or were to provide their own source of labour. The Sajüdis 
Government realised that there were numerous vested interests in 
the policy of property restitution and land reform and tried to 
understand all of the different demands being made on them, 
especially the conflict between former owners and the current 
residents.
This was not only the case in the agricultural sector. There 
were also great conflicts regarding urban residential, business 
and industrial property reform. Those who had lost their homes 
or businesses during the Soviet occupation wanted to be offered 
either their return (where possible) or alternative 
accommodation. Yet what was to be done with the tenants who had 
taken over the property in the interim years? How could the 
Government offer a family who had lost their spacious and elegant 
apartment in the centre of Kaunas a cramped flat in a Soviet- 
built tower block in one of the monolithic suburbs which had 
evolved under Soviet planning? Would that be considered adequate 
or fair compensation?^ If people were allocated a similar, pre­
war apartment, who could predict whether the original owners 
would resurface? There were as many differing interests in the 
urban sector as in the agricultural sphere. Dominating all of the 
above criteria was the desire for Lithuania's property to remain 
in Lithuania's possession and not to be bought out by wealthy 
foreigners4 could be perceived as lording it over the poorer 
Lithuanians. These were the problems with which the successive 
post-Soviet governments had to deal.
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Therefore, one of the first pieces of legislation passed by 
the Sajüdis Government was on the restoration of Lithuanian 
citizenship to persons requesting it. The initial law, passed in 
1991, restored Lithuania's Citizenship to those who had emigrated 
or fled during World War II or the Soviet O c c u p a t i o n . Direct 
descendants of Lithuanian citizens were also entitled to claim 
citizenship. There was, however, a fundamental drawback to this 
law. Those persons wishing to reclaim citizenship had to renounce 
the citizenship of their adopted country. For the 812,000 
Lithuanians living in the USA especially, this would be an 
extremely difficult decision to make. US citizenship is prized 
around the world and few Lithuanians were willing to relinquish 
it to gain the citizenship of a country whose independence was 
determined by the whims of other states.
Although many Lithuanians wished for the restoration of their 
citizenship and to possess a Lithuanian passport, they wanted to 
hold it in conjunction with the citizenship of their new 
c o u n t r y . 43 Landsbergis' Government, however, stubbornly insisted 
that Lithuanian citizenship would only be awarded upon the 
renunciation of all other states' citizenship. This angered many 
Lithuanian emigres, who had made new lives and new homes for 
themselves since their exodus, but still wanted to express their 
Lithuanian national i d e n t i t y . ^  It was also to cause numerous 
difficulties regarding the process of land reform and the 
restitution of property.
Due to the unforeseen speed with which independence was 
achieved, the laws governing land reform and the restitution of 
property were rushed into place by the Landsbergis Government, 
who wished to be seen to be acting quickly to re-establish an 
independent Lithuanian state. The Law on the Procedure and 
Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership to the 
Existing Real Property was passed on 18 June 1991 and coupled 
with a Resolution Regarding the Process of Enforcement and 
Application of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the 
Procedures and Conditions of the Restoration of Ownership Rights
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on 16 July 1991. Both of these were passed before there had been 
international recognition of Lithuania's independence, reflecting 
the importance with which they were held by so many Lithuanians .
In accordance with the 18 June 1991 Law, the right of real 
property ownership would be restored either 'by giving over the 
actual property, or the equivalent... or by financially 
compensating the persons.Restitution would be granted to the 
original owner, spouse, child or parents provided they were 
certified citizens and permanent residents of the Republic of 
Lithuania.4G Already before Lithuania had received international 
recognition of her independence, the issue of citizenship had 
arisen and the first problems emerged: so many of the direct
descendants of former property owners had fled into exile and 
were no longer either permanent residents or citizens of 
Lithuania. Chapter 2 of the Law confirmed the need for all 
returned agricultural property to remain in active agricultural 
service.47 This was widely approved of by the Lithuanian people, 
as it was expected that this would give their economy the much- 
needed boost and be a real asset in the inaugural period of 
economic transition.^
In urban areas, land would be allocated free of charge for the 
construction of a private house. The size and location of the 
plot would be determined by the Government of Lithuania. This 
clause was ripe for abuse; those with Government connections 
inevitably received land in the more attractive areas. 4^ where 
pre-war houses existed, the owners would be entitled to their 
return. Forest areas were also available for restitution, 
provided the former owners adhered to State plans for the 
forestation of Lithuania. Pre-war industrial and commercial 
ventures were also to be restored to former owners, or sold by 
allotting shares.
With all of these cases, compensation was offered if, for any 
reason, the property could not be restored, or if only part of 
the property was available. Under the Soviet administration.
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larger properties were often subdivided, and this made it 
considerably harder to return it to its original owners. 
Compensation was also offered, according to Chapters 3 and 4 of 
the Law, for cases where the land had been subsumed by transport 
or industrial infrastructure or turned into a military base. 
Compensation was also available for former owners of land flooded 
during the construction of the Kauno Maré and other hydro-related 
projects.®^ The offers of compensation proved attractive to both 
former owners and soon-to-be-dislocated tenants, but even after 
international recognition of Lithuania's independence, when the 
real process of Government began, it was not forthcoming as 
promised in the legislation.
The first amendments to the Law were made in the Resolution 
of 16 July 1991. Lithuania's numerous deportees and their 
children were exempted from the vital status of permanent 
residency. Further amendments were made to cover the status of 
existing tenants on contested property, to define "ownership" in 
greater detail and to expand on the issue of compensation.^ 
While the Resolution solved some of the problems which arose with 
the drafting of the new Law, other areas were left pending for 
the Government to settle, such as the procedure by which 
residential houses and industrial or commercial installations 
would be handed over.®® This was to create difficulties for the 
Government and, when it failed to meet the challenges posed by 
the complications of property restitution, to heighten its 
unpopularity.
The Law on Land Reform was passed by the Seimas on 2 5 July 
1991, also before there had been international recognition of the 
restitution of Lithuania's independence. The Law covered the area 
of private land: the restitution or purchase thereof and state 
land. State land unavailable for purchase included land under 
roads, airports and ports, land along Lithuania's borders and 
needed for territorial defence; land needed for public use or 
allocated for allotment to educational facilities; land assigned 
for the plantation of forests or containing mineral facilities
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and land where economic activities were prohibited under l a w .
In accordance with the Law, land reform was to be implemented 
by the Agrarian Reform Commission run by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. It was tasked with establishing agrarian reform 
agencies to enact the reform and to take requests from people 
wishing for the restitution of their property.®® The Law also 
covered Land Exploitation Organisation. It was the introduction 
of the agrarian reform agencies which was to trigger the 
conflicts surrounding the whole procedure of land reform. It was 
these agencies which were to create so many of the difficulties 
regarding property restitution, as they handled the applications 
for compensation or return of property. It was inevitable, 
therefore, that this Law could not be enacted as written, and 
despite being promulgated by the Seimas, revisions were 
inevitable. They were not to be made by the Landsbergis 
Government, which failed to reach a consensus on what articles 
of the Law needed modification. This was both a core reason for 
its defeat in 1992 and an obstruction to Lithuania's 
regeneration. The whole area of Land Reform was a factor which 
the elected LDLP would have to tackle upon its re-election 
because of its importance to the development of Lithuania's 
economy.
Upon the restitution of independence, Sajüdis members 
highlighted their commitment to the social welfare of the 
Lithuanian people. Despite deserting the USSR, the Lithuanians 
were committed to retaining the beneficial aspects of the welfare 
state. Saulius Peceliünas supported a policy of full employment 
and Rimantas Smetona advocated guaranteed payments for illness, 
disablement, unemployment, maternity leave and old age. Aloyzas 
Sakalas proposed a policy of optional extra private health 
insurance as practised in western states.®® These policies were 
all commendable in theory, but due to the worsening economic 
situation caused by the breaking away from the USSR, while the 
payments were offered, they amounted to very little in actual 
monetary value. Like so many of Sajüdis' policies, their promises
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regarding social policies were wildly ambitious and when they 
failed to be kept led to increasing dissatisfaction with the 
administration.
Some of the challenges facing Lithuania in the early years of 
its independence could have been met more easily had full use 
been made of the significant emigre community outwith Lithuania, 
many of whom were eager to assist in the reconstruction of their 
country. Rita Dapkuté was one of a few American Lithuanians 
welcomed back by the Landsbergis government : she became 
Landsbergis' personal advisor^, but despite the willingness of 
the emigre community, far less use was made of them in comparison 
to Latvia and Estonia, where emigres were welcomed back and their 
skills were used to assist in the process of reconstruction. No 
Government official, in either the Landsbergis or LDLP 
administrations, was prepared to either acknowledge or justify 
this fact.
This has proven to be a tragedy for Lithuania. Prior to the 
restitution of independence, there had been a thriving and active 
emigre community, many members of which were eager to aid their 
country in its rebirth. Instead, all they faced were 
obstructions : they were either unable to acquire citizenship, as 
discussed above, or their offers of assistance were flatly 
refused. Alienation of the emigre community has without doubt 
been a brake on Lithuania's redevelopment in the post-Soviet 
years. This is especially apparent when studying Latvia or 
Estonia®® and should be taken as an example of the mentality of 
homo sovieticus (especially the ability to create unnecessary 
obstacles and the reluctance to receive advice), negatively 
influencing Lithuanian Government figures.
Failure to inaugurate comprehensive policies to reconstruct 
Lithuania was not the only inadequacy of the governing party. 
Some factions within Sajüdis launched a policy of deliberately 
obstructing the process of creating legislation by paralysing the 
Seimas. They walked out of the chamber when they wished to block
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the passing of bills and thereby ensured that the required quorum 
was not reached. Other tactics included holding separate meetings 
outside the chamber, which discredited the legitimacy of the 
Seimas. This petty behaviour was also apparent in the amount of 
infighting within Sajüdis, which led to the fragmentation of the 
party and ultimately to its defeat in 1992.®®
The few remaining members of Sajüdis were, however, further 
hampered by their complete lack of experience of being in 
government. This was by no means unique to Lithuania: throughout 
the former USSR and its associated sphere of influence, 
governments were elected in the immediate aftermath of 
independence because they had no links with the Communists, that 
is, they were untarnished by the past regimes. But because it had 
only been Communists who had been employed in the governmental 
bureaucracy during the old regimes, their successors had little 
idea how to administrate and govern, being more concerned with 
personal petty squabbles and infighting than with presenting a 
comprehensive political agenda. 'Inexperienced in democratic 
parliamentary procedures, [they] adopted rules on quorums and 
voting to engage in group abuse, dilatory tactics, and individual 
obstruction of due process.'®®
No matter how ineffective they were in government, Sajüdis 
members were also hindered during those first years of 
independence by the prevailing climate of social and economic 
hardship, a climate which affected the region of the entire 
former USSR and its satellite states. New democratic values 
became relatively unimportant to a majority of people as their 
living standards deteriorated to an extent unseen during the 
years of Soviet occupation.®^
Demonstrating his commitment to upholding democracy, despite 
the worsening economic situation, Landsbergis called numerous 
referenda. On 23 May 1992 there was a referendum on the 
institution of the President of the Republic of Lithuania. On 14 
June 1992 over 68% of eligible voters voted in favour of the
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unconditional and immediate withdrawal of troops of the former 
USSR presently under Russian jurisdiction from the territory of 
Lithuania and on compensation for damages to the Republic. On 13 
October 1992 there was a further referendum on the Constitution 
of the Republic of Lithuania and on the Law of Enforcement of the 
Constitution. ®2 But the frequency of such referenda limited 
their impact and led to a wave of apathy among the electorate, 
particularly as they failed to produce conclusive results. The 
voters who did participate in the referenda often, as in the case 
of the one on the creation of a President, resorted to other 
tactics, such as spoiling ballot papers. This was a means of 
protesting against what was seen as the inefficiency and 
incompetence of the regime, despite still supporting the idea of 
a free vote.
The electorate were not only actively protesting against 
incompetence, however. They were, in some cases, demonstrating 
the effect of the Soviet Occupation and the evolution of homo 
sovieticus : including the consequences of the imposition of a
communal society. People often unknowingly reacted against the 
new system of government as it was felt that there was little 
benefit for them as individuals in the new democracy. Therefore 
electoral turnout plummeted between 1990-1996.®® This 
selfishness (not voting) was to subconsciously sabotage the 
evolution of Lithuania in the first years of independence. By not 
voting, the people then had less of a say in who actually 
governed the country and tended to complain about the Government 
more.
A low turnout also reflected the political apathy which was 
a concomitant of homo sovieticus. Although some Lithuanians 
disliked individual people in Government, the actual method of 
Government, unlike in 1990, was not vehemently disapproved of. 
Voter apathy, however, is not the sole prerogative of homo 
sovieticus, or, indeed, of bureacratic societies: it is a feature 
of many democracies where there is, like in Lithuania, general 
contentment with the type of regime coupled with disinterest in
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the opposing political factions which are seen to be extremely 
similar. In the USA, for example, electoral turnout is 
notoriously low. In 1988 only 50.2 per cent of the electorate 
voted®4 and in the election of 1992 that figure only increased 
to 54 per cent.®® A similar trend occurred in the UK. Although 
the turnout was in most cases between 70-80 per cent, as in 1987 
(73 per cent) and 1992 (77 per cent)®®, this figure could
plummet to US depths when examining individual constituencies. 
Even in 1997, which was one of the most fiercely-contested 
elections of recent times, turnout was still, in some areas,well 
below 6 0 per cent.®^ Apathy was, therefore, not a feature unique 
to Lithuania.
Ultimately it was Landsbergis' government's total inability 
to quickly solve the problems afflicting Lithuania which was 
responsible for its defeat in 1992: the electorate could see
little progress under Landsbergis' leadership. He was, however, 
also impeded by the socio-political climate of the time, which 
perhaps, regardless of the skill of Brazauskas as an opponent, 
made his defeat inevitable. Many Lithuanians expected instant 
results after the collapse of the USSR. They suffered from the 
delusion that during the years of the Soviet Occupation, 
Lithuania had always been perceived as being in the "West" by 
other Soviet republics, but on achieving this independence, they 
realised how far behind their Western neighbours they had fallen. 
Sajüdis' belief in 'romantic nationalism and nostalgia for the 
days of pre-war independence held little meaning for a populace 
suffering real hardship in economically trying times.'®®
By being in opposition, suggests Anatol Lieven, Brazauskas had 
'escaped responsibility for Government during the period 1990- 
1992 whereas Landsbergis saddled himself with it and with it the 
unpopularity it brought.'®® Brazauskas himself, as shall be 
elaborated upon later in this chapter, was also unable to prevail 
over a disenchanted electorate when he went to the polls in 
October 1996. From the date of the recognition of Lithuania's 
independence, the country was burdened with frequent cabinet
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reshuffles of both Prime Minister and senior Government 
officials.7° This did not contribute to the stability of the 
country, nor did it encourage the feeling of confidence required 
for the process of reconstruction.
This is not, however, to deny that the Landsbergis 
administration had been a complete failure. Although it will be 
remembered more for the errors that it made, which cost Lithuania 
so dearly, there were significant strides taken along the paths 
of reconstruction and regeneration during the first two years of 
complete independence. These were mostly in the field of re­
establishing the inter-war governmental structures which had been 
cast aside during the Soviet Occupation, such as a parliament, 
a system of local government and the judicial system.
The Sajüdis government was committed to restoring Lithuania's 
pre-Occupâtion governing structures, with political power to be 
vested in the office of the President and the Seimas 
(Parliament). The Seimas, seat of all legislative power, was to 
be composed of 141 members, each of whom was elected for a four- 
year term by secret ballot on the basis of universal, direct and 
equal suffrage. The role of the Seimas was to consider and enact 
amendments to the constitution; create laws; adopt resolutions 
and call referenda; announce elections; approve the candidature 
of the Prime Minister and supervise the activities of the Prime 
Minister and his Council of Ministers. It also had the power to 
demand a vote of no-confidence in the Prime Minister or other 
Ministers; to impose martial law and to mobilise Lithuania's 
armed forces. Its other area of responsibility was in the 
approving of the state budget and establishing taxes; the 
ratifying of treaties and debating foreign policy issues.
As in the inter-war years, Lithuania's Head of State was to 
be a President, elected by universal suffrage and secret ballot 
for a five-year term. His tasks were to work in conjunction with 
the government to implement policy; to appoint Lithuania's 
diplomatic representatives and, with the approval of the Seimas,
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to propose Lithuania's Prime Minister and key ministerial and 
military officers. Executive power was vested in the Council of 
Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister.^ Until 1996 the 
President was always of the same political party as the governing 
majority in the Seimas, but following the defeat of the LDLP in 
October of that year, Lithuania found herself in an unknown 
position, with the Seimas dominated by Landsbergis' Christian and 
Conservative coalition but with the LDLP leader Algirdas 
Brazauskas remaining as President. This demonstrated 
the Lithuanians' commitment to abiding by the terms of the 
Constitution which technically did allow for such an occurrence, 
but it remained to be seen what effect on the processes of 
creating and passing of new legislation such a situation would 
have.
After reconstructing the mechanisms of national government, 
Landsbergis' officials also had to remodel Lithuania's local 
government administration, which had been absorbed entirely into 
the Soviet structure following the start of the Occupation. In 
December 1991, Lithuania was subdivided into 585 administrative 
territorial units. Local government was split into two areas, 
the lower level comprising rural districts and towns, the higher 
level handling cities and regions. In 1991 the Union of 
Lithuanian Large Towns was created to assist in the process of 
local government.
The key concerns in local government were economics-related. 
All of the main political parties who campaigned for seats in 
local government pledged to 'clean up the crumbling economy' 
(LDLP manifesto), 'seek economic well-being' (Lithuanian 
Peasants' Party), 'to encourage foreign investment' (Life's Logic 
Party), 'to seek ways to decrease unemployment' (Lithuanian 
Women's Party), 'to revive and develop the economy' (Lithuanian 
Economic Party), 'to create new jobs' (Homeland Union) or 'to 
improve the functioning of the [local] economy... and solve 
everyday economic problems.' (Lithuanian Centre U n i o n ) ^
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Local policies reflected the national government picture. 
Lithuania's commitment to maintaining a just democracy was 
reflected in the parties' pledge to ensure the rights of 
minorities within the country: 'thorough integration of non-
Lithuanian citizens into... public and political 
life... safeguarding of citizens' rights irrespective of 
nationality and creed,' (Lithuanian Russian Union), fielding 
candidates for local government of deliberately various 
nationalities, including Russians, Poles and Tartars, (LDLP), 
being part of the common Christian West-European culture... not 
isolated,' (Christian Democratic Party).^
Political parties also expressed a commitment to ensuring 
Lithuania's position in the international community: although
this was not strictly a local government issue, it was included 
in many parties' manifestos. The Lithuanian Russian Union 
encouraged the 'establishment of good-neighbour relations. . . [and] 
the building of Lithuanian prestige in international 
organisations and the community of nations.' The Christian 
Democratic Party emphasised Lithuania's position in 'a global 
political association... as part of an evolving, unified free 
Europe. ' 76
Some political parties had more specified agendas than the 
wider spread of the manifestos of the main parties. There was, 
however, little difference between their local and national 
policies. The Social Democratic Party stressed the importance of 
social justice and the maintenance of democracy in both its 
manifestos, with self-government according to the Charter of 
European Self-Government.77 The Farmers' Union and the 
Lithuanian Peasants' Party were both committed to defending the 
rights of the agricultural sector of the population, 'to 
representing the interests of the village and related 
occupations,'78 while the Green Party's programme was based on 
improving Lithuania's environment after decades of Soviet-induced 
pollution. The importance of justice and the judicial system in 
a newly democratised Lithuania, however, was the backbone of many
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of the local government manifestos issued after 1991. This was 
especially true of the Homeland Union, Lithuanian Centre Union, 
LDLP, Lithuanian Russian Union, the Christian Democratic Party, 
the Lithuanian Peoples' Party, the Social Democrat Party and the 
Lithuanian Economic Party.
The judicial system was constructed around the Supreme Court, 
the highest judicial body in Lithuania, whose judges were all 
appointed by the Seimas on the recommendation of the President. 
the Courts of Appeal, district courts and local courts of 
Lithuania's administrative regions were also presided over by 
Presidentially-approved judges, each appointed for five-year 
terms. To ensure the preservation of Lithuania's democracy, a 
special Constitutional Court was established in 19 91 to ensure 
the constitutionality of acts passed by the Seimas and the 
Government. It was composed of a panel of nine judges, each 
eventually to be appointed for a single 9 year term, but one 
third of the panel was to be replaced annually to ensure 
impartiality. Further impartiality was ensured by the decision 
to create an independent Prosecutor-General's office. The 
Prosecutor-General and his deputies were appointed by the Seimas 
for five-year terms®®
Upon the restitution of independence, the Landsbergis 
government decided to retain the death penalty, incurring the 
hostility of western groups such as Amnesty International, but 
it was decided by the Landsbergis government that it was still 
necessary, in the difficult climate of transition, to have the 
ultimate penalty for criminal offences.
By the time of his defeat in 1992, Landsbergis and his 
government had therefore been able to restore some of the 
mechanisms of government which had laid firm foundations for the 
maintenance of democracy in Lithuania. These foundations have 
since been tested in two elections and have been proved to 
function. This is perhaps the greatest contribution Landsbergis 
could have made to his country in the first years of post-Soviet
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independence.
Brazauskas was determined to continue the democratic processes 
re-established by Landsbergis. Firstly, he ensured that
Lithuania's long-awaited constitution was finally promulgated 
after being approved by over 56 per cent of the electorate in a 
referendum on 25 October, 1 9 9 2 . The Constitution was based on 
French, German, US and earlier Lithuanian models and incorporated 
clauses on the defence of human rights and national minorities. 
The legislative system was based on a US model, while the
executive structure resembled the French arrangement. The
Constitution 'attempts to combine modern democratic principles 
with Lithuania's national traditions as well as with the more 
recent inheritance of the Socialist welfare s t a t e . T h e  
natural freedoms; of expression, religion, workers' rights, found 
in western democracies were included, as were the social rights 
inherent in a welfare state: free medical care, free higher
education, pensions and unemployment benefit.®®
The LDLP was certainly committed to maintaining a democracy. 
In the statute of the Party, it clearly stated that 'freedom and 
wellbeing is the main criteria of civilisation...the equality of 
people, their spiritual, political and economic freedom, their 
individual expression... form the main principles of the LDLP.'®^ 
Brazauskas was determined to 'safeguard democracy and human 
rights,'®® and create a political climate to ensure their 
continuation. He emphasised the importance of religion, education 
and science in the regeneration of the country.®®
As will be demonstrated in Chapter VI, the LDLP remained 
convinced of the need to develop a market economy. The LDLP 
advocated 'well-thought, gradual consecutive privatisation' and 
the revival of the 'true nature of co-operative property.'®^ By 
the time of the elections of 1996, the economy had stabilised: 
in 1992 GDP had decreased by 34 per cent, but by 1995 it had 
increased by three per cent. Inflation, which had reached 1165 
per cent in 1992 was down to 36 per cent by the end of 1995.®®
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Unemployment had also declined in the four years of LDLP 
Government. It stood, officially, at 5 per cent in 1996 as 
opposed to 9 per cent in 1992.®® The LDLP also pledged to 
continue with the second wave of privatisation, although they 
acknowledged that it had not occurred as quickly or as 
successfully as had been originally hoped in 1992.®®
The LDLP also proved infinitely more adept at dealing with 
Moscow and improving relations between Russia and Lithuania. Far 
more than Landsbergis, Brazauskas understood the importance of 
'good neighbourliness'. His relationship with Yeltsin was better 
than Landsbergis' had been and he was therefore able to diffuse 
certain situations, such as the tensions which had arisen over 
Lithuania's oil and gas debt to Russia with greater effectiveness 
than Landsbergis. As will be shown in Chapter IV, Brazauskas 
campaigned vigorously to secure Lithuania's admission into NATO 
and the EU,®®- but by the end of the period under review was 
still unsuccessful. This can not be entirely attributed to his 
actions: as will be shown, it was the unwillingness of existing 
member states to expand which prevented the admission of 
Lithuania and the other states of Central and Eastern Europe.
Yet the LDLP was also to fall victim to the "pitfalls of 
incumbency"®®. Unfulfilled promises which had been made to the 
electorate in 1992, especially regarding the delicate process of 
land reform and the restitution of property and the fact that in 
1996 the standard of living was still below 1989 levels®® all 
contributed to the defeat of the party.®*
As in the case of Sajüdis, the LDLP was hampered by the 
conflicting interests surrounding the process of land reform and 
property restitution. As the reforms introduced by Sajüdis had 
proved ineffective, a new Law on Land was drafted, finally 
promulgated by Brazauskas and the Seimas on 26 April, 1994.®^ It 
was a highly complex brief, covering many aspects of land reform, 
distribution, ownership, right of possession, the rights of users 
and conditions of use. It also included all legal necessities
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including matters related to purchasing, mortgaging or inheriting 
of land. The Law clarified the differences between State and 
privately (or common) owned land and defined which land was 
allocated for agricultural purposes, forestry needs or 
conservation areas. It determined what land would be placed under 
state control and how property disputes would be resolved.®®
The Law on Land, however, still failed to resolve certain 
outstanding issues. Foreign investment was still hampered by the 
insistence of the Government, in Article 3, that 'all land in the 
Republic of Lithuania belongs by right of ownership only to the 
citizens of the Republic of Lithuania.'®® Land could not be 
inherited by people who were not citizens of Lithuania®®, which 
alienated the many Lithuanian emigres who had, according to the 
wills of their relatives, inherited property.®®
Perhaps of greatest concern to Lithuanian citizens was the 
amount of control the State was to maintain over the land. In 
accordance with Article 30, the Government was permitted to 
'issue and revise... standard acts on the regulation of such 
issues as the ownership, holding, use of land' and 'work out and 
implement programmes for the use of land, optimisation of 
territories and land improvement.'^® Hostility to the Law on 
Land was also incurred by the inclusion of a clause allowing for 
the 'taking of land for the needs and common (use) by local 
governments, if it is provided for in the...plans of towns and 
settlements and land use plans.'®®® Land plots would 'be taken 
from the owners. . .by buying them out at the official land market 
price...or by giving [them] ... other plots of land of equal 
value. ' ®®2
While the Law, in theory, made ample provision for 
compensation, it was this section which was most open to abuse 
by corrupt local authorities. In 1993, all agricultural land in 
Lithuania was suddenly divided into zones®®®. The majority of 
the finest arable land became "Green Zone". It was 'taken from 
the owners' by the Government in order for it to be resold.
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according to Article 30, to local villagers. This, in theory, was 
designed to encourage support for the LDLP from those who had 
feared that the introduction of a market economy would lead to 
the loss of their livelihood as collective farms were disbanded. 
The LDLP claimed that if people were able to own their own 
property, they would be far more receptive to the ideas of the 
LDLP,
This policy, however, had a fatal and perhaps deliberate flaw. 
For the LDLP was torn between wanting to modernise and, in the 
ideological mindset of homo sovieticus, to maintain as much power 
and control as possible. In this case, power and control equalled 
the possession of land. The "Green Zone" land was therefore made 
available for purchase at rates far higher than the average 
collective worker could ever afford and thus the great majority 
of the land remained in state control.
Land which fell into the "Yellow Zone" remained under 
questionable ownership. It was earmarked by the State as land 
ideally for return, but the original owners had failed to provide 
the correct documents of proof of ownership or to fulfil the 
requirements of citizenship. The land in the "Grey Zone" was 
immediately returned to the inter-war owners, provided all the 
correct documents were produced and that the owner was a 
Lithuanian citizen. This often proved to be the lowest quality 
land of the entire p r o p e r t y .  ®°4 Any swamps, marshlands or 
forests on the property were open for negotiation. Because the 
land was of lesser quality, however, it was often not reclaimed 
instantly and the State managed to retain control over it.
It was not just the quality of the land, however, which 
influenced people's desires to either leave or reclaim the land. 
In true Soviet style, not all of the "Grey Zone" land was grouped 
together and often only odd parts were available for return. This 
was, in most cases, insufficient to farm profitably and 
therefore, because of the stipulation that all returned land had 
to be worked, (Article 9: 'Land Users must use land according to
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the proper purpose of its use.'®°®) it was left in the holding 
of the State. Local agricultural reform agencies often created 
additional complications for the former owners by preventing 
access routes from being constructed where necessary, for example 
where two separate "Grey Zone" segments were returned, divided 
by "Green Zone" land.®®®
That most land would remain in state control was also 
inevitable because, despite the terms of Article 32, which stated 
that compensation would be at the 'official market price', it was 
so paltry that many land owners did not wish to accept it. This 
was compounded by the frequent amendments to the Law on Land. 
From its promulgation on 26 April 1994 until March 1997, there 
were 15 amendments to the law. In 1994, therefore, aware that 
these amendments would most probably be forthcoming, many 
landowners were extremely reluctant to either claim and start 
working the meagre plots of land restored to them or settle for 
virtually worthless compensation in the belief that in the next 
months a more favourable settlement might be introduced. ®°7
By 19 96, acutely aware that the land reform problem had not 
abated, the Government passed another amendment to Article 4 7 of 
Lithuania's Constitution, by which certain non-Lithuanian 
citizens would be able to purchase land.®®® It allowed for 
foreign enterprises whose offices were registered in Lithuania 
and which originated from EU, OECD or NATO member states to 
purchase non-agricultural land in Lithuania®®® and for 
representatives from other states to lease plots of land. This, 
however, was only a partial solution to the problem, as the 
majority of potential foreign investors wanted to utilise the 
agricultural sector, for which Lithuania was historically 
noted. ®®®
The significance of the failure of land reform policies can 
not be underestimated. By 1997, the majority of land which could 
have been returned to its interwar owners or their descendants 
had not been done so and remained in the control of the state.
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This prevented both foreign and domestic investment by parties
which had been willing to do so prior to independence. It also
highlighted the corruption of local and governmental authorities, 
who were prepared to draft and manipulate new legislation in 
order to ensure that they maintained maximum control and
authority.
The four years of LDLP government witnessed a definite 
increase in crime and corruption, some of which was directly 
linked to leading members of the LDLP such as Prime Minister 
Adolfas Slezevicius, who was forced to resign in 1995 after being 
implicated in a banking scandal.®®® Such actions discredited the 
government and provided ammunition for Landsbergis' Christian- 
Conservative Homeland Union coalition which emphasised the 
necessity for morality in Government and highlighted the
seemingly cavalier attitude of the Government towards the spread 
of corruption.
Corruption and the escalation in strength of the Mafia were 
to be the scourges of the post -Independence Governments in many 
of the former Soviet Republics following the collapse of the 
USSR. Lithuania was no exception. As Ashot Manucharyan of the 
Karabakh Committee indicated in 1988, 'in Italy or the USA the 
mafia just means organised crime...but here... the mafia, the 
state and the law overlap. Criminals in the shadow economy have 
party and police connections. It is all intertwined.'®®^ in the 
Soviet era, the shadow economy had played a major role in a 
society burdened by the chaos and inefficiency of a centrally 
planned economy and it had spawned this class of people who 
formed the "mafia". It was these people who were able to profit 
when Lithuania abandoned the old Soviet criminal and legal codes 
upon the restitution of independence, as numerous loopholes 
remained, for example, regarding currency exchanges, trade and 
profits. The mafia, who were skilled in all of those areas, were 
able to exploit their abilities to maximum advantage. Once the 
new legal codes were finally drafted, the success of the mafia 
increased, as they were able to apply some of their practises
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legally, in a capitalist framework.®®®
Some of their other practises, however, remained illegal after 
the introduction of a new criminal code in 1992. Nonetheless, 
they continued to be used and the mafia was still predominantly 
a network of criminals. A common practice was that of extortion 
and, if payments were not met, retaliatory arson. A frequent 
sight, especially in Vilnius, by 1994 was the view of burnt-out 
houses or retail outlets. ®®^ Klaipeda was also a mafia 
stronghold, partly because of the presence of the port and the 
regular flow of trade and passengers which created prime 
conditions for illegal operations. Another familiar sight, 
especially in Klaipeda, was the presence of large, armed 
bodyguards surrounding men heavily bedecked in silk suits and 
gold jewellery, with a few decorative women (or prostitutes) in 
attendance in the leading hotel and restaurants.®®^ Street 
crime, not necessarily the work of mafia associates, also 
increased following independence. By 1993 it was 80 per cent over 
the 1989 rate.®®6
There were also far more serious crimes, such as murder: Vitas 
Lingys, a prominent journalist at Lietuvos Rytas (a tabloid 
newspaper) was murdered on 10 December 1993 after writing 
articles exploring the activities of the Vilniaus Brigade and 
condemning Lithuania's mafia groups. When Boris Dekandize, the 
accused, received the sentence of the death penalty after being 
found guilty of the murder at his trial in 1994, other mafia 
members threatened to blow up the Ignalina nuclear power station 
if the execution took place. Although the execution eventually 
occurred in 1995, there was no attack on Ignalina, but security 
at the power plant had increased noticeably to counter this and 
future prospective threats. ®®^
Corruption was not solely the prerogative of the mafia, 
however. It ran throughout Lithuanian society, including through 
the corridors of Government. This was one of the greatest causes 
of discontent among the electorate. In a survey on Baltic
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nationalities conducted in 1994, there was general opposition to 
the misuse of wealth that was felt to be occurring in post-Soviet 
Lithuania. Respondents believed that those with large incomes did 
not, in general, contribute to the growth of Lithuania's economy, 
instead being more likely to "exploit" their fellow citizens and 
over 80 per cent of those questioned believed that they were 
likely to be "dishonest" . In 1996, the spread of corruption 
was one of the key reasons for the defeat of the LDLP.^^^ The 
electorate had become increasingly disenchanted with the 
perceived abuse of office of senior government officials, 
especially when Prime Minister Slezevicius was implicated in the 
aforementioned banking scandal of 1995. There was a distinct 
feeling that members of the Government were acting in their own 
interests, rather than in the interests of the state.
This was most apparent when examining the issue of land 
reform. Perhaps the most serious failing of the LDLP government, 
however, was its inability to resolve this vital matter. Failure 
to resolve the land question inhibited foreign investors, whose 
presence, it had been believed, would be so beneficial for 
Lithuania's post-Soviet development and adversely affected all 
aspects of the economy as well as disillusioning potential 
supporters of the LDLP.
While continuing Landsbergis' policy of rebuilding the 
mechanisms of Government, the LDLP failed to make any real 
further progress. By 1996 Lithuania still did not possess an 
impartial civil service. This was one of the most important 
brakes to the development of post-Soviet Lithuania. Without 
an effective civil service, there was a marked increase in the 
levels of bribery and corruption and laws were seen as 
ineffective. This, suggested Vice Foreign Minister Rokas 
Bernotas, was perhaps 'the greatest relic of the Soviet era, with
all its vices.'^ 2
Under the old regime, state employees represented themselves, 
their office, their department and their ministry, but (with a
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few exceptions) lacked loyalty and paid the state only "lip 
service", illustrating the selfish and retrospective nature of 
homo sovieticus. These traits, however, were typical of people 
in internal exile and not just of those who suffered under the 
Soviet regime. In the first years of government most state 
employees suffered from severe job-insecurity and received 
salaries well below levels which could be earned outwith the 
state sector. These factors did little to ensure loyalty, 
conscientiousness or commitment and contributed to a frequent 
turnover of staff as Lithuania's fledgling civil servants left 
office to seek better employment in the private sector. Their 
successors were, in most cases, no more loyal, conscientious or 
committed.
Lithuania required the creation of an impartial and 
professional civil service and a specific law to govern this 
institution.Incentives were necessary to attract the right 
type of people to employment within the civil service. These had 
to include not only an attractive salary, comparable with the 
private sector, but also the promise of promotion, family 
support, health insurance, education subsidies and ample 
pensions. With these advantages, the civil servant would 
naturally gain prestige and a status that would not be worthwhile 
to lose. Using a process of strict selection via special 
examinations, an impartial and professional civil service, 
impervious to the changes in government, would evolve. The Civil 
Service could refuse to be dictated to by the personal whims of 
individual government officials. While none of these criteria 
were met in the first years of independence, Lithuania received 
little value from her state employees.
It was, however, the ever-present legacy of homo sovieticus 
which proved to be the greatest pitfall for the LDLP government. 
Those who had been bureaucrats during the period of Soviet 
occupation had learned how to profit from the new economic system 
and, by 1996, this had led to an extremely visible difference 
between rich and poor: the benefits of a market economy had, in
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the eyes of many Lithuanians, been distributed unequally. 
Landsbergis and his Homeland Union were able to paint the LDLP 
as 'the party of the new economic elites that profited from 
insider deals while the rest of the country suffered during the 
tough t i m e s . T o  a great extent this was an accurate 
description: most Lithuanians did not resent their neighbours 
having greater wealth than themselves, but what they did resent 
was the manner in which this wealth had been acquired (often via 
illegal means.)
As in the 1992 elections, it was unspoken sentiments which 
were to influence the electorate. In this case, the voters 
approved of the removal of the repressive nature and adherence 
to the old Communist ideology from the soul of the LDLP. They did 
not, however, approve of the excessive pragmatism adopted by 
Party members. There was a definite sense, shared by a sizeable 
proportion of the Lithuanian population, that the LDLP 
bureaucrats were only looking after their own interests and not 
the interests of the electorate. This view was given added 
credibility by the widespread increase in corruption during the 
LDLP's years in office.
Popular disenchantment with the elected government was 
reflected in the widespread voter apathy: by 1996 the turnout for 
elections was only 53 per cent, as opposed to over 75 per cent 
in 1 9 9 2 . This put the voter turnout approximately on a par 
with the USA at that time.
Increasing opposition to the Government became more effective 
with the union of the Christian and Conservative factions of the 
Seimas into the Homeland Union in 1996. As a united body it was 
able to do what the individual factions had been unable to in 
1992: it presented a solid force opposed to the LDLP and its
corruption and was consequently victorious. But it was unclear 
whether the new governing coalition had learned anything of real 
value during its time in opposition. Homo sovieticus was still 
as present in 1996 as it had been in 1992 and some of its
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manifestations were even more firmly entrenched in the Lithuanian 
psyche than they had been on the restitution of independence.
Most notably, the increase in corruption and the 
solidification of the power of Lithuania's former Communist 
bureaucrats: those who had learnt how to profit under both the 
old and new regimes. 'Tales of official corruption and crime 
resonate...the Nomenklatura has strengthened its position in the 
economy, media and j u d i c i a r y . Landsbergis was still guilty 
of many of the same faults as he had been prior to his 1992 
defeat and his success in the 1996 polls made him even more 
unwilling to reform his policies and, indeed, his personal 
nature. (His favourite method of attacking opponents was still 
to denounce them as agents of Moscow and the KGB.)
The political system in Lithuania was evolving so slowly that 
it seemed inevitable that the Homeland Union would also be ousted 
in the year 2000 elections. With neither main political group 
being radically different from the other, both being committed 
to the maintenance of democratic independence, the transition to 
a market economy, campaigning for admission into NATO and the EU, 
ensuring the credibility of Lithuania's banking system and the 
protection of the Litas as Lithuania's currency, this would be 
a sign of popular discontent with the general political 
climate.(This expression of popular discontent is used 
worldwide, for example it can be clearly seen in result of the 
General Election of 1 May 1997 in the UK, which saw an 
unprecedented swing from the Conservative Party to Labour after 
18 years of government.^"O) It was highly unlikely that in four 
years the Homeland Union would be able to achieve anything of 
real value and would probably suffer at the ballot box as a 
result.
By 1996 it could be seen that there were definite similarities 
between the political situations in Latvia and Estonia with that 
in Lithuania. All three states had installed the mechanisms of 
democratic government and had held free and fair elections. 
The most striking similarity among the three states was the
141
formation of coalition governments among right-wing nationalist 
forces, as following the restitution of independence in all three 
Baltic states, the major nationalist movements which had demanded 
the restitution of independence had all fragmented as internal 
strife and individuals' desire for power had led to their 
breakup. In Estonia, the governing coalition was made up of 
members of the Isamaa and Moderates electoral alliances and the 
Estonian National Independence Party, while in Latvia it was a 
coalition between Latvian Way and the Latvian Farmers' Union 
which held elected office.
All three Baltic states possessed Democratic Labour Parties, 
all former Communist parties, but with varying degrees of 
political importance (Lithuania having elected them to office, 
the 2,000-strong Estonian faction and the smaller Latvian group 
which had won no seats in the Saeima (the Latvian Parliament) in 
the 1993 elections.) Unfortunately, the governments of the Baltic 
states were all also tarnished by political scandal. On 14 July 
1994 the entire Latvian cabinet, led by Prime Minister Valdis 
Birkavs, resigned after three of its members were forced out on 
charges of corruption.Numerous ministerial resignations for 
similar reasons in the first years of independence also weakened 
and fragmented Mart Laar's Estonian coalition government.
Poland echoed Lithuania's move by re-electing Aleksander 
Kwasniewski and the former Communists, renamed the Alliance of 
the Democratic Left (SLD) and claiming to be a Social-Democrat 
party, in 1995.^^“^ As in the case of Sajûdis, Solidarity, the 
trade union movement which had symbolised Poland's struggle to 
throw off Communist government, had proven ineffective in office 
once its aim had been achieved. The legacy of Soviet domination 
has proven as strong in Poland as in Lithuania, with the former 
Communist Nomenklatura returned to power and profiting from the 
benefits of a capitalist environment, while the ordinary people, 
in a majority of cases failed to reap the benefits of
capitalism.
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Latvia, Estonia and Poland all shared Lithuania's difficulty 
in ridding themselves of their former-Soviet constitutions. By 
1996 Poland was still bound by its former-Soviet statutes, 
while it was only in 1992 that Estonia and Latvia managed to 
introduce their own, both basing them on their interwar 
constitutions (Estonia's of 1938 and Latvia's of 1922) . in 
Estonia and Poland, as in Lithuania, post-Soviet judicial systems 
had been installed, but Latvia was still bound by the Soviet 
criminal code.
While the first four years of independence did witness the 
beginning of reconstruction in the sphere of influence of the 
former USSR, it was to be only a beginning. In Lithuania, basic 
governmental and administrative structures had been reinstalled 
and the transition from a member state of the USSR to an 
independent democracy had been made. Individual political parties 
had been created and were allowed freedom of operation unknown 
during the Soviet occupation. But no political faction was 
untainted by corruption or scandal and it was this stench of 
corruption which so disillusioned the electorate and contributed 
to the growth of popular apathy.
Total failure by either administration in the period under 
review to conclusively solve the land reform issue, which in the 
most agricultural of the three Baltic States was a vital matter, 
did nothing to assist Lithuania throughout its period of 
transition. The reforms introduced by both of the post­
independence Governments 'destroyed collectivisation but did not 
replace it with a viable s y s t e m . W h a t  was in theory a 
domestic policy issue: the transfer of land ownership or tenancy 
thereof, was to influence most aspects of Lithuania's 
reconstruction because of its impact on the economy and, 
crucially, on the foreign investment on which Lithuania was 
reliant. It also had a social impact, as failure to implement a 
concrete policy of land reform created tension for Lithuania's 
farmers and alienated the emigre community which had been 
prepared to assist in Lithuania's rebirth by investing in their
143
former homeland. Former Communist bureaucrats were able to profit 
from the new system, whilst the ordinary people became even more 
disadvantaged and disillusioned than under the Soviet regime. 
This was the trend which would characterise the first years of 
re-independence in Lithuania, a trend which Lithuania's 
politicians would do little to reverse.
1. As used by M. Kaminski in the Financial Times 18 October 1996.
2. See Appendix II for the election results of October 1992.
3. Gerutis, A. in Gerutis, A. (ed) Lithuania 700 Years Manyland, 1984, ppl93- 194. See Appendix II for details of the election results.
4. Vladas Gaidys, opinion pollster, interview, 26 June, 1994
5. The exceptions were Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Kyrgyztan and the Russian Federation. In the Russian Federation, however, the former Communists, headed by Genady Zyuganov, were encroaching on Yeltsin's popularity and posed a serious challenge in the 1995 elections.
6. The Economist 16 April 1994 p54
7. ibid
8 . See Chapter II for a full analysis of the characteristics of a bureacratic society. Found in a specifically "Soviet" environment, they created homo 
sovieticus.
9. See Appendix II for the previous occupations of the first Government.
10. See Appendix II for the February and March 1990 election results.
11. See Appendix II for trade figures.
12. Lieven, A. op cit p268
13. Morrison, J. Boris Yeltsin, From Bolshevik to Democrat Penguin, 1991, pp214-225
14. Vardys, V./Sedaitis, J. Lithuania: The Rebel Nation Westview Press, 1997 pl98
15. ibid
16. The economic situation influenced people's desire for a return to the oldsystem. In a survey conducted in 1994 for the Centre for the Study of PublicPolicy at Strathclyde University, 70 per cent of respondents cited their economic situation as being "unsatisfactory" and worse than in 1989. (Questions 103-104) Lithuania's economic situation in 1989 was deemed to have been better than in 1994, although there was a consensus that by 1999 the situation would improve. (Questions 105-108) There was little to choose between those who preferred the Soviet system of Government to that installed in post-Soviet Lithuania (Question 123) , but at the same time the great majority of people preferred the freedoms of thought and movement possible in the new democracy. (Questions 129-137)
144
17. These upheavals are described in more detail later in the chapter.
18. The Independent 22 October 1996
19. Virtually all of the new political parties formed after 1991 had keyfigures from Sajûdis among their leaders. Of those who gained sufficient votesto return deputies to the Seimas, Homeland Union - the LithuanianConservatives were led by Landsbergis, The Centre Union by R, Ozolas and R.Bickauskas and the Christian Democratic Party by P. Katilus and A. Saudargas. Other smaller parties, even the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and Polish- political parties had members of Sajûdis among their ranks.
20. Vardys, V./Sedaitis, J. Lithuania; The Rebel Nation op cit, pl98
21. Vladas Gaidys, Opinion Pollster, interview 26 June, 1994
22. ibid
23. Lozoraitis was, however, allegedly subject to a "dirty tricks" campaign masterminded by Kazys Bobelis, another emigre in the USA who returned to Lithuania as a supporter of Brazauskas, rewarded for doing so by receiving the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Seimas. (This was greeted with wry amusement on the part of many ordinary Lithuanians, as Bobelis was a surgeon by occupation, not necessarily the best training for handling the foreign affairs of a re-emerging nation.) The campaign targeted Lozoraitis' Italian wife as "proof" of his lack of recognition of the importance of his Lithuanian origins and his commitment to Lithuania's rebirth. Although this campaign was petty and spiteful and probably had no real bearing on the outcome of the elections, it left a nasty taste in the mouths of many people and may be used as an example of how the mentality of homo sovieticus continued to exist in post-Soviet Lithuania: the willingness to resort tomisleading propaganda in an attempt to discredit an opponent. It has also been argued by a number of Lozoraitis supporters that had he decided earlier to run for the Presidency, he would have received more votes: Lozoraitis' last-minute campaign was not lengthy enough to amass sufficient popular support.
24. Source: Beaver, P. (ed) Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States op cit
25. See Appendix II for Election Figures for 1996
26. Lietuvos Aidas was the key pro-Landsbergis paper. It had been founded by Jonas Basanavicius as his state newspaper and Landsbergis resurrected it for the same purpose.
27. Lithuanian history and culture are so closely intertwined that it is virtually impossible to separate them: it was the culture which was responsible for the maintenance of the distinct national identity which was preserved despite centuries of occupation.
28. Lieven, A. The Baltic Revolution op cit, p274
29. Vice Foreign Minister R. Bernotas, interview, 24 March 1997.
30. ibid
31. See Appendix II for the election results of 1990.
32. From personal experience in Lithuania in the Autumn of 1992.
33. Joné Brazauskaite, interview, 21 January 1997.
34. Lieven, A. The Baltic Revolution op cit, p25 9
145
35. ibid, p266. These sentiments were also confirmed by Fr. Vincentas, the priest in the northern town of Vieksniai, interview, 3 July, 1994.
36. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania 24 March 1996, pi
37. Only the environment received specific attention in the manifesto.
38. This was perhaps more important in Lithuania than in the other Baltic states, because Lithuania was more agricultural and thus more dependent on this reform than Latvia or Estonia.
39. Vice Foreign Minister Bernotas, interview, 9 April, 1997
40. In many cases, for example in the Marijampolé region, there were few actual buildings to be returned, as they had generally been destroyed, razed or subdivided and removed by the invading Nazi or Soviet forces. But there was still a demand for the return of the actual land, which was seen, especially by the previous owners of large farms as being extremely valuable : houses and barns could be rebuilt easily, especially with the profits that would be inevitable from farming prime agricultural land using modern, western farming methods.
41. Professor Reklaitis at Kaunas Technological University was in this exact situation. In 1940, after being deported to Siberia, he lost his apartment, which was situated in the centre of Kaunas. The apartment he was offered as compensation was so small that it could have fitted into the drawing room of his previous abode and was located four miles from the city centre. He refused to settle for this and in 1997 was still continuing to fight to regain his old apartment. Interview, 20 March 1997.
42. See the Law on Citizenship, 1991
43. Jone Brazauskaite, interview, 8 March, 1992
44. ibid
45. Law on the Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership to Existing Real Property, Chapter 1, Article 1, 18 June 1991.
46. ibid, Article 2.
47. ibid, Chapter 2, Article 4.
48. Z. Rutkauskiene, a former land owner, interview, 2 November 1991
49. Zigmas Brazauskas, architect, interview, 20 June 1994.
50. Law on the Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights ofOwnership to the Existing Real Property op cit. Chapter 2, Articles 1-8.
51. ibid. Chapters 3 and 4, Articles 12-17.
52. Resolution on the Law Regarding the Process of Enforcement...on the Procedures and Conditions of the Restoration of Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property, 16 July 1991.
53. ibid, Article 12.
54. Law on Land Reform, Chapter 3, Article 13, 2 5 July 1991.
55. Law on Land Reform, Chapter 4, Articles 17-19, 25 July 1991. See AppendixIV for an example of an Agrarian Reform Agency. (Marijampolé).
146
56. Department of Press and Public Relations of the Seimas Political Parties and Organisations of the Republic of Lithuania October 1991 p4
57. But when the LDLP were victorious in the 1992 elections, she left political life and opened a pizza restaurant in the heart of Vilnius.
58. An opinion expressed by all Lithuanian emigres interviewed between 1991- 1994. They were extremely disheartened by this.
59. By October 1992, of the 98 Sajûdis deputies elected in 1990, only 42 still represented the Party.
60. Vardys, V./Sedaitis, J. Lithuania; The Rebel Nation op cit, pl93
61. See the Survey Study on Nationalities in the Baltic States op cit for Lithuanians' views on the deterioration in their standards of living. There was a definite agreement that their economic situation was worse than during Soviet times.
62. First Secretary A. Misevicius, interview, 22 April 1997.
63. See Appendix II for turnout figures.
64. The Times, 5 November 1992
65. The Guardian, 5 November 1992
66. The Times, 11 April, 1992
67. In Liverpool Riverside, for example, there was only a 51.3 per centturnout. (Source: The Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1997)
68. Vardys, V./Sedaitis, J. Lithuania: The Rebel Nation op cit, pl99
69. Lieven, A. op cit p2 55
70. There had been 7 by 1996.
71. Beaver, P.(ed) Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States op
cit p7
72. ibid
73. These included 11 cities, 44 regions, 81 towns, 22 settlements and 427areas. Source : ibid
74. Municipal Elections Manifestos Lithuanian Information Institute, 1996
75. ibid
76. ibid
77. Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania Lithuanian Information Institute, 1995 and Local Government Manifestos Lithuanian Information Institute, 1995.
78. ibid
79. ibid
80. Beaver, P.(ed) Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States op 
cit p8
147
81. Tiesa, 3 November, 1992
82. Vardys, V./Sedaitis, J. Lithuania: the Rebel Nation Westview Press, 1997,p206
83. ibid
84. Statute of the LDLP
85. Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania Lithuanian Information Institute, 1995
86. ibid
87. Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania Lithuanian Information Institute, 1995
8 8. Election Programmes of Lithuanian Political Parties: State Management. Economics and Finance Seimas Analysis Group, 1996
89. Financial Times 18 October 1996 (Although Lithuania's official unemployment figures are recorded by Labour Exchanges. They do not, however, take into account the sizeable percentage of the population working for wages far less than the recognised minimum level and therefore living in virtual poverty.)
90. Bernotas, R. Main Points of the Political and Economic Programmes of the Main Parties in Lithuania Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996
91. Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania Lithuanian Information Institute, 1996
92. Kaminski, op cit
93. ibid
94. The unpopularity of the LDLP was not, however, connected to the persona of its leader, Brazauskas. Despite his party's defeat, Brazauskas himself continued to remain the most popular political figure in Lithuania.
95. Law on Land, 26 April 1994
96. ibid
97. ibid
98. ibid. Article 19
99. Many Lithuanians who had relatives who had fled to the West made such provisions in their wills even before independence had been restored. They believed that it was these people, the majority of whom were far wealthier than those who had been trapped in Lithuania after the start of the Soviet Occupation, who would best be able to provide for the running of the property when and if it were returned.
100. ibid. Article 30
101. ibid. Article 32
102. ibid
103. see Appendix IV for a map of the Marijampolé region, July 1994.
148
104. ibid
105. Law on Land, 26 April 1994
106. See Appendix I for a case study of the Balsupè Estate, where two separate "Grey Zone" plots were returned, yet an access route linking them was prohibited.
107. ibid. The major example in this thesis is the Balsupè estate, because it is the one where I have personal experience of the difficulties of property restoration. It is, however, one of the clearest examples of all the complications of the land reform policies in the post-Soviet years and reflects similar problems encountered throughout Lithuania.
108. Law on Supplementing Article 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 20 June 1996
109. ibid, Article 1 «
110. The British Pig Improvement Company, for example, had no interest in anything except the agricultural sector. Their investment would have greatly benefited Lithuania, but with the frequent, ineffective amendments to the Law on Land, their investment was not forthcoming.
111. See Chapter VI for details.
112. B.B.C. Television The Second Russian Revolution: Breaking Ranks 1991
113. Jone Brazauskaite, interview, 21 January 1997
114. From personal experience of Lithuania in 1994.
115. The Lithuanian mafia, while having no connection with their American namesake, have adopted their style of dress: the stereotypical gangsterportrayed in such films as "The Godfather", being both incredibly villainous and threatening in appearance. I was propositioned by a leading mafia member inside the Klaipeda Hotel in July 1994, although when he realised that I was a foreigner, he backed away. The mafia in Lithuania have little to do with foreigners.
116. Lietuvos Rytas, 26 January 1993
117. Professor V. Reklaitis, interview, 5 May, 1997
118. Rose, R. , Maley, W ., Vilmorus & Emor Study on Baltic Nationalities op 
cit, (Questions 2-8)
119. Vice Foreign Minister R. Bernotas, interview, 24 March, 1997
120. ibid
121. Vice Foreign Minister R. Bernotas, interview, 16 August 1996.
122. ibid
123. The example cited by Bernotas, among others, is that in Lithuania, when motorists are stopped by Police for traffic violations, instead of issuing tickets, as practised in western states, a monetary fine is extracted by the Police officer at the time. In most cases, the officer often has to face the offer of a bribe. Bernotas believes that Police should merely issue tickets and have nothing to do with the direct handling of money, thus removing themselves from the risk of corruption.
149
124. Bernotas, basing his ideas on the civil services of the UK and Germany, drafted plans for the creation of an impartial civil service based on the above criteria. His belief was that it would be better, in the long-term, to have a smaller and better-trained civil service, than a larger body composed of lower-calibre candidates. But by the time of the 1996 elections, the government had made little progress towards the creation of such a structure and this was of no use in Lithuania's rebirth and reconstruction.
125. Kaminski, M. The Financial Times 22 October 1996
126. Vice Foreign Minister R. Bernotas, interview, 24 March 1997.
127. Wall Street Journal 25 October 1996
128. Kaminski, M. in The Financial Times, 18 October 1996
129. As suggested by Laime Paleckis, 7 November 1996 in conversation, a view held by many others both within and outside Lithuania,
130. The Financial Times 2 May, 1997, pi and other newspapers on the same date. So-called "New Labour" was only electable after it had abandoned its core socialist principles and had vowed to continue some of the Conservatives' policies. Therefore many of the electorate believed they were actually choosing between similar parties and opted for a change in personnel rather than a change in political philosophy.
131. See Appendix II for a list of the principal political parties in the Baltic States.
13 2. Beaver, P. (ed) Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States op 
cit p7
13 3. ibid
134. Kwasniewski was extremely keen to be seen as a modern, western leader. He posed with his wife and daughter for a feature in the Spanish-owned 
"Hello!" magazine shortly after his election in 1995, in an attempt to demonstrate his openness and commitment to the transition to a democratic political system and the introduction of a market economy and to prove that he was not an "old style" Communist. "Hello!" also attracted the Czech President, Vaclav Havel, who gave numerous interviews to the magazine following the assumption of the Presidency. Although "Hello!" is strictly apolitical and renowned for never writing anything hostile about its subjects, (instead featuring lavish photographs of their homes), it has an extremely wide circulation in both Europe and the Spanish-speaking countries of South America. Kwasniewski, in particular, used the magazine as a publicity vehicle, aware that many western Governments were wary of the return to office of the former Communists and he was anxious to allay those fears.
13 5. Beaver, P. (ed) Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States op 
cit, pl3
136. Although a new post-Soviet Constitution was promulgated in 1997.
13 7. Beaver, P. Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States, op cit, P7
138. ibid, p8
139. Vardys, V./Sedaitis, J. Lithuania: the Rebel Nation op cit, p203
150 
CHAPTER IV
LITHUANIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
'The geographic centre of Europe, Lithuania can not afford to 
succumb to parochialism.
'The foreign policy of Lithuania is based on her geopolitical 
situation and on the fact of being a newly sovereign entity. 
Although this statement was issued in 1993, the sentiments could 
have been applicable to 1918 or even 13 86, especially regarding 
the significance of her geopolitical situation. Lithuania's 
foreign policy has always had to take this fact into account. 
'The geographical position of the Baltic lands, at the point 
where East meets West, has made them a battleground for a 
succession of races and states striving for economic and 
political mastery in the r e g i o n . in a small state such as 
Lithuania, geopolitics has a greater influence than in a larger 
state which is more capable of adequately defending itself 
against potential aggressors. The direction of Lithuania's 
foreign policy has, to a great extent, been forced upon her by 
her geographic and political history/*
Foreign policy is an amalgam of interests and issues, very 
often becoming an extension of domestic policy concerns, 
especially security, which influences all aspects of political 
life. And perhaps the most important element of any state's 
foreign policy is also this need for self-defence. In his 
Presidential Address of 1994, President Brazauskas acknowledged 
that a priority of Lithuania's foreign policy was 'the 
integration of Lithuania into European and transatlantic 
political, economic and security structures.'® It is therefore 
extremely difficult to separate foreign and defence/security 
policies, as they are for the most parts intertwined. This 
chapter, however, will concern itself with the mechanics of 
creating a new foreign policy, starting with the building of a
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foreign service; and an examination of the process of re­
establishing international links, including the development of 
tourism as a process of improving relations with other states.
The following chapter, devoted to Lithuania's security, will 
examine the more military aspects of foreign policy and the 
structure of Lithuania's armed forces. These chapter divisions 
are to make analysis more manageable rather than because there 
is a clear distinction between foreign and security policies, 
especially as "security" does not merely imply military strength. 
Military security has not always been the sole criterion for 
determining a state's foreign policy. There is also the need for 
economic security and here again, the importance of a state's 
geographic position comes into question. The developing and 
strengthening of relations with neighbouring states, as well as 
those further away, is part of the normal and historic process 
of international relations. Cultural affinities with neighbouring 
states also have to be considered for the formation of foreign 
relations of a less political nature.
Foreign policy in a democracy takes into account not only 
geopolitics, but also the ethnic structure of the population; a 
reflection of the composite nationalities within the state's 
boundaries (a modern derivative of ancestral tribal loyalties). 
For this reason, Lithuania's foreign policy must be seen as 
separate from that of Latvia or Estonia, because those states 
have a far greater number of minorities®, and the interests of 
these minorities have to be taken into account when formulating 
policy. While there are obvious similarities between Lithuania 
and the other two Baltic States, they can not be studied as a 
single unit because of this difference. Due to their size and 
geographical position, the Baltic States have often been grouped 
together in the eyes of non-Balts. The Lithuanians, however, have 
always opposed this and wish to be perceived as an individual 
state in the belief that this would better advance their 
interests in the field of (re)entry into the international 
community.
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This view has also been expressed by foreign nationals with 
an interest in Lithuania. Michael Peart, for example, the British 
Ambassador to Lithuania in 1994, said that Lithuania's best 
chance of entering international organisations such as the 
European Union or the WEU was to ally herself with Poland. He saw 
this as preferable to maintaining firm links with the other two 
Baltic States, whose Russian minorities had the potential to 
cause alarm in the EU, as even following the ending of the Cold 
War, Russia and Russian motives were not entirely trusted by the 
western states.®
After the 1918 declaration of independence and upon the 
restitution of that independence in 1990, Lithuania faced the 
same challenges: to create and implement a foreign policy which 
would fulfil the necessary criteria. Firstly, a specific Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs had to be established and then a policy 
created. Decisions had to be taken on the formation of a 
framework of alliances and alignments as Lithuania appeared on 
the international stage.
It was not until 1920, two years after independence had first 
been declared in the 20th Century, that Lithuania was free from 
German or Soviet invading forces and it was only with the 
convening of the Constituent Seim in that year that effective 
government could begin. Lithuania's foreign policy had to firstly 
reflect the geographical position: sandwiched between the
considerably larger entities of Soviet Russia and Germany, both 
states having previously occupied Lithuania. A further neighbour, 
Poland, although smaller than either Germany or the USSR, had 
also expressed a desire to incorporate Lithuania and in 1922 was 
able to seize Vilnius and the surrounding region.
Territorial disputes, however, were not confined to aggression 
against Lithuania. Despite being occupied by French forces since 
1920, the port of Klaipeda was traditionally perceived by most 
Lithuanians as being part of Lithuania, and on 10 January 1923, 
Lithuanian troops occupied the region, meeting with no resistance
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from the French. Although there were international protests, the 
territory was officially transferred to Lithuania on 16 February 
of that year.® By the mid-1930s, Lithuania's foreign relations 
were heavily influenced by three concerns: the growing strength 
of the USSR, the rising power of Nazi Germany and continuing 
hostile relations with Poland.^ In 1939, Lithuania's 
territorial integrity was compromised still further, when she was 
forced, with the threat of invasion, to cede the Klaipeda region 
to the Nazi Reich.
These territorial concerns were therefore of the utmost 
importance to the Government, which was faced with the task of 
establishing a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1920. The main 
influences behind the establishment of this office were British 
and French, but this was due primarily to personal 
connections.^ The staffing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
was also undertaken through such personal connections. Lithuania 
did not have an apolitical civil service at this time. Staff were 
posted abroad depending on linguistic skills: the Paris, Berlin 
and London Embassies were excellent examples of this.*-® 
Lithuania's first Minister of Foreign Affairs was Petras Klimas: 
a fluent French speaker, he later became Ambassador to France. 
With insufficient funds to pay for the training of a civil 
service, preference was given to those Lithuanians who had 
studied abroad, (many had studied at Universities in Switzerland, 
France or Germany) when it came to filling the senior positions 
in the Ministry.
Security concerns were not the sole criteria for the moulding 
of Lithuanian foreign policy in the inter-war years. As in the 
year following the restitution of independence in 1990, economic 
and trading concerns were of the utmost importance. But here, 
too, Lithuania's geographical position was to influence the 
development of these links. As non-Slav Europeans, Lithuania's 
natural instinct was to turn towards western Europe, but until 
Germany adopted a policy of agricultural protectionism in 1929, 
it was the German state which monopolised the European markets
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targeted by the Lithuanians.^ Once this German policy 
materialised, however, Lithuania was able to capitalise on this 
and the UK, in particular, became her principal market for the 
export of timber, dairy and meat products. Although Germany did 
import from Lithuania, by 193 6, Britain had surpassed Germany as 
the major source of exports*-® also due to the success of the 
Anglo-Lithuanian Commercial Treaty which had been signed on 6 
July 1934 and was renewed in 1936 'for a further indefinite 
period' .
Other trade links were developed with the USSR for the import 
of agricultural machinery, textiles and tobacco and the export 
of agricultural produce and with the Scandinavian states, 
although Latvia and Estonia were more reliant on them than 
Lithuania, but Lithuanians were reluctant to develop strong ties 
with the USSR, as it was felt that this would hinder their 
chances as being perceived as a modern, European state in the 
eyes of other Europeans.*®
The situation in 1990-1991, therefore, was not entirely 
dissimilar from that of 1918: the same challenges had to be
surmounted: to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to 
develop a foreign policy reflective of Lithuania's geopolitical, 
economic and cultural concerns. Any foreign policy, however, had 
to also reflect the concerns of the Lithuanian diaspora which by 
1991 numbered over 1 million, predominantly in the USA. These 
concerns increased markedly after the international recognition 
of Lithuania's independence as many emigres took a considerable 
interest in events in their homeland.*® Most importantly, 
Lithuania was still sandwiched between two much stronger power 
blocks: the former USSR and the European Union (EU). Without a 
psychological security guarantee from the latter, her 
independence was solely at the discretion of the former. This 
fact was to influence the evolution of Lithuania's foreign 
policy, but did not totally control it. It could be argued that 
Lithuania had no right to a foreign policy if she could not 
ensure her own independence, but this did not deter the post-
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Soviet Governments from inaugurating a highly complex and 
ambitious policy.
The first task of the Landsbergis Government in the area of 
foreign relations in 1990 was to re-establish the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Most of the original staff were recruited from 
academic institutions around Lithuania, reflecting the academic 
origins of Sajûdis. Unlike in 1920, however, the knowledge of a 
foreign language was not an initial criteria for placement in the 
ministry. This was a direct legacy of the Soviet occupation, 
where the learning of western European languages was frowned 
upon.*® A few select members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
were sent to participate in the year-long Foreign Service 
Programme run by Oxford University, where they learnt what was 
actually necessary for the building of a foreign service.®®
The establishment of diplomatic relations with world powers, 
regional powers and immediate neighbours was one of Landsbergis' 
main priorities upon the restitution of Lithuania's 
independence®*. He wished to sever completely all ties with the 
former USSR and believed diplomatic relations with western states 
vital for enhancing Lithuania's international prestige. They 
provided a formal link with foreign governments, a link which had 
been (officially) non-existent during the years of the Soviet 
Occupation.
Lithuania's trainee diplomats had to be retaught basic 
diplomatic skills which are taken for granted by diplomats from 
western states but not by those from the former USSR. These 
included learning how to word statements and media interviews, 
understanding the intricacies of diplomatic protocol, learning 
how to liaise with other ministries and how to co-ordinate 
Government policy so as to provide a unified position on a 
particular issue. The Lithuanians were also having to learn how 
to establish embassies or missions in those states with which 
Lithuania should have special ties, and indeed why Lithuania 
should establish diplomatic relations with particular states. In
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a post-KGB state, the Lithuanians had to master the gathering of 
information (intelligence) about those states or international 
organisations which could have any influence on the shaping of 
Lithuania's foreign policy.®®
The structure and role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
diverse: not merely restricted to formulating and identifying
Lithuania's national interests, but also involving the 
recognition of states, the preparation and enacting of 
negotiations and the drafting of and eventually implementing 
treaties or other agreements. The dispensation of economic and 
material aid and the arranging of foreign visas all also fell 
under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but its 
activities were supervised by the Foreign Affairs Commission of 
the Seimas
In a post-Soviet (far less bureaucratic and structured) 
society, a significant problem faced by staff at the Ministry was 
deciding which issues would be dealt with on what level of power. 
Between 1991-1994 there were three centres within the Government 
structure which dealt with foreign affairs: the Office of the
President, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Vytautas Landsbergis and President Brazauskas 
undertook many of the international relations duties, in fact 
both were criticised by both Lithuanian and foreign observers for 
spending too much time abroad and not enough time in 
Lithuania.®4 The advance in telecommunications technology has 
enabled most Heads of State to contact international counterparts 
with great ease even during times of crisis. Even during the 
Soviet clampdown in Vilnius in 1991, Landsbergis was able to 
contact President Gorbachev's office in the Kremlin although he 
was in the besieged Parliament building.®®
To ease the problem of work-share throughout the Ministry, 
Vice Foreign Ministers®® were appointed: one specifically in
charge of co-ordinating foreign affairs by liaising with the 
Foreign Affairs Commission and the office of the President. This
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position was designed to cover the legal aspects of foreign 
relations and to take responsibility for answering questions 
relating to foreign affairs put to it by the Seimas.
Another Vice Foreign Minister was in charge of liaising 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's 
office. But hindering the development of these information 
channels in the years between 1991-1994 was the fact that 
decisions were made at different speeds in various departments 
and, proving to be a major legacy of the Soviet occupation, that 
Lithuanians were not practised at dispensing or willingly sharing 
important information. A further legacy, perhaps the greatest 
obstruction to the development of Lithuania's foreign policy was 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not staffed during the 
period under review by professional, impartial civil servants. 
This led to a growing tendency for personal beliefs and values 
to hinder the decision-making process.®®
Between 1991-1994, Lithuania's foreign policy decisions fell 
into two main categories. The first related to the structure of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the broad outline of foreign 
policy, the allocation and structure of embassies or missions and 
the appointment of Ambassadors or Counsellors, the handling of 
treaties and the deciding upon budgets. These issues needed to 
be handled predominantly by the President's Office and the 
Foreign Affairs Commission of the Seimas. The Prime Minister's 
Office could handle the other category of foreign policy 
decisions: the trade and finance agreements, the international 
movement of material goods and people and the distribution of aid 
and assistance.®®
Given Lithuania's limited military capability in the face of 
aggression from a much stronger opponent, it was also necessary 
to establish a specific structure to handle crisis management. 
This entailed the establishment of a particular framework capable 
of seizing authority for decision-making, of building an 
emergency communication network between senior state officials
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and their offices, of devising liaison plans with other states 
(both with their Governments and their mass media) and of 
creating action plans to be taken in the event of different 
crisis scenarios.
This was first tested by the Lithuanians at the time of the 
Soviet clamp-down in Vilnius in January 1991. Landsbergis had 
instructed Stasys Lozoraitis in Washington D.C. to lead the 
Government-in-Exile if, as expected, he and his Government in 
Vilnius were arrested by Soviet officials. One "action plan" 
proved successful: in 1990-1991, independence activists ensured 
that Lithuania received significant attention in the western 
media.®® It was partly the massive western media presence which 
restrained the Soviet forces from committing further atrocities 
in Vilnius in January 1991.®° The media was a valuable tool, and 
was often unofficially used in the creation of foreign policy 
during the 1991-1994 period.
Before Foreign Policy could be drafted or implemented, 
however, Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs faced a more 
daunting task: that of recruiting staff. Because of Lithuania's 
understandable concern for her security, the reliability of a 
person often took precedence over their knowledge of a foreign 
language or diplomatic ability. Nonetheless a working knowledge 
of either English or French was considered necessary.®* Those 
who had displayed their loyalty to Lithuania by actively 
campaigning for her independence were favoured. This was a direct 
reaction to the Soviet Occupation, under which (until 1988) 
virtually all traces of the distinct Lithuanian identity and 
sense of nationality were prohibited by law.
In his Diplomatic Handbook. R. Feltham described the essential 
characteristics for a career diplomat: he 'must understand other 
countries, other cultures, must like people...he needs a 
knowledge and understanding of his own country...the determinants 
of its foreign policy priorities...A knowledge of the mechanisms 
and procedures of international intercourse... skills in
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negotiating day-to-day diplomacy, skills in observing, analysing 
and reporting, skill in representation, skill in management of 
a mission, skill in communication and public diplomacy, cross 
cultural skills. He must exercise political awareness, personal 
acceptability...and leadership.'®®
To the Lithuanian trainee foreign service staff, the above 
list of characteristics could appear daunting, but it certainly 
could not have been rigidly adhered to. Many of the initial 
recruits to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, 
attempted to fulfil its more limited requirements: reliability, 
a good command of at least English or French, an interest in 
foreign states and a knowledge of world affairs, a willingness 
to be posted abroad, a broad knowledge of arts and sciences, a 
degree of empathy and an obvious willingness to understand 
people, the ability to work as part of a team and a talent for 
observation, analysis and reportage.®®
Diplomats, however, are not the sole staff within any state's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Perhaps more important than the 
diplomats are the civil servants, the supporting staff, as the 
behind the scenes work is vital to the successful formulation of 
any state's foreign policy. Lacking an impartial, qualified civil 
service, Lithuania had to take untrained workers into the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Initial recruits required only 
professional clerical skills, a limited knowledge of foreign 
languages and the ability to work within a team.®*
Vice Foreign Minister Rokas Bernotas wanted to devise a series 
of entrance examinations to ensure that future employees of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did, indeed, conform to these 
guidelines, but these had not come into effect by 1994. Therefore 
as in 1920, the first post-independence diplomats were mostly 
chosen by the Foreign Minister and the President, often on the 
basis of personal acquaintance. But during the years between 
1991-1994 the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs began 
working closely with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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on the development of an impartial civil service with the 
presence of Permanent Secretaries who would report to a Minister 
who was a political appointee.®®
Due to her position as a re-emerging state, Lithuania lacked 
a body of staff who could form the diplomatic core of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most sought-after positions 
which needed immediate filling were the Secretaries, Counsellors 
and Advisers. In the 1991-1994 period, older applicants were 
given preference as it was hoped that they could offer maturity, 
an experience of life and that they would be able to exercise 
authority. But these criteria did not necessarily prove to be 
such an advantage.®®
Recruitment to the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
hindered, however, by the lack of an official Diplomatic Service, 
unlike in the UK, for example. Although significant numbers of 
candidates applied to join the Ministry in, the first years of 
independence®® the higher-calibre candidates targeted by the 
Ministry were deterred from applying because of the lack of job 
security and pension prospects. Because the Government was under 
pressure to reduce state expenditure, the starting salaries of 
members of the Ministry were kept well below the level that could 
be earned in the private sector.
The creation of a fully-fledged Diplomatic Service in 
Lithuania will eventually alleviate these problems, by offering 
a fixed period of guaranteed employment and advantageous wage 
levels, coupled with substantial retirement benefits. Having 
these privileges, Vice Foreign Minister Bernotas hoped that the 
corruption of the Diplomatic Service can be prevented and that 
more capable candidates will be attracted to the Ministry. But 
between 1991-1994 staff were only offered renewable contracts of 
between three and five years, with none of the added benefits 
inherent in a developed civil service.®®
One of the earliest achievements of the new Ministry of
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Foreign Affairs was the establishment of the decision-making 
centre, based around the Minister and his supporting staff. The 
most important subordinate to the Minister, was his personal 
Secretary. By having to relegate the flow of information to the 
Minister, the Secretary was responsible for making key decisions. 
He also had to be able to exercise sufficient authority to 
prevent lower-ranked Ministry staff from attempting to circumvent 
him and gain direct access to the Minister.
The remainder of the decision-making centre was based around 
the Vice Ministers and Junior Ministers. They were responsible 
for liaising with the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign 
Affairs Commission, but were also in charge of supervising the 
supporting structures of the Ministry. In order to distribute the 
work-load, two members of staff were appointed to work in 
conjunction with the Ministers, but these were specifically not 
career diplomats and were interchangeable throughout Lithuania's 
different Ministries.®®
Within the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there 
were functional departments and specific area "desks". The 
functional departments were Legal, Protocol, Press and
Information, Economic, Economic, Consular and Property. In time,
Lithuania's individual Embassies should be able to have
individual staff to devote to each functional department, as 
opposed to the current situation, where fewer staff work with an 
amalgamation of functions.*® The world was divided into the 
following geographic "desks": Northern Europe and Scandinavia, 
Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Asia, Africa and the Pacific, and the
Americas, plus separate desks for the United Nations, European 
Integration and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) .**
The objectives of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
included the development of specific policy and the expression 
of it to the international community. It also involved formal
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international representation: the creation of missions or
embassies, (whose heads are the official representatives of the 
President), the conducting of international negotiations and the 
signing of binding treaties or agreements.
The Ministry was also tasked with the gathering of 
intelligence: data on foreign issues which could in some way
affect Lithuania. In a post-Cold War era, intelligence came from 
a variety of overt sources far removed from the covert methods 
used by the KGB during the Cold War years. While an established 
foreign service, such as the British FCO has particular 
departments specifically for the collection and analysis of such 
information, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
heavily reliant on interpretations of foreign media reports 
rather than on independent assessments and analysis of local 
events by its diplomats. There was not, by 1994, a fully- 
operational overseas intelligence body similar to the British MI6 
or the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to perform such 
a task.
The Lithuanian Government was therefore forced to use 
inexpensive, yet still global, sources of information. The best 
resource for this task was the use of major information agencies, 
in particular Reuters/" significant amount of Lithuania's 
intelligence also came from key international newspapers, such 
as The Financial Times, and foreign affairs journals, especially 
The Economist, Newsweek, Time and Foreign Affairs. But these 
journals could not be relied upon to produce the most accurate 
information as all of them had some element of political bias. 
They were also somewhat of a hindrance to Ministry staff as they 
often contained articles written in a more verbose style than 
that to which the staff at the Ministry were accustomed: 
therefore they had to be condensed or re-written."
With so much of Lithuania's foreign intelligence deriving from 
media sources, dealings with journalists were of the utmost 
importance to the staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This
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proved to be a problem, as, resulting from decades of Soviet 
occupation, Lithuanian diplomats were unused to dealing with the 
media. The Ministry staff became aware that discussion in the 
media of what was perceived to be a national issue, could harm 
Lithuania's foreign relations." Ministry officials were 
therefore positively discouraged from talking to the media and 
this privilege was reserved for the Minister and Vice Ministers, 
This led to a straining of relations between the Ministry and the 
public, partly because any enforced blanket of secrecy was a 
legacy of the Soviet regime. There was also the belief that 
secrecy might be enforced to cover particular interests of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or to escape public accountability.
Relations were further tested by the fact that officers within 
the Press Department were, like most of the other staff, recent 
employees with limited experience and little knowledge of the 
needs of the media. Other problems stemmed from the fact that the 
Press Department had little access to information about key 
issues under discussion in the Ministry, which failed to improve 
relations between the Ministry and the media. This could only be 
improved by the appointment of an experienced diplomat as head 
of the Press Department, who could then serve as an initial link 
between the Ministry, politicians and the media. By the end of 
1994, however, this had not materialised and relations between 
Ministry staff and their Press Department had deteriorated from 
the initial relative harmony and were therefore of little real 
use. 4G
Although Lithuania was not a prime target for security 
breaches, the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were 
nonetheless aware of the maintenance of sufficient levels of 
security. Although reliability was a primary factor for 
recruitment at the Ministry, Lithuanians were well aware of the 
likelihood of staff corruption at a later date. The legacy of the 
USSR's KGB Security Force, with its capability for attracting 
informers, especially by the use of blackmail, was omnipresent 
in Lithuania. In the initial stages of operation in 1991, the
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majority of Ministry information was not classified, but,
nonetheless, despite Lithuania not appearing to be a rational
terrorist target, Lithuania's diplomats undertook basic 
preventative measures to ensure their security, such as the
installation of security cameras and the provision of bodyguards 
for senior political figures. Some of the bodyguards, however, 
gained so much diplomatic experience, that they became diplomats 
in their own right."
A highly symbolic act in the months which followed the
regaining of an internationally recognised independent status was 
the restoration of her former missions and embassies and the 
establishment of new overseas offices. These were seen as a 
visual expression of Lithuania's sovereign status. The size of 
each mission was considered irrelevant: its presence alone was 
sufficient. Due to the aforementioned budgetary considerations, 
the missions and embassies remained small, with minimal staffing. 
Their objective was primarily to represent the Lithuanian state, 
but this was coupled with an attempt to procure desperately 
needed economic assistance.
Many of Lithuania's missions during this period did not 
contain a member of staff employed directly by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Government, responsible for most of the 
Ambassadorial appointments, therefore communicated with the 
mission directly, a process which served to confuse and hinder 
actions within the Ministry. This situation was not eased by the 
fact that there was no single document which clearly explained 
the particular status of a mission or embassy and the activities 
it was expected to undertake. Therefore, many embassy staff found 
themselves not only promoting Lithuania's economic interests, but 
also handling the consular issues and media relations. This did 
not contribute to the smooth operation of the mission.
In the years 1991-1994 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs faced 
a dilemma: whether it was better to have more smaller missions 
or fewer but better staffed and equipped facilities. The latter
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option was chosen. Having committed Lithuania to an extensive 
foreign policy, it was necessary to establish missions in 
Lithuania's neighbouring states, in major world powers, at the 
headquarters of International Organisations, Regional 
Organisations and in states that could become possible trading 
partners. But with still relatively under-developed 
communications links between the missions and Vilnius, 
Lithuania's diplomats faced the problem of being out of touch 
with the domestic political and economic situation. Many staff 
in the Embassy in London, for example, could only discover what 
issues were dominating the Lithuanian political scene by reading 
press clippings assimilated by friends of the Embassy staff.
The appointment of Ambassadors caused significant problems in 
Lithuania's first years of independence. A debate raged in the 
Government over whether to use political appointees, as practised 
in the USA, or career diplomats, as used by the UK. Members of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs originally believed that a 
political appointee would be perhaps a more representative 
figurehead for Lithuania, whilst a professional diplomat might 
prove to be too involved in the Ministry and less aware of 
current political trends. But given the youthfulness of 
Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through lack of choice 
the majority of Ambassadors appointed since 1991 often lacked 
proper diplomatic skills and did not develop particularly 
harmonious relations with the Ministry."
An attempt to combat this was made by the introduction of a 
short training period for all new ambassadors, with emphasis on 
their functions, duties and responsibilities. Staff of the 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office explained to Ministry 
officials, in an attempt to eradicate traditional Soviet forms 
of diplomatic behaviour still practised by some of the Lithuanian 
diplomats, that 'it is not only what is said that counts but also 
how it is said and e x p l a i n e d . ' ^  The Danish Minister in London, 
A. Hugau, was appalled that after donating the use of the Danish 
Club in London as a venue for a reception celebrating Lithuanian
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Independence Day, no member of the Danish Embassy was either 
invited to the reception or thanked for the use of the facilities 
afterwards.
The specific role of the Ambassador was to negotiate with the 
government to whose state s/he was accredited. The Ambassador 
also reported back to Vilnius on the political, economic and 
social conditions of the state in which s/he was based and on the 
policy of its government. S/he was expected to provide an 
analysis of the political situation based on the opinions of 
local political leaders, officials and from other sources, such 
as journalists, who could offer a valid judgement on current 
affairs.
By 1994 Lithuania had missions or embassies in the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, Belarus, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, The Holy See, 
Italy, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. There were 
also representatives at the United Nations and the European 
Union. The Government aimed to establish further missions in 
Finland and Norway, some Central Asian States, including 
Kazakhstan, Japan, South Korea, China, Turkey and in some African 
states as soon as it became a financially viable proposition.^^
The establishment of an Embassy in the years between 1991-1994 
was a complex procedure, often made more complex by the reminder 
(and sometimes also existence) of an embassy dating back to the 
previous period of independence. In order to clearly see the 
pitfalls encountered and challenges faced by Lithuania's post- 
Independence diplomatic staff, a study of one of Lithuania's most 
important embassies, the London embassy, was undertaken."
International recognition of Lithuania's independence was also 
reflected by the establishment of foreign embassies in Vilnius. 
By 1994 there were 20 foreign embassies in Vilnius." H.E. Lars 
Magnusson, of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the 
first Ambassador to be accredited to Vilnius on 29 August 1991,
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although the Swedes had already established a presence in Riga 
and Tallin before independence had been officially accepted by 
the USSR.Relations between Lithuania and Sweden date back to 
the 14th Century and even in 1991 there were approximately 100 
ethnic Lithuanians resident in S w e den." The Ambassador 
recognised that public opinion on Sweden was extremely pro- 
Lithuanian: between 1990-1991 on every Monday at 1pm in one of 
the central squares of Stockholm there were pro-Baltic 
demonstrations.
Although by 1994 more Swedish investment had been donated to 
Latvia and Estonia, principally because of their closer 
geographic position to Sweden, some business links between south­
eastern Sweden and Lithuania were forged. Most Swedish aid was 
directed at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station. When the French 
withdrew from monitoring the project in 1994 because of fears for 
their safety^® the Swedes assumed leadership and by February 
19 94 had earmarked US$12 million for the power s t a t i o n . "  By 
1994 there were already 6 0 Swedish companies operating in 
Lithuania, targeting specific markets such as the automobile 
industry and the environment. Svenska Petroleum, working in a 
joint venture with the Lithuanians, was the first company to 
drill for oil in Lithuania. Although Sweden refrained from 
officially endorsing Lithuania's requests to join NATO and the 
EU, the Ambassador did nothing to hinder this process.
H.E. Michael Peart was the first British Ambassador accredited 
to Vilnius, arriving at the end of 1991. There were four staff 
in 1994, one of whom was Lithuanian. Ambassador Peart was 
extremely supportive of Lithuania and spearheaded the 
establishment of links between British and Lithuanian Ministries, 
such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and other 
organisations such as the Strathclyde Police Force, which worked 
with the Lithuanian Police Force.
As one of the biggest partners in trade and economic and 
political co-operation, the establishment of the German Embassy
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in Vilnius was of great importance to the Lithuanians. Diplomatic 
relations were formalised in September 1991 and one of Bonn's 
most experienced diplomats, H.E. Reinhart Kraus, was appointed 
in October 1992. He had previously worked in Bucharest, Sofia and 
Tirana, which gave him some experience of the challenges faced 
by the post-Soviet satellite states and former Soviet Republics. 
His main tasks were to increase political dialogue between 
Lithuania and Germany and to intensify economic relations. In 
conjunction with the Riga and Tallin embassies, Baltic "cultural 
weeks" were organised in 1993 to establish and further strengthen 
cultural relations. Links were also developed between German and 
Lithuanian Ministries. By 1994 there were relations, expressed 
in the form of agreements between almost every Ministry in Bonn 
and Vilnius, including on help in the case of catastrophes, 
cultural agreements, treaties on agriculture and on crime 
fighting.
A large amount of the German Ambassador's work was concerned 
with visas. Lithuanians needed visas to enter Germany in the 
years 1991-1994 (10,000 visas were issued in the month of April
1994 alone^^). The German Government believed that the Central 
and Eastern European region was not especially stable during the 
years of transition and that the growing threat of crime was a 
valid concern. More serious, however, was the insecurity of 
Lithuania's eastern border. As relations between Russia and 
Belarus strengthened, Bonn became increasingly aware of the 
likelihood of a potentially hostile Russia being on Lithuania's 
immediate border. Kraus believed that the need for Visas would 
only be abolished 'when we do not fear any uncontrolled 
influences on our c o u n t r y . ' "  But, as with many foreign 
diplomats in Lithuania, while recognising the security threats 
facing Lithuania, the Ambassador was not prepared to openly 
support the request for blanket security guarantees or actively 
encourage Lithuania's applications to international (security) 
organisations. He called instead for the creation of 'an 
integrated security system which takes into account the 
necessities and preoccupations of all the parties concerned,'
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bearing in mind the interests of both Lithuania and Russia."
Facing a similar reception from western states were Estonia 
and Latvia, both states establishing their embassies in Vilnius 
immediately following international recognition. Estonia already 
had a presence in Vilnius: it was the first mission in Lithuania 
of a state which still had no international recognition. The 
Ambassador, H.E. Valvi Strikaitiene, finally presented her 
credentials to Landsbergis on 1 July 1992 having been employed 
as an adviser to the mission since 1991. She held a unique 
position among Lithuania's foreign diplomats in that she was 
married to a Lithuanian and spoke the language fluently. Estonia 
faced similar problems to Lithuania caused by the lack of the 
existence of a diplomatic service and the Ambassador, like so 
many in Lithuania, was not a professional diplomat, instead she 
was a translator, selected for a diplomatic appointment, like all 
her staff at the Vilnius embassy, due to her knowledge of 
Lithuania.
Most of Strikaitiene ' s work was devoted to the developing and 
strengthening of relations between Vilnius and Tallin and the 
expansion of economic ties. The Baltic States signed trilateral 
trade agreements immediately after international recognition of 
independence but Ambassador Strikaitiene accepted that their 
success would be dependent on 'definite economic co-operation and 
much effort.'" By 1994 there were over 40 Lithuanian-Estonian 
Joint-Ventures, mostly in the field of trade, but she wanted 
greater emphasis to be placed on joint ventures in actual 
production.
The Ambassador advocated strengthening political ties between 
the two states and appreciated the assistance given by the 
Lithuanians regarding the matter of Russian troop withdrawals 
from Estonia. She highlighted the importance of organisations 
including the Baltic Council, Baltic Assembly and the Baltic 
Peacekeeping Battalion as signs of definite co-operation. But 
with her knowledge of Lithuania, she was well aware that
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Lithuania's alignments tended towards the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe, while accepting that Estonia was closely tied to 
Finland and the other Scandinavian states.
Creating embassies in Vilnius played a considerable role in 
the renovation and modernisation of the Old Town. The sixteen 
states represented in Lithuania all acquired handsome, yet run­
down, structures and began the process of their restoration. The 
most drastic example of this was the acquisition and 
modernisation of the French Embassy. The French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was attracted by a large 14th Century building 
on Daukanto Square, in the heart of the Old Town. It was sold to 
them for US$1, on the condition that France paid for the entire 
process of renovation and reconstruction. Not a single external 
or internal structural detail was permitted to be changed, which 
led to the presence of a door in the main reception hall being 
only four feet high."
Establishing embassies, however, was merely the start of 
Lithuania's re-integration into the international community. 
Needing to fulfil the criteria of geopolitical security, escaping 
from dependency solely on the former USSR for fuel and joining 
international organisations, Lithuania began to reaffirm historic 
links and generate new links with foreign powers. Relations with 
the UK flourished during the first years post independence 
because both Landsbergis and Brazauskas enjoyed good relations 
with Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major." The only official 
meetings between senior Government officials of the two states 
were during President Brazauskas' visit to London in April 1993, 
which covered the issue of the Russian troop withdrawal from 
Lithuania, foreign investment in Lithuania, the development of 
Lithuania's banking system, migration and crime. Brazauskas also 
met with staff from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to discus the re-introduction of the Litas.
There were, however, a number of joint British-Lithuanian 
projects during the 1991-1994 period conducted at a sub-
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governmental level. One of the first projects began shortly after
the recognition of Lithuania's independence in September 1991,
when the Procurator Fiscal in Scotland began working with the 
Procurator in Vilnius and the Head of the Archives in Vilnius in 
tracing those suspected of committing War Crimes. Under the 
Brazauskas Government, Israel also became involved in this 
project, with a member of the Israeli Knesset, Dan Meridor, and 
one of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre Directors, Effrein Zuroff 
spending time in Lithuania in June 1993 to establish a committee 
to review the rehabilitation files of those charged with
committing "crimes against humanity". The second of the 15 most- 
wanted war criminals named by the Simon Wiesenthal Centre was 
Anton Gecas, resident in Scotland. After suing Scottish 
Television in 1992 over a programme which detailed his alleged 
offences during World War II, the presiding judge declared that 
'he was "clearly satisfied" that Mr Gecas was a mass
murderer.'" On 3 February, 1994, however, the case was 
suspended, which angered those at the Simon Wiesenthal Centre and 
again soured relations with between Israel and Lithuania."
Beginning in 1992, links were formed between the Director of 
the State Harbour of Klaipeda, V. Greiciunas and Capt. Bill 
Barker of the Port of London Authority, who advised on the 
restoration and renovation of Klaipeda Harbour. The Port of 
London Authority provided monetary and advisorial assistance and 
this became one of the most successful and long-term joint 
projects. By 1994 there was still a large amount of work to be 
done on the restoration of the harbour, but the links with 
Britain were ensuring that the work continued to fulfil 
Klaipeda's potential as the key port of the south-east Baltic^.
There were also frequent visits to the UK in the course of 
1992 from members of the Interior Ministry, including Interior 
Minister Dr. Vaitekunas and the Head of the Police Force, Arvydas 
Makstalé, to the Land Rover plant at Solihull. The Lithuanians 
purchased a number of Land Rovers, plus other police equipment 
and also formed a relationship with the Strathclyde Police Force
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for training, thus cementing the relationship between the 
Strathclyde region, which possesses the second largest Lithuanian 
community in Great Britain, and Lithuania.^ A smaller project 
covered housing associations, a joint project between Dr. 
Jonaitis from the Housing Ministry and employees of the 
Department of the Environment in 1993 and a further project 
relating to financial policy, where advice was given to the 
Director of the Central Bank of Lithuania, Dr. Visokavicius, by 
the President of the Bank of England, in 1994.
While a number of joint ventures were therefore successful and 
beneficial to Lithuania during the 1991-1994 period, one of the 
projects which actually had the greatest potential, work between 
the British and Lithuanian Ministries of Agriculture on the 
development of Pig Improvement Companies, failed to materialise. 
This was a direct result of the inability of both post- 
Independence governments to enact a regulated policy on land 
reform. While the British Pig Improvement Companies believed 
Lithuania to be a perfect location for the establishment of pig 
farms, with the land and climate being eminently suitable, they 
were not prepared to invest while the ownership of so much of 
Lithuania's land was under dispute. This was to prove to be a 
severe blow to both the economy of Lithuania and future 
investment prospects
The UK, despite its small size and relatively small Lithuanian 
population, was a key player in Lithuanian events during the 
1991-1994 years. It seems all the more remarkable, therefore, 
that the state with the largest Lithuanian population outside 
Lithuanian borders, the USA, actually provided relatively little 
assistance during the immediate post-independence period. The US 
Agency for International Development (AID) created a SEED 
Assistance Act in 1992’'^ which was responsible for co-ordinating 
the transfer of monetary and material aid to Lithuania. US AID 
operated throughout the Central and Eastern European region and 
was funded by US taxpayers. The Agency targeted its assistance 
according to the strategic importance of each country and if, as
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in the case of Lithuania, the country was seen to be advancing 
along the path towards a democratic state, the aid was scaled 
down and sent elsewhere/"
US AID worked in conjunction with Partners for International 
Education and Training (PIET), a US Non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGO), which was created in 1992 to undertake multi-sector 
training of business leaders and government officials in Central 
and Eastern Europe. PIET established a presence in Riga from 
where it could co-ordinate its work throughout the Baltic States, 
training individuals involved with making and implementing new, 
democratic policies. The programme in Estonia was judged 
successful and completed in early 1997, while the those in Latvia 
and Lithuania were scheduled to be completed at the end of 
1997."
There was, however, surprisingly little activity between the 
two states between 1993-1994. This was partly due to the 
recalling and replacement of the Lithuanian Ambassador to the 
USA, Stasys Lozoraitis in May 1993. Lozoraitis was a popular 
figure in Washington, where he had been often resident following 
his exile from Lithuania in 1940. Although he had stood against 
Brazauskas in the Presidential elections of 1992, Brazauskas 
stated that it was not for political reasons that he was being 
recalled, but that he had failed to 'maintain proper contact' 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vilnius. Landsbergis 
described this act as a great blow to Lithuania, as Lozoraitis 
was a recognised and trusted figure on the world stage, who had 
carried the torch for Lithuania during the years of 
occupation." Lozoraitis' successor in Washington was a 
political supporter of Brazauskas, the honorary Consul in Los 
Angeles, Vytautas Cekanavicius.
Although the Clinton administration disapproved of the recall 
of Lozoraitis, the USA still provided some assistance to 
Lithuania between 1993-1994. US National Security Adviser Anthony 
Lake agreed to provide observers to monitor the Russian troop
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withdrawal. World Bank President Lewis Preston agreed to grant 
Lithuania credits to enable Lithuania to settle its debts to 
Russia for natural gas and Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
established a US$50 million Baltic Enterprise Fund to assist 
businesses in the Baltic States."
While there was little other official aid donated to Lithuania 
by the USA during this period, as it was spreading its financial 
resources across a vast stretch of Central and Eastern Europe, 
the importance of the USA was not underestimated by the 
Lithuanians, especially in the economic sphere. This importance 
was officially recognised in March 1994, when the Lithuanian 
currency, the Litas, was pegged to the US$ at a rate of 
Lt,4:US$l, in accordance with the Stability of the Litas Law 
passed on 17 March 1994 .
Lithuania's critical geopolitical position, between the West 
and Russia, was highlighted by her foreign policy: while looking 
to states such as the UK and USA for assistance, Russia could not 
be ignored or alienated. Russian affairs concerned Lithuania for 
several reasons: at the start of this period there were still 
large numbers of Russian troops stationed in Lithuania and there 
was the territorial problem posed by the location of the 
Kaliningrad Oblast, with Lithuania sandwiched between the 
territory and the main landmass of the Russian Federation. 
Lithuania was dependent on Russia for its fuel supplies and most 
Lithuanian exports were destined for Russian and eastern markets.
Relations between Vilnius and Moscow were exceptionally poor 
under the Landsbergis Government because of the loathing of 
Moscow by Landsbergis for the behaviour of Soviet troops in 
Vilnius in January 1991." He was also sufficiently idealistic 
to want to abandon all links with Russia and to concentrate 
instead on the re-establishment of relations with Western Europe. 
Russia retaliated to the hostility of Landsbergis by interfering 
with the regularity of fuel supplies to Lithuania. Throughout 
1991-1992 there was only limited heat, hot water and energy for
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Lithuanian citizens, many of whom began blaming Landsbergis for 
their discomfort, which contributed to his lack of success in the 
1992 elections."
Relations improved slightly, however, with the victory of 
Brazauskas' LDLP (former Communists) in 1992. His victory was 
certainly partly due to the fact that he knew how to liaise with 
Moscow as a result of his tenure as First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Lithuania and that he enjoyed cordial 
relations with President Yeltsin. Nonetheless, Lithuanian 
attitudes towards Russia did not alter with the change in 
Government.
The killing of Lithuanians at the Vilnius Television Tower by 
Soviet troops in January 1991 was, during the 1991-1994 years, 
a bitter memory.®^ In January 1993 the investigations into the 
massacre conducted by Prosecutor Juozas Gauditis concluded that 
the operation was undertaken with the full knowledge of Soviet 
officials. He learned that the former KGB Head, Vladimir 
Krychkov, Deputy Interior Minister Nikolai Demidov, Deputy 
Defence Minister Vladislav Achalov as well as leaders of other 
Soviet military units had arrived in Vilnius on 8 January and had 
overseen the whole operation." This made a mockery of former 
Soviet President Gorbachev's insistence that Soviet troops had 
been provoked by Lithuanian demonstrators . The conclusions of the 
Prosecutor were applauded by many Lithuanians, but there were 
still, throughout the first two years of the Brazauskas 
Government, a number of reasons for Lithuanian antipathy towards 
Russia to remain constant.
The issue of Russian troop withdrawal was the most 
controversial, because it was the most obvious reminder of the 
Soviet Occupation. The agreement covering the troop withdrawal 
was only concluded on 3 0 September 1992 and began to falter by 
January 1993, when the National Defense Ministry reported that 
the withdrawal had fallen behind schedule due partly to the 
difficulties of relocating during the winter and partly due to
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the reluctance of the Russian troops and their dependents to 
leave Lithuania and relocate in Kaliningrad or Pskov. Although 
the withdrawal was proceeding according to schedule by April 
1993, in May Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, in a visit 
to Lithuania, warned that the process could be delayed because 
of a shortage of railway cars to remove the troops : a statement 
which was ill-received in Lithuania." But unlike in Latvia and 
Estonia, the Russians were true to their word and the withdrawal 
was completed on schedule on 31 August 1993. 100 troops remained 
in the Radviliskis Raion to guard and load ammunition from 
warehouses and they remained there until the end of 19 93 and an 
additional 41 troops remained in Klaipeda until 15 October to 
finalise the transfer of the Russian military facilities located 
there. The transfer did not proceed without difficulty, however, 
as the Commander of the North-West Group of forces. Col. Gen. 
Leonid Mayorov failed to travel to Vilnius to sign the document 
formally noting the completion of the withdrawal."
The removal of the Russian troops from their territory was a 
vital psychological victory for the Lithuanians, but Russia's 
military power still remained a significant concern, not only 
because of Russia's huge military reserves" but also because of 
the issue of troops withdrawing from East Germany transiting 
through Lithuania. The Lithuanians were highly opposed to more 
Russian troops passing through their territory and began a series 
of negotiations with Russia to ensure that there was no danger 
to Lithuania's security. The border between Kaliningrad and 
Lithuania was a contentious issue: the Lithuanians were aware 
that drugs and arms could be smuggled into Lithuania across this 
border and wanted to limit troop transfers around this region". 
On 3 January 19 94 Russian trains were redirected around 
Lithuania, but an agreement initialled on 22 March 1994 allowed 
for the transit of troops to continue, as long as strict border 
controls continued. All Russian citizens required visas to enter 
Lithuania and as of 1 April 1994, this was reciprocated by the 
Moscow Government.
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Despite the delicate issue of troop withdrawal, a more basic 
issue was the supply of fuel and energy to Lithuania by Russia. 
Lithuania was engaged in the construction of an oil-unloading 
terminal off Butingé on the Baltic coast, working in conjunction 
with Latvia, which also faced a similar fuel dependency crisis. 
It was hoped that upon its completion, fuel would be piped to 
Lithuania's refinery at Mazeikiai and therefore Lithuania would 
not be reliant on the whims of Russia to regulate her energy 
supply. But by 1994 this had not yet become the case.
In February 1993 Lithuania was forced to purchase 4 billion 
cubic metres of gas from the St. Petersburg company Lentransgaz. 
It was to be paid for in hard currency at a price of US$82 per 
1,000 cubic metres. By April 1993 the Lithuanians were having 
difficulty in repaying their loan and Russia threatened to cut 
off gas supplies. The Prime Minister of Lithuania, Adolfas 
Slezevicius, suggested that the debt owed to Lentransgaz be 
balanced by Russia's debt to Lithuania for transit and energy to 
Kaliningrad and a repayment for all the environmental damage 
caused by the Russian occupation of Lithuania. This offer was 
rejected by Lentransgaz, but the supplies of gas to Lithuania 
were not restricted." On 13 April the crisis was partially 
alleviated by the announcement from the Deputy Energy Minister 
of Lithuania, R. Tamosiunas, that Russia had agreed to sell 
Lithuania 1.5 million tonnes of oil and repay debts amounting to 
5 billion rubles. Payment of these debts, incurred by the energy 
and transit costs to Kaliningrad were to be transferred to the 
Lentransgaz debt of 21 billion rubles."
The danger of having the majority of energy supplies deriving 
from one source was graphically illustrated in the summer of 
1993 . On 23 May Lentransgaz halved the supply of gas to Lithuania 
and cut off all supplies on 27 June because the Lithuanians could 
not honour their loan repayments." Following meetings conducted 
between Russian Deputy Premier Sergei Shakrai and the Lithuanian 
Prime Minister Slezevicius, supplies were restored. The Russian 
delegation also announced its interest in investing in the
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Lithuanian gas industry: purchasing 50 per cent of the shares in 
the gas main, 20 per cent of the Mazeikiai oil refinery and a 
controlling share of the fertilising plant at Jonava, Lithuania's 
largest gas consumer." The Lithuanian government was faced with 
no choice but to agree to these proposals, because the economic 
investment was sorely needed. But Lithuania was then placed in 
an extremely vulnerable position of being dependent on the 
maintenance of good relations with Russia to protect its energy 
supply.
Good relations with Russia were also required for the 
continuation of Russo-Lithuanian trade, on which Lithuania was 
forced to rely. Trade was dependent on political relations 
between the two states. On 8 April 1993 Russia announced the 
establishment of a Consulate in Klaipeda and on 14 April 1993 the 
former Minister of Material Resources Romualdas Kozyrovicius 
presented his credentials to Russian Vice President Aleksandr 
Rutskoi as Lithuania's Ambassador to Moscow. In return, 
Valentinas Obiotysevas was despatched to Vilnius from Moscow. A 
most-favoured-nation trade agreement was signed on 18 November 
1993 between Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Slezevicius which 
halved Russian duties on goods imported from Lithuania. The 
inherent tensions in relations between the two states, however, 
were highlighted in a political exchange between Presidents 
Brazauskas and Yeltsin on 1 April 1994, regarding the Russian 
President's refusal to ratify the trade agreement."
Relations between the two states were therefore of the utmost 
importance to Lithuania during the years between 1991-1994. 
Despite Lithuania's desire to look west, by virtue of her 
geographic position, she was forced to maintain her links with 
the East. While dependent on Russia for energy and unable to 
adequately defend herself against Russian military aggression, 
concessions had to be made to appease Russia and reduce the 
danger of the developing of open hostilities. Enjoying a 
tolerable relationship with Moscow, Brazauskas was able to steer 
Lithuania along a conciliatory path, diffusing situations which
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could have led to increased tension, such as the transit of 
troops. While the legacy of the Soviet Occupation remained too 
great for links between Lithuania and Russia to be anything more 
than cordial, Brazauskas, far more than his predecessor 
Landsbergis, did recognise the necessity for keeping relations 
smooth and did his utmost to achieve this during the 1991-1994 
years.
Relations also had to be kept smooth with the other Baltic 
States, which was not as easy as had been believed. The first 
sign of unity came in Copenhagen in March 1992, when the three 
Baltic States joined with Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Russia and Poland to form the Baltic Sea Council. It was 
designed to be a forum in which issues of common concern not 
dealt with specifically by other organisations could be 
discussed. At a meeting in March 1993 in Helsinki, Estonia was 
unanimously elected as Leader of the Council." The first 
tensions began appearing in the Council shortly thereafter, when 
both Lithuania and Latvia opposed the decision to create a 
particular commissioner for ethnic minorities and human rights, 
because both states believed that this work was adequately 
undertaken by the OSCE's Commission for Ethnic Minorities."
Bilateral, then extended to trilateral, co-operation 
agreements calling for the creation of a free trade zone and co­
operation in the distribution of energy resources, were signed 
in 1993 and in the same year a permanent Baltic Defence Council 
was created. The designated Baltic Free Trade Agreement came into 
operation on 12 September 1993 and a Baltic Council began 
functioning on 31 October, to serve as an instrument for 
increased co-operation among the three Baltic states and to co­
ordinate legislation and policy on ecology, energy, economics, 
communication, culture, education, social issues, science, 
defence, security and foreign policy."
Until 1993 the Baltic States faced a common problem of the 
continued presence of Soviet troops on their territory. Once
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Lithuania succeeded in having the last troops removed, this was 
not such a concern, but common fear regarding security, energy, 
transport and the admission into international organisations 
remained ever present. All three Baltic states expressed their 
support for President Yeltsin, in the belief that his leadership 
was the best guarantee for the maintenance of Baltic 
Independence. At the same time, all three Baltic States were 
quick to condemn Russia's desire for a UN peacekeeping mandate 
for its "near abroad" as unacceptable in December 1993."
Relations between the Baltic States were tested in the first 
post-Soviet years. The large Russian minorities in Latvia and 
Estonia were a constant concern in Lithuania and in February 1993 
a dispute between Lithuania and Latvia arose over the extradition 
to Lithuania from Latvia of Sergei Parfenov. As the former OMON 
commander in Riga, he was wanted for questioning regarding the 
destruction of a Lithuanian customs post at Smelnyé on 23 May 
1991. The Lithuanians were displeased that because*of the signing 
of a Latvian-Russian extradition protocol in January 1993, 
Parfenov would serve his sentence in Russia."
Inter-Baltic relations were tested still further when in March 
19 93 Estonia backed down from the common visa agreement signed 
by all three Baltic States in March 1992. The Estonian Government 
justified this action by claiming that neither Latvia nor 
Lithuania had adequate control over their eastern borders. under 
the new arrangements, citizen of approximately 40 states, 
including the UK and USA could enter Estonia on a common Baltic 
visa, but all others would require a separate Estonian visa." 
This action served to illustrate the weakness of the idea of pan- 
Baltic unity: the three states, though bound together by
geography, were not politically or culturally in harmony.
Nor were relations with Poland especially harmonious during 
the 1991-1994 years. There were always some tensions inherent 
from years of shared, turbulent history and historical grievances 
over territorial disputes, which continued into the post­
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independence period, but following international recognition of 
Lithuania's independence, negotiations took place to draw up a 
Friendship Treaty between Poland and Lithuania. The first step 
towards co-operation during this period was the signing of a 
Polish-Lithuanian Military Agreement in Vilnius on 15 June 
1993.^ °'^  But the Friendship Treaty hit a stumbling block in its 
drafting because of the legacy of the continued territorial 
disputes.
In an attempt to conclude the Treaty, Polish Prime Minister 
Hanna Suchoka met Prime Minister Slezevicius on 26 July 1993, 
where they agreed to confine all references to "historical 
questions", that is, the territorial disputes, to a separate 
declaration. The Polish media interpreted this as meaning that 
the Lithuanians were prepared to drop the contentious clause in 
the Treaty which related to the inter-war Polish invasion of 
Vilnius. A further disagreement, which successfully stalled the 
July talks, related to the protection of the rights of the Polish 
minority in Lithuania.
A second round of talks to discuss the treaty were scheduled 
for 16-17 August 1993 in Vilnius between the two Deputy Foreign 
Ministers. After a period of intensive negotiation, 20 out of the 
2 6 points to be included in the treaty were agreed upon, but the 
contentious matter of "historical questions" and the preamble 
were not discussed. In December, Prime Minister Slezevicius paid 
a private visit to Polish Opposition Leader (who was to become 
President in 1995) Aleksandr Kwasniewski of the Democratic Left 
Alliance Party. During the course of his visit, it emerged that 
the Lithuanian Government had agreed to the designation of 
Vilnius as the "historical capital" of Lithuania, rather than 
insisting that Poland renounce the 1922 invasion.
Therefore the Lithuanian-Polish Friendship and Co-operation 
Agreement was finally signed on 26 April 1 9 9 4 . On 28 February 
1994 in an address to the Lithuanian Nation, President Brazauskas 
had stated that the 'Treaty reflected territorial integrity, with
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Vilnius and Warsaw as the capitals, and the inviolability of the 
borders between the two s t a t e s . The difficulties which had 
blocked the signing of the Treaty were only resolved eventually 
by omitting them from the final draft and stressing good 
relations. This was an adequate short-term solution, but one 
destined to cause problems in the future.
While political relations between Lithuania and Poland were 
therefore, cordial on paper, the historic grievances remained. 
These were illustrated by the tensions and subsequent delays 
always encountered at the Lithuanian-Polish border crossings and 
the fact that many Lithuanians were aware of a hostile reception 
from Poles: many were aware that it was unsafe to drive across 
Poland; there was a significant risk of "carjacking"
There were equal tensions with the state of Belarus, despite 
the determination of political leaders of both states to 
implement their Free Trade Treaty, signed on 16 March 19 93 and 
to improve economic and trade co-operation. These tensions were 
based on security and defence-related issues, which are covered 
in more detail in the following chapter. But the Treaty concluded 
with Belarus, Lithuania's first Free Trade Treaty with a former 
Soviet republic, was mutually beneficial for both states. Belarus 
purchased 4 billion kilowatt hours of electricity, fertilizers, 
electrical equipment and consumer goods from Lithuania, which in 
return purchased tractors, trucks, motor oils, chemical products 
and raw materials for light i n d u s t r y .
More amiable relations were enjoyed with the Scandinavian 
states. Iceland was the first state to recognise an independent 
Lithuania on 23 August, 1990, long before international 
recognition was universal. This mattered far more than the 
donation of material aid and was something for which most 
Lithuanians were extremely g r a t e f u l . As a measure of 
gratitude. President Brazauskas paid his second overseas trip as 
President to Iceland on 18 March, 1993.
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Relations with Denmark were equally important: Brazauskas'
first foreign trip as President was made to Copenhagen on 17 
March 1993. Denmark had been at the forefront of states aiding 
Lithuania since the recognition of its independence in 1991. 
Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Elleman Jensen had a particular 
interest in Lithuania and was determined to provide as much aid 
as possible. It was not until the election of the Brazauskas 
government that this assistance was really valued. Attempts had 
been made to provide assistance in the reconstruction of 
Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991-1992. Elleman 
Jensen had offered members of the Danish Foreign Service to go 
to Lithuania and work as shadows for the trainee Lithuanian 
diplomats. This offer was rejected outright by Landsbergis, who 
was too proud to accept such a generous offer of help, believing 
that the Lithuanians were more than capable of reconstructing 
their foreign service without any overseas assistance. This was 
a grievous error and was certainly (partly) responsible for a 
number of serious breaches of diplomatic protocol and ineffective 
operations of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 
1991-1994 period.
The installation of the Brazauskas government in 1993, led to 
an increase in diplomatic activity between Denmark and Lithuania. 
On 16 March 19 93 an inter-governmental agreement was signed 
between the Lithuanian Energy Minister Leonas Asmantas and Danish 
Interior Minister Biter Weiss on the exchange of information and 
co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and protection 
against radiation, designed to safeguard the Ignalina nuclear 
power station. This complemented the assistance being provided 
by the French and the Swedes. In the course of 19 93 Denmark began 
playing an active role in the training of the Baltic Peacekeeping 
Battalion (BALTBAT) and this assistance was greatly valued by 
Lithuanian commanders, cementing the relationship between the two 
states.
Relations with Norway, Finland and Sweden were also of great 
importance to Lithuania during the 1991-1994 period. All the
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Scandinavian states provided economic and material aid to 
Lithuania {although Finland devoted most of its resources to 
Estonia) and this enhanced relations throughout the region^°®. 
By the end of 1994, relations with the Scandinavian states 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) were coupled with 
Estonia and Latvia in what was referred to as the "3+5" format. 
In his Presidential Address of January 1994, President Brazauskas 
stressed their 'common outlook on problems, such as the 
ecological problems of the Baltic Sea r e g i o n . H e  also 
emphasised the importance of 'strengthening regional security and 
[ensuring] the democratic evolution of Russia.'"^
Lithuania's international relations were not confined to 
merely her immediate geographical vicinity. For a small state, 
they were extremely widespread. This reflected Lithuania's 
geopolitical position as a bridge between East and West. 
Relations were maintained with many of the former Soviet 
Republics, especially Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, with 
former Soviet satellite states, especially the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Croatia (formerly part of Yugoslavia) and Romania 
and with those further abroad, such as Kuwait and China. Ties 
with western Europe also merited importance, especially with 
France and Germany, with whom Lithuania had enjoyed a fruitful 
relationship in the inter-war years. These primarily took the 
form of treaties which provided economic assistance and cultural 
co-operation.
In the course of the period under review, relations also had 
to be cultivated with international organisations. Her 
aspirations to join security organisations such as NATO are 
covered in the following chapter. Lithuania's entry into the 
United Nations was the immediate consequence of international 
recognition and its importance can not be under-estimated. 
Lithuania's Ambassador to the UN, A. Simiutis, was an active 
member of the UN from Lithuania's admission to the organisation 
on 17 September 1991, and in return he demanded UN assistance in 
the monitoring of the Russian troop withdrawal from Lithuania in
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the course of 1992-1993."^
Admission into the UN was just the start of Lithuania's 
campaign to enter international organisations. For economic, 
political and security reasons, Lithuania was, like all the 
states in the former Soviet sphere of influence, desperate to 
enter the European Union. Little thought was paid at this time, 
however, to the actual consequences of joining a federal Europe. 
Debates on sovereignty and the power of common European 
institutions, such as those which led to the creation of the 
Referendum Party in the UK in 1995, were conspicuously absent 
from the Lithuanian political agenda during the 1991-1994 period 
as the security guarantee, an inherent concomitant of membership 
of the EU, was of far greater importance to Lithuania.In his 
Presidential Address of January 1994, Brazauskas admitted that 
'Lithuania... looks most favourably upon the European Union. 
However it is very poorly informed about what that is, and what 
membership...would concretely mean for Lithuania... Society's 
outlook is more emotional that rational. [They] think that 
joining the European Union is tantamount to entering Eden: [they] 
are wrong. '
Lithuania was admitted into the Conference for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe in 1991, the Council of Europe in 1993 and 
received Associate Member status of the EU in the same year. 
Lithuania convinced a delegation from the European Parliament 
which arrived in Lithuania in May 1993, headed by Kirsten Jensen, 
that it was not guilty of any human rights or minority abuses, 
which would have prevented admission into the EU. Lithuanian 
Ministers argued that Lithuania had a better record on the 
treatment of minorities than many of the Central and Eastern 
European states applying for EU membership. But by 1994, 
despite fulfilling the human rights criteria and the economy 
beginning to stabilise, Lithuania was no closer to admission to 
the EU than in 1991. Although foreign monitors of events in 
Lithuania, including the British Ambassador Michael Peart, 
believed that Lithuania would eventually enter the EU, this was
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not likely in the near future."^
Although failing to gain entry into the most desired 
international organisations, NATO and the EU, Lithuania did, in 
the years between 1991-1994 join numerous international 
organisations, all a measure of her re-integration into the 
international community.
Re-establishing foreign political relations was not the sole 
means by which Lithuania began to re-integrate itself into the 
international community. Participation in international events 
was seen by ordinary Lithuanians as further recognition of their 
sovereign s t a t u s . T h e  most significant of these was their 
return to the Olympic Games, in February 19 92 in Albertville, 
France and then in the Summer games in Barcelona in 1992, made 
all the more appreciated by the success of discus thrower Romas 
Ubartas, who won a gold medal and the national Basketball Team 
which scooped the Bronze medal. Lithuania had participated in the 
1924 and 1928 Olympiads and Lithuanians had played in USSR teams 
during the occupation, but seeing the Lithuanian flag paraded at 
the Winter and Summer Games of 1992, watched by Landsbergis in 
the VIP stand with other world leaders, were truly auspicious 
moments for the Lithuanian people.
A far less auspicious moment, though still a feat of re-entry 
into Europe, was the debut of Lithuania in the Eurovision Song 
Contest in 1993. Although the contest is seen largely as a farce 
by the population of western Europe, it was highly important to 
the Lithuanians, as it brought them into direct contact with the 
west. Lithuanians were desperate to be perceived as "European" 
and entering a European-wide competition was a definite sign that 
they were finally beginning to be accepted as such. The 
Lithuanian entrant, Ovidijlis Vysniauskas (chosen by a Ministry 
of Arts Committee) was, however, far less successful than the 
Olympic medal-winning basketball team (who became national heroes 
upon their return to Lithuania). Vysniauskas failed to be awarded 
even a single point from the panel of Eurovision judges and thus
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Lithuania was eliminated from the following year's contest.
Lithuania also participated in a number of sporting fixtures, 
primarily football. They played a number of qualifying games for 
the 1994 World Cup, but failed to reach the finals in the USA. 
Teams also participated in European championships, again, with 
only limited success. Greater success came in Basketball, where 
the national team, composed predominantly of players from the 
Zalgiris team, won convincing victories: eleven out of eleven at 
the European Olympic Qualifying Tournament at Saragossa, Spain. 
Sarunas Marciulionis, voted Lithuania's Most Valuable Player in 
1992, was signed by the NBA's Golden State Warriors in the USA 
in 1991, and had a large Lithuanian following.
Lithuanians also excelled in rowing, with teams at the 
Olympics and the international regattas at Lucerne and Henley, 
where although not among the prize-winners, participation alone 
as a recognised Lithuanian national was a great achievement in 
the eyes of the Lithuanian public. The Lithuanian Rowing 
Federation took out an agreement with Henley Royal Regatta on 6 
November, 1991 to allow for entry into international 
competition.The Lithuanians were, however, hindered by both 
a lack of funds and sponsorship and an inability to transport 
their equipment. They were reliant on the generosity of British 
rowers and clubs to donate b o a t s . other sports in which 
Lithuania participated on an international scale included rifle 
and pistol shooting, cross-country skiing, biathlon and 
equestrian sports, especially dressage.
On an altogether different level, Lithuania participated in 
the Aerobatic World Championships from 1991. Two pilots, Jurgis 
Kairys and Stepas Artiskevicius (deceased in 1981) had trained 
with the USSR's aerobatics team working with the Sukhoi Company, 
where Kairys was chief test-pilot in the USSR for aerobatic 
aircraft, especially the SU-31. Kairys competed on behalf of the 
USSR from 1986. and first competed for Lithuania at the 38th 
Salon d'Aéronautique at Le Bourget in Paris in 1991.^ ^^
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As Lithuania was brought into the public eye, tourism 
increased, which was another form of re-integration into the 
international community. During the years of the Soviet 
Occupation, Lithuania had been a key tourist destination for 
citizens of the former Soviet republics, but western tourists 
were desired, partly for their hard currency. In the dying years 
of the USSR, the state-run travel service. Intourist, organised 
brief tours to Lithuania via Moscow and Leningrad, but tourism 
only really began to flourish in the post-Independence years. 
With Eastern and Central Europe capturing westerners' imagination 
in the years following the collapse of the USSR, Lithuania had 
the potential to become a significant tourist destination.
From 19 91 numerous hotels were either constructed or renovated 
throughout Lithuania. Lithuania's largest cities: Vilnius,
Kaunas, Klaipeda and Siauliai had all possessed Soviet hotels 
catering for visitors from other Socialist republics, but these 
were far below standards demanded by western visitors^^ Some 
former Soviet hotels were closed and renovated, others were taken 
over by Dutch and Swedish companies and a further selection were 
modernised on the initiative of Lithuanians. A few hotels, 
however, remained run along Soviet-style lines and became unsafe 
for westerners.Compared to western rates, the prices for 
Lithuania's most luxurious hotels were extremely reasonable^\, 
but were still beyond what most Lithuanians could afford. But by 
the end of 1994 there were still no recognised international 
chains of hotels in Lithuania, which hindered the growth of 
tourism.
Unlike in Russia, however, where by 1994 tourists were 
definitely unsafe, Lithuanians tended to treat foreigners with 
a great deal of respect and Lithuania was regarded as a "safe" 
tourist destination. Many Lithuanians saw this as a demonstration 
of their civilised, European origin, as opposed to the uncouth 
behaviour of their Slav, Russian neighbours. The production of 
comprehensive English-language guides and the establishment of 
a tourist information agency both contributed to the opening up
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of Lithuania and its re-integration into the international 
community. By the end of 1994, tourism was still at modest 
levels, but was beginning to develop and would, no doubt, 
increase as the years passed.
Prior to the restitution of Lithuania's independence, travel 
to Lithuania had been extremely difficult, involving routing the 
journey through the Russian Federation (usually either through 
Moscow or Leningrad.) With independence came increased access to 
and from the West. In 1991, Lithuania became the first of the 
former Soviet republics to form its own airline, breaking away 
from the Soviet carrier Aeroflot. Lithuanian Airlines (LAL), 
whose General Director was Stasys Dailydkas, was originally 
composed of the old Aeroflot aircraft requisitioned by the 
Lithuanian Governmental but one western Boeing 737-200 was 
leased from Ireland and a deal was concluded in late 1994 for the 
purchase of two Boeing 737-500, due to enter service in the 
second quarter of 1995.
Passenger numbers of LAL grew at around 2 0 per cent per annum 
from 1991 and rose to 209,000 in 1993. In 1993 LAL was able to 
make 3,854 scheduled and 1,346 charter flights and revenues rose 
by between 2 5-30 per cent, By the end of 1994 LAL was 
operating 18 flights per day, with direct connections to 
Amsterdam Schipol, Berlin Tegel, London Heathrow, Paris Charles 
de Gaulle, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Stockholm, Warsaw, Kiev, Moscow 
Sheremetevo-1 and St. P e t e r s b u r g . Special arrangements were 
also made with Icelandair for passengers to fly from Vilnius to 
New York City via Copenhagen on a thrice-weekly service from 
January 1994. Other links were also forged with SAS to enable 
visitors from the USA and Canada to reach Lithuania, marketing 
arrangements were also concluded with a number of US and European 
airlines including British Airways, Transworld Airlines (TWA) and 
Northwest Airlines. To assist it in the transition from a route 
system based around Russia to one redirected towards western 
Europe, LAL employed the services of a Canadian consultancy, 
International Industries. Their principal aim, according to
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spokesman Tom Currie, was to 'create a large regional airline 
with international connections...to give our passengers a seven- 
day-a-week possibility to fly to the USA.'^ ^^
The formation of LAL was a key moment in the rebirth of an 
independent Lithuanian state: a modern symbol of national
i d e n t i t y . T o  protect this symbol, the Lithuanians were 
reluctant to link their airline with the Latvian-Estonian 
collaborative venture Baltic Airlines, preferring instead to 
concentrate on establishing more permanent links with western 
Europe's principal air hubs. Upon its formation, LAL was 
immediately recognised by the International Civil Aircraft 
Organisation (ICAO) and by the International Association of 
Travel Agents (lATA) . This was an achievement of which the 
Lithuanians were justifiably proud, as it was both an important 
element of the process of re-integration into the international 
community and it established LAL's reputation as a legitimate, 
and more importantly, safe carrier.
Air travel was seen as the principal method of transport to 
Lithuania. To cope with this sudden influx post - independence, 
Vilnius airport was completely rebuilt and modernised. Foreign 
airlines began operating flights to Vilnius, including Lufthansa, 
Austrian Airlines, LOT, Malev, SAS, Swissair and, of course, 
Aeroflot, and this facilitated an increase in tourism between the 
years 1991-1994.
Other methods of reaching Lithuania, however, were both less 
efficient and more complicated. There were numerous train 
connections, but many of these, although being touted as 
"express" links, were, in comparison with western European 
railway systems, both slow and uncomfortable. Delays crossing the 
Lithuanian border hindered the efficiency of the rail network as 
means of bringing foreigners into Lithuania and all trains 
heading west had to pass through Grodno in Belarus, which meant 
that passengers required a Belarussian transit visa, adding an 
extra complication to the journey.
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The principal inter-war method of travel to Lithuania had been 
the ferry from Germany to Klaipeda. Following the restitution of 
independence in 1991, two ferry companies began operating: from 
Kiel and Mukran, the journeys taking 3 0 and 18 hours respectively 
in (by western standards) primitive conditions. Their advantage 
was that they avoided the lengthy wait at the Polish border, but 
with safety at the forefront of people's minds, especially after 
the "Estonia" disaster of 1994, ferries were not, by the end of 
1994, a practical and widely used method of reaching Lithuania.
Foreigners (tourists) were also discouraged from travelling 
to Lithuania by car because of the difficulties encountered in 
entering Lithuania. At the Latvian and Russian borders the wait 
tended to be only around an hour, but at Medininkai on the 
Belarussian border it could take several hours and at Lazdijai 
on the Polish border the wait could last several days. Once 
inside Lithuania, however, concessions were certainly made for 
the car-driving foreigner, because of the inefficiency of the 
public transport system. International companies Hertz and Avis 
were quick to establish offices in Lithuania in 1991 and, in a 
feature uncommon in western Europe, provided cars with 
accompanying drivers. Many of them had a (basic) understanding 
of either English or German to counter the difficulties posed by 
the lack of knowledge of Lithuanian possessed by many visitors.
Further connections with the international community were made 
during the 1991-1994 period as the process of "town-twinning" 
began to operate. This was enacted mainly by the Union of 
Lithuanian Large Towns working in conjunction with organisations 
such as the British-based Friendship Link. The concept of town 
twinning is one to which little importance is attached in the 
West, but to the Lithuanians it assumed great importance because 
it was again seen as a sign of international recognition and of 
re-emergence into the international community. The Union of 
Lithuanian Large Towns was tasked with the process of finding 
suitable twins and it was here that the greatest hurdles had to 
be overcome.
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The Lithuanians wanted to form links with European and 
American towns to reflect the historic bonds between Lithuania 
and the west, but there were problems in finding similar towns 
to twin with, because in theory they needed to have similar 
economic and social conditions. For example Vilnius should have 
been twinned with London, because of their joint status as 
capital cities. Instead, Vilnius was first twinned with Madison, 
Wisconsin in the USA, a small town, unheard of by the majority 
of the world's population. It was impossible to match economic 
and social conditions of any Lithuanian city with a western 
European or American city of a similar status^^.
The concept of town twinning took a slightly different turn 
from 1992, however, when the Christian-based Friendship Link was 
created to 'extend the hand of friendship to the New Democracies, 
to promote political and cultural relations with these new 
emerging democracies and to improve the understanding and 
awareness of the development and changes in the New 
Democracies.'^ 9 The Directors of Friendship Link began 
investigating the possibility of twinning towns based on status 
(apart from their rank as capital city, second city et cetera). 
By this process, Vilnius became twinned with Cambridge, England, 
because they each had respected, medieval universities.
In the four years following the restitution of independence, 
Lithuania made giant leaps along the path towards re-integration 
into the international community. Her status changed from being 
a republic of the former USSR, whose representation abroad had 
been limited to exiles assuming an unofficial role as 
spokespersons for an unrecognised state, to an internationally 
recognised republic, with numerous foreign accreditations. Within 
the first four years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
operational, although not without the inevitable teething 
troubles inherent in the creation of any new state office, and 
a fledgling diplomatic service was also functioning. Lithuania 
had established relations with numerous states worldwide, rather 
than confining her attentions to the immediate region.
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demonstrating her unique geographical position as a bridge 
between East and West. Lithuania not only joined international 
organisations, but also began participating in international 
events, actions which were elements of the process of rejoining 
the international community and were greatly appreciated by the 
Lithuanian population.
But re-integration into the international community was not 
nearly as effective as had been hoped by so many^ ^^  at the start 
of this period. While Lithuania gained entry into some 
institutions, most importantly the UN, others, such as the 
European Union, remained closed to her, primarily because of her 
uncertain and unstable geopolitical position, and this hindered 
her evolution in the post-Soviet years. Although Lithuania had 
been able to re-enter the international sporting arena, this was 
far more a symbolic gesture and had little political 
significance.
Critically affecting her development from 1991 was the 
attitude of her governments. The Landsbergis Government was a 
real impediment to the establishment of Lithuania's foreign 
relations: his insistence that Lithuania look only to the west 
and fracture all ties with the East, with a conscious rejection 
of all Soviet government practises, was to her detriment. His 
unwillingness to accept the proffered foreign assistance, and the 
assistance of Lithuanian communities worldwide, cost Lithuania 
dearly. It obstructed the pace of development of her Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which was a vital piece of her government 
structure, and by offended and alienated those states and groups 
which had previously been so willing to assist in Lithuania's 
regeneration.
This attitude was partly due to the presence of the mentality 
of homo sovieticus, which had evolved over fifty years of Soviet 
Occupation. It exposed itself by the stubbornness and refusal of 
the Government to accept advice and the reluctance to be dictated 
to by external forces, regardless of the positive influences they
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would have had on Lithuania's transition from Soviet republic to 
an independent state. The mentality of homo sovieticus also 
accentuated the over-ambitious nature of Lithuania's foreign 
policy and made it appear amateurish to western observers: this 
was particularly apparent when studying the re-establishment of 
Lithuania's overseas missions.
Despite the success of the LDLP in the 1992 elections, the 
damage to the development of Lithuania's foreign affairs had been 
done. Two years of idealistic policies meant that Lithuania had 
not achieved all that had been hoped for in the first years of 
independence. Brazauskas was more realistic: prepared to reaffirm 
links with the East as well as the West and in the last two years 
of the period under review, Lithuania's foreign policy finally 
began to take shape. But Brazauskas was also hindered by the 
continuing influence of the former USSR and the geopolitical 
position in which Lithuania was left following its collapse.
Crucially, Lithuania's geopolitical position prevented 
Brazauskas from achieving his desired goals : because of the
instability of the region, other states were reluctant to 
establish anything more than superficial relations with Lithuania 
and it seemed as if this would remain the case in the years 
following 1994. Upon the restitution of independence, Lithuania's 
geopolitical position had influenced the direction her foreign 
policy would take, but it was also geopolitics which ensured that 
the principal objectives of obtaining entry into European and 
transatlantic structures would remain unfulfilled.
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CHAPTER V 
LITHUANIA'S DEFENCE AND SECURITY
"A State of Limbo
In September 1991, after finally achieving full international 
recognition as an independent state, one of the Landsbergis 
government's first moves was to disassociate itself completely 
from the former USSR. Lithuania, along with the other two Baltic 
States, refused to join the successor body to the USSR, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States^ and resented being 
categorised as a Soviet Successor State in the same class as the 
Central Asian Republics. The Lithuanians emphasised the 
historical traditions of statehood and sovereignty which had 
preceded their occupation by the USSR in 1940.^
Lithuania was, however, in a precarious geopolitical position 
in September 19 91. Although her borders, unlike some of the other 
members of the former USSR* were fixed and internationally 
recognised as such, there was still a visible Soviet military 
presence in Lithuania.^ Lithuania did have, however, a 
comparative advantage over the other states in the region, in 
having such a small ethnic Russian minority resident on 
Lithuanian territory.^ Soviet troops had established strategic 
military bases outside Vilnius, Kaunas and Siauliai and at 
Barysai and Zokniai. Although no nuclear weapons had been 
stationed on Lithuanian soil, due to her geographical position, 
Lithuania was used by the Soviet military command as a location 
for a number of long-range conventional weapon-launching 
facilities.
Latvia and Belarus, Lithuania's former Soviet neighbours, both 
had large former Soviet military and ethnic Russian civilian 
populations and these were to continue to provide cause for 
concern throughout the 1991-1994 period and would present key 
security questions for the post-independence governments. 
Kaliningrad, the Soviet enclave to Lithuania's South-West, was
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still a heavily militarised zone, becoming even moreso as former 
Soviet troops withdrawing from the former East Germany and Poland 
were barracked there until accommodation could be found in the 
Russian Federation itself. The Russian Government demanded 
overland access through Lithuania to the enclave and this 
presented a notable security dilemma for Lithuania. Until the 
Kaliningrad issue was resolved, Lithuania would be required to 
continue to maintain at least cordial relations with Russia.
Therefore while being in a comparatively stable position 
relative to the other states in the region, Lithuania was 
nonetheless in a delicate situation: as long as Russian troops 
remained on Lithuanian territory, the retention of Lithuania's 
independence could not be assured. Following a series of delicate 
negotiations led by Dr. Gediminas Stankevicius, Russian forces 
were withdrawn from Lithuania by the end of August 1993, over a 
year before Russian troops were withdrawn from the other two 
Baltic States.® Lithuania needed to formulate a defence and 
security policy which would assist in the preservation of her 
independence. Although the Lithuanians accepted that their state 
would be militarily difficult to defend, due to the lack of 
strategic planning and command, open borders, a lack of natural 
defences and the proximity to the Russian Federation, both of the 
post-independence governments in the period under review opted 
for a policy of developing a security and defence framework, 
albeit a limited framework, as opposed to selecting the option 
of neutrality, which in many ways might well have proven to be 
an easier option, in terms of eliminating the need for a costly 
defence force and the necessary equipment^. The other 
alternative which had been open to them was opting for a "half­
way" solution of developing a border defence and national guard 
working in conjunction with a strong police force.
Both of these options were rejected by the Sajudis and LDLP 
administrations in the belief that adopting a neutral stance in 
the international arena would prevent early admission to the 
international organisations which Lithuania desired to join.
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Likewise, establishing only a border guard force could be 
interpreted by these security organisations as Lithuania being 
unwilling to participate in the joint military operations which 
were launched in their name, either in the guise of international 
peacekeeping efforts or limited aggression. It was felt that 
there should be no additional hurdles to postpone Lithuania's 
entry into these institutions.^
Lithuania, however, accepted that even with a limited military 
force, she had to procure a security guarantee from one or more 
of these western security organisations, especially NATO and the 
Western European Union (WEU), in order to achieve real stability 
and security. Overtures to these organisations were made even 
before independence was internationally recognised, but by the 
end of the period under examination, only observer status of the 
WEU had been granted, which did little to prov^c^an effective 
mantle against potential aggression.
Also fundamental to the process of strengthening Lithuania's 
security was the necessity to forge or strengthen existing 
relations with regional powers. For this, Lithuania was able 
to exploit her all-important geographical position. Lying not 
only on the western fringe of the former USSR and on the eastern 
fringe of Europe, Lithuania could also be incorporated into the 
Nordic region. From the first declaration of the restitution of 
independence in March 1990, Lithuania had enjoyed the support of 
the Nordic states, especially Denmark, Sweden and Iceland, the 
first state to unilaterally recognise independent Lithuania. 
Estonia was in a similar position, enjoying extremely favourable 
relations with Finland. Although none of the Nordic states were 
able to provide Lithuania with the hoped-for official security 
guarantee, the moral support in the early years of independence 
was appreciated by the Lithuanian government and people alike.
Lithuania's defence and security during 1991-19 94, however, 
was not only dependent on preparing to combat external threats. 
Although not as serious as in the other Baltic States or former
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republics within the USSR, there was a small internal threat as 
well, which could have jeopardised the security of the state. 
This can be divided into two distinct categories: the first being 
the presence of a small Russian minority which, had an extremist 
faction come to power in the Russian Federation itself, could 
have become political agitators and created instability in the 
region. The second category be described as the Mafia, which grew 
in prominence and influence during the 1991-1994 period. A mafia 
member was linked to the sole case of nuclear terrorism in 
Lithuania, when he threatened to blow up Lithuania's nuclear 
power facility at Ignalina in the Summer of 1994 after the 
execution of BQris Dekqnfdize for the murder of Vitas Lingys. 
The rise of organised crime in Lithuania in the post-Soviet years 
was not unusual in the states of the former USSR or East Bloc, 
but nonetheless had a detrimental impact on the preservation of 
Lithuania's security and stability.
The following sections shall examine in closer detail the 
procedures by which Lithuania created and implemented her defence 
policies during the 1991-1994 period. The restructuring of the 
armed forces, applications for entry into international security 
organisations, security concerns from neighbouring states and 
internal threats will also be considered. The legacy of the fifty 
years of Soviet occupation must also be surveyed to see what 
impact this had on the newly re-independent state's defence and 
security policies.
Since attaining fully recognised independence in 1991, the 
successive governments of Lithuania were all too well aware of 
the fact that they were unable to feasibly defend themselves from 
any external aggressor by themselves. Therefore both of the post- 
Soviet governments were united in their commitment to 
strengthen. Lithuania's state sovereignty and defence.*-® In 
order even to be considered for membership of any international 
security organisations of the European Union (EU) , which were so 
vital for her defence, Lithuania had to prove that she posed no 
risk to Europe's overall security and stability.^ It was
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therefore in Lithuania's interests to maintain stable, if not 
overtly friendly relations with all of her neighbouring states. 
But while Lithuania's defence and security policy was therefore 
geared towards active participation in international security 
organisations such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), 
relations with the Russian Federation had to be accorded the 
highest priority, because of the possible security implications 
of potentially alienating the far more powerful state.
In their quest for admission into NATO and the EU, both of the 
post-independence governments aligned their defence and security 
policies with those of NATO and EU member states. They both 
confirmed that they were aware of and would be willing to 
contribute to the financial burden of NATO membership.^® 
Simultaneously, however, some elements of co-operation were 
forged with the other two Baltic States. Co-operation in this 
sphere was not as thorough nor as wide-ranging as had originally 
been anticipated. The formation of the Baltic Peacekeeping 
Battalion (BALTBAT), about which more shall be written later in 
this chapter, was the greatest success of joint operations. But 
between 1991-1994 plan were also drafted for the creation and 
implementation of co-ordinated policies to control airspace and 
state borders on land, coastal and territorial waters, to combat 
terrorism and to prevent the smuggling or trafficking of 
narcotics.^ The Baltic States' Chiefs of Staff also inaugurated 
the process of making compatible their defence and security 
doctrines, although little progress in this sphere had been made 
by the end of the period under review.
It had been expected by western analysts^” that Lithuania's 
co-operation with Latvia would have been at the forefront of 
Lithuania's security policy in the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of the USSR, but this does not prove to have been the 
case, with the hoped-for Baltic co-operation failing to live up 
to its potential promise. President Ulmanis of Latvia illustrated 
the poor co-operation between the Baltic States when he stated 
that relations with Ukraine were of greater importance to Riga
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than relations with Lithuania or Estonia.^
Landsbergis and Brazauskas were extremely reluctant to align 
themselves too closely with Latvia in the belief that being seen 
to be too entangled with the other Baltic States would
hinder early admission into the WEU or NATO.^ Latvia was 
perceived to be a serious concern to the Vilnius Government 
because of the large Russian minority in the country. At the end 
of 1994 there were still over 500 Russian troops with 
approximately 200 associated dependents still on Latvian soil, 
who were maintaining the strategic radar base at Skrunda and who 
posed a legitimate security threat.^
The Latvian armed forces themselves were not perceived as 
being a threat to Lithuania as they were extremely limited both 
in strength and capability. In 19 94, however, there was a 
widely-held belief in both the Lithuanian Parliament and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs that Latvia was unlikely to remain independent 
in future years: that it would be re-incorporated into the
Commonwealth of Independent States and it was the likelihood of 
this possibility which represented the greatest threat to 
Lithuania: 'The Latvians are facing a real threat from Russia,' 
said Algirdas Saudargas, former Minister of Foreign Affairs^®. 
He envisaged a re-incorporation of Latvia into the CIS as 
occurring within a decade. This view (although with an 
unspecified timeframe) was also held by his successor, Povilas 
Gylys.
Gylys' attention during the 1992-1994 period, therefore, was 
concentrated on relations with Belarus and Russia. Government-to- 
Government relations between Vilnius and Moscow improved with the 
return to power in 1992 of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party 
(LDLP), but the majority of ordinary Lithuanians remained 
concerned about and suspicious of Russia.^ While the Yeltsin 
government was not perceived as being an immediate security 
threat to Lithuania's independence, there were ever-present fears 
that the installation of a more radical government would affect
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Lithuania's future as an independent state.
The so-called "Zhirinovsky Factor"^® could not afford to be 
overlooked as demands for the re-incorporation of the Baltic 
States into the greater Russian Empire were frequently publicly 
stated.29 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who rose to prominence in 1993, 
vowed to abolish the independence of many East European countries 
and opposed the extension of Western influence in the region. He 
had captured the imagination of many Russians with his slogan 
'Never shall anyone humiliate the Russians'®® and his ultra­
nationalism. Zhirinovsky blamed the Baltic States for the breakup 
of the USSR and threatened that should his Liberal Democrat Party 
assume office, he would 'pump nuclear waste into the three 
countries to force them to comply with Moscow's wishes.'®®
Even Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's Foreign Minister, perceived as 
a "moderate" in the West, spoke of Russia's interest in her so- 
called "near abroad", suggesting that some or all of the Baltic 
States were included in that "Near Abroad".®® The Vilnius 
Government was alarmed that in the restructuring of Russia's 
Defence Ministry, according to a special decree issued by 
President Yeltsin on 7 May 1992, a special post, the Deputy 
Defence Minister for Co-operation with CIS Armed Forces and 
Russian Troops in the "Near Abroad", had been created. This lent 
an air of importance and credibility to the concept of the "Near 
Abroad". This post was held by Col. Gen. Boris Gromov.
The Lithuanian Governments were extremely concerned at the 
manner in which the West dealt with Russia. 'They don't stick to 
normal rules of thinking,' said Gediminas Stankevicius. 'It 
shouldn't be considered that just because Russia is not as bad 
as it used to be that this is cause for rejoicing. It is not. In 
the USA they are very tied to personalities. Washington DC used 
to be tied to Gorbachev and we had to suffer for that. Now they 
don't make demands on Yeltsin because they are afraid of opening 
the door for Zhirinovsky. But personalisation is a myth. Russian 
interests have basically remained the same. There is not that
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much difference between the politics of Zhirinovsky and Kozyrev, 
but it is a tradition in Russian politics to focus on a worse 
alternative to cover up present problems. Russia acts the way 
that the West allows it to act and if Russia is allowed to 
overstep the political boundaries it will do so.'®®
Kozyrev's concept of extending Russian influence to the "Near 
Abroad" certainly alarmed the Vilnius governments. As former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Saudargas said, 'We have to steer 
clear of Russia. I always say the best relations with Russia are 
no relations with Russia.'®* The Lithuanians rightly or wrongly 
perceived the Gorbachev and Yeltsin administrations as lulling 
the West into a false sense of security. They developed a new 
role for Russia as an international peacekeeper or mediator and 
thereby distracted western observers, preventing them from 
noticing an increasing Russian influence in Ukraine and Belarus, 
an influence which could spread to Lithuania and the other Baltic 
States. ®®
Russia still did, it should be remembered, possess enormous 
military strength after the collapse of the USSR and it remained 
a great concern of all the states which had once been a part of 
or affiliated to the USSR. With an estimated total strength of 
2,030,000 men, the Russian armed forces comprised five main arms 
of service. The most senior were the Strategic Rocket Forces; the 
largest arm was the Ground Forces; then the Air Force, Air 
Defence Forces and the Navy.®®
The Army itself possessed a strength of a million men, with 
60 Motor Rifle Divisions, four Airborne Divisions, 18 Tank 
Divisions and 14 Artillery Divisions. The Air Force had a 
strength of 165,000, with a Strategic Nuclear Force strength of 
a further 150,000. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) 
had limited Russian aeronautic equipment stationed West of the 
Urals to 3,450 fixed-wing combat aircraft, 890 armed helicopters 
and 300 naval aircraft. The Navy had a strength of 300,000 and 
an extensive fleet which included 39 Nuclear-powered Ballistic
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Missile submarines and 131 frigates.
There were also, at the end of 1994, 250,000 Border Guards
working for the Border Service of the Russian Federation, a 
division created by President Yeltsin on 30 December 1993. The 
Border Guards assumed a security role equal to that of the armed 
forces with the responsibility for protecting the 60,932 km of 
Russia's border. Efforts to create a uniform CIS border regime 
had yet to bear fruit by the end of 1994. Russia also possessed 
a 120,000-strong security service, which replaced the notorious 
and feared KGB after the collapse of the USSR. Despite 
restrictions imposed upon it by the CFE treaty, the Russian armed 
forces remained a formidable opponent to members of the former 
USSR and East Bloc and remained an obvious threat to Lithuania, 
whose armed forces would have presented no realistic obstacle to 
their Russian counterparts.®®
Although Lithuania did not share a direct border with the 
greater part of the Russian Federation, there was a common border 
with the Kaliningrad Enclave and it was this piece of Russian 
territory which was responsible for many of the tensions inherent 
in Russo-Lithuanian Relations. Kaliningrad remained a significant 
security threat to Lithuania and the border crossings between the 
two states were heavily guarded by Lithuanian soldiers, as 
Vilnius believed that narcotics and possibly arms were being 
smuggled into or through Lithuania via these gateways.®® A long- 
running dispute regarding the transit of Russian troops through 
Lithuania from Kaliningrad and the former East Germany was only 
resolved by a Treaty signed on 18 January 1995, Demands made by 
Russia since the restitution of Lithuania's independence for an 
extra-territorial corridor were flatly refused by the Lithuanian 
Government. Lithuania would never give and could never in the 
foreseeable future grant any pre-determined transit rights to 
Russia, which could then be interpreted as setting a precedent 
for a Russian occupation of Lithuania.®^
By the terms of the Yalta Agreement in 1945, East Prussia was
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divided, with the territory around Allenstein being granted to 
Poland. The remaining three-quarters of the territory of the 
former East Prussia, including the city and port of Konigsberg, 
renamed Kaliningrad by the Soviets, was only temporarily put 
under Soviet control. It was, however, absorbed into the USSR 
without real western opposition by a Decree of 7 April 1946, thus 
fulfilling a 200-year old ambition to gain the territory on the 
part of Russian and, post-1917, Soviet leaders. The question of 
who would eventually control the region resurfaced in widespread 
public debate in Germany, Poland, Lithuania and Russia
immediately following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the 
dissolution of the USSR and the restitution of Lithuania's
independence.
Historically Kaliningrad was an ethnic German region, part of 
East Prussia, but there would be serious resentment by Russia and 
Poland if the area were, in the future, to be returned to
Germany. If the area were put under Polish control, the Germans,
Lithuanians and the Russians would, no doubt contest the issue, 
in 1994 there was mounting concern in the West of Lithuania at 
what was seen to be an increasing German presence in the reason 
and an element of German revanchism. The Lithuanian port of 
Klaipeda was also at several stages of its history under German 
control and there was a real worry that if Kaliningrad were 
returned to Germany, demands might also be made for the "return" 
of Klaipeda.^
These fears were accentuated by the publication in 1993-1994 
of German books on the region which deliberately used the name 
Memel rather than Klaipeda and OstpreujSen/Konigsberg rather than 
Kaliningrad. One such text, widely on sale throughout Germany, 
was H. M . F. Syskowski's OstvreuBsen: Koniasbera und das
Koniasbercrer Gebiet published in 1994. In its 129 pages of text, 
there was not one reference to Kaliningrad. The history of the 
region omitted the fifty years following the start of World War 
II. Instead it focused on the historical German settlement of the 
region. The tendency towards revanchism in the region was
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further emphasised by the caution displayed by regional officials 
when discussion the renewed interest of Germany in the region. 
'Kaliningrad welcomes the interest... despite the ambiguous 
political overtones,' said Valerian Yurov, spokesman for the 
Department of Foreign Economic Relations.Although Chancellor 
Kohl issued a 'solid reassurance to Russia over any possible 
claim to... Kaliningrad'the issue continued to remain in the 
political consciousness throughout the period under review. 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky was prepared to return the enclave to 
G e r m a n y ^  while Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announced that 
Germany could share the administration of K a l i n i n g r a d . ^
Lithuanian Government ministers argued that failure to resolve 
the Kaliningrad issue was to hinder Lithuania's development in 
all spheres in the post-Soviet years. The Landsbergis Government 
questioned whether the West would passively allow Kaliningrad to 
be turned into a part of Russia. It likened the Kaliningrad issue 
to the Berlin problem, which dominated the Cold War, only in 
reverse: a Russian enclave in the centre of Europe/*? (it is
vital to remember that most Lithuanians perceived themselves as 
being part of Europe and that meant Europe as a whole, not just 
the region of Central or Eastern Europe.) Both the Landsbergis 
and Brazauskas administrations believed that if the West put up 
no opposition to Russia's claim, however tenuous, to the region, 
Lithuania would be trapped, pincer-like, with Russia on both 
sides and thus be separated from E u r ope.^ Russia appeared 
determined to retain control of the enclave primarily because of 
its strategic position as a warm-water port on the Baltic, the 
maintenance of which has always been a traditional Russian 
aspiration.
Regardless of ownership, both of the post-independence 
Lithuanian governments advocated a demilitarisation as well as 
a de-occupation of the region, as approximately 50 per cent of 
Kaliningrad's population were Russian soldiers or associated 
personnel.^ Most of these came from the former North-Western 
Group of Forces which had been deployed in the former Soviet
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satellite states which had formed the Warsaw Pact. After the 
Pact's dissolution, the troops were gradually withdrawn, an 
operation which was completed finally on 31 August 1994. While 
some divisions were redeployed to the Moscow, Urals, Volga and 
North Caucuses Military Districts, others were relocated in 
Kaliningrad as an interim, temporary move, until adequate 
accommodation could be found for them in the Russian Federation 
itself. There was, however, one division, the elite 11th Guards 
All-Arms Army, based specifically in Kaliningrad post-1991, which 
had the capability to come to a war footing within 24 hours, 
which was of the greatest concern to Vilnius.
The concentration of military force in the region was 
strengthened by the presence of the Baltic Sea Fleet which was 
still headquartered in Kaliningrad during the 1991-1994 period, 
although a significant but unspecified number of personnel were 
based around St Petersburg. The disadvantages incurred by the 
enclave status of Kaliningrad were outweighed, in the eyes of 
Russian Naval commanders, by its advantages and therefore the 
number of Navy personnel in the enclave was expanded by the 
redeployment of formations withdrawn from Polish and East German 
Naval bases by the end of 1993.^
The Baltic Sea Fleet, under the command of Admiral Vladimir 
Egorov, did withdraw its 240 strike aircraft from Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia, but these were still perceived to pose a 
threat to the Baltic States as the majority of them were 
redeployed to neighbouring Kaliningrad. In addition, the Baltic 
Sea Fleet possessed ground forces also deployed in Kaliningrad, 
composed of one Naval Infantry Regiment, one Coastal Defence 
Division, one Coastal Artillery Brigade, one Fleet Spetsnaz 
Brigade and 250 main Battle Tanks, 300 Armoured Infantry Vehicles 
and 200 Tube Artillery Pieces, again surpassing the total 
military capability not only of Lithuania, but of the three 
Baltic States combined.^ The Baltic Sea Fleet also upgraded its 
submarine facilities during 1994, although this was of little 
immediate consequences to Lithuania. It was, however, to be
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perceived in Vilnius as a form of psychological intimidation on 
the part of the Russian Federation.^
Russia, however, was not the sole security risk to Lithuania. 
Of increasing importance to the Lithuanian Governments over the 
1991-1994 period was Belarus, which moved towards ever-closer 
integration with Russia over those years. Although there were 
no serious territorial disputed between Lithuania and Belarus, 
Vilnius became ever more suspicious of Minsk, as relations 
between Minsk and Moscow strengthened. In March 1994, in a survey 
conducted throughout Lithuania, 63 per cent of respondents 
favoured the unification of Belarus and Russia, while 55 per cent 
favoured the creation of a new Soviet state. The Belarus 
border was only 4 0 km from Vilnius and in 1994 an agreement was 
concluded between Minsk and Moscow which allowed for the 
patrolling of Belarus' borders by Russian troops. This caused 
great alarm in both Lithuania and Poland, especially with Yeltsin 
being quoted as stating: 'It's our [Russia's] border, too, no
arguing about it.'^’' The attitude in Lithuania held by many 
parliamentarians was that the West was ignorant of the security 
threats posed to Lithuania or, indeed, to any of the Baltic 
States or Poland by such an action.
The military capability of Belarus, even without strengthening 
bonds with Russia was sufficient to concern Lithuania between 
1991-1994. In 1994, the estimated total strength of the 
Belarussian military forces was 84,000, but despite signing the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, acceding to the Lisbon Protocol, 
ratifying START I in 1993 and pronouncing them to be under 
Russian control, it was the presence of 100 ballistic missiles 
still on Belarussian territory which was perceived to be a grave 
threat to Lithuania. Despite the Belarussian government 
prohibiting all modernisation programmes for the armed forces 
during the 1991-1994 years, in all spheres the Belarussian 
military capability remained vastly superior to and totally 
incomparable with their Lithuanian counterparts. The army had, 
at the end of 1994, a total strength of 50,000 persons, with two
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Motor Rifle Divisions, two Artillery Divisions, three Mechanised 
Brigades, three Surface-to-Surface Missile Brigades and two Anti- 
Tank Regiments, the Belarus Army was still heavily committed to 
Soviet operational art and tactical doctrine, with great emphasis 
being placed on self-defence and internal security.
The Air Force was even more daunting for the Lithuanians, with 
an estimated strength of 34,000 personnel. It was equipped with 
MiG-23, MiG-25 and Su-27 Fighter aircraft and Su-24, Su-25 and 
Yak-28 Ground Attack aircraft. Although an agreement between 
Minsk and Moscow was signed on achieving independence from the 
former USSR which allowed Belarus to take command of 90 per cent 
of the locally-based combat element of the Soviet Air Force, 10 
per cent of the former Soviet Long-Range Aviation aircraft and 
an Air Transport Regiment, the CFE Treaty limits for Belarus 
comprised 260 fixed-wing combat aircraft and 80 armed 
helicopters, plus supporting second-line transports and trainers. 
These were to be manned initially by approximately 12,000 
personnel grouped into 7-8 regiments complemented by about 22,000 
members of the Air Defence Forces,
The proportion of equipment inherited by Belarus from the 
former USSR (389 Combat Aircraft and 7 9 helicopters) 
substantially exceeded the fixed-wing CFE limits. Therefore many 
had to be scrapped: the first batch being done so in the presence 
of military inspectors from the UK, USA, Netherlands and Norway 
at Lesnaya Air Base on 1 April 1993. But although the Air Force, 
both in terms of equipment and manpower, was being continually 
reduced even after the end of 1994, it was still several hundred 
times larger than the Lithuanian Force, whose inventory was 
comprised solely of 7 trainer aircraft.
Although Russia began patrolling Belarus' borders in 19 94, 
Belarus also maintained its own border guards, at an estimated 
strength of 8,000 projected to rise to 20,000 by 1996. Even 
though the former Western Border Troops Division of the USSR KGB 
covering Ukraine and the Belarussian S.S.R. was abolished in
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December 1991, the Minsk Operational Group of the former Western 
Troops District was transferred to Belarussian jurisdiction to 
form the nucleus of the Belarussian Border command, established 
in December 1991. the Border Command adopted the Soviet modus 
operandi with troops grouped into 300-400-strong detachments 
{otryad) . In late 1992, three air detachments were formed to 
support border control operations. The formation of these three 
detachments triggered yet more alarm bells ringing in Vilnius, 
as even without the Russian support which had been present from 
February 1994, these guards represented a real threat to 
Lithuania.
Poland, too, must not be ignored when examining potential 
threats to Lithuania's security. Relations with Poland had 
historically been strained, reaching their nadir in 1922 when 
Poland seized Vilnius and the surrounding territory. In 1991 
relations between the two countries were extremely poor. Some 
Polish commissars in Lithuania had supported the anti-Gorbachev 
coup in August 1991 and upon the full recognition of Lithuania's 
independence the Landsbergis Government replaced the leaders of 
these councils, often with Lithuanians, which caused discontent 
among the sizeable Polish minority in Lithuania. President 
Landsbergis claimed that 'Right Wing Poles both inside and 
outside the country want parts of Lithuania to become Polish 
a g a i n . T h i s  was a sentiment which was certainly shared by a 
proportion of Lithuanians but it was rarely voiced openly.
The Poles were not quite so passive. Immediately after the 
abortive coup in Moscow, the large Polish minority in the south 
of Lithuania petitioned the Landsbergis Government for an 
autonomous region: a request which was flatly refused.^ From
1992, however, the situation improved, despite an habitual 
distrust of Poland being frequently expressed in all echelons of 
Lithuanian society and frequent allegations of mistreatment from 
the Polish minority also being voiced.^ Although these 
underlying sentiments did indeed cause concern in Lithuania, 
government-to-government relations strengthened over the course
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of 1991-1994 with the concluding of friendship and trade 
agreements.^. Nonetheless, with 2,545 tanks, 2,704 armoured 
vehicles, 486 combat aircraft and 12 major naval vessels, Poland 
had the ability, if not the inclination, to pose a real threat 
to Lithuania's security.
Abiding by the CFE treaty, Poland had to reduce its total 
military force levels to 234,500 (far greater than Lithuania's 
total of 5,200 military personnel.) Her army had a strength of 
18 8,100, divided into 8 Mechanised Brigade Divisions, one Armour 
Division, one Coastal Defence Division and one Air Cavalry 
Division, Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish 
Army adopted western-style training methods, with Polish troops 
being sent to NATO-member states' military academies. Poland's 
Air Force had a total strength of 72,600 and was equipped with 
numerous aircraft made by Soviet companies Mikoyan, Sukhoi and 
Antonov: including 2 63 fighters, 124 fighter-bombers, 64 combat 
helicopters, 241 trainers, 92 transporters and 206 transport 
helicopters. Poland's Navy (Lithuania's weakest branch of the 
armed forces) amounted to 17,800 personnel, operating three 
submarines, one destroyer, one frigate and 7 corvettes. In 
addition to the regular force, there was a para-naval force, the 
Maritime Frontier Guard, subordinate to the Ministry of the 
Interior. By the end of 1994 there were a further 13,800 
conscripts serving in the Ministry of the Interior force: a
security force with its own Air Regiment. Even though the Polish 
Armed Forces were heavily dependent on conscripts who served for 
18-month periods, who made up over 55 per cent of the entire 
force, the 45 per cent of professional troops were still far 
greater in number than in Lithuania and still posed a legitimate 
threat and concern to Vilnius. The election of the former 
Communist Aleksandr Kwasniewski in November 1995 was a further 
anxiety for Vilnius, although it was the Lithuanians who had set 
this precedent by re-electing their former Communist government, 
although the first months of his period in office gave little 
real concern to the Lithuanians.
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The deteriorating situation in Belarus, however, proved to be 
also of great importance to the Poles and this was beneficial to 
Lithuania. As former Foreign Minister Saudargas explained, 'the 
Poles have not changed, despite the signing of a friendship 
treaty: of course they have expansionist tendencies regarding
Lithuania, but they have Belarus on their other border and that 
is far more of a concern to the Poles and is a real potential 
problem. '
The greatest external threats to Lithuania were therefore not 
immediate. Of all her neighbours, Belarus posed the most feasible 
threat, especially as ties with the Russian Federation continued 
to be strengthened during the years 1991-1994. Since 1994, 
however, it was yet again the possibility of a change of 
leadership in Moscow which was likely to jeopardise Lithuania's 
independence, if the relatively moderate government of Boris 
Yeltsin was replaced by a more hardline regime such as that 
proposed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky or the former Communist Genady 
Zyganov, both of whom performed well in the 1995 elections.^ 
Both of the Vilnius Governments in the years 1991-1994 were well 
aware that without possessing the type of security guarantee only 
available through NATO or WEU membership, Lithuania's 
independence and security were wholly dependent on actions beyond 
her control: on the maintenance of the political status quo in 
her neighbouring states.^
Both the government and people of Lithuania as a whole have 
always viewed NATO as the main security guarantor in Europe. 
Fearing a resurgent Russia, Lithuania continued to believe NATO 
to be one of the few visible symbols of stability in an 
increasingly unstable world. Immediately following international 
recognition of Lithuania's independence, the question of joining 
NATO was raised, although an official application was only issued 
on 5 January 1994. The application, however, reaffirmed 
Lithuania's desire not only for a security guarantee from Europe, 
but also to contribute to the security of Europe. ?° On 27 
January, 1994, President Brazauskas, in a speech given to the
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Secretary General of NATO and to the North Atlantic Council, 
stated that 'a country's stability and security are essential 
pre-requisites for democracy and free market to function. We are 
convinced that the assurance of Lithuania's national security is 
an inseparable part of European security as a whole. Lithuania 
can not guarantee her security alone. We think European and at 
the same time Lithuanian security must be ensured through the 
political, economic and defence integration of the countries 
concerned, while the most important institutional expressions of 
such integration are the European Union and NATO.'"'*-
The Vilnius Government, in conjunction with those of the other 
states of the region, greatly appreciated the assistance provided 
to it by NATO states with the formation of the North Atlantic Co­
operation Council (NACC) in 1991.^2 Lithuania recognised that 
the NACC was to play a substantial role as a means of 
preventative diplomacy and in January 1994 President Brazauskas 
emphasised its contribution to the process of withdrawal of the 
Russian troops from L i t h u a n i a . The increased number of NACC- 
organised activities since its inauguration illustrated the 
unambiguous interest of its partners in the development of 
further political consultation and co-operation with the regions 
of central and eastern Europe. Lithuania, along with the other 
Baltic States, welcomed in particular the opportunities provided 
by the NACC Ad Hoc Working Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping 
for joint military exercises.
The NACC was particularly important for Lithuania during the 
period under review because it enabled Lithuania to make use of 
NATO assistance in restructuring its defence forces along western 
guidelines. In its first years of operation, emphasis was placed 
on European security, encompassing peacekeeping, defence planning 
and maintaining democratic civil-military relations, all of which 
were supported keenly by V i l n i u s .
By 1994, however, the limitations of the NACC had become 
glaringly obvious.Firstly, a consensus was required on all
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issues, which, with a membership of 38 states, was to prove 
impossible to obtain, unless uncontroversial issues were the 
topic of debate. The organisation also failed to take into 
account the diversity of the region comprising the former Warsaw 
Pact States in so far as security and stability problems were 
concerned, with different states having varying concerns 
regarding ethnic minorities'^ '^  or the presence of former Soviet 
military personnel, for example. Therefore the former Soviet and 
East Bloc states which had initially welcomed the creation of the 
NACC as a substitute for NATO, realised that as a substitute the 
organisation was inadequate and they began to press again for 
full NATO membership. 'For four years the Eastern Europeans 
[were] offered make believe institutions: CSCE, an irrelevant
umbrella for Europe's orphans...[and] NACC...designed to do 
everything that Partnership for Peace is meant to achieve but all 
it did was plan peacekeeping operations that nobody was willing 
to undertake,' wrote Jonathan Eyal.
The proposed expansion of NATO was to create difficulties for 
both existing and aspiring NATO members, especially regarding the 
implementation of the physical process of enlargement. One of the 
greatest hurdles to overcome was that there was no and had never 
been a document listing criteria for membership of the 
organisation. This had been a deliberate policy for, according 
to Sir Percy Cradock, the British Prime Ministers' Foreign Policy 
Adviser during the 1980s and early 1990s, 'publishing such a 
list, indeed creating such a list, would be ipso facto to agree 
to a new member or candidate for membership as soon as they had 
conformed to the listed criteria. It would be very hard to say 
to a candidate state; "Yes, yes, you meet our criteria, as 
published, but no you can not join. " ' It has also been 
suggested by a British Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Counsellor®® that NATO members had deliberately not compiled a 
list of criteria for membership because the existing member 
states would be unable either to agree to the criteria or, 
indeed, fulfil them. Therefore they would be best left unwritten.
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It must also be questioned, however, whether the existing NATO 
members even desired an expansion of NATO at this time, fearful 
of the dilemmas this action would inspire. As Eyal explained,
' NATO bureaucrats fear[ed] that admitting new states would 
embroil the Alliance in many Yugoslav-type conflicts and saddle 
the organisation with myriad social and economic problems.'®*- 
This dilemma was to continue long after this period under review. 
In 19 95, for example, the German Defence Minister, Volke Rühe, 
spoke of 'eine Erweiterung, nicht eine Eroffn^n^ von NATO', that 
is, a widening, not an opening-up of the organisation.®^ But how 
could that be interpreted? Not one single NATO member state 
advocated outright the expansion of the organisation®®. Yet 
neither were they to declare openly that this could never 
happen,®"* instead 'those who wish[ed] to duck the issue argue [d] 
that with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire 
it is impossible to define Europe's frontiers,'®^ Therefore they 
adopted stalling tactics.
This indecision was partly, no doubt, because the suggested 
expansion of NATO was also to create problems by heightening 
tension in the politically-sensitive region. The Russian 
Federation had made it extremely clear on numerous occasions®® 
that it was not in favour of such a process, believing it to be 
a threat to its own security. Lithuania vigorously supported the 
West's position that Russia should not have a right of veto with 
regards to an eastward expansion of NATO, but at the same time 
was aware of the Russian perception of the organisation as being 
an alliance directed against Russian and the CIS states, a 
perception which affected the attitude of numerous Russian 
politicians towards the concept of NATO enlargement.®? By 1994 
the formerly moderate Andrei Kozyrev had become almost as radical 
as Zhirinovsky in his 'echoing [of] the new rhetoric of 
nationalism'®® and Grigor Yavlinski, leader of the Yabloko Party 
(the largest pro-democracy political party in Russia) indicated 
that any NATO enlargement would immediately be met by a Russian 
military union with Belarus and "naked pressure" on Ukraine to 
follow suit.®®
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Therefore, in a attempt to appease both Russia and the states 
of Central and Eastern Europe, an interim measure to joining 
NATO, the Partnership for Peace Programme (PEP) was inaugurated 
in 1994.®® President Brazauskas was among the first Central and 
Eastern European Heads of State to sign the framework document 
on 27 January 1994. The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
particularly valued PFP as a practical basis for co-operation in 
accordance with Lithuania's recognised needs and aspirations and 
the Lithuanian Government was particularly grateful to the USA 
for promoting the concept of PFP as a preliminary step towards 
full NATO membership,®*-
As he signed the PFP framework document, Brazauskas stated 
that Lithuania was 'prepared to begin the work needed to 
implement the democratic control of defence forces, candid 
defence budgetary processes, along with joint military planning, 
training and exercises.' He saw PFP as being a 'means by which 
the security of the entire region from Vancouver to Vladivostok 
can be enhanced.' But while signing the framework document, 
Brazauskas was aware of its limitations. 'I imagine this 
initiative does not completely satisfy every state that is 
striving for closer proximity to or membership in NATO. It is a 
compromise plan, oriented not toward the past, but toward the 
future, toward a Europe not divided by barriers of suspicion, 
hostility, differing ideologies and different standards of 
living.' He called on as many of the Central and Eastern European 
and former Soviet states as possible to participate in the PFP 
programme. ®^
The official application for membership of NATO and the 
signing of the PFP framework document in January 1994 revealed 
that the objective of integration into western security 
structures enjoyed the unanimous support of all the significant 
Lithuanian political forces.®®, enhancing Lithuania's 
predominantly western orientation, despite the return to power 
in 1992 of the former Communist Government, the Lithuanian 
Democratic Labour Party, still led by Algirdas Brazauskas. The
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general public also endorsed this view. In an opinion poll 
conducted by Baltic Survey, 60 per cent of those polled favoured 
strengthening Lithuania's ties with NATO. Although 13 per cent 
actively disapproved, the remainder were of no fixed opinion. 52 
per cent supported Lithuania's membership of PFP, while 57 per 
cent favoured full membership of NATO when the opportunity
By signing the framework document of PFP, Lithuania committed 
herself to the continuing move towards a full pluralist democracy 
and a market economy, plus ensuring respect for human rights as 
well as the rule of law, while at the same time contributing to 
common action to preserve stability in the region. PFP was viewed 
in Vilnius as a process which offered practical ways to advance 
and enhance international co-operation between interested states 
and NATO in the areas which were demanding priority attention, 
while the individual nature of each member's partnership 
programme allowed for different levels and speeds of progress.®® 
Lithuania's Individual Partnership Programme was signed in 
November 1994 : Lithuania became the ninth state to launch its
individual programme. Most Lithuanians believed that a 
specifically Lithuanian Partnership Programme, tailored to 
Lithuania's special needs and developed with NATO would become 
an essential part of the process of full integration into the 
NATO structure.®®
The Lithuanians did not, however, accept PFP as a substitute 
for NATO membership. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bronislovas 
Lubys, declared in January 1994 that while implementing its 
partnership programme, Lithuania would continue to bear in mind 
her official NATO application and continue to process of 
restructuring her security and defence systems to NATO-specific 
standards, as well as assisting NATO members in the field of 
conflict prevention.Lithuania stated her intentions of taking 
an active part in NATO as she had taken in the League of Nations 
during the inter-war years, and she was one of the first Central 
and Eastern European states to appoint a designated liaison
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officer at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels and to appoint a 
military representative to the Partnership Co-ordination Cell 
located at Mons in Belgium.
The major flaw with PFP, as perceived by the states of Central 
and Eastern Europe, was that while representing a preliminary 
manoeuvre to joining NATO, the concept did not provide the much- 
needed and hoped for security guarantee. In an interview in June 
1994, the Lithuanian negotiator Gediminas Stankevicius expressed 
sentiments about the shortcomings of PFP which could easily have 
been the words of any Minister in a former East Bloc state or 
member state of the USSR: 'PFP is no [security] guarantee: it is 
a programme for developing defence systems and increasing co­
operation. Maybe it's a step towards joining NATO, but they want 
us to be an "attractive" proposition first and while we are not 
yet attractive to NATO, we are pretty attractive to Russia and 
without NATO membership the West will stand by as we are 
swallowed up.'®®
The limitations of PFP were also recognised by European 
states, Jonathan Eyal highlighted the tenuous nature of the 
Partnership: 'partners usually cohabit but do not marry.'®® He
expressed the sentiment shared by so many of the Central and 
Eastern European states that western Europe was unwilling to 
welcome them into the NATO fold, judging that by 'offering 
Tajikistan and Poland the same formal partnership reinforces the 
idea that the two are of the same security importance to 
Europe . ' *°®
Lithuania shared with the other Central and Eastern European 
states a common distrust and residual fear of Russia and its 
territorial ambitions, which increased the urgency for a real and 
legitimate security guarantee. President Brazauskas alerted the 
NATO Secretary-General to the Lithuanians' concern regarding 
Russia's attitude to the "Near Abroad". 'Russia's statements, 
concerning her special interests and Russia's exceptional right 
to maintain peace in the so-called "Near Abroad" or the former
2 2 6
territory of the USSR, are not entirely consistent with the 
spirit of international law or of the "Partnership for Peace". 
Statements about Russia's special interests in the Baltic are 
especially difficult to understand, if only because Lithuania and 
the other Baltic States were never a legitimate part of the 
USSR. '
The Governments of post-independence Lithuania did understand, 
however, that membership of NATO was a complex and evolutionary 
process which demanded both material and intellectual resources. 
To meet these demands the Lithuanians hoped for the creation of 
numerous bilateral programmes to assist them in reaching NATO 
standards of equipment, training and organisation. Their prime 
target for assistance in this sphere was the USA, which indeed 
was able to provide technical and administrative assistance in 
the first stage of the process which aimed to lead eventually to 
complete inter-operability between Lithuania and the NATO member 
states.*®^ The Lithuanian Government realised that ' NATO states 
need[ed] to be convinced that any candidates for membership 
[were] not only willing to share the burden, but [also] able to 
do so. ' *®®
During the 1991-1994 period, the Governments of Lithuania were 
also aware that admission into the Atlantic Alliance would best 
be achieved by either individual states or in small groups, as 
opposed to the whole region being admitted at once. Former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Saudargas and negotiator Gediminas 
Stankevicius both expressed the suggestion that Lithuania should 
align herself closely with Poland, which was perceived by both 
the West and by the states of Central and Eastern Europe as being 
one of the most likely candidates for early admission into NATO. 
This opinion was also supported by the British Ambassador to 
Lithuania, Michael Peart. *®^
The few existing criteria for admission into NATO which needed 
to be fulfilled included the resolution of any ethnic minority 
conflicts, the transition to a pluralist democracy and a
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commitment to a transformation to a market economy. The minority 
issue was certainly to prove a hindrance to a number of the 
potential applicants, including Lithuania's two fellow Baltic 
States, Latvia and Estonia.*®® This issue provided further 
grounds for Lithuania to link herself more closely with Poland 
despite the historical animosity between the two states.
By the end of 1994, however, admission to NATO was still a 
J^æ^^and the Government of Lithuania realised that membership 
would not be achieved in the near future.*®® Therefore the 
Government was faced with little alternative but to concentrate 
on developing its political links with NATO, extracting maximum 
benefit from PFP and, despite its acknowledged limitations, 
working actively in the NACC. None of these actions, however, 
assisted Lithuania by providing the security guarantee that she 
so desperately craved, leaving the maintenance of her 
independence at the end of 1994 solely at the discretion of more 
powerful Eastern neighbours.
The failure to achieve a viable security guarantee was to 
affect all aspects of the development of Lithuania in the years 
between 1991-1994: it had economic implications, as foreign
companies were reluctant to invest in the Republic because of the 
threat of instability caused by political uncertainty in Russia 
and Belarus. The social dimension also had to be considered: many 
states which had continually pledged to uphold Lithuania's 
independence refrained from implementing actual measures which 
would ensure the maintenance of this independence. Had there been 
an invasion of Lithuanian territory during these years, there was 
a consensus among ordinary Lithuanian citizens that while vocal 
objections would have been made by the West, no physical action 
would have been taken.*°^ The loss of morale among the people, 
perhaps inevitable in this situation (where it was accepted that 
the maintenance of Lithuania's independence was outwith the 
control of her democratically elected government), was also to 
negatively affect the restructuring of the economy and 
infrastructure and thus hinder the development of the state and
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her re-integration into the international community and the 
developed world.
In an effort to procure the desired security guarantee, the 
Lithuanian government also approached the Western European Union 
(WEU) to appeal for a European-based option as well as or indeed 
instead of an Atlantic guarantee. Lithuania was finally awarded 
Associate Partner Status on 9 May 1994, along with Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. Vilnius recognised the importance of cultivating good 
relations with the organisation, given the increasing role of the 
WEU within the new European Security architecture.*®® Closer 
relations with the WEU were perceived by Western, Central and 
Eastern European states alike as a method of extending the area 
of security and stability eastward.*®® Consultation and co­
operation with the WEU was also perceived as being a preliminary 
step towards future integration into the EU's remodelled security 
structure.**® Being granted Associate Status of such an 
organisation was perceived in Lithuania as being a major step 
towards that eventual goal. ***
A similar problem as with NATO had to be faced in dealing with 
the WEU, however: there were no published criteria for
membership. The WEU evolved from the Treaty of Brussels, 
concluded in 1950, but all new members were also NATO members 
which, believed Peter Gooderhan, ECO Deputy Head of the Security 
Policy Department, would "most probably" hold true for future 
membership. **^
The WEU did differ from NATO in its dealing with the former 
East Bloc and Soviet states. While NATO did not, in the years 
between 1991-1994, formally differentiate between these states, 
the WEU reflected EU policy and in practise did distinguish 
between various Central and Eastern European states: offering
Associate Partner Status to only nine of the Central and Eastern 
European and former Soviet states was a prime indication of the 
organisation's differing philosophy.
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As an Associate Partner, however, Lithuania was able to start 
making a significant contribution to the remodelling of the 
European security framework. Lithuania participated in the 
drafting of a "White Paper" on European Defence under the aegis 
of the WEU Permanent Council. Lithuania's involvement in this 
process was concrete proof of her determination to re-integrate 
into Europe and to make a real contribution to Europe's security, 
as well as appealing for a guarantee for her own security.**® 
But by the end of 1994 no legally-binding guarantee had been 
obtained and Lithuania did not possess a single formal security 
guarantee. This was of great concern both to the government and 
citizens of the state, as Lithuania was left to all intents and 
purposes defenceless and politically isolated in the face of 
mounting instability in the former USSR.
Failing to acquire a security guarantee from the West, 
Lithuania was forced to attempt to counter the identified threats 
to her security by herself. She required a defence force as both 
of - the post-Soviet governments had vetoed the concept of 
Lithuania adopting neutral status or settling for a strengthened 
police force which would take on the additional responsibilities 
of border guards. At the start of the Soviet Occupation of 
Lithuania in 1940, Lithuania's existing defence forces were 
totally absorbed into the military command structure of the USSR. 
When the Soviet forces withdrew in the years following the 
restitution of independence, they took with them the majority of 
their hardware, leaving Lithuania with virtually no defence 
equipment. Therefore on achieving independence, Lithuania had to 
begin again to recreate a military defensive and offensive force, 
to acquire equipment for this force and to devise a defence 
doctrine according to which these forces would operate.
Lithuania's Ministry of Defence was established in April 1990 
(before international recognition had been achieved) and it was 
this organisation which was ultimately responsible for designing 
and implementing Lithuania's defence policies during the 1991- 
1994 period. It was tasked with establishing a few basic
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organisations which were observed by Western military experts to 
have functioned smoothly and efficiently since their inception. 
Perhaps the most important of these organisations, especially 
during times of peace, was the Council of Defence, which 
provisionally commanded the Lithuanian Armed Forces, which in 
1994 amounted to approximately 5,200 personnel.**^
The Lithuanian Navy in the years which followed the 
restitution of independence was extremely limited both in 
capability and size. It was basically little more than a 
coastguard service with a few additional responsibilities. 
Numbering 3 00 men at the end of 1994, it was equipped with two 
frigates, both of the Russian Grisha-class, each of which could 
carry 40 officers and 40 sailors, as well as four patrol cutters. 
All six vessels were acquired from the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet 
in exchange for housing benefits. All six vessels, however, were 
required to spend the majority of their time in the harbour at 
Klaipeda, because of the operational difficulties caused by a 
lack of spare parts and fuel.
Although the fleet was expanded by the donation from Sweden 
of a coastguard tug and the purchase of several smaller vessels 
of an undisclosed class in 1993, the Lithuanian Navy remained 
woefully inadequate for the tasks expected of it. Her warships 
failed to offer even the most remotely credible deterrent to any 
possible adversary and were a severe burden on the already 
overstretched Lithuanian defence budget. Despite this, both of 
Lithuania's Defence Ministers during the 1991-1994 period. Dr. 
Audrius Butkevicius and Linas Linkevicius, were committed to 
maintaining Lithuania's Navy in their belief that all Western 
states with territorial waters to defend needed a Navy.**®
The Lithuanian Air Force during the years between 19 91-1994 
was also of limited strength and operability. By 1994 it was 
composed of 200 personnel and flew four Czech-built L-39 
trainers, two L-410 Turbolet transporters and 25 Russian AN-2 
light transport aircraft. The L-39s were acquired from Kirgizia
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in 1993 in a barter deal: the Lithuanians traded chickens and 
chicken feed for the aircraft, while the L-410s were a gift from 
Germany. With such few assets, the Lithuanian Air Force was only 
able to provide limited support functions during the 1991-1994 
period. **®
The cream of Lithuania's military forces, never moreso than 
during the challenging post-Soviet years, had always been the 
army. Its backbone was the 4,300-strong**"* Gelezinis Vilkas 
(Iron Wolf) Brigade. This unit was comprised of 7 battalions, 
each of which (in 1994) consisted of three Motorised 
Airtransportable Companies, one Supply Company and one Support 
Company. The troops were equipped with small arms including RPK- 
47 machine guns and AKM-74 assault rifles. The Gelezinis Vilkas 
Brigade had sole charge of operating Lithuania's 10 armoured 
personnel carriers (APCs).
Lithuania's Army was also trained to be used for border 
defence purposes in the years between 1991-1994. The specially 
trained border guards made up the VSAT organisation {Valsybes 
Sienu Apsaugos Tarnyba) and their responsibilities included 
specifically the policing of and attempting to defend the 1,447km 
of border which separated Lithuania from the Kaliningrad Oblast, 
Poland, Latvia and Belarus, as well as the 99km of coastline.
VSAT troops were complemented by members of the SKAT 
organisation {Savanoriska Krasto Apsaugos Tarnyba) which 
represented the territorial defence forces of Lithuania, the bulk 
of the Army. In peacetime SKAT was tasked with preparing 
conscripts for Army service, but in the evenT of war, it was 
believed by Western military experts that its responsibilities 
would be extended and upgraded to include co-ordinating the 
mobilisation of Army divisions as well as territorial 
defence. **®
Lithuania maintained the Soviet tradition of Military Service 
following the restitution of her independence and in 1992 6,000
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conscripts were called up to serve for a two-year period of duty. 
In 1993, however, the number of conscripts called up had to be 
reduced to 2,700 because of financial constraints resulting from 
the limited defence budget. The number of conscripts fell still 
further in 1994.**® Conscription in the years following 
independence, however, was infinitely preferable to conscription 
during the Soviet Occupation, as the majority of Lithuanians 
greatly preferred serving in their own army and not in an army 
which had been to them that of an occupying power. There was also 
the reassurance for the young men that they were not going to be 
sent to the Afghanistan war, which had traditionally been the 
fate of many Lithuanian conscripts during the last decade of the 
Soviet Occupation.*^®
In general, however, the Lithuanian Armed forces between 1991- 
19 94 would most likely have proven ineffective if put to the 
test. There was a lack of both middle-ranking commanders and 
heavy weapons and it was accepted by the Government that 
Lithuania would be unable to defend itself against an assault 
from a serious aggressor. Nonetheless, particularly in the 
Gelezinis Vilkas Brigade, levels of both motivation and training 
were high and it was these elite troops, therefore, which were 
chosen to participate in the tri-national BALTBAT. British 
commanders involved in the training of the BALTBAT troops 
admitted in March 1995 that the Lithuanian Gelezinis Vilkas 
troops were not only the best trained, but also the cleanest and 
best turned-out.*®*
Restructuring the Armed Forces was a monumental task that 
required foreign assistance. But not all of that assistance was 
what could be termed "front line action", that is, assistance in 
active training of groups such as the BALTBAT. Germany, for 
example, was one of the NATO states which provided significant 
aid to Lithuania. Post-war "sensitivities" prevented Germany from 
taking on any role which could be interpreted by Russia as 
displaying expansionist tendencies.*®® Therefore assistance was 
provided in the form of monetary and supply capacities. Former
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East German materiel was donated to Lithuania*®® and financial 
assistance was also provided. But the most crucial assistance 
came in the spheres of language training, communication and staff 
planning. A series of negotiations held between 1991-1994 
culminated in a detailed programme of meetings and training 
sessions held throughout 1995.*®^  This was to enable the 
Lithuanian Armed Forces to begin the necessary process of 
restructuring. By the end of 19 94, however, very little actual 
progress was to be achieved on this front : more was to be
attained in the following years.
While the restructuring of Lithuania's Armed Forces proceeded 
slowly during the 1991-1994 period, there were some major 
achievements and successes. The best example of this was the 
BALTBAT. In 1994 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed 
between the three Baltic States, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
and the UK which promoted the formation of a joint Baltic 
Peacekeeping Battalion, designated BALTBAT. This unit adopted 
western military standards, taught by training teams supplied by 
the UK and Nordic states and was equipped with western materiel. 
Training standards were planned to be sufficient to ensure that 
the BALTBAT could be integrated with the United Nations' Nordic 
Battalions, *®®
By the end of 1994 the BALTBAT comprised a rifle company from 
each of the three Baltic States plus an integrated joint 
headquarters and logistics company. It was being trained by UK 
Royal Marines in the former Soviet camp at Adazi in Latvia. 
Materiel with an estimated value of US$10 million was supplied 
by Germany, the USA and the Nordic states. The members of the 
BALTBAT wore US Army uniforms with their individual national 
insignia. Germany was committed to supplying over two million 
rounds of ammunition from former East German stocks, while Sweden 
provided electronic targets and other support equipment. Danish 
representatives were to chair a steering group that co-ordinated 
the provision of supplies from the committed states.
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The Royal Marines in charge of the common training of the tri­
national brigade found that the legacy of fifty years of Soviet 
military training was challenging to overcome. The basic weapon 
training programme was standardised on the Chinese Type 56 
version of the AK-47M assault rifle and the SA-60 rifle drills 
as practised in the UK were adapted to suit the AK-47. Sgt. Steve 
Goodwin, one of the Royal Marines' instructors at Adazi, 
emphasised their commitment to safety, which had traditionally 
been overlooked by former Soviet military instructors : 
'safety...is something which is obviously not in the Russian 
military culture.'*®® This opinion was confirmed by a Latvian 
officer in the BALTBAT, who described his initial training 
process under the Soviet regime as being one of a large class 
(usually composed of a minimum of 30 recruits) who would merely 
watch a lone instructor demonstrate how to strip and make ready 
a Kalashnikov, yet the recruits themselves were rarely able to 
handle a gun, let alone fire it. Combatting the lack of morale 
displayed by the Baltic troops, again a legacy of 50 years of 
conscription into the Soviet Red Army, also proved to be a 
significant obstacle to western instructors.*®?
The Lithuanian participants in the BALTBAT, however, drawn 
from the elite Gelezinis Vilkas Brigade, were committed to 
learning as much as they could from their western instructors, 
in order to be able, in turn, to pass on that knowledge to the 
rest of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. As an un-named Lieutenant 
said in March 1994 after completing the first period of training
at Adazi, 'we want to be able to go back to our country with new
skills. For us it's a way to guarantee our country's
security.'*®® To continue training according to western
standards, Lithuania sent troops to Denmark, Germany and Sweden 
during 1993-1994.
Latvian trainee troops have been aided during this period of 
reconstruction by the presence in Latvia of Lt-Col Janis 
Kazocins, a British Army Officer of Latvian origin who has been 
on secondment to Latvia since 1992 and has been appointed Deputy
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Chief of Staff of the Latvian Armed Forces. The UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office's "Know How Fund" has also enabled Latvian 
Officers to attend training courses in the UK and other European 
states.*®® The Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian General Staffs 
all aspired to create a joint syllabus on the basis of BALTBAT 
training, which could be used in future years to train future 
regiments of Baltic troops.*®®
After the initial training period at Adazi, specially selected 
recruits were tasked with forming "Commander's Cadres" in each 
of the Baltic States to train troops. Emphasis was placed on the 
teaching of English and safe practices for weapons' handling. The 
Cadres were due to receive further training at Adazi in February 
1996 before leading their Nation's company on a UN Peacekeeping 
tour with one of the Nordic states. But providing the training 
to the initial BALTBAT has not been inexpensive. Latvia had to 
allocate 8 per cent of her entire defence budget to ensure that 
its 33 Officers could participate and Estonia had to use five per 
cent of her defence budget.
Linking the BALTBAT with NATO members was viewed as being an 
important step to potential North Atlantic Alliance membership, 
but involving two non-aligned Nordic States in its military 
affairs ensured that Russia and the other CIS states did not 
perceived the formation of the BALTBAT as a form of premature or 
"back door" NATO membership, which could easily heighten tension 
in the region. Despite the fact that not all of the western 
states engaged in assisting the BALTBAT were NATO members, this 
did not appear to pose problems for the Battalion, as confirmed 
by Lt Col Lars Ranstrom of the Swedish Armed Forces HQ. In an 
interview in March 1994 he stated that although the BALTBAT might 
use NATO standard drills for infantry training. 'The principles 
of UN peacekeeping are common to...all the Nordic countries.'*®*
Initial reports suggested that the BALTBAT has proven to be 
a successful venture, demonstrating both closer Baltic co­
operation and close regional co-operation. Although Estonia's
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Chief of Peacekeeping, Lt Col Mart Tiru, indicated that the 
BALTBAT was the only planned joint unit. It is now highly 
probable that common staff level teaching and procurement are 
being considered by the three states. BALTBAT's contribution to 
the three states' real security, however, remains questionable. 
Recognised skills in the field of peacekeeping would prove to be 
of little use in the face of serious aggression towards any of 
the Baltic States,*®®
Lithuanian troops in the years between 1991-1994 were also 
involved in UN Peacekeeping operations apart from those 
undertaken as part of the BALTBAT's commitments. They were 
involved in one of the most extensive and delicate peacekeeping 
operations in the history of the UN: UNPROFOR.*®® 33 Lithuanian 
troops saw active service in Croatia, where they were praised for 
their actions by both UNPROFOR commanders and civilians alike. 
In Croatia, where the Lithuanian troops were most active, it was 
the sensitivity of the Lithuanians to the problems of the 
civilians which was most appreciated, as this mindset had been 
found to be lacking in other national peacekeeping forces.*®"*
Until the problem posed by a lack of equipment and manpower 
could be resolved, however, Lithuania's forces were able to 
participate only in a limited number of operations. Nonetheless, 
what they were able to achieve was remarkable, given their 
limited capabilities and the hurdles which they had to overcome.
By 1994 therefore, Lithuania had only minimal success in the 
field of restructuring her defence and guaranteeing her security. 
The crucial objective of attaining a real and concrete security 
guarantee had not been achieved and this was the most serious 
obstacle facing Lithuania as the situation to her East grew 
increasingly unpredictable. Nonetheless an element of re­
integration into the international community had been achieved 
with admission into the NACC and the acquisition of Associate 
Partner Status in the WEU. But by the end of 1994, Lithuania was 
not alone in this predicament. None of the former East Bloc or
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Soviet states had achieved admission into the WEU or NATO, none 
of these states had the security guarantees that were desired to 
protect them from the effects of instability in Russia and none 
of them were any closer than Lithuania to achieving such 
guarantees.
Western states, while supporting the transition to democracy 
under way in the region were not prepared to antagonise their 
former enemy, Russia, and were still uncertain of the future 
these states might have. The return to power of former 
Communists, as in Lithuania, Belarus and Hungary, was cause for 
concern, even though commitments to maintaining democracy were 
pledged by many of the re-elected former Communists. As Ojars 
Skudra stated, 'the West wants the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe to speak with one voice...NATO can not provide a security 
guarantee while the Viseghrad states try to differentiate 
themselves from their neighbours, but at the same time return 
Communist governments. There is no alternative security guarantee 
to NATO that would be as effective, but NATO can not give it to 
them. '
While failing in their principal objective, however, the 
Lithuanians did make some progress in the restructuring of their 
military forces and achieved some success in this sphere. Their 
participation in the BALTBAT and in peacekeeping operations is 
commendable and boded well for future collaboration. Western 
assistance in this achievement was vital and at the same time 
highly effective both in the fields of training and planning. The 
legacy of homo sovieticus, however, in particular the reluctance 
to use initiative or shoulder responsibility, was a hurdle which 
required serious attention. Lithuania's military forces had to 
be retrained in many areas, ranging from basic safety drills to 
logistics i n s t r u c t i o n . H e r  negotiators also had to learn 
western practices when applying for entry into international 
organisations. But these were obstacles which were common to the 
whole region and not Lithuania-specific.
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In comparison with the other states in the region, Lithuania 
was in a relatively stable position. There were no serious 
minority issues and the limited internal threat of potential 
terrorism at Ignalina had been contained. Kaliningrad was still 
a grievance and a concern and the obvious threats from Belarus 
and Russia could not be overlooked. Despite her best efforts, 
however, the maintenance of Lithuania's security and defence was 
in the hands of forces beyond her control. In accepting that the 
vital security guarantee from NATO would not be forthcoming in 
the immediate future, the Lithuanians were required to adopt a 
somewhat fatalistic attitude towards their future and concentrate 
on reconstructing their state while pretending to ignore the 
growing uncertainties in the East. Unfortunately, potential 
western investors in Lithuania or, indeed, in any states in the 
region, were not able to overlook this threat so easily and thus 
Lithuania's rebirth and regeneration in all spheres in the years 
between 1991-1994 were adversely affected, again not entirely 
through the deliberate fault of Lithuania's Governments or her 
people.
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CHAPTER VI
LITHUANIA'S ECONOMY 1991-1994
"One step forward, two steps back.
The rebirth of the Lithuanian state during the period 19 91- 
19 94 was reliant on the reconstruction of the national economy. 
In 1991 it was a decaying relic of a Soviet central planning 
system that 'bore little resemblance to economic reality'^ and 
had brought little or no benefit to Lithuania during the course 
of the 50 years of occupation. Both in Lithuania and outwith the 
state, it was clearly understood that re-integration into the 
international community was conditional on the Lithuanian 
Government, regardless of its leader, launching the state along 
the path to a market economy. This was necessary to ensure that 
the international community truly believed that Lithuania was 
intent on remaining an independent state and not like Chechnya, 
for example, which was only nominally independent from Russia or, 
as in the case of Belarus, aiming to maintain close economic and 
political ties with Russia. But it was only when Lithuania's 
independence was finally unilaterally recognised by the 
international community, following the abortive anti-Gorbachev 
coup in Moscow in August 1991, that the foreign economic 
assistance so desperately required by Lithuania began to 
materialise.
In March 1990, the Government of the USSR believed that the 
imposition of an economic blockade on Lithuania would lead to the 
collapse of the newly established Lithuanian Government and a 
renunciation of all claims to independence. Gorbachev's 
Government, however, had erred in its judgement. In March 1990, 
98 per cent of all industrial enterprises in Lithuania were 
state-owned and managed and the Soviet Government believed that 
a blockade would lead to the breakdown of Lithuanian industry, 
transport and other services in less than a fortnight.^ The 
blockade, however, was only to be truly effective for 8 weeks and
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it was during this time that many companies in Lithuania were 
privatised* as during the period of the blockade Lithuania's 
minute private sector excelled itself, fuelled by the popular 
enthusiasm generated by the nominal restitution of independence. 
The brevity of the blockade coupled with the season of its 
imposition {Spring being easier to survive with shortages than 
Winter) meant that the country continued to function. It has, in 
fact, been argued that had the blockade been imposed for a longer 
period of time, the foundations of Lithuania's private sector 
would have been more firmly entrenched and better able to 
withstand the economic difficulties that were inevitable during 
the period of transition which ensued.^
On the achievement of full independence in 1991, the 
Landsbergis Government had to attempt to define Lithuania's 
economic policy in an attempt to fully re-integrate into the 
international community. The Government held three main ambitions 
in 1991 which were to influence heavily the creation of its 
economic policy: the re-introduction of Lithuania's inter-war
currency, the Litas (Lt)/ the transformation of Lithuania's 
economic system from a Soviet, centralised economy to a western- 
style market economy and the subsequent attainment of a western- 
level standard of living. This idealistic and over-ambitious 
policy summarised the attitude of the Landsbergis administration, 
which contributed to its eventual defeat at the hands of the 
Lithuanian electorate in 1992.
The Litas was one of the most tangible reminders of Lithuanian 
independence prior to the Soviet occupation of 1940 and its re- 
introduction was to be an emotional and symbolic issue, as well 
as a practical economic move. The re-introduction of the Litas, 
however, was not to occur overnight to the regret of many 
Lithuanians.G Until 31 July 1991, the legal currency of 
Lithuania remained the Soviet-issued Ruble, although the most 
widely-circulated currency on the black market was the US Dollar 
(US$), followed by the Pound Sterling (GB£), the German 
Deutschmark (DM) and "Marlboro" cigarettes. The Ruble was highly
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unpopular throughout Lithuania, because not only was it a visible 
reminder of the years of Soviet occupation which had contributed, 
amongst other things, to Lithuania's economic decline from 1940, 
but because it had an extremely limited value as it was not 
convertible in Western "hard" currency exchanges. Although 
relatively worthless by international standards, in 1991 the 
Rouble had accounted for some 43 per cent of Lithuania's gross 
national product (GNP),''
The Litas was first introduced in Lithuania on 1 October 1922. 
In the four years of independence which had preceded this action, 
Lithuania's currency had been composed of a variety of different 
notes: German Ostmarks or Ostrubles, Avalov-Bermondt-marks,
Kerenski-notes, Latvian rubles and even Bolshevik "revolutionary 
money". In the prelude to the introduction of the Litas, 
Lithuanian economists were divided over what value to accord the 
new currency in relation to the international market and 
international exchange rates. The "Patriots" wanted to fix the 
value of the Litas as being US$1:Lt5. The opposing faction, the 
"Realists", however, argued that this proposed rate of exchange 
was too high for a war-devastated, newly-independent state. Their 
arguments prevailed and in 1922 the exchange rate was formally 
established as being US$l:LtlO.® One Litas was composed of 100 
centas and contained 0.150462 grams of pure gold.^ the first 
Litas notes were printed in Berlin and later in Czechoslovakia 
and in the United Kingdom by De La Rue. The American Banknote 
Corporation assumed the bill-printing tender offered by the 
Lithuanian Government in 1924.
In 1991 the American Banknote Corporation again received a 
contract from the Government of Lithuania to reprint the new 
Litas. But delays in the re-issuing of the currency were to 
occur, mostly because of the continued existence in circulation 
of so many Rubles. As a result of this, the Ministry of 
Economics, responsible for relaunching Lithuania's new currency, 
decided that with the re-introduction of the Litas, a significant 
amount of Rubles would have to be taken out of circulation. To
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resolve the problem of interstate payments with Russia and other 
former Soviet republics, the Lithuanian Government decided to 
establish a transitional currency, the Talonas, which came into 
circulation on 1 August 1991. The publicly-announced temporary 
nature of the new currency, however, was to restrict its 
usefulness, as the majority of Lithuanian people distrusted it, 
referring to it as "Animal Money", in reference to the designs 
of indigenous Lithuanian animals and birds printed on the back 
of each note .
Finally, on 25 June 1993, three years after the restitution 
of Lithuania's independence and two years after that independence 
had received unconditional international acknowledgement, the 
Litas was formally re-introduced after a period of 53 years. The 
exchange rates were set at US$1:Lt4, GB£l:Lt6 and DMl:Lt2,3. 
Lithuanians with memories of the inter-war years recalled that 
the Litas had been a stable and reliable currency and its re- 
introduction brought with it memories of relative political 
stability and social and economic well-being.^*- The reasonable 
rates of exchange with western currencies, especially when 
compared with the Russian Ruble or even the Italian Lira, 
reflected the faith which the international markets placed in 
Lithuania's stability and prospects. By 1994, however, it was 
felt that perhaps this faith had been misjudged, as the economy 
was not performing as well as had been predicted, with industry 
working only at half capacity throughout most of the year. 
Suggestions were raised in the Seimas about decreasing the value 
of the Litas in relation to western currencies, but there was 
great reluctance to do so on the part of the Government, for fear 
that this would signify to the international community that 
Lithuania's post-Soviet economic policies had proven to be 
unsuccessful, which would discourage foreign investment in
Lithuania.*2
According to the Director of Macro-Economics in the Economics 
Ministry, Dr. Gediminas Miskinis, several fundamental mistakes 
were made regarding the handling of the re-introduction of the
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Litas. Most obviously, the time factor. The Latvian currency, 
the Lat, was re-introduced in 1992, a year before the Litas, 
although Latvia had only been universally recognised as an 
independent state for the same length of time as Lithuania. 
Lithuania needed a fully convertible currency to encourage 
foreign investment in any significant amount as well as for the 
boosting of popular morale. Delays in the re-introduction of the 
Litas allowed Lithuania's economic difficulties (difficulties 
inevitable in the rebirth of any state coupled with those arising 
as a result of the need to radically alter the economic structure 
of the whole country) to accumulate.
Dr. Miskinis also argued that the Government should have 
allowed the Bank of Lithuania to have sole responsibility for the 
establishment of Lithuania's monetary policy. The official 
exchange rate was originally established by the Bank of Lithuania 
working in conjunction with the Government, but the Government 
found itself in the unenviable position of having to borrow a 
considerable amount of money from the Bank to finance its 
policies between 1991-1994 and was therefore considered to be an 
unequal partner for such an important relationship.
A further crucial mistake was made by the Government and the 
Bank of Lithuania in the fixing of the international exchange 
rates for the Litas in 1994. The decision was taken on the 1994 
rate on 1 April of that year. This proved to be a rudimentary 
mis judgment of timing as it was the day on which value added tax 
(VAT) was added on to all prices for the first time, causing both 
unavoidable price rises and an increase in inflation.
Perhaps the most serious misjudgment, however, which was not 
recognised by the Lithuanian Ministry of Economics, was made in 
determining to which state's currency the Litas should be pegged. 
To properly establish a new currency on the international market, 
it needs to be pegged to a state with similar levels of inflation 
and/or with a similar pattern of economic growth. By choosing to 
peg the Litas with the US$, the Lithuanian government failed to
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comply with either of these guides. On 1 April 19 94, for example, 
Lithuania's inflation was a miraculously low 1.6 per cent, but 
that of the USA was merely 0.4 per cent. Similar problems were 
also encountered by Estonia, which pegged its Krown to the 
Deutschmark despite having serious problems with inflation: in 
one month in 1994, Estonian inflation was greater than that in 
Russia.
One must wonder, therefore, why both the Lithuanian Government 
and the Bank of Lithuania were so insistent on pegging the Litas 
to the US$. This is most probably an inheritance from the first 
period of independence in the C2 0th. Throughout Lithuania, 
especially among the older generations who remembered 
independence, there existed a widespread desire to return to the 
inter-war years and eradicate as many memories as possible of the 
period of Soviet Occupation. Many people believed that this could 
be achieved by restoring the mechanisms of Government to the way 
they were in 193 9. Restoring an independent, convertible 
Lithuanian currency and pegging it once again to the US$ was seen 
as being one of the most graphic ways of illustrating this, even 
though the differences between Lithuania and the USA were far 
greater in 1994 than they had been in 1918. The USA in 1994 was 
the last remaining truly global superpower, whilst Lithuania was 
struggling to heal herself from the damage caused by the Soviet 
occupation and was floundering in the lowest ranks of a table of 
Eastern European Competitiveness created by Ernst and Young and 
World Link. The results of this survey indicated that Lithuania 
was in the third division of Central and Eastern European states : 
on a scale of 1-5 (5 being the highest possible score) Lithuania 
scored no higher than a 3 and more frequently only a 2 on 
assessments of economic prospects and stability.**
Although the main aim of the Landsbergis Government, and 
indeed that of a significant number of the Lithuanian population 
in 1991, the re-introduction of the Litas, had been achieved by 
1994*^ , this alone was not sufficient to surmount all of the 
economic challenges posed by the need for a transition to a
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market economy. Whilst there was a great deal of popular 
contentment at the eventual restoration of the Litas, inflation, 
inevitable in the period of great transition dominating the years 
between 1991-1994, created a new era of hardship and led to the 
spawning of new divisions within society which were to accentuate 
both the successes and the failures of Lithuania's economic 
evolution in the three years following international recognition.
The transition to a market economy, which influenced the 
direction of Government policy for these crucial years was not, 
of course, solely about the réintroduction of an independent 
currency. It was to cover the rebirth of the banking network, 
which had been relatively widespread in Lithuania before 1940, 
the complex process of privatisation and the attraction and 
subsequent use of foreign investment.
The reconstruction of Lithuania's banking network was vital 
for the adaptation to a market economy. All banks in Lithuania 
during the period 1991-1994 were established in accordance with 
legislation contained in the 1991 Laws on the Bank of Lithuania, 
Commercial (Joint-Stock) Banks and Joint Stock Companies.*^ 
Licenses necessary for the (re-)establishment of a bank were 
available from the Bank of Lithuania and then, conforming to 
directives laid down in the 1991 Commercial (Joint-Stock) Bank 
Law, a bank could then be established in either an "open" way, 
with the bank's founders acquiring part of the nominal capital 
specified in the statutes, with the remainder being acquired by 
the offering of shares available for public purchase, or in a 
"closed" way, with all of the shares in the Bank being held by 
the bank's founders or distributed by these founders to a 
specific market rather than in a public sale.*"*
The 1991 legislation enabled both individuals and legal 
entitities to establish a bank on Lithuanian territory. Several 
requirements were contained in this legislation, however, which 
had to be fulfilled in order to do so. The most important was the 
need for the individual founder or legal entity to be a citizen
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of Lithuania or registered therein. There had to be a minimum of 
10 individual founders per bank, unless it was to be a joint 
venture, in which case the minimum number of founders could be 
reduced to two, as long as one of them was a credit union. LtlO 
million was the minimum amount of capital required in order to 
register a bank, but from 1 July 1995, this value was to increase 
to Lt20 million.
The 1991 legislation enabled foreign banks to establish 
branches in Lithuania by allowing their registration as a 
foreign-capital enterprise. It was necessary to obtain a special 
license from the Bank of Lithuania which could only be issued 
three months after the date when the Bank of Lithuania received 
all of the documents relevant to the establishment of the branch. 
This was a particularly carefully-worded clause, because 
"documents relevant" was open to a variety of possible 
interpretations depending on the relationship between the Bank 
and the foreign credit union hoping to establish a branch in 
Lithuania.
ECU 5 million was the minimum capital necessary for 
registration as an individual branch of a foreign credit union, 
but its development (following the successful acquisition of a 
license which could be held for an indefinite period) could only 
proceed after the payment of a registration fee of US$10,000 or 
its equivalent in another convertible foreign currency. The Bank 
of Lithuania did, however, retain an element of control over the 
foreign credit union: the right to curtail or terminate its
activities if an office were not opened within six months of 
license acquisition; if the founding bank were liquidated or if 
any Lithuanian laws were broken. Indigenous Lithuanian banks, 
however, had to conform to equally specific requirements 
regarding monetary reserves; minimum nominal capital and its 
ratio to the bank's assets; liquidity; individual loans; 
deduction of profits to capital reserves and foreign currency 
risk limits. Failure to adhere to these requirements could result 
in the closure of the bank.
255
By 1994 most Lithuanian banks were offering services 
comparable to their western counterparts, such as the provision 
of current and deposit accounts; loans; limited foreign currency 
transactions; the purchase and selling of some precious metals 
and the leasing of safety deposit boxes. Unlike in many western 
states, for example, the UK, interest paid on deposits at a fixed 
rate agreed between the bank and the individual customer was not 
to be taxable.
The concept of individual loans was one which had been 
prohibited under the Soviet regime and was to prove most 
attractive to the average Lithuanian citizen. They were made 
available, usually on short-term periods of between three and six 
months but had extremely high interest rates. In 1993 the lowest 
interest rate on a loan was 71.4 per cent in August, but the 
highest rate had been reached in June, a staggering 13 0.7 per 
cent.*® Before the authorization of a loan, a number of 
guarantees were required: mortgage documents on any real-estate 
(or given that during this period the majority of Lithuanians 
still lived in state-owned accommodation, mortgage documents on 
a car or other significant consumer good would suffice.) With the 
mortgage document, a letter of guarantee from a third party, 
enterprise or bank and the adoption of a loan insurance policy 
were also necessary. For business purposes, not only did the 
above criteria have to be met, but a customer had to produce a 
detailed business plan, a statement of cash flows and tax returns 
as well as identity papers and a written guarantee of the ability 
to repay the loan.
By the end of 1994 the largest number of banks were located 
in the Capital, Vilnius. Their apparent success was indicated by 
the fact that many banks occupied substantial refurbished 
premises in the centre of the capital. In Lithuania's other major 
economic centres, however: Kaunas, Klaipeda and Siauliai,
independent regional banks provided a significant service to much 
of the Lithuanian population. In March 1994, Ükio Mankas in 
Kaunas and Vakaru Bankas in Klaipeda ranked, according to the
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amount of authorised capital stock assets, in the top 10 banks 
of Lithuania.
Between 1991-1994, some foreign credit lines were established 
by several Lithuanian banks with foreign institutions. The 
Commercial Vilnius Bank used two types of credit lines: short­
term credits guaranteed by US and German banks and direct 
credits, which were not accompanied by a guarantee, from German, 
Swedish, Danish, French and Italian banks. During 1994, the 
Lithuanian Joint-Stock Innovation Bank, the first bank in 
Lithuania to operate on commercial grounds following the 
restitution of independence and to be oriented towards long-term 
financing since its registration in 1988, drafted general 
agreements of a similar nature with Swiss and German banks and 
with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
The Lithuanian banking network could not, however, totally 
reorient itself towards Europe and the USA. Out of necessity, 
during the 1991-1994 period, close banking ties had to be 
maintained with the Russian Federation and other members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) , given the continued 
economic relations maintained between Lithuania and this 
region.
As a result of the slow development of securities, capital and 
insurance markets, by the end of 1994 banks were considered to 
be the most significant sector of the money market in 
Lithuania.2° in 1993, 29 banks had generated 10 per cent of
Lithuania's GNP.^* 1992 should be seen as the turning point for 
Lithuania's ever-increasing banking network. This was partly a 
result of the economic boom which occurred following 
international recognition of Lithuania after August 1991.
During the period 1992-1993, joint-stock commercial banks 
increased their share in the banking capital market: in 1993 the 
base capital of this group increased 7.7 times, their network of 
branches and bureaux by five times and their assets by 2.6 times.
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The state banks, however, maintained their dominance of the 
market, holding 61 per cent of banking capital, 63 per cent of 
loans and 65 per cent of fixed deposit markets.
During 1993, however, the initial security of the banking 
network in Lithuania was to be destabilised as a result of the 
waging of a dispute regarding the dominance of the fixed-term 
deposit market. Officially functioning banks were challenged by 
firms engaged in illegal credit-deposit activities. For a 
considerable period of time, registered banks attempted to 
compete with their opposition by offering higher interest rates 
to attract customers (the non-registered banks offered two to 
three times higher interest), but until the collapse of a number 
of these illegal operations following bankruptcies and a series 
of financial scandals, the officially recognised banks were 
unable to develop as effectively as had been expected following 
their first few years' performances.
With the fall of inflation by the end of 1993^ *, however, 
Lithuania's official banks were able to strengthen their position 
on the deposit market. During the course of 1994, increasing 
numbers of banks were able to offer the highly-desirable western- 
style conditions, which brought with them an air of confidence 
in the Lithuanian banking system, although despite the clampdown 
of 1993 there were still a significant number of charlatan 
institutions offering exceptional interest rates for fixed-term 
deposits and all too often disappearing without a trace 
overnight^. Nonetheless, despite relatively low interest rates, 
the deposits held in registered Lithuania banks remained, by 
December 1994, the most effective mechanism for the investment 
of free funds.
The re-establishment of Lithuania's banking network between 
1991-1994 was a relative success, despite the growth of illegal 
money-lending institutions. Lithuania's success was rewarded in 
December 1993, when 7 Lithuanian banks became members of the 
international fund-transferring mechanism, SWIFT. The rise in the
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number of illicit operations, however, was merely a symptom of 
the general trend in the Lithuanian economy during this period; 
when freed from the confines of Soviet society, criminal 
organisations began to flourish throughout Lithuania, with the 
intention of extracting the greatest profit from wherever 
possible^®. The newly developing economy was to become a prime 
target.
Although the re-establishment of the banking network in 
Lithuania was to be relatively smooth during the 1991-1994 
period, privatisation was to be less so. This may be explained 
by the fact that it was a far more complicated process, with far 
more individual concerns at stake. Between 1991-1994 
privatisation in Lithuania, as directed by the Ministry of 
Economics, was carried out in accordance with the 1990-1991 Law 
on Initial Privatisation of State Property of the Republic of 
Lithuania, the Law on Privatisation of Agricultural Enterprises 
of the Republic of Lithuania, the Law on Privatising the Housing 
Space of Republic of Lithuania, the Law on Conditions and 
Procedure of the Restitution of the Ownership Rights to Residents 
to the Existing Real Estate and the Law on Land Reform.^®
With the passing of the Law on the Initial Privatisation of 
State Property in 1991, two-thirds of the value of the total 
amount of State property (excluding the actual land) were 
earmarked for privatisation. In September 1991, 200 small
enterprises were privatised, 50 per cent at auction and 50 per 
cent by shares. A system of privatisation by voucher scheme was 
launched which entitled holders to bid for either ownership or 
shares in an enterprise with only five per cent needing to be 
paid in c as h .T h e  Initial Privatisation Law concentrated on 
Lithuania's manufacturing industry (factories and other 
industrial plants) and hotel privatisation. Agriculture, 
forestry, some communication enterprises and housing were omitted 
from the original Law because of the difficulties which had to 
be faced regarding former ownership predating the Soviet 
Occupation. Priority was given to small-scale privatisation.
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although some medium and large-scale enterprises were dealt with 
at the same time as a method of encouraging the creation and 
development of the private sector in as many economic spheres as 
possible throughout Lithuania.
A significant challenge to privatisation, however, was posed 
by the total lack of understanding of its concept and mechanisms 
on the part of a substantial number of Lithuanians, especially 
the workers who had the most to lose from the down-sizing and 
streamlining of factories which was an inevitable accompaniment 
to privatisation. Education via the media was launched by the 
Lithuanian Information Institute in 1991 in an attempt to 
overcome this fundamental lack of knowledge and despite this 
difficulty. Spokeswoman for the Lithuanian Information Institute, 
Kazimiera Janulaitiene, confirmed that there had been a 
"remarkable" amount of privatisation legislation passed during 
1991. She accepted, however, that the 'ratification [of these new 
laws] was easy compared with actual enforcement.'^®
Four prime areas were highlighted as being areas where the 
difficulties of privatisation could be eased. Firstly in the 
training of Lithuania's lawyers, economists and business 
professionals able to understand the new legislation and its 
consequences. Sweden offered assistance in training, while 
scholarship schemes for Lithuanians to study abroad were 
negotiated with other European states and with the USA and 
Canada. Secondly, priority was to be given to the improvement and 
expansion of existing laws on foreign investment and trade to 
encourage the much-needed foreign assistance. Improvement was 
also desired for the laws on bankruptcy, monopolies, the 
structure of capital markets and the registration and transfer 
of securities. Finally, a consumer protection law had to be 
drafted.
The above issues were designed to ease the transition' from the 
centralised state economy to the western market economy, but, as 
realised by staff at the Lithuanian Ministry of Economics,
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outlining these priorities was far easier than actually 
implementing their suggestions^. The greatest opponent to 
change proved not to be any political group, but rather it was 
the Lithuanian psyche, the mentality of homo sovieticus, which 
had been grafted on to that of homo lituanicus after 50 years of 
Soviet occupation. Perhaps the most damaging inheritance left to 
Lithuania by the Soviet Union, not counting the obvious results 
of the population dispersal and/or pogrom of the 194 0s, was the 
transformation of the entrepreneurial and conscientious 
Lithuanian into the sheep-like and idle person unwilling to 
labour for his or her own good or the good of others. This innate 
selfishness and unwillingness to take a risk which might prove 
to be either a great success or tremendous mistake is seemingly 
the result of living in an atmosphere of terror and repression 
inherent in a totalitarian state.
The desire to comply with the regime in order to survive was 
a sentiment held by many Lithuanians throughout the occupation. 
This attitude has been held throughout the course of history, a 
typical example being in the Netherlands during the period of 
Nazi Occupation during World War II, but whereas the Dutch only 
had to endure five years of occupation during World War II and 
were therefore able to return to " normal" quite soon after 
liberation,®* after 50 years of Soviet Occupation it was 
inevitable that there would be longer-lasting consequences of the 
forced acquiescence to the occupying regime.
With privatisation solely by Lithuanians therefore hindered 
by the presence of this psychological ghost, it was necessary and 
indeed encouraged by the Landsbergis and Brazauskas governments, 
for enterprises requiring privatisation to appeal for foreign 
investment. In 1991 the attraction of the hard currency that 
would accompany such investment was an added bonus. The Ministry 
of Economics drew up a list of enterprises that would be 
available for hard currency-privatisation only. These included 
those enterprises relating to the manufacture of food products 
and beverages, textiles, clothing and footwear, rubber and
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plastic products, bricks and concrete products, metal products 
and general hardware, computing machinery and electrical 
appliances including televisions and radios. Printing activities, 
wholesale trade, hotels and restaurants, cinemas, textile dyeing, 
clothing repair plants, film developers, hairdressers and funeral 
parlours were also available for hard currency.®®
Joint ventures with foreign partners, foreign capital re­
investment into Lithuania's national economy and the utilisation 
of foreign capital credits were targeted in 1991 as being one of 
the most effective methods of attracting foreign investment to 
Lithuania. Landsbergis and his Government realised the importance 
of political stability in attracting foreign investment, though 
in a time of such dramatic economic transition, it was accepted 
that this would be quite difficult to achieve and maintain. As 
a preliminary move, the Government of Lithuania highlighted 
specific areas where foreign capital would be most welcomed. The 
environment, energy, transport and communications sectors were 
all earmarked as areas where foreign investment, either by 
outright acquisition or in the form of a joint venture, would be 
appreciated. Tourism, manufacturing, textiles and the food- 
processing industry were also highlighted. By 1994, however, 
priorities had shifted slightly. the Brazauskas Government 
recognised the need for "significant capital injections" of hard 
currency in a number of Lithuania's enterprises to ease what had 
turned into a "critical financial state."®®
The Brazauskas Government firmly believed in 19 94 that the 
most profitable investments, both for Lithuania and the party 
making the investment, could be made in industries with an access 
to local raw materials or in industries which had a long-term 
tradition of manufacturing, especially in light industry, the 
food and food-processing industries, in building materials and 
timber-related products, as well as in the chemical, petro­
chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Investment in machine 
building, especially tractors and equipment for forestry needs, 
and in the production of metal-working equipment were also
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considered priorities by 1994. To ease the critical situation in 
Lithuania's agricultural sector "significant capital 
injections"®* were required for the purchase of seeds, 
fertilisers, necessary pesticides and fodder.
These were more basic industries than had been indicated by 
Landsbergis in 1991, who optimistically wanted great emphasis 
placed on investment in the communications and tourist sectors. 
Some progress had been made in the communications sector, most 
notably the establishment of Lithuanian Air Lines®®, while 
tourism, although increasing, was perceived as being of secondary 
importance to the reconstruction of the more essential secondary 
industries needed to regenerate Lithuania's economy. It was only 
following the election of Brazauskas in 1992 that foreign 
advisers and consultants were really able to start working on 
assisting foreign investment truly effectively in Lithuania,as 
the more idealistic Landsbergis had been prepared to neglect 
these offers of advice and assistance and thus ignored some of 
the most pressing issues which needed to be faced in the early 
years of Lithuania's rebirth.
By 11 January 1994, in the second year of Brazauskas' 
Government, 55,000 private firms, along with 19,00 0 shareholding 
companies, had been privatised in Lithuania. Of these, 2,900 were 
joint ventures and 600 were wholly foreign-owned, setting the 
precedent for further foreign investment in Lithuania.®® Both 
the Landsbergis and Brazauskas Governments were committed to the 
attraction of foreign capital and investments for Lithuania. 
Therefore special incentives were developed to attract an even 
greater foreign presence. Joint ventures and foreign capital 
enterprises in Lithuania were awarded tax deductions and the 
repatriation of dividends and profits amassed by foreign owners 
were tax-exempt. The Law on Foreign Investment in Lithuania was 
drafted with the specific purpose of encouraging future 
investment : one of its most important clauses was the right for 
a venture or foreign capital enterprise to lease land for a 99- 
year period, along with a priority right to extend the term of
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the lease after its expiration.^
As a further attempt to attract foreign investment and 
increase Lithuania's reserves of western "hard" currency, a 
special privatisation process of enterprises for "hard" currency 
only was started in August 1992. It was co-ordinated by the 
Division of State Property Management Methodology within the 
Ministry of Economics Department of Privatisation. There were no 
financial quotas imposed on either foreign investors or 
Lithuanian nationals paying in "hard" currency, unlike those 
paying in Talonai or Litu. Foreign investors willing to acquire 
companies using "hard" currency were given an extra incentive by 
the passing of the Law on Foreign Investments, which stated that 
no additional permits would be required for future investment in 
Lithuania,
Arrangements for payment were made with Vytis Bankas in 
Lithuania, the Park Avenue branch of Citibank in New York City 
for US$ investment and with the Eschborn branch of Deutschebank 
in Germany for transactions made in DM.^ ® In an attempt to 
simplify the hard currency privatisation process, the Ministry 
of Economics compiled a list of the entities available for hard 
currency privatisation. Its aim was to ease the regulation and 
monitoring of the companies as well as to ease the process of 
calculating main economic indicators.^
Privatisation of state property for "hard" currency occurred 
through state auctions and by the submission of written tenders. 
In order to bid for an enterprise, a registration fee of US$50 
was required, as well as an initial contribution amounting to 10 
per cent of the original sale price, also paid in US$. 
Registration for such an auction had to occur at least 24 hours 
before the date and at registration documents, including 
identification, a bank credit notes well as other bank details 
required presentation. The successful purchase of an enterprise 
in Lithuania was bound to complete the payment for it within a 
five-year period. Interest rates on the purchase ranged from five
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per cent after the first three years to 7 per cent on the fifth 
year. The property transfer was to be certified by an official 
contract at the time, followed within five days by the official 
certificate of ownership rights issued by the Privatisation 
Commission. By January 1994, 28 specifically-earmarked "hard"
currency only enterprises had been sold at auction for a total 
price of US$4 million.
Privatisation by written tender, however, was to follow a 
different procedure. The reports of the Central Privatisation 
Commission regarding the privatisation of individual enterprises 
were published in the Privatisation Information Bulletin^ in 
both Lithuanian and English, which during the 1991-1994 period 
was gradually being accepted as being the language of 
international commerce. This bulletin was also to appear in 
Lithuania's national newspapers and in the international 
financial press. Written applications to tender had to be 
submitted to the Ministry of Economics Privatisation Department 
and had to enclose a non-refundable cheque for US$250 payable to 
the Ministry of Economics if in Lithuania or to the Finance 
Ministry if payment was to be made outside Lithuania.
When competing offers for tender were submitted, all of the 
proposals were sent from the Central Privatisation Commission to 
the specially established Tender Commission. The Tender 
Commission was granted 15 days to examine the proposals before 
submitting its analysis of all of them back to the Central 
Privatisation Commission. It was the Central Privatisation 
Commission, however, which on the basis of these judgements had 
the direct responsibility for selecting the victorious offer.
The most widely-publicised sale of a private enterprise by 
tender was the Klaipeda Tobacco Company, sold to the 
international tobacco magnate Philip Morris in May 1993. The 
acquisition of a 65 per cent share of the Klaipeda Tobacco 
Company was the first successful privatisation of this kind 
anywhere in the former USSR/"
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Philip Morris' acquisition of the Klaipeda Tobacco Company was 
a ground-breaking step for large-scale foreign investment in 
Lithuania. The relative ease with which the move was accomplished 
gave confidence to other large-scale investors. Largely on the 
strength of the success of the Philip Morris deal, Kraft Jacob 
Suchard invested heavily in Kaunas Confectionary, marking the 
start of large-scale foreign investment by companies such as the 
Swedish-Swiss conglomerate Asea Brown Bovary (ABB).
What was revealed in both the Philip Morris acquisition of 
Klaipeda Tobacco Company and Kraft Jacob Suchard's takeover of 
Kaunas Confectionary was the need for western advisers to assist 
in the Government in dealing with the complex mechanism of 
privatisation and foreign investment. Between 1991-1994, a number 
of western consultancies began to take an active interest in 
Lithuania and in the transformation of its economy. Assistance 
was to come from private companies and international 
organisations. These included Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, 
KPMG Peat Marwick, McKenna & Co., Courtaulds and Rothschild & 
Sons. Most active were EU organisations, especially the PHARE 
Programme and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
and the US Government Agency for International Development (AID) 
office. Examples of the work undertaken by the international 
consultancy firms were most clearly reflected in the takeover of 
Klaipeda Tobacco Company. Rothschilds, however, worked more 
closely with the Lithuanian Finance Ministry, advising the new 
Central Bank of Lithuania how to deal with the gold reserves 
which dated back to before the Soviet Occupation and had been 
held by the Bank of England until its restoration to Lithuania 
in 1992."
The EBRD was only active in Lithuania from 1993. As well as 
working with other companies and agencies by sponsoring 
development programmes, it provided individual assistance to the 
Lithuanian Government. On 4 November 1993, it was publicly 
announced that the EBRD and the Lithuanian government were to
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jointly establish an investment bank in Lithuania. The EBRD was 
to hold 3 5 per cent of the shares and the Government the 
remaining 65 per cent. The new bank's fixed assets reportedly 
totalled ECU5 million, with the principal source of the credit 
resources being the North Investment Bank (NIB). According to the 
then Vice President of NIB, Ulf Hindstrom, its goal was to grant 
long-term credits to the quickly increasing private sector of the 
Lithuanian economy. The World Bank provided a similar service to 
the Lithuanian Government during the same period: in 1992 a US$60 
million credit was granted to the Government."
Relations with the IMF, which were of great importance to the 
Lithuanian Government, were fairly precarious during the 19 91- 
1994 period. The agency and the Government tended to clash over 
economic requirements, which created an air of crisis during many 
of their dealings. In 1992 the IMF and the Government of 
Lithuania had collaborated in the drafting of a memorandum which 
covered the necessary changes that would have to be made to the 
structure of Lithuania's economy. The memorandum stressed the 
need for tight monetary control to seed up the introduction of 
the Litas, but the Government was engaged in increasing salaries 
and benefits to compensate for rising inflation. In 1993 Prime 
Minister Adolfas Slezevicius had set the increase in salaries and 
benefits as being 40 per cent. Under pressure from the IMF, 
however, he was forced to reduce this in May 1993 to between 10- 
15 per cent. These pay and benefit increases had to be paid from 
the Lithuanian state budget, rather than from the IMF loans. 
Salary increases for teachers and health workers, however, were 
to be above the recommended rate of increase at 3 0 and 20 per 
cent respectively. Other state employees were to receive only 10 
per cent salary increases during 1993.
The favourable reaction to Lithuania's policy by the IMF led 
to an improvement in relations, cemented in the awarding of a 
US$40 million loan in October 1993, with a further US$60 million 
being made available throughout 1994. On 11 April 1994, Lithuania 
was able to draw an additional US$36 million from the IMF. This
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provided badly needed supplies of hard currency for the 
Lithuanian Government to enable the continuation of the programme 
of privatisation."
Economic aid from the Government of the USA was far more wide- 
ranging than any of the individual organisations offering 
assistance to Lithuania between 1991-1994. It was co-ordinated 
through the AID Office created in response to the demand from and 
with the intention of attracting support from the substantial 
Lithuanian community in the USA. 'The United States [was] 
committed to helping Lithuania help itself through the difficult 
economic reforms [then] underway. The USA supported Lithuanian 
efforts to move to an economy characterised by market forces and 
private ownership.'"
US economic assistance to Lithuania during this period took 
into account the all-too-apparent fact that whether desired or 
not by the Lithuanian people, Lithuania was still tied to its 
past as a part of the former USSR. Thus the assistance strategy 
proposed by the USA took into account not only the activities of 
other donors, such as EU; the most pressing need for immediate 
assistance; the priorities outlined by the Lithuanian Government; 
but also the effect of policy implementation on the homo 
sovieticus mindset."
With economic reform in Lithuania being concentrated on the 
development of a market economy through increased privatisation, 
(price) liberalisation and export promotion, the US Government 
was committed to assisting Lithuania in achieving its pre-defined 
objectives, although there was the realisation in Washington D.C. 
that the resource levels provided (US$10 million per year) were 
easily dwarfed by the magnitude of the task facing the 
Lithuanians. The specific function of the AID office was to 
guarantee that the assistance offered by the USA would be well 
co-ordinated with the other major assistance donors and would be 
concentrated in the areas where the USA held a comparative 
advantage over other donor states. The USA AID office tended
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believed that assistance should be for the medium- to long-term, 
rather than for what tended to be costlier and less-effective 
short-term relief. Thus the aid programme devised by the US 
Government was one which was flexible enough to adapt rapidly to 
any new or unanticipated demands in a few specific areas. It was 
believed that the narrowing-down of the assistance would be vital 
to the success of the programme.
Working in tandem with the Lithuanian Government, the US 
Government identified specific areas where, it was believed, it 
held the necessary advantage over other donor states, in 
particular Denmark or Germany. In the economic sphere it was the 
all-important private-sector development which emerged as the 
focus for US assistance.SI In all its efforts in all sectors of 
Lithuanian society, however, it was abundantly clear that the US 
Government stressed the importance of the continuation of a 
democratically elected Government and its accompanying processes. 
Simultaneously, the US Government underlined the importance of 
its support for nascent democratic institutions as they were to 
develop between 1991-1994.
Although until 19 94 the level of US Government assistance was 
to remain fixed at US$10 million, it was estimated that this 
figure would increase with the start in operation of the Baltic 
Enterprise Fund. After an analysis of the economic climate in 
Lithuania at the end of 1994, no termination date for this 
project was set.
US Government concentration on the development of the private 
sector in Lithuania was the result of previous experiences in 
other former Soviet and East Bloc states since the collapse of 
the Warsaw Pact in 1 9 8 9 . This indicated that because the 
enterprise and financial sectors were so closely intertwined, the 
necessary restructuring of the banking system had to be 
undertaken in conjunction with the restructuring of the business 
sector. Analysts believed that economic productivity would be 
enhanced by the development of legal and regulatory reforms that
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would also protect the environment.
Within the financial sector, therefore, the US Government 
devised a strategy that would reshape the banking system in order 
that it could perform more effectively the services required by 
a market economy. These included the mobilisation of deposits and 
the ability to on-lend them to final borrowers. In January 1993 
the majority of individuals continued to place their savings in 
the State Savings Bank, despite the fact that it offered strongly 
negative interest rates. In mid-1993, two-thirds of all bank 
assets were controlled by the three State banks: the Savings
bank, the Commercial bank and the Agricultural bank, with the 
remaining one-third divided among 23 commercial banks."
Although by the end of 1993 direct state bank lending to 
public sector enterprises had been reduced, arrears from state- 
owned enterprises had become an informal means of financing the 
economy, which was eroding the effectiveness of credit control 
by the monetary authorities. The US Government perceived this to 
be a severe problem which could have undermined the success of 
Lithuania's economic transition and in an attempt to alleviate 
this, it was recommended that a thorough financial and 
operational audit of each bank would be needed to determine the 
degree to which non-performing loans were undermining a bank's 
solvency and to evaluate the scope for their restructuring, 
privatisation or liquidation."
US assistance in the financial sector was designed to 
strengthen the ability of the Central Bank of Lithuania to 
supervise and regulate commercial banks, to carry out prudent 
monetary policy and to facilitate international transactions, a 
concomitant of attracting foreign investment. The aid was also 
designed to ease the development of the Government debt 
instruments, tax laws and other legal requirements which were 
necessary to strengthen the development of Lithuania's financial 
sector. American assistance began to provide for commercial banks 
with technical skills in bank management, credit analysis.
270
international operations, accounting standards, supervision and 
the hastening of the development of an improved payments 
system."
The US Government was also able to play a significant role in 
the promotion of Lithuania's business sector between 1991-1994. 
It focused on the transformation of the business sector from one 
of state ownership and control to one based on private ownership. 
The US Government's role concentrated on the development of an 
environment in which new private businesses could develop and/or 
grow, either as a result of the privatisation of an existing 
enterprise, or through the creation of entirely new enterprises.
US assistance in the business sector provided some capital 
through the Baltic Enterprise Fund. The assistance was designed 
to strengthen enterprises in areas such as accounting, financing, 
marketing, production and management as well as to be able to 
provide policy advice on investment issues specifically for the 
Lithuanian Government. The assistance from the US was also 
drafted in an attempt to strengthen the formulation and 
implementation of environmental legislation that affected the 
business sector as well as for the aiding of the Lithuanian 
Government in its further attempts at privatisation beyond 1994.
While the Government of the USA chose to provide aid to only 
a few specific areas, assistance granted to Lithuania under the 
European Union PHARE programme was far more diverse. The PHARE 
programme, which started its operations in 1991, was based on a 
multi-sector approach. Its main emphasis, however, was on 
assisting the Government of Lithuania in the process of 
transformation from a centralised, planned economy to its desired 
market economy. A generous amount of support was given to private 
sector development and to the restructuring of Lithuania's 
financial institutions."
The provision of support under the PHARE programme was almost 
exclusively for technical assistance, that is, the supplying of
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professional manpower, which was generally undertaken through 
contracts with consultancy companies. Technical assistance and 
training were the main aims of the programme, reflecting the view 
held by the European Commission that substantial private 
assistance in the form of capital aid was not at that time yet 
appropriate in the private sector, as it was felt that there 
needed to be a fundamental restructuring of this sector, as well 
as in the Government administration before such injections of 
capital would prove worthwhile."
Lithuania was to benefit from substantial assistance provided 
by the Group of 24 (G-24) most industrialised countries and their 
related financial institutions. The activities of some of these 
institutions, such as the IMF, EBRD and World Bank, were co­
ordinated by the PHARE programme, which supplied the manpower 
necessary to held these institutions achieve their aims. PHARE's 
particular role was in employing consultants to prepare projects 
that were then funded by the aforementioned international 
financial institutions and/or the G-24."
Requests for financial support from PHARE had to be submitted 
by a Lithuanian organisation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
who acted as the National Aid Co-ordinator. If the request 
amounted to more than ECU50,000, it was subject to competitive 
tendering, eventually decided upon by the EU. One of the key 
roles played by the PHARE Programme was that of an aid co­
ordination unit. The Lithuanian Unit was established in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1992. The Unit was designed 
to act in an advisory capacity to the Lithuanian Government and 
its overall objective was to ensure that the assistance to 
Lithuania did not overlap. It also had to assist the Government 
in managing its aid flows. To do so effectively, workers in the 
Unit had to establish an inter-ministerial structure for 
proposing, evaluating and prioritising projects needing 
assistance and for taking decisions on the most effective use of 
available funds. Part of its work in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs concerned the efficient day-to-day management of
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assistance to the Government, both from the PHARE Programme and 
from other donors."
One of the greatest successes of the PHARE programme's aid co­
ordination unit in Lithuania was the compilation of a Project 
Database of externally supported activity in Lithuania. Its 
intention was to clearly demonstrate which areas of the economy 
had received external assistance and which still required held. 
The database contained details of completed and ongoing projects, 
as well as those where financing was still being sought. Breaking 
down the PHARE programme into sectors : those which were relevant 
to the development of the Lithuanian economy between 1991-1994 
were the assistance in the preparation of a public investment 
programme, assistance to small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
assistance to investment promotion and assistance to 
privatisation.
Throughout the 1991-1994 period, the Lithuanian Government was 
keen to increase the level of public investment as part of a 
strategy for the promotion of economic growth. The PHARE Public 
Investment Programme (PIP) was created to identify national and 
cross-sectoral priorities for public investment which had a 
reasonable economic rate of return. One of the most important 
functions of the PIP was to ensure that loan funds for public 
investment were channelled to priority areas and that total 
borrowing remained within Lithuania's debt-service capability. 
The PIP unit was established in the Ministry of Economics in June 
1993. In the period 1991-1994, however, the usefulness of the PIP 
was limited as it was operating on a reduced base. By 1993 it was 
obvious that to function effectively, a significant amount of 
training would have to be undertaken by PIP staff. This training 
was completed at the end of 1993 and 1994 was spent in preparing 
to identify medium-term priorities for investment assistance. In 
November 1994 the PIP for 1995-1997 was approved by the 
Government. It was to finance 79 public investment projects as 
well as investments in budgetary organisations and to complete 
27 already started projects, mainly in the energy sector."
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PHARE's Small-and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) sector was a 
vital sector of the programme between 1991-1994* Research by the 
PHARE programme concluded that small business activity in 
Lithuania grew rapidly between 1991-1994. In this period the 
number of registered enterprises increased by two-thirds to a 
total of 85,000 (made up of approximately 22,000 share companies 
and 62,000 personal enterprises and p a r t n e r s h i p s . ) "  To assist 
Lithuania's economic development, these entrepreneurial 
tendencies needed a focus in order to create active and growing 
businesses. By 1994 PHARE's SME division believed that SMEs would 
dominate the Lithuanian economy for the remainder of the century, 
as well as continuing this domination in the 21st Century. These 
SMEs would provide market-oriented products and services to 
supply both domestic needs and external requirements. They would, 
in all probability, become the main source of employment, 
demanding new skills and offering higher salaries than were 
available in 1 9 9 4 ."
To assist in this transitory phase of Lithuania's economic 
development, the PHARE SME Technical Project was launched in 
1991. The two main aims of this project were the provision of 
assistance for the development of a national policy framework to 
encourage SME growth and to work with existing organisations to 
create a network of new business advice centres throughout 
Lithuania to provide active support to individuals and small 
firms. Between 1992-1994 this project was managed by Richard 
Hindle of the British economic and management consultants Segal 
Quince Wicksteed Ltd. (SQW). With the collapse of the Warsaw 
Pact, SQW began operating in other East Bloc states from 1990 and 
was able to use this experience in Lithuania". SQW worked in 
close collaboration with the Danish Technological Institute, 
which was responsible for the training of staff required for the 
PHARE-sponsored Business Advisory Services.
Since 1970 it had been accepted in both the states of Western 
Europe and in North America, that it was the small firms and 
self-employment that provided the largest source of
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employment." Small businesses increased both in number and in 
importance as they adapted to and stimulated economic growth. 
Government-designed and sponsored programmes facilitated small 
business growth and, at a local level, partnerships had been 
formed between businesses and other organisations to promote 
economic development and to devise new methods for improving 
business performance. It was these previous successes which PHARE 
attempted to replicate in Lithuania.
In 1993 the first Business Advisory Service (BAS) centres were 
established in Lithuania. These were locally controlled 
organisations offering business information and counselling 
services. Their chief feature was the running of short practical 
training courses and helping firms to draft business proposals. 
The principal clients of these BASs were SME managers, self- 
employed persons and those Lithuanians contemplating starting 
their own business."
The PHARE Programme provided substantial help to the SME 
sector of the Lithuanian economy. Equipment, business 
information, including a series of brochures specially designed 
and written to meet specific Lithuanian needs, a database and 
assistance in establishing and organising the new BAS centres all 
came to Lithuania with PHARE assistance. All members of staff had 
to undergo the Danish-taught training programme, which covered 
business skills and western style training techniques. This was 
an attempt to re-educate the BAS staff, most of whom had 
originally been educated under the Soviet regime and were 
hindered by the inevitable decline in professional enthusiasm 
caused by the presence of homo sovieticus.
By 1994, three BAS centres were fully operational: in Kaunas, 
Lithuania's second city; in Klaipeda, Lithuania's major port and 
in Alytus, a town in the South of Lithuania, housing one of 
Lithuania's largest factories, Snaige, a refrigerator-making 
plant. All three received active support from local Lithuanian 
organisations, including Chambers of Commerce, Technical Colleges
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and Universities. By the end of 1994 further BAS centres in 
Vilnius; Panevezys, an industrial town located approximately half 
way between Vilnius and the Latvian Capital Riga and in Siauliai, 
another industrial town in the North of Lithuania, had become 
operational. The BAS network was therefore able to supply the 
main centres of Lithuania's population."
The Lithuanian Government realised the necessity of 
establishing a national framework for SME policy. Clear legal 
guidelines were required to assist SMEs with decisions on 
investment and business strategy. New Government programmes were 
therefore developed to actively support and enable private 
business activity. The PHARE project team worked with Ecofin, a 
firm of local consultants and with the Entrepreneurship Division 
of the Ministry of Economics to assess the economic environment 
for SMEs and to identify what particular changes in the 
regulatory, tax and policy framework could held small business 
development.
They also worked at identifying possible new initiatives, such 
as encouraging small business development associated with 
educational and research institutes, and in supporting innovation 
in SMEs and supervising the required transfer of technology to 
them from Western states. The PHARE project team was also 
required to consider what organisational capability and 
mechanisms were needed to facilitate the promotion and 
development of SMEs in Lithuania. These activities were designed 
to supplement the work already being undertaken by the project 
team in 1993, which involved the hosting of seminars and 
workshops for government officials, businessmen, researchers and 
bankers. The workshops aimed to provide a forum for the sharing 
of information, the stimulation of discussion and the development 
of ideas for new initiatives."
PHARE also financed the establishment of a special SME Credit 
Line, through which new companies were able to receive loans at 
a manageable rate of interest, in order to start up or expand
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existing businesses. The loans were received by the Bank of 
Lithuania and then lent to specific commercial banks, which in 
turn lent these to businesses. PHARE provided assistance in 
creating and managing the Bank of Lithuania's credit system as 
well as in the field of business plan appraisal."
By the end of 1994, the PHARE-supported Euro Information 
Correspondence Centre had become functional. It was designed to 
assist local businesses in obtaining information on legal and 
statistical questions relating to the European Union and its 
member states. The centre was designed to disseminate information 
from prospective business partners from within the EU as well as 
to disperse information on Lithuania and Lithuanian firms among 
European states.
The PHARE SME initiative was to be one of the most productive 
of all EU-sponsored projects for assisting Lithuania's transition 
to a market economy. With increased investment being such a vital 
part of this, however, PHARE project co-ordinators decided to 
launch a specific programme of assistance to investment. Since 
19 92 the PHARE programme was able to provide Lithuanians with 
assistance in exploring ways in which foreign investors might be 
able to provide Lithuanians with assistance in exploring ways in 
which foreign investors could be drawn to Lithuania. The 
assistance culminated in 1993 in a recommendation by the PHARE 
Programme to establish the Lithuanian Investment Promotion Agency 
(LIPA) , which came into being in October of that year as an 
autonomous organisation supervised by a formal Board drawn from 
both the public and private sectors of Lithuanian industry."
The Agency was supported throughout 1994 by a PHARE-appointed 
permanent technical adviser and had a broad mandate to promote 
investment in Lithuania. One of its most important tasks was that 
of image building: the promotion and publicising the reputation 
of Lithuania as a location for foreign investment and for the 
promotion of investment opportunities. The abiding culture of 
homo sovieticus, however, meant that the Lithuanians themselves
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were often more of a hindrance than a help regarding image 
promotion.
LIPA's other tasks related to the generation of investment by 
the use of marketing directed at specific target sectors in 
selected foreign countries and the provision of investment 
services. These services included the supplying of reliable 
information on the business environment in Lithuania and any 
specific information required to make an investment decision. A 
role which was novel to LIPA, or, indeed any other newly-created 
Lithuanian agency, was that of providing policy feedback, which 
had been of no importance under the Soviet regime. PHARE 
suggested that LIPA should make proposals to the Government based 
on the experience of contact with foreign investors, for 
improving investment policy, regulations and the requisite legal 
framework.
The key area of Lithuania's economic transition, as already 
indicated, was that of privatisation which dominated all aspects 
of Lithuania's economic life between 1991-1994. PHARE only became 
active in Lithuania and indeed in all three Baltic States, 
following a meeting in 1993 when the EU and the Governments of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed a Framework Agreement For 
Privatisation Assistance in the Baltic States. As of July 1993, 
PHARE finally became fully operational in the Baltic.
The main area of concern was that which covered strategies and 
methodologies for privatisation. A review of domestic 
privatisation was presented in October 1993. This contained 
recommendations on the rationalisation of legislation, the 
simplification of institutional structures, the limitation of 
preferential treatment for employees, the establishment of a 
state holding company and the development of capital markets. 
PHARE helped to establish the Best Business Plan methodology to 
prepare for the adoption, in due course, of a multi-enterprise 
approach, offering groups of enterprises for sale as a definite 
group, instead of individually.^
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PHARE consultants were also required to work with the Ministry 
of Economics on the institutional and legal framework in 
Lithuania: reviewing laws on the initial privatisation of state 
property and the subsequent administration and management of 
privatisation. The PHARE team recommended the establishment of 
a state property fund to own and manage all state property 
awaiting privatisation and the establishment of a Privatisation 
Agency to be responsible for implementing privatisation. At the 
end of 1993, PHARE agreed to assist the Government in the field 
of communications training and in forming a Government 
Information Service to handle queries regarding future 
privatisation. This field, although commendable for its 
intentions, was only to be of minimal use by the end of 1994, as 
many disputes regarding the privatisation of Soviet-confiscated 
land had yet to be resolved, with frequent changes in legislation 
covering these issues causing inevitable delays and increased 
confusion.
The third area of privatisation assistance on which PHARE 
concentrated during the 1993-1994 term was that concerning 
specific enterprises and transactions, where PHARE staff worked 
on identifying and assessing likely candidates for privatisation 
as well as in the preparation and negotiation of transactions. 
This team of advisers also assisted the Ministry of Agriculture 
with an evaluation of the Sugar industry in Lithuania/"
The work of the PHARE programme between 1991-1994 should by 
no means be underestimated. Of all overseas donors, PHARE 
provided the most comprehensive assistance to Lithuania during 
this period, covering all sectors of society and not just the 
economy. The programmes' success, however, were adversely 
affected by the social and political climate in Lithuania during 
this time: well-meant intentions were hindered by less than
enthusiastic attitudes towards change, attitudes which were held 
by a growing number of Lithuanians intent on resisting the 
alterations to a general way of life that were being suggested 
by western organisations and countries.
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One of the most fundamental changes to both the Lithuanian 
economy and society was the introduction of Lithuania's foreign 
trading capability. New markets had to be sought and specific 
Lithuanian products targeted for export. It was felt that union 
with the other two Baltic States would improve Lithuania's 
chances of competing in the international market and as an 
accompaniment to this, a free trade agreement was signed with 
Latvia and Estonia in February 1994. The search for viable new 
markets for Lithuanian products was to direct Lithuania back to 
its former associates in the USSR, as it was these markets which 
were most in need of whatever Lithuania could export. 
Landsbergis, however, stubbornly refused to accept this, which 
hindered Lithuania's economic growth in the first years after the 
restitution of independence. Brazauskas, however, with a great 
deal of past experience in dealing with these markets, accepted 
the need for Lithuania to tailor her trading policies to meet 
this demand, however emotionally or psychologically unpopular 
this move would be for the Lithuania people.
The effects of change coupled with the effects of resistance 
to change may best be shown by an examination of Lithuania's 
performance in the four years under review. To do so accurately, 
it is advisable to divide the period into two distinct blocks: 
the first covering the life of the Landsbergis administration, 
in power until the end of 1992, the second covering the period 
of the first two years of the Brazauskas administration. Despite 
the great steps made in restoring Lithuania's currency, 
restructuring the banking system, launching the process of 
privatisation and being funded by a variety of foreign aid 
organisations, by the end of December 1992, the economic 
situation in Lithuania had deteriorated to an extent undreamed 
of even during 1991, which had been, in comparison with 1992, a 
period of increasing economic growth. This was mostly the result 
of the sudden fracturing of ties with the Russian Federation and 
many of the other former Soviet republics along with the gradual 
removal of the Ruble from circulation in Lithuania. Also 
responsible was the forced disassembling of the old economic
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system, coupled with the attempt to replace it instantaneously 
with a market economy of the type not seen in Lithuania since 
before the start of the Soviet Occupation.
The gravity of the economic situation at the end of 1992 was 
reflected in most areas of Lithuania's industrial sector. In 
comparable prices, industrial production for the period January- 
November 1992 was only 48.8 per cent of the production for the 
same period in 1991." Productivity amounted to only 53.4 per 
cent worth of the previous year's output, whilst production of 
fertilisers, sugar, synthetic fabrics, cellulose, paper, cement, 
bicycles, hi-fi equipment, tinned fish and other fish products, 
mixed feed and the all-important refrigerators" all decreased 
by over 40 per cent in 1992."
During the same period, the construction industry reflected 
this trend with 31 per cent less work completed than during the 
same timeframe in 1991. Contributing to this, however, was the 
sudden awareness affecting the Lithuanian people, who had begun 
to construct (lavish) private houses from 1991 onwards, that not 
only would the materials needed in their construction require 
payment for, but that the houses themselves, upon completion, 
would cost more than many Lithuanians were prepared to pay for 
insulation and other basic utilities. By 1992, therefore, many 
half-built houses were scattered throughout,Lithuania. This was 
to continue in 1993-1994 as in a reaction to living in such 
cramped surroundings during the Soviet Occupation, many 
Lithuanians designed and started to build luxurious properties 
without much thought given to the day-to-day realities."
With the fall in general production, transport by road and 
rail shrank by 4 0 per cent when compared with the months between 
January-November 1991. The deficiencies in the Lithuanian economy 
at the end of 1992, however, were even more apparent when 
compared with the situation at the end of 1989, when Lithuania 
was still a Soviet republic: for the January-November period, 
general production had decreased by 6 0 per cent, industrial
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production by 55 per cent and agriculture by 34 per cent."
These difficulties faced by Lithuania were to have a 
detrimental effect on the employment sector. On 3 December 19 92, 
79,000 individual enterprises were registered, of which 71,000 
were entirely active. These employed approximately 1.9 million 
people (75 per cent in the state sector and 25 per cent in the 
private sector). Compared with 1991, the number of workers in the 
private sector had increased 1.6 times, but more than 210,000 
employees in all sectors of industry and construction were forced 
by the end of 19 92 to work "short" two or three day weeks and/or 
take unpaid leave .
Lithuanian companies were affected more than had been 
originally thought by the breakdown in relations with the USSR 
(although many were reluctant to admit this, given the depth of 
hostile feelings towards the USSR.) The removal of Lithuania from 
the Ruble economy contributed to the breakdown in settlement of 
accounts between many Lithuanian and CIS companies, with an 
estimated loss of 15 billion Talonai. Inflation during 1992 was 
to further afflict the Lithuanian economic and industrial 
sectors, reaching close to 90 0 per cent, compared with average 
salaries which rose by only 400 per cent, thus in effect halving 
the income of the average worker.
This led to an overall decline in the standard of living, with 
household income dropping by around 55 per cent at the end of 
1992 when compared with 1991. In October 1992 food accounted for 
51 per cent of necessary household expenditure, whereas non-food 
spending made up 25 per cent. In October 1991, however, food had 
only accounted for 31 per cent of necessary expenditure, whereas 
non-food items had taken up 38 per cent of a household budget. 
But as food prices were forced upwards, average consumption 
decreased. Potatoes, the staple of the Lithuanian diet, decreased 
from the consumption of 128kg/capita in 1991 to 95kg/capita in 
1992. Fish (another staple) consumption also decreased from 
19.2kg/capita to 10.5kg/capita. the consumption of meat products.
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eggs, sugar, vegetables and fruits and berries also decreased by 
significant amounts during the year."
Lithuania's entire industrial sector was to suffer the effects 
of economic transition. From Lithuania's heavy chemical 
production, machine building and mining enterprises to the 
timber, electrical, fabric and food producers, both output and 
the resulting Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fluctuated in the 
first years of independence, which echoed the fluctuating 
fortunes of the Lithuanian people^.
Economic reform in Lithuania was subject to particular 
characteristics which separated it from economic reform in other 
Central and Eastern European states. Key to this was the fact 
that until October 1 1992, Lithuania was forced to use a foreign 
currency, the Russian Ruble, which had ever-decreasing value in 
the international arena. Secondly, Lithuania had to completely 
transform her economy, not only into a market economy, but into 
one of a totally independent state from one which only a small 
part of a much larger Soviet-wide economy. The delay in 
separating from the Ruble caused Lithuania to become entangled 
in the inflationary processes caused as a result of the 
continuing fall in value of the Ruble in Russia, and therefore 
incapable of pursuing a strict anti-inflation policy. Lithuania's 
inflation was further affected during 1991-1994 by the constantly 
increasing prices of imports from the former USSR, especially in 
the energy sector, as well as by the decrease in the 
manufacturing sector. The forecast of continually rising 
inflation was sufficient to have a negative effect on the 
accumulation of capital and further investment/"
The Brazauskas Government acknowledged that the economic 
reforms implemented in 1991-1992 were of some benefit to 
Lithuania, especially the increase in wages and prices in 1991 
to reflect foreign economic conditions, the refusal to set 
prices, the hasty privatisation of state housing and a non­
deficit state budget. In carrying out these reforms, however.
283
mistakes, that could perhaps have been avoided, were made, 
resulting in increasing economic decline. Perhaps most important 
was the delay in introducing the temporary currency, which if it 
had been done at the end of 1991, when prices were liberalised, 
would have acted as an effective anti-inflation measure. Coupled 
with this was the fact that there was not even a partial 
safeguarding from inflation of deposits made in Lithuanian 
savings banks during 1 9 9 1-1 9 9 2 .^
In general, economic reform between 1991-1992 was carried out 
with insufficient consistency and resolution. The reform of the 
Lithuanian economy was mostly unco-ordinated: when the Talonas 
was introduced, a labour and capital market should also have been 
created at the same time. Many state enterprises failed to orient 
themselves towards investment or increased manufacturing 
capability. Profits were used for day-to-day expenses and in 
saving jobs, as managers expected unending Government subsidies 
to assist them. Perhaps the key problem facing the newly-elected 
Government at the start of 1993 was the need to increase the 
efficiency of state-owned enterprises whilst at the same time 
having to understand the transition to a market economy, and with 
it the bringing about of effective privatisation, was a slow, 
evolutionary process/"
From 1993, it is possible to see that there was a distinct 
shift in attitudes regarding the performance of Lithuania's 
economy. On election, the Brazauskas administration attempted to 
stabilise the economic situation: to stop the manufacturing
decline and to reduce inflation. The Government perceived its 
reform programme as developing along three parallel lines: the 
formation of competitive structures for active market 
participation, the creation of a favourable economic climate to 
enable market entities to function and a refinement of the social 
security system/"
The foundation of economic structures was to be achieved by 
the Government's promotion of various forms of privatisation for
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State enterprises, the amelioration of some of the existing 
restrictions, or their actual abolition. The aim of the 
Government was to encourage the belief that the most important 
aim of privatisation was the increase in manufacturing capability 
as well as to create the best possible environment for those 
potential investors in private businesses or shares. To do so, 
policy-makers targeted various forms of credit, the increase in 
renting and the possible buying-out of rented property and added 
the incentive of a decrease in the tax on profits if allocated 
to future investment."
SMEs, as already indicated, were given as much encouragement 
as possible by the Government, acting on the advice of PHARE 
consultants. The Government therefore attempted to improve the 
legal bases fundamental for encouraging private businesses and 
stimulating the creation of favourable conditions for economic 
growth, especially in the early stages of development."
By 1994, there were indeed some small-scale trade projects in 
operation between Lithuanian SMEs and their western counterparts. 
One of the most successful during this period was the project 
between the joint-stock company Audejas in Vilnius and The Bryan 
Group in North Carolina, USA. Managing Director James Bryan of 
the furniture upholstery company had already examined potential 
investments and trading projects in Latvia and Estonia in 1992- 
1993, but had become disheartened by the corruption and lack of 
professionalism which had led to his withdrawal from an Estonian 
project with a mill in Medveni : the amount of bribes and
kickbacks made it an unprofitable project. In Latvia, he 
encountered the bureaucratic and initiative-lacking mentality of 
homo sovieticus when dealing with Trade Ministers, who failed to 
understand the basic laws of supply and demand and consequently 
believed that The Bryan Group was trying to take advantage of 
their companies."
Then, through an emigre who had interpreted for the Lithuanian 
company Audejas in 1993, James Bryan was introduced to the
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President of the company, Jonas Kerabacis. After a series of 
meetings in 1994, the first contract to supply high-quality 
linen-based upholstery fabric to a consortium of North Carolina 
furniture makers was signed on 5 February, 1995. Audejas was been 
one of the SME successes during the 1991-1994 period. Bryan was 
extremely impressed at the professionalism of the staff and their 
willingness to adapt their products to suit western market 
tastes." Their true desire to export to the West was reflected 
in their punctuality, reliability and commitment to high quality. 
Staff even learned English, to be able to better communicate with 
their American partners.
By 1996 it was envisaged that Audejas would be exporting up 
to six 40 foot containers, each of which would hold 18,000 metres 
of fabric. This fabric would retail in the US for US$70 per yard, 
which was US$2 below standard market price, giving a 20 per cent 
price advantage: highly attractive to the western
manufacturer." The trading relationship was further expanded at 
the end of 19 94 when Audejas and The Bryan Group were joined in 
partnership by the Swedish company A. G . Nelstrom, distributor 
of textile machinery bought by Audejas and other Lithuanian 
textile firms, thus expanding Audejas' market to Scandinavia." 
Other textile companies were also to benefit from trade with the 
West, but few as successfully or as efficiently as Audejas.
Of greatest concern to the Government between 1992-1994, 
however, was the poor efficiency of many of the still- 
unprivatised state-owned enterprises. In 1992 the state sector 
was still the dominant employer, with 58.1 per cent of all 
Lithuanian employees (although this was to decrease to 46.7 per 
cent in 1993) . It was these enterprises which to a great 
extent determined the functioning of Lithuania's manufacturing 
capability. From 1993, the Government worked on the strengthening 
of anti-monopoly controls and supervision, and targeted stricter 
Governmental regulatory means, especially price controls."
The second of the Government's intentions regarding the
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economy during this period was the creation of a favourable 
economic climate. The Ministry of Economics concentrated on the 
expansion of free prices (with the exception of the monopoly 
producers) , the limiting of the issuing of money into circulation 
and refining the system of taxation: not stifling the activity 
of Lithuania's manufacturers, but at the same time providing the 
State with a sufficient income. The Government recognised the 
importance of the need for a securities market to encourage the 
distribution of capital and such a market began operating in the 
Spring of 1993.
By the end of 1994, however, it was apparent that despite all 
the efforts made by the government on behalf of the economy, 
Lithuania was suffering the effects of the transition phase in 
its economic development. Manufacturing production was down to 
24.9 per cent of its 1991 total and was employing only 66.6 per 
cent of its 1991 staff. Average minimum monthly earnings were 
only US$8 and the number of unemployed had risen to over 30,000 
from 4,600 in 1991, with those persons actively job-seeking up 
to 81,000 from 5,200 in 1991." By 1994, every second worker in 
the industrial sector was not working at full capacity and 
industry as a whole only functioned at half capacity." This was 
partly inevitable because of the difficulties being encountered 
in the drastic transition from a planned to a market economy 
coupled with the inevitable problems arising from fuel dependency 
on the Russian Federation", but also because of some 
outstanding and previously unconsidered elements that were to 
heavily influence Lithuania's reconstruction between 1991-1994.
Affecting Lithuania's development during this time, in 
particular in relation to economic issues, was reform of the 
agricultural sector and in particular the question of land 
restitution. Prior to the Soviet Occupation and subsequent 
annexation of Lithuania, she had possessed a well-developed 
network of small farms and medium-sized holdings which had worked 
the land and agricultural production was Lithuania's main source 
of income". After 1940 the farms were grouped into collectives
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{kolkhoz) and taken over by the State®”^. During the period of 
the Soviet Occupation, Lithuania's agriculture and, in 
particular, food processing sectors played a key role in the 
Soviet economy. The USSR provided the necessary market for 
Lithuania's agricultural produce. Approximately one third of meat 
production and at least 4 0 per cent of milk production as well 
as fish and leather products were exported to Russia and the 
other Soviet Republics."
The restitution of Lithuania's independence, however, led to 
a significant decrease in both agricultural production and the 
revenues earned from it. Nonetheless, in 1993 agriculture still 
contributed 11 per cent of Lithuania's GDP and employed over 22 
per cent of the population and of the three Baltic States, it was 
Lithuania which placed the most emphasis on the agriculture 
industry." In the arable sector, the main crops were cereals 
(barley, wheat and rye), the bulk of which were used as animal 
feeds; potatoes and sugar beet. Prior to the Soviet Occupation, 
livestock production had been the most important sector of 
Lithuanian agriculture. This continued throughout the Occupation, 
but upon the restitution of independence this sector declined 
rapidly as Lithuania was reliant on imports of animal feed from 
Russia and domestic purchasing power dropped.
In the inter-war years, Lithuania's second most important 
sector in agriculture was the food-processing industry 
(abattoirs, meat processing plants, dairies and mills). This 
remained important during the period of Occupation, but few of 
the facilities were modernised sufficiently. Thus on achieving 
the restitution of independence, Lithuania was prevented from 
exploiting this sector of her industry for western trade purposes 
by the fact that none of the plants met EU standards. Therefore 
Lithuania was forced to rely on former Soviet republics as a 
market and privatisation of sector was extremely slow during the 
first years of independence. Also suffering from the slow pace 
of privatisation was seed and fertilizer production and its 
distribution as it was still both expensive and monopolised.
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Lithuania's agricultural sector was also hampered by the lack of 
suitable machinery: many smaller farms were still, by 1994,
unmechanised and the large Soviet-built tractors and other farm 
machinery were ill suited to the small private farms which had 
been established after independence.
By 1994, the total budget for agriculture amounted to US$53 
million from a total budget of US$1.01 bi lli on. In  an attempt 
to alleviate the worsening economic situation caused by the 
reduction in size of the individual sectors and loss of markets, 
the Farmers' Support Fund was established by the Government in 
1994 to provide credits for investment in Lithuania's rural 
infrastructure.
The modernisation of Lithuania's agriculture sector, however, 
could not be funded entirely from the Government's budget. 
Lithuania became extremely reliant on the EU PHARE programme for 
subsidies for agriculture reconstruction. Although there was no 
specific sectoral PHARE programme for agriculture, assistance 
came in the form of General Technical Assistance Facilities 
(GTAF) . From 1991, assistance came in the form of economic 
analysis support for the development of fisheries strategies and 
reforms; for improving winter wheat production and restructuring 
the hothouse sector; the restructuring and privatising of agro­
processing industry; agricultural extension; livestock efficiency 
and trade promotion and i n f o r m a t i o n .
Agricultural reform was impeded, however, by the complex 
processes of privatisation which were to dominate agricultural 
affairs following the restitution of independence. The principal 
difficulty with privatisation of agricultural property, as with 
all property in Lithuania, was the fact that so much of it had 
been confiscated by the Soviet authorities during the Occupation. 
The process of restitution of land to its inter-war owners began 
in 1991, but because privatisation of the land itself had already 
begun in 1989, the claims for the restitution of property far 
exceeded the acreage available. It was therefore necessary for
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the Landsbergis Government to introduce a compensation scheme: 
either the land itself, equivalent acreage elsewhere in the form 
of either agricultural land, forest or house construction sites 
or monetary compensation.
But of the 450,000 claims for land restitution made between 
1991-1994, by December 1994 over 300,000 of these claims were 
still outstanding and some of those few which had been settled 
were, in fact, totally contradictory to those claims still 
awaiting settlement. This was not the only significant obstacle 
to Land Reform: it proved extremely difficult to assess property 
boundaries as the majority of claimants no longer possessed title 
deeds to their property. A further blow to former owners was that 
only US$1.3n were made available as monetary compensation for 
land: many claimants believed that they would receive far less 
than the land was actually worth and therefore refrained from 
reclaiming the p r o p e r t y .
In an attempt to ease the land reform situation and encourage 
the restitution of property, the Governments in the years 1991- 
19 94 frequently changed the procedure regarding the restitution 
of property. This action served only to further complicate and 
delay the process as increasing numbers of claimants became 
reluctant to settle for the proposed compensation in the belief 
that the following months would see a radical change in policy. 
As a result, restitution of property slowed to such an extent 
that an effective land market, vital for such an agriculture- 
based state, was unable to develop. Foreign investment in 
agriculture was sorely hindered, which contributed to Lithuania's 
slow economic growth in the first years of independence. This was 
not only the case in agricultural land. All pre-Occupation 
property was affected by the Governments' failure to produce a 
fully comprehensive property restitution policy. Therefore 
foreign investment in factories and other structures and 
enterprises became a hazardous venture as many foreign companies 
were unwilling to fund an enterprise that could be made useless 
with a change in the Land Reform Laws and were thus deterred from
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doing so.^ °^
One of the greatest impediments to the successful 
transformation of the Lithuanian economy during the first years 
of independence, could be seen to be this legacy of the Soviet 
occupation which had affected all aspects of society. On a 
superficial level, the Occupation had isolated Lithuania from all 
Western business influences. The business environment at the time 
reflected an amalgamation of old rules and laws, inconsistent 
with the principles of a market economy, as well as a rapidly 
evolving series of new and often conflicting legal and regulatory 
requirements. The poorly-functioning systems acted as a drag on 
the development and growth of the private sector. These included 
difficulties regarding company registration and in the securing 
of legal collateral placed against a loan.
A further hurdle which had to be surmounted by the Lithuanian 
industry and economy as a whole was the dearth of management 
talent in all sizes and at all levels in enterprises. Throughout 
the years 1991-1994, Lithuania continued to rely on management 
trained according to Soviet methods. Thus businesses continued 
to be ill-prepared to compete in a global environment. One of the 
clearest examples of this, even though it was on an extremely 
small scale, occurred in 1994. A consortium of Lithuanian 
industrialists participated in an exhibition of developing 
nations' industry held at Earls Court in London between 9-13 May. 
Infirmation about their attendance was only sent to London on the 
Wednesday prior to their arrival and no arrangements were made 
for publicising the Lithuanians' presence among the Lithuanian 
communities in Britain who would have supported them, or for 
inviting local Lithuanians or even Embassy officials to the 
exhibition. The delegates failed to enquire about what facilities 
would be made available to them: whether they could obtain booths 
or tables on which to display their wares. At 3am on the morning 
of the Exhibition's opening, the delegates received a few tables 
and chairs, not sufficient to do justice to the products on 
display. This was perhaps one of the most obvious examples of the
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negative effects of Soviet training: the complete reluctance to 
take any initiative.
This lack of initiative: a sheep-like mentality, formed the 
mindset of homo sovieticus and made a profound contribution to 
hindering Lithuania's natural growth over the 1991-1994 period. 
Any good intentions, such as the investment by a foreign company 
such as the British Pig Improvement Company, was obstructed by 
homo sovieticus. Deliberate legal blocks or even unpremeditated 
actions, carried out in the best Soviet style, impeded growth and 
development. The bureaucracy beloved of Soviet administrators 
proved to be one of the best methods of preventing change.
There was another branch of homo sovieticus that was to have 
an equally pernicious influence on Lithuania's development. The 
number of "Square Boys", the Lithuanian "Mafia" (so-named for 
their short hair cuts and shoulder-padded suit jackets) grew 
rapidly following independence. Unlike the organised crime 
syndicates of the Italian or American Mafia, there were two types 
of "Square Boy": those who had profited under the Soviet regime, 
(which despite its claim to equality, had always been extremely 
unequal) and those for whom independence had brought with it the 
acquisition of consumer goods as well as the adoption of "Mafia- 
esque" business practices in an attempt to become even wealthier. 
From 1991, as the "Square Boys" gained greater influence, 
extortion was practised on an ever-increasing scale, with violent 
attacks on opponents becoming widespread, especially in the 
cities and large towns.
The conspicuous consumption favoured by the "Square Boys" was 
pandered to in a country desperate for a source of new markets : 
for example, a franchise of the top couturier Karl Lagerfeld 
opened in July 1994 on Gediminas Prospektas, Vilnius' main 
street, where a man's jacket retailed for several years' salary 
of the ordinary Lithuanian. The average Lithuanian was sorely 
angered by the rise of the "Square Boys", but the lack of the 
existence of a legal code following the abolition of the USSR's
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constitution in Lithuania, coupled with the mindset of homo 
sovieticus or just a reluctance to become involved {in the 
interests of personal safety) had allowed the "Square Boys" to 
go about their activities largely unchecked.
By the end of 1994, the idealism which had once characterised 
the Landsbergis Government and his years in office, had been 
replaced by the pragmatism and acceptance of reality by 
Brazauskas and his Government. Landsbergis' aim of providing 
most, if not all, Lithuanians with a western standard of living 
had proven to be wildly over-ambitious, disregarding the 
challenges that Lithuania would be forced to face over the coming 
years. Brazauskas, ever the more realistic and practical of the 
two Presidents during the period under review, realised that 
Lithuania's transition to a market economy was indeed an 
evolutionary and lengthy process and during the 1992-1994 years, 
took active measures to ease Lithuania gradually along her chosen 
path. At the same time, as a survivor of the Soviet Occupation 
of Lithuania, he was sufficiently pragmatic to realise the 
necessity of trying to maintain some ties with the East, rather 
than rushing headlong into the arms of the West, arms which were 
not necessarily outstretched or welcoming.
Unpredicted by Lithuanians in the years preceding the 
restoration of independence was the negative impact on the 
Lithuanian economy by the creation of the European Union during 
Lithuania's period of enforced isolation behind the Iron Curtain. 
Where Lithuania played an active role prior to 1940, such as in 
the export of dairy and meat products as well as timber and 
textiles, to states such as the UK, by 1991 these markets were 
for the most part closed off because of the restrictions imposed 
by the EU. Therefore new, non-EU markets had to be found by 
Lithuanian exporters and, out of necessity, these were to be 
predominantly former Soviet Republics, most notably Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
In common with the other Baltic States, by December 19 94 a
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number of Lithuanians, exhausted by the burdens imposed on them 
by the process of economic transition and angered by the obvious 
flaunting of wealth by those who had made the shift to a market 
economy (albeit often by the use of illegal means), were harking 
back to the old days of Communism. While memories of the 
injustice and harshness of that regime had (deliberately) been 
forgotten, it would probably take several more generations before 
the ethos held by homo sovieticus, which had permeated Lithuanian 
society to an undreamed of extent, would finally be laid to rest. 
Until that date, every positive move forward made by Lithuanians 
in the aid of their country's economic development, most notably 
the re-introduction of the Litas, could be counterbalanced or 
even driven back by the existing legacy of the old regime.
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CONCLUSION
'May the sun of Lithuania banish the darkness...
In the name of that Lithuania may unity flourish.'
V. Kudirka^
In 1991, international recognition of the restitution of 
Lithuania's independence had been accompanied by senses of 
anticipation and expectation throughout the Lithuanian diaspora. 
They hoped that, after breaking free from the USSR, Lithuania 
could return to the pre-Soviet levels of economic performance and 
reintegrate into the international community in which she had 
been an active member prior to the loss of her independence in 
1940. This thesis therefore, was designed to test such a 
hypothesis and the initial belief was that it would provide an 
extremely positive analysis of the rebirth of the Lithuanian 
nation and state. Yet those interested in Lithuania had 
completely failed to anticipate the dramatic impact of the legacy 
of the 50 years of Soviet Occupation on the reborn country. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis may be disproved, for after a 
detailed examination of the essential components of the rebirth 
of a nation, it is evident that Lithuania has not been able to 
escape as quickly as had been thought possible from the clutches 
of the former USSR.
There were, however, some significant achievements in the 
first four years of full independence which should not be 
overlooked. By the end of 1994, the mechanisms of democratic 
government had been reinstated and unlike in the inter-war years, 
Lithuania did not appear to be heading towards the imposition of 
an authoritarian and nationalistic regime. Lithuania's government 
and legislature were installed by the process of free and fair 
elections; when necessary, her leaders admitted defeat gracefully 
and campaigned ethically for re-election. After lengthy debate, 
the Lithuanian state acquired a new, modern constitution to 
replace that of 1938 and as 1995 approached, there was a 
functioning judicial system and a specifically-constructed
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Constitutional Court overseeing the maintenance of democracy in 
the state.
In the international arena, the process of reintegration was 
also well underway by the end of 1994. Most importantly, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been re-established and, in 
highly symbolic actions, Embassies (re)opened around the world. 
Lithuania had accepted membership of numerous international 
organisations, most importantly the United Nations (UN) , and had 
made clear her commitment to and her intention of joining the 
European Union (EU), although Lithuanians regarded the Union as 
both the provider of a security guarantee and a market for her 
produce and had given little thought to the political 
consequences of joining and the implications for Lithuania's 
sovereignty. Both Governments in the 1991-1994 period confirmed 
their determination to achieve the goal of EU membership. The 
Lithuanian Governments also were leading participants in the 
establishment of organisations, such as the Council of Baltic Sea 
States, as forums for debating regional rather than global 
issues.
Landsbergis and Brazauskas made concrete efforts to cultivate 
relations with other Heads of State. The two leaders were 
extremely popular in the West, but Landsbergis was less so in the 
immediate region. As former Communist parties were re-elected in 
Central and Eastern Europe, however, Brazauskas was able to 
associate with them and improve Lithuania's international 
standing, especially in the case of Poland. The signing of the 
Lithuanian-Polish Friendship Treaty was another symbolic event 
in Lithuania's immediate post-Soviet history, given the tradition 
of animosity between the two nations.
Equally symbolic in the eyes of Lithuanians, though not 
necessarily in the eyes of westerners, had been Lithuania's re- » 
entry into international events such as the Olympics and other 
sporting fixtures. Even competitions which were unmitigated 
disasters for Lithuania, such as the Eurovision Song Contest,
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were worth entering. From a Lithuanian perspective, wherever 
there was someone competing or participating as a Lithuanian 
national, this was a public display of Lithuania's distinct 
identity, which had been suppressed for so long.
Participation in international events was made possible by the 
improvement in communication links with the non-Soviet world. In 
particular, the establishment of Lithuanian Airlines (LAL) in 
1991 was a vital step in the process of re-integration. More 
people were therefore encouraged to visit Lithuania as, 
especially from Europe, it was an easily reachable destination. 
In turn, increasing numbers of Lithuanians were able to visit the 
West and thus links between western states and re-emerging 
Lithuania could be cemented. The introduction of programmes such 
as Rotary scholarships for Lithuanians and the provision of 
teaching jobs in Lithuania for speakers of western European 
languages contributed to the strengthening of international 
associations.
These relations continued to be augmented as it became 
apparent to western Governments that Lithuania was absolutely 
committed to maintaining her independent status. There had been 
speculation in the West that the election of the LDLP, the former 
Communist Party of Lithuania, might possibly lead to a return to 
a close union with Russia, as Lithuania's immediate neighbour 
Belarus had done, much to the concern of many Lithuanians. 
President Brazauskas, however, was quick to reaffirm his 
commitment both to maintaining Lithuania's hard-won independence 
and to campaigning for her entry into western security 
organisations such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). 
Lithuania's desire for NATO membership was graphically 
illustrated by her willing participation in the creation of a 
joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT) and the deployment 
of Lithuanian forces on peacekeeping duty in the former 
Yugoslavia. Lithuanian troops also began to undergo training 
according to NATO guidelines and to use, where possible, NATO- 
compatible equipment.
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A great psychological victory was achieved by the Brazauskas 
government when Soviet troops were withdrawn from Lithuanian soil 
a year ahead of those troops in Latvia and Estonia. This was a 
recognition of the sensible relationship of Brazauskas and Boris 
Yeltsin, one which was not always the most cordial, but was 
considerably better than the extremely poor relationship between 
Yeltsin and Brazauskas' predecessor, Landsbergis. One of 
Brazauskas' strengths was his recognition of the importance of 
Lithuania's relationship with Russia. Russia could not be ignored 
while Lithuania was dependent on Russia for fuel, had the 
Kaliningrad Ohlast on her western border and was incapable of 
defending herself and maintaining her independence in the face 
of potential Russian aggression. As neighbouring Belarus' links 
with Russia strengthened, with Russian border guards patrolling 
Lithuanian borders, the maintenance of this stable relationship 
became of ever greater significance.
A stable relationship with Russia was also vital for the 
improvement of Lithuania's economic development. Lithuania's 
economy had been hindered by Landsbergis' stubborn refusal to 
accept the importance of Russia as a market for Lithuanian 
produce, but upon the assumption of office by Brazauskas and the 
LDLP, trade improved markedly between the two states.^ The real 
boost to the Lithuanian economy, however, was the abandoning of 
the Ruble in 1991 and replacing it, first with the temporary 
Talonas and then, on 25 June 1993, with her inter-war currency, 
the Litas. The Litas was pegged to the US$, was convertible and 
proved to be a stable currency in a region where many currencies, 
in particular the Ruble, were not. Its introduction contributed 
to the decline in inflation (from 1020 per cent in 1992 to 189 
per cent in 1994) and to a rise in GDP from US$846 million in 
1992 to US$4245 million in 1994.^
With both Landsbergis and Brazauskas being committed to the 
transition to a market economy, an extensive and ambitious 
programme of privatisation was launched. Some enterprises, such 
as the Klaipeda Tobacco Company or Kaunas Confectionary, were
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privatised very effectively and benefited from western input. 
This was particularly evident when observing the increase in 
production quality over the 1991-1994 period. Western assistance 
was also responsible for the transformation of goods produced by 
Lithuanian factories from obviously Soviet in style to western. 
A typical example of this was the textiles produced by the 
Audejas company, which modernised its designs and colour schemes 
within 12 months of forming a link with an American distributor.
As both the scale of privatisation and GDP increased and a 
fully convertible currency introduced as Lithuania advanced 
towards a market economy, her banking network, which had 
collapsed during the Soviet Occupation, was reconstructed. This 
was yet another indication that both post-Soviet Governments were 
committed to maintaining Lithuania's independence and creating 
a market economy. Mindful, however, of Lithuania's inability to 
defend herself if the need arose, both Governments decided to 
keep her gold reserves stored in the Bank of England, where they 
had been since the inter-war years, for safekeeping.
This decision reflected the delicate situation in which 
Lithuania found herself during the early years of her rebirth. 
Despite launching complex programmes to recreate a democracy, to 
regenerate the economy and to rejoin the international community, 
both of the Governments assessed suffered huge policy failures, 
which impeded these processes. The impact of these failures was 
not alleviated by the fact that it was external circumstances, 
beyond Governmental control, which actually dictated the 
maintenance of Lithuania's independence. Lithuania anxiously 
monitored events in Russia and this created a climate of 
desperate uncertainty, detrimental to her evolution. While 
Landsbergis and Brazauskas were determined to rejoin Europe, 
neither of them could ignore the political situation in the CIS, 
as it had immense repercussions for Lithuania's future. Further 
hindering Lithuania's development in the 1991-1994 period was the 
legacy of the Soviet mentality which had been instilled in the 
Lithuanian people throughout the decades of occupation.
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The characteristics of this legacy, however, were not all the 
sole property of homo sovieticus, as the progeny of the Soviet 
system was known. Many of them, such as internal exile, a loss 
of initiative or a reluctance to shoulder responsibility, are 
typical of bureaucratic societies in general. What makes homo 
sovieticus unique is that all of these traits emerged both imbued 
with specifically Soviet (Communist) tendencies and in a 
particular geopolitical region as the existing societal and 
governmental structures were replaced by alien systems. The homo 
sovieticus found in Lithuania and other former Soviet republics 
or satellite states could not have been exactly replicated in, 
for example, the historic bureaucratic and dictatorial regimes 
of Western Europe or the more contemporary administrations in 
South America or Africa. There is also a further division of the 
species of homo sovieticus which again differentiates Lithuania 
and her East Bloc neighbours from Russia itself and other 
bureaucracies: that it evolved as a direct reaction to the
imposition of authoritarian rule following invasion and 
incorporation into another state. This left a legacy in these 
states that would otherwise not have occurred.
This legacy manifested itself in a variety of ways. In 
domestic political life, it was the spread of corruption 
throughout all areas of society which was detrimental to 
Lithuania's development. Scandals even affected the highest 
echelons of the Government, which, as in Western Europe, 
contributed to electoral defeat. But the rise in corruption in 
Lithuania and the other states of Central and Eastern Europe, was 
also accompanied by the growth of mafia-style activity. It had 
been present under the Soviet regime, but increased markedly upon 
independence, as people engaged in these types of activities were 
best suited to take full advantage of the transition to 
capitalism. This was also an indication of the existence of the 
mentality of homo sovieticus, a species of which was devoted to 
manipulating the system to greatest advantage. Corruption at 
government level was furthermore the result of the desire not to 
relinquish power. The former Communist bureaucrats were best
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placed to gain from the social, political and economic transition 
and they were determined to benefit from it.
The desire of the LDLP to retain control was most apparent 
when examining the procedure surrounding land reform. The 
inability to inaugurate a successful policy was one of the 
greatest failings of the post-Soviet Governments, as it halted 
so much development in Lithuania. By the end of 1994, most land 
was still in state control, which hindered foreign investment and 
also distanced those emigres who wished to return and assist 
their country of birth. The Law on Citizenship made it even more 
laborious for Lithuanian emigres to invest in their homeland, 
especially as they were forced to renounce the citizenship of 
their adopted country if they wanted Lithuanian citizenship.
Lithuania's numerous emigres were further alienated between 
1991-1994 as their offers of assistance were largely bypassed. 
Although the emigre communities had been extremely active in the 
years preceding independence, most of the offers of help made 
after independence had been regained were ignored, unlike in the 
inter-war years, where emigres had been welcomed and their advice 
valued. This was a clear example of homo sovieticus being 
unwilling to accept advice in the belief that he did not need to 
be taught anything.
The actual process of Government, however, was made
additionally complex by the fact Lithuania did not possess an
impartial civil service at any time in the period under review. 
Therefore all departmental decisions were based on personal or 
political whims, which did not create efficiency and solid
government in the critical years of the rebirth of the state.
While Government service could not offer benefits like those of 
western states: such as employment security and good pensions, 
Lithuania was unable to recruit high-calibre staff, as they were 
employed by the far higher-salaried private sector.
Establishing Lithuania's Governmental departments on political
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foundations was all the more precarious because of the changing 
fortunes of Lithuania's political elite in the 1991-1994 years. 
The fragmentation of Sajüdis after the restitution of 
independence was an inevitable occurrence, given its disparate 
membership, but the sheer volumes of petty infighting and the 
numbers of political parties created from it, were astounding. 
The legacy of the Soviet Occupation was incredibly pernicious : 
five decades of repression had created such a climate of 
selfishness that people were determined to create individual 
parties which were based on their precise beliefs rather than 
compromising. This meant that the majority of the new political 
parties created failed to receive sufficient votes to gain 
representation in the Seimas: a self-defeating action.
Political conflict contributed to the growth in apathy of the 
Lithuanian people during the period under review. While apathy 
is not the sole prerogative of homo sovieticus, it was a clear 
element of the mentality. Disenchantment with the evolving 
political system in post-Soviet Lithuania increased the 
popularity of the former Communists, as the voters felt that they 
were better suited to govern the country. Despite their ability, 
however, their alleged corruption contributed to the LDLP's own 
election failure in 1996. By the end of the period under review, 
therefore, the political situation in Lithuania was dismal. 
Although the vital political structures such as the legislature 
had been re-established, the members of the key political parties 
were becoming increasingly unpalatable to the electorate, a fact 
reflected by the decreasing turnout for referenda and elections. 
Although most Lithuanians were committed to a democracy, they had 
been unprepared for the difficulties which accompanied it.
Further impediments were faced in the reconstruction of 
Lithuania's foreign policy in the years between 1991-1994. 
Lithuanians had assumed that their country would easily be able 
to re-enter the international arena from which she had been 
barred in 1940, but this was not to be the case. Internal 
conflicts between existing members regarding expansion of the
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organisation is one reason why no state in Central or Eastern 
Europe has yet achieved entry into the EU. Lithuania's 
politicians can not, however, be blamed for this failure, but 
they can not escape censure for other foreign policy 
shortcomings. A crucial error was not implementing plans for the 
introduction of an apolitical Diplomatic Service. Like the 
failure to introduce a civil service, this left Lithuania with 
a critical dearth of candidates for diplomatic appointments. As 
a result, Lithuania presented an amateurish and lacklustre facade 
to the international community. This was most apparent in the 
selection of Ambassadors and other Embassy personnel and the 
manner in which her foreign relations were conducted. Although 
this had vastly improved by 1997, the damage had been done: many 
supporters of Lithuania during her battle for independence, such 
as Denmark, had become disenchanted with the reborn state.
Although dedicated to ensuring good relations with 
neighbouring states, neither Government's foreign relations were 
as successful as had been hoped. Although inter-Baltic co­
operation had enjoyed some degrees of success, disputes over visa 
issues, minorities and the presence of Russian military forces 
in the region led to tensions between the three states, tensions 
highlighted by the reluctance of the three states to be grouped 
together as a single entity. Relations with Poland were also 
delicate, despite the signing of the Friendship Treaty. The 
Treaty failed to incorporate the major disputes, especially 
regarding the designation of Vilnius and the renunciation of 
Polish claims to Lithuania. It did not, therefore, permanently 
solve the existing dilemmas: they were only temporarily put aside 
and were set to cause problems in the future.
Failure to ensure Lithuania's security was a major concern in 
the 1991-1994 years. Despite campaigning vociferously for entry 
into NATO, the EU and the WEU, no Government of any Central or 
Eastern European state was able to procure it. Lithuania was 
thereby left defenceless, without a security guarantee. Although 
this was not the fault of her Governments, they received the
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blame from the electorate. Lithuania did not possess and could 
never afford the military strength required to deter any likely 
aggressor and needed western assistance to do so. This was 
recognised by the West: in 1994, Carl Bildt wrote that 'the
security of the Baltic nations needs to be assured by integration 
with the institutions of the West.'^ Yet only associate status 
of the EU, WEU and the inadequate Partnership for Peace were 
offered, none of which could assure Baltic security. Further 
legacies of the Soviet occupation were the shortcomings of the 
Soviet military doctrine and the extremely poor (though better 
than their Latvian and Estonian counterparts) levels of training 
of the Lithuanian armed forces.
While the West lacked confidence in the maintenance of 
Lithuania's independence, the economy could not develop as 
rapidly as had been anticipated in 1991. Large-scale investment 
was therefore not forthcoming, but this was also because of the 
inability to introduce comprehensive land reform. The economic 
policies of both Governments were overambitious. Landsbergis 
attempted to completely abandon the Russian market, but although 
Lithuania had Western Europe as an outlet for her produce in the 
inter-war years, the creation of the European Economic Community 
had effectively thwarted this after the restitution of 
independence. Brazauskas' economic policies were on too large a 
scale. Instead of the instant prosperity which had been expected 
with the adoption of capitalism, Lithuania witnessed a dramatic 
increase in inflation and the cost of living, accompanied by a 
general decline in the standard of living. Although official 
unemployment figures remained low, they were highly misleading, 
as many of the unemployed did not register at state offices.
The slow pace of development of Lithuania's economy between 
1991-1994 was a direct repercussion of the presence of homo 
sovieticus. 50 years of Soviet occupation had led to a tendency 
of absenteeism, apathy, an increase in pilfering from the 
workplace, a widespread loss of initiative, the inability to take 
decisions and the reluctance to shoulder responsibility, all of
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which did not facilitate the smooth transition to a market 
economy. Another branch of homo sovieticus, averse to 
relinquishing power and control, also obstructed the pace of 
economic reform. And the Soviet-style "mafia", a further type of 
the species, benefitted most of all from this disarray.
By the end of 1994, therefore, many people were disenchanted 
with post-Soviet life.^ Much of what had been promised in the 
campaign for independence had not materialised and people had not 
gained as much as had been expected from abandoning the USSR. 
This was not, however, entirely the fault of the Governments. The 
Soviet Occupation had created a new breed of Lithuanian, one 
which was unsuited for the reconstruction of the state. Homo 
sovieticus was impatient, unprepared to wait for the benefits of 
capitalism, or to earn the rewards of a capitalist society. S/He 
wanted those benefits instantly, which was impossible. Homo 
sovieticus was also unwilling to accept advice, an error which 
crippled Lithuania's development during this period, or to use 
initiative. This was coupled with the reluctance of those who had 
been in power to relinquish their control, again an action 
damaging to Lithuania's rebirth.
What was most unusual in post-Soviet Lithuania, as it was a 
trait not apparent in the inter-war years, was the habit of 
accusing and denouncing fellow Lithuanians: the harmony which had 
characterised the Lithuanian independence movement had vanished 
almost as soon as its goal had been achieved. This tactic was 
practised in particular by Landsbergis and is not an action which 
is commendable. As Antanas Smetona, grandson of President 
Smetona, indicated, 'in those [Soviet] times, everyone was 
someone and if you begin to accuse everyone, there will be no one 
left.'G A key trait of life in any occupied society was going 
into internal exile, while conforming with the regime on the 
surface. But despite appearing to conform, the majority of 
Lithuanians, including the Communist leader Brazauskas, never 
abandoned their sense of national identity and thus the charge 
of collaboration is particularly uncharitable. As Smetona himself
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said, 'if a person went along with the system so that he could 
earn a crust of bread, I can not condemn him, because I do not 
know what I would have done in his s ho e s. T hi s  mentality, 
however, was not one unique to Lithuania, but was apparent in all 
of the post-Soviet republics.
So what does the future hold for Lithuania? From the time of 
the period which had been reviewed to the present, the situation 
in Lithuania has not radically changed. There has been another 
shift in Government, but the mechanisms of democratic rule are 
in place and the economic policies are still consistent: 
Lithuania is making some progress towards achieving a market 
economy. While the situation in Russia remains politically 
constant, Lithuania's independence is assured and she is 
continuing to develop her foreign relations. All of these are the 
essential components of the rebirth of any state.
But the problems which overshadowed Lithuania's rebirth in 
1994 are no nearer resolution. Crime and corruption are 
increasing, a practical policy of land reform has not been 
introduced, Lithuania still does not possess a viable security 
guarantee and the growth of her economy, as with all aspects of 
her society, is being hindered by the presence of the mentality 
of homo sovieticus, which evolved in Lithuania during the fifty 
years of incorporation in the USSR. None of these obstacles are 
likely to be surmounted in the near future and should the 
political order in Russia change, Lithuania will be in jeopardy. 
Despite this, the indisputable sense of national identity 
traditionally held by the Lithuanian people, (which ensured that 
the rebirth of this nation would eventually occur) remains 
potent. Whatever the future holds, Lithuanians hope that 
subsequent generations, untainted by the legacy of the Soviet 
Occupation, will continue to live in what their forefathers have 
always considered to be 'a land of heroes'
1. From Lietuvos Himnas, written in 1898, translated by J. Brazauskaite in 1988
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2. See Appendix II for details of the trade between Russia and Lithuania in 1993 .
3. See Appendix II for data tables.
4. Bildt, C. The Baltic Litmus Test in Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 5
5. See Appendix III for Ugios' cartoon which graphically displays this sentiment.
6. Interview with Antanas Smetona, Lietuvos Aidas, 15 March, 1997
7. ibid
8. Lietuvos Himnas, op cit.
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APPENDIX I; CASE STUDIES
The following case studies are all referred to in the body of the 
thesis. In each, the appropriate chapter and end note numbers, 
are indicated at the beginning of the text.
Case Study: The Forest Brothers: 1940-1953 (Chapter I)
The Forest Brothers could not have waged their campaign and 
survived for so long without the assistance of ordinary people. 
Joanna Brazauskaite, an aged woman from Vieksniai, frequently 
assisted Forest Brothers after the rest of her family had been 
deported or had managed to flee. She herself had been severely 
assaulted by Soviet troops. Brazauskaite had several anecdotes 
which give an idea of how Lithuanians supported the Forest 
Brothers and the climate of fear in which they lived:
"I took in a Forest Brother one night in 1947 and he was 
feeling unwell. I hid him in the basement, but during the night 
I heard some strange noises coming from the basement and when I 
went to check the next morning, I found that he had died. I 
didn't know what to do, because if I were caught with the body 
of a dead Forest Brother in the house, I would be arrested. So 
I kept him in the basement for a couple of days and finally one 
night I managed to drag him to the fringes of the forest and bury 
him. "
"In 1952 a Forest Brother came to my village. We heard there 
were Russians coming and it wasn't safe for him to try and get 
back to the forest, because it was likely that he would get 
caught on the fringes. So we disguised him: his hair was so long 
and he wore it in two plaits, like a girl. So we shaved him and 
put him in a dress and sat him in the corner. When the Russians 
arrived, and asked who the old woman was, I said that she was a 
cousin who was dumb and the Russians believed it and left. This 
Forest Brother was one of the most successful: he was only
arrested in 1958, five years after the Forest Brothers' campaign
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officially ended."
Interview: 29 June, 1994.
Case Study : The Lithuanian Embassy in London (Chapter IV)
In the inter-war years, the London Legation^ had been one of 
Lithuania's most active foreign posts. By 1939 it had a staff of 
six, including: Minister^ Balutis, Deputy Minister Balickas,
Counsellor Rabinacius, Agricultural Attache^ Varkala and Public 
Relations' Spokesman Sricevas. In 1926 Rabinacius found an 
elegant building at 19, Palace Gardens, opposite the Soviet
Embassy at No. 13.
When War broke out in 193 9, Rabinacius, a Lithuanian Jew, 
emigrated to Lithuania and Sricevas returned to Lithuania, before 
fleeing to Canada, where in later years he became Lithuanian 
Consul General. For fear of bomb damage, all the furniture from 
the Legation was placed into storage in a warehouse in
Bermondsey, which, while the Legation itself was spared any
damage, suffered a direct hit in an air raid and was totally
destroyed. In 1940, following the Soviet Occupation of Lithuania, 
all the staff at the Legation were ordered to report to the 
Soviet Embassy in London "to be given new assignments".^
Only one person^ reported to the Embassy, because his wife, 
a Communist sympathiser, had forced him to. He was awarded a new 
position as Head of a Russian bank in London, but that did not 
save his wife's family, who were all deported to Siberia in 
1944.® None of the other remaining Legation staff appeared at 
the Soviet Embassy, as they were convinced that they would be 
returned to Lithuania and/or deported, especially as they were 
aware that some members of their family in Lithuania had already 
been sent to Siberia.
As the War continued and funds became depleted. Minister 
Balutis was nearing bankruptcy. Brazgionis, a Lithuanian working
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at De La Rue, which printed Lithuania's money, and whose sister 
was married to former Lithuanian President Grinius\ agreed to 
lend Balutis £1,500. With this loan, Balutis was able to survive 
until the end of the War when he sold 19, Palace Gardens to the 
Syrians in December 1945 for £11,000. He bought the smaller 
premises of 28, Essex Villas for £5,500.® The building was left 
in Balutis' will to "The People of Lithuania", but was put in 
Balickas' name, so that it could not be seized or confiscated by 
the Soviet authorities.® Balutis (until his death), Balickas and 
Varkala, while no longer having a state to represent, remained 
in the UK on the ECO Diplomatic List as "Diplomats in Britain 
welcomed by Her Majesty's Government" until international 
recognition of the restitution of Lithuania's independence in 
1991.
Upon the restitution of independence, 28, Essex Villas once 
again assumed its role of Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania. 
In the course of the Soviet Occupation of Lithuania, the two 
surviving members of the Legation staff had grown old. Varkala 
had ceased communicating with Balickas after the fiasco 
surrounding the loss of Balutis' papers after his death and had 
worked as a businessman, later retiring to Hampshire with his 
wife. Balickas, in contrast, remained in residence at 28, Essex 
Villas, converting it into his family residence. This was to 
prove a serious problem upon the restitution of independence, for 
although the Lithuanian Government wanted to re-open their 
Embassy, Balickas and his family were extremely reluctant to lose 
their home.
There was also the complicated question of whom to appoint as 
Ambassador. Technically the post should have been filled by 
Balickas, as he was Balutis' immediate Deputy, but this was not 
approved of by the Lithuanian Community in London, who believed 
that Balickas was no longer of entirely sound mind. He had also 
lost their favour by his unwillingness to participate in the 
numerous demonstrations calling for the freedom of Lithuania. 
Many of the Lithuanian community in London believed that Varkala
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should assume the mantle of Ambassador, as not only did he have 
a fluent command of the English language, unlike Balickas (who 
despite all his years in residence in the UK never learned more 
than the most basic of vocabularies) , but because he also had 
enough practical common sense and business acumen to be of real 
assistance to Lithuania in the first, difficult years of post- 
Soviet independence.^® But, in what proved to be a costly 
mistake, the Landsbergis Government believed that Balickas should 
be rewarded for maintaining the Embassy during the Occupation and 
appointed him Ambassador.
The Ambassador alone, however, could not run the Embassy, 
especially an Ambassador in failing health. But there was, as in 
all of the re-opened or re-established missions around the world, 
a shortage of staff and the funds to provide them. S. Kervaitis 
and G . Stankevicius were temporary officials sent to the Embassy 
and in 1992, Antanas Nesavas was despatched from Vilnius (with 
a minimal command of the English language) to act as Charge 
d'Affaires. The bulk of the work, however, was originally carried 
out, gratis, by a volunteer from the Lithuanian community in 
London, Jone Brazauskaite.
The 45 years of Balickas' residency in 28, Essex Villas, 
however, caused problems. Balickas considered the Embassy to be 
his home and was reluctant to lose any of his living space. 
Consequently all of the Embassy work was undertaken in one small 
attic room, while the large, elegant staterooms remained 
Balickas' home except on the sole occasion of Lithuanian 
Independence Day, 1992, when he grudgingly permitted the state 
rooms to be used to host an evening reception. Equipping the 
Embassy with a staff whose chief officers had a minimal command 
of English and being forced to operate from an attic room gave 
an air of amateurism to the whole running of the Embassy and 
presented a poor image to the British Diplomatic community and, 
indeed, to anyone who visited the Embassy.
It was left to Nesavas and Brazauskaite, who were joined by
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a Lithuanian American, Imsré Sabaliunas, as Head of Chancery, to 
begin operating the Embassy. They had to prepare for the 
accreditation of Balickas: the presentation of credentials to the 
Queen was a monumental event in the eyes of the Lithuanian
people. Balickas demanded that his visit to Buckingham Palace 
should begin not from the Embassy, but from the Presidential 
Suite at the Carlton Hotel, as he had seen Ambassadors from other 
states do.^ ^
Following the accreditation, the Embassy staff began to 
undertake more menial tasks. Nesavas had to learn how to operate 
in a western society. The legacy of homo sovieticus hung over 
him: he was extremely unhelpful to callers at the Embassy and was 
incensed when Brazauskaite would volunteer information to those 
who required it.^ ® He also had to learn how to answer letters: 
on arriving at the Embassy, Brazauskaite had discovered a 
towering pile of unanswered correspondence, which had just been 
disregarded in typical Soviet manner by Kervaitis and 
Stankevicius. As well as the paperwork, the other important task 
was to acquire an Embassy car. The Lithuanian community in London 
was approached by Brazauskaite and an offer of a top-of-the-range 
Rover was made. This was the beginning of the real alienation of 
the London Lithuanians: Nesavas rejected it, believing that
Lithuania needed a car with more " status Thus, at far
greater expense, a Volvo 85 0 was purchased, a move which truly 
offended the Lithuanian community as they felt they had been 
roundly snubbed.
Following the election victory of the LDLP in the Autumn of 
1992, more staff began arriving at the Embassy. These were
predominantly political appointments made by Brazauskas. A 
Political Counsellor and an Economics Counsellor were both former 
Communists and brought with them the mentality of homo
sovieticus, which was not of great benefit to the smooth running 
of the Embassy. Relations between the Embassy and the Lithuanian 
community in London soured still further as the Embassy staff 
ignored their efforts of help. This was in direct contrast to the
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case of Latvia, where the Latvian community in London were 
extremely active in re-opening and running the Embassy and whose 
efforts were appreciated by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.Brazauskaite left the Embassy, although she continued 
to maintain contact privately with some of the Embassy staff ad 
given them assistance, particularly in the field of press 
relations. Varkala also maintained contact with the Embassy, 
again, in a private capacity, but relations with Balickas 
remained hostile.
The legacy of homo sovieticus meant that the Embassy did not 
function smoothly and it failed to provide a real service to the 
Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Things became worse in 
the Autumn of 1993. As Ambassador Balickas grew increasingly 
frail, Brazauskas accepted that he needed to be retired. Nesavas 
presumed himself to be the natural successor, as he had been 
undertaking the majority of Balickas' Ambassadorial duties. As 
the months went on, however, it appeared as if this would not be 
the case and over a January 1994 weekend, Nesavas disappeared 
without trace. It was not until April 1994 that he resurfaced in 
Vilnius, claiming to have suffered a mental health illness. 
Brazauskas had not intended that Nesavas should succeed Balickas: 
under his regime. Ambassadorial appointments tended to be people 
he wanted away from Vilnius and Balickas' successor was no 
exception.
Raimundas Rejackas had been Brazauskas' General Adviser and 
was appointed Ambassador at the start of 1994 as he had fallen 
into disfavour with a number of Brazauskas' prominent supporters 
in Vilnius.^ This move was not appreciated by the London 
Lithuanians, who believed that the maintenance of relations 
between Lithuania and the UK was so important that the best 
quality candidates should be posted to the London Embassy as 
opposed to Government "rejects". As news of the nature of the 
Ambassadorial appointment became widespread through political 
circles in London, Lithuania's status in the eyes of the British 
ECO decreased, as it was believed that London was being snubbed
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by the appointment of "second rate" candidates.^ It was felt 
that by the appointment of such a character, Lithuania did not 
value the importance of her foreign relations and this was to 
hinder the growth of these relations in the post-independence 
years.
In the years following 1994, the Embassy continued to be 
staffed by political appointees. The successor to Rejackas was 
Justas Paleckis, formerly a member of the USSR's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ideology Chief of the CPL. He had been 
Brazauskas' Foreign Policy Adviser, and his appointment 
displeased some of the London Lithuanians. Compared to his 
predecessors, however, Paleckis was by far the most competent of 
all of Lithuania's fledgling Ambassadors. The appointments made 
to the Embassy at the end of 1996, though political by their 
nature, were of far greater benefit to Lithuania, as they were 
all efficient and moderately successful diplomats. As the lease 
on 28, Essex Villas, reached expiration, the Embassy moved to a 
freehold building in Gloucester Place and shortly after moving 
out of the building which he had occupied for over 50 years, 
Balickas died on 22 December 1996.
The Lithuanians had made a shambolic start at re-establishing 
their diplomatic community in Britain. Similar cases were 
reported in Paris, Bonn and Washington D.C.. All of the new 
Embassies were burdened by the inefficiency and petty bureaucracy 
which had characterised the Soviet regime and thus it was only 
five years after the restitution of independence that Lithuania's 
diplomats were finally able to function in a manner even vaguely 
similar to their western counterparts and not in the former 
Soviet style.
1. The term "Legation" was used, rather than "Embassy" in the inter-war years.
2 , Lithuania did not have official Ambassadors in the inter-war years and used the term Minister instead, although the Minister possessed Ambassadorial powers and held Ambassadorial status.
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3. Many states with Embassies in London do not place great importance in the position of Agricultural Attache, but because of Lithuania's volume of agricultural exports to the UK in the inter-war years, this position was vital. In the post-Independence years, however, there was not an Agricultural Attache at the Lithuanian Embassy in London.
4. On 13 August 1940, all members of the Lithuanian Legation in London received a letter from the Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in London, stating that the Government of the USSR had "taken over the legation of the former Lithuanian Republic." The Legation staff were ordered to "1) immediately hand over all documents and archives located in the Legation and transfer all power to the representatives of the USSR in Great Britain. 2) To immediately inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Legation was discontinuing all activities of the Mission and Consulate. 3) On completely concluding the handover and following the meeting [with the Soviet representatives] to return immediately to the Motherland."
(The original letter was typed in Russian, translated by A. Ashbourne, 15 October, 1993.)
5. Petras Varkala refused to name him during the interview on 15 October, 1993 .
6. She stopped supporting Communism after the deportations, having lost her entire close family.
7. To a westerner, such family detail might seem excessive, but family connections were (in the inter-war years and to a great extent are, post- Independence) the basis for most activity within Lithuania, either in the field of international relations or commerce. The family unit is given great importance in Lithuania and the concept of the extended family is widely used. Family loyalty, no matter how distant the genealogical connection, was, and still is, therefore, a powerful force in Lithuania, as demonstrated by the pressure applied for Minister Balutis' loan.
8. Petras Varkala, who oversaw the sale and purchase of the Legation's buildings. Interview, 15 October, 1993.
9. Balutis' Will (Executor, Petras Varkala). Balutis died on 30 December, 196 7. In his will, all of his estate was left to "The People of Lithuania" and instructions were given to Petras Varkala to open his diaries and papers 10 years after his death. But relations between Balutis and Balickas, his Deputy, were "terrible" (according to Varkala) and the papers and diaries, which would have provided an excellent insight into the history of inter-war Lithuania, were never handed over and were presumably lost. All of Balutis' possessions were put in the name of Balickas "on condition that when Lithuania regains her independence, everything shall be given to Lithuania." It is interesting to note the optimism which characterised the exiles: the use of the word "when" rather than "if" illustrated the belief that the Soviet occupation would only be temporary and that Lithuania would eventually be able to reaffirm her independence.
10. Discussions with many members of the Lithuanian community in London throughout 1991-1992. I met no one, apart from Balickas' family, who believed that he should have been appointed Ambassador.
11. Jone Brazauskaite, interview, 16 February, 1992 and my personalexperiences of the Embassy in 1991-1992. Perhaps the worst part of beingforced to go to the attic for Embassy business was being stared at by the Ambassador and his wife as one ascended the five flights of stairs and being made to feel extremely uncomfortable, as if trespassing, which is, in fact,more or less how they viewed visitors to the Embassy.
320
12. Brazauskaite counselled vehemently against this, believing it to be a thoroughly unnecessary expense, but she was overruled by both Balickas and Nesavas, who wanted to enjoy the trappings of Ambassadorial power, however inappropriate.
13 . A definite legacy of the Soviet occupation was the reluctance to volunteer information of any kind: it took many months before Brazauskaite couldconvince Nesavas to answer the telephone with the words "Lithuanian Embassy, hello," rather than to say nothing at all.
14. A. Nesavas, Charge d'Affaires, Lithuanian Embassy, interview, 11 March,1992 .
15. Paul Zandosky-Roddy, Latvian Community in London, interview, 5 September,1993 .
16. Nesavas remained in the employ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite his obvious mental instability, but was posted to Georgia, where he died in a drink-related road accident in December of that year.
17. Therefore Brazauskas considered it expedient to have him out of the public eye. In a similar manner, Cabinet members Cecil Parkinson and David Mellor were forced to resign their posts in the UK after their behaviour was deemed embarrassing to the Government. Like Parkinson, in particular, Rejackas regained political office by being elected to the Seimas in the 1996 elections. The difference, however, was that he changed parties in 1995 and is now a Conservative. He claimed that this was an intellectual decision: that he was disenchanted and disgusted with the abuses of power by the LDLP. Source: J. Brazauskaite, interview, 21 January, 1996.
18. Petras Varkala, interview, 15 February, 1994
19. Sir Percy Cradock, former head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, interview, 6 April, 1994
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Case Study on Jurais Kairvs: International Participation of a
Lithuanian Aerobatic Pilot. (Chapter IV)
Kairys' participation in international competition is arranged 
through the Transport Ministry in Vilnius, which is responsible 
for liaising with the organisers of the international 
competitions and their sponsor, Breitling. Unlike other 
Lithuanian sportsmen and women, who struggled to distance 
themselves from their link with the USSR, Kairys continued to 
demonstrate his ties to Russia. In competition, he advertised the 
fact that not only was he the Lithuanian champion, but that he 
was also chief test-pilot for Sukhoi. His relationship with 
Sukhoi was mutually beneficial: the Russian company had a pilot 
demonstrating its product to an international audience while 
Kairys was given the opportunity to fly different types of 
aerobatic planes manufactured in both East and West in his 
capacity as chief test pilot. He was involved in the development 
of the SU-31 from the programme's inception and was able to use 
the knowledge he had gleaned from flying many aerobatic planes 
to enable the SU-31 to be one of the most agile aerobatic planes 
ever manufactured; "The best plane I have ever flown!"
Kairys also benefitted from maintaining his relationship with 
Sukhoi because with the poor economic situation in Lithuania, he 
would not have been able to compete internationally without the 
Sukhoi sponsorship. The maintenance and the entry fees would have 
been more than he could afford and Kairys was reluctant to ask 
the Lithuanian Government for so much financial support. 
Attending international air displays is just one achievement of 
re-integration and although air show participation has rarely 
been given a great deal of importance or considered significant 
by western states, in Lithuania Kairys was feted as a national 
hero because he had brought his state, once more, into the public 
eye.
Source: J. Kairys, interview at the Internationale Luft
Ausstellung (ILA) Berlin, 27 May, 1994
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Case Study: The Acquisition of Klaipeda Tobacco Company. (Chapter 
VI)
Throughout the negotiations with Philip Morris (the world's 
largest manufacturer of cigarettes and other tobacco products) 
the Government of Lithuania was advised by a number of 
international consultancy firms. KPMG Peat Marwick Policy 
Economics Group advised on financial aspects, McKenna & Co. 
handled the legal side and Arthur Andersen provided general 
assistance. Their role was to design a specific, detailed path 
along which privatisation would proceed. This covered the initial 
plan for privatisation, the notice of tender and the following 
application forms as directed by the Central Privatisation 
Commission, the tender documents and relative tender assessment 
criteria. All the documents were written in English, but were 
subsequently translated into Lithuanian and Russian to allow for 
quick assessment of their contents to be made by all interested 
parties.
The initial privatisation plan covered an overview of the 
Company, proposals on the necessary restructuring to enable it 
to compete in the international market, regulatory issues and an 
analysis of Klaipeda Tobacco Company's potential market 
valuation. It also contained an outline of the tender process, 
the necessary documentation and timetables for the various stages 
of privatisation. Valuations of the Company were made by 
examining discounted cashflow and making a projection of the 
impact of the implementation of regulatory decisions on cash-flow 
calculations. These covered the level of minority State equity 
retained; employment guarantees and operation restrictions such 
as the cost of advertising, price liberalisation and levels of 
import duty and tax.
Following verification of the valuation memorandum, the 
official notice of tender was published in the Lithuanian press 
in November 1992 and was also sent to target potential investors. 
A 10-week period was given in which bids could be submitted.
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Applications for tender documents were submitted by interested 
potential bidders in a manner which allowed for legally 
enforceable confidentiality provisions (made possible by the 
charging of a US$250 administration fee). The documents ensured 
that all tender proposals were legally binding under Lithuanian 
law, that they covered all the necessary business, financial and 
legal details of the company and that prospective bidders were 
entirely clear about the rules governing the eventual tender. 
This was a vital matter as this case was setting a precedent for 
future large-scale privatisation in Lithuania and therefore 
everything had to be made deliberately clear to potential 
investors to avoid any misunderstandings and to ensure that 
future privatisation projects would proceed smoothly.
In order that competing bids could be compared, a draft 
agreement of the Klaipeda Tobacco Company was also included. This 
outlined certain guarantees made by the Government, most 
importantly specific environmental issues related to the past 
practices at the company in the days before the protection of the 
environment had been a real concern. A pro-forma tender proposal 
was included which specified the exact tender proposals needed 
regarding payment, plus investment, technical, marketing, 
training and employment assistance. A western-style marketing 
strategy was also included in the package.
Tender proposals were submitted by interested bidders at the 
end of January 1993 and then the process of selection by the 
Lithuanian Government began. In mid-February, representatives of 
Philip Morris were invited to Vilnius for further negotiations, 
which resulted in the publication of a review proposal and the 
subsequent signing of a conditional sale agreement in March. The 
sale of Klaipeda Tobacco Company was approved a week later, 
following the sale agreement, escrow agreements and a letter of 
disclosure being published on 1 April. The official share 
transfer documents were signed in May, a mere 7 months after 
original negotiations began.
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The Lithuanian Government was attracted by Philip Morris' bid 
because of several key points made in the February review 
proposal. The tobacco magnate paid the Republic of Lithuania 
US$12.5 million for 64.9 per cent of existing equity. 
Contributions to equity were also made in capital expenditure, 
of which approximately US$3 0 million was to be used to modernise 
and develop the enterprise. Designed to attract the support of 
the existing employees at Klaipeda Tobacco Company at a time of 
rising unemployment, Philip Morris guaranteed to maintain 
existing employment levels for a three-year period and then 
indicated that employment in the Company was actually expected 
to increase by a further 33 per cent. As a gesture of goodwill, 
Philip Morris further endeared itself to the people of Klaipeda 
by contributing US$500,000 to establish an employees' pension 
fund and by making a US$100,000 donation to a Lithuanian 
children's hospital.
Source: EU PHARE Programme Klaipeda Tobacco Comoanv PHARE, 1994, 
pp3-8
Case studv: Property Restitution: (Chapter VI)
Property: 600 Acre farm, Balsupè, near Marijampolé. 
Pre-Occupation Owner: Z. Rutkauskiene (in possession of original 
title deed)
The farm was confiscated in 1944 when Rutkauskiene and the 
majority of her family were deported to Siberia on charges of 
capitalism and alienating the workers of the village. The 
original wooden houses and barns were removed from their 
foundations, subdivided and replaced throughout the village of 
Balsupè, on the northern fringe of the property. Most of the 
original buildings in the village, including the Church and 
family cemetery were either razed or heavily vandalised. The 
acreage became incorporated into a large kolkhoz.
At the end of 1991, the first Law on the Restitution of
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Ownership Rights to Residents of Existing Real Estate was passed, 
according to which, the property would be returned to 
Rutkauskiene. The land, however, was not immediately returned, 
despite a personal assurance from President Brazauskas in April 
1993 that it would be. Then in late 1993 the law was changed 
again and new legislation, outlined in Chapter III, prevented the 
immediate return of the property.
In 1994, additional legislation divided the property into 
zones (see map in Appendix IV). Rutkauskiene was informed that 
200 acres were available for return: 12 acres at the far east of 
the property and the remaining 188 at the far west of the 
property, around the site of the former houses. No access would 
be provided to link the two. The remaining 4 00 acres, the most 
prime arable land, was designated a "Green Zone". This was 
subdivided into small plots, with the intention of selling them 
to the villagers of Balsupè. Balsupè, however, is an extremely 
poor village, especially after its near destruction by the Soviet 
occupying forces and no villager could afford any of the plots 
of land. Rutkauskiene was also extremely reluctant to relinquish 
any claim to the land; the compensation for the 400 acre prime 
site only amounted to the value of six television sets and she 
was not prepared to settle for such a paltry amount.
On 5 July, 1994, Rutkauskiene, accompanied by relatives from 
the West, one of whom had received the personal assurance from 
Brazauskas of the property's return, contacted the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Vilnius. There they were told to see the Head of 
the Agriculture Commission in Marijampolé, Mindaugas Allessius. 
Their meeting was tense and unproductive. Allessius was far more 
used to dealing with poor farmers and his manner of dealing with 
them, witnessed personally by Rutkauskiene and her family, was 
to shout abuse at them until they departed. This tactic, however, 
was not to work with Rutkauskiene. But all Allessius could 
finally say was that the land restitution policy would be 
changing "no doubt within six months" and that it was best to 
hold out and wait for a more favourable policy. By 19 97, however.
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the land was still unreturned and the majority of it was lying 
idle.
The most disappointing aspect of this whole case, and one 
which affected so many Lithuanian farms and enterprises, was the 
loss of foreign investment. In 1991, Rutkauskiene's niece had 
approached the British Pig Improvement Company, (BPIC) who, after 
an exploratory visit to the site had pronounced it highly 
suitable for pig farming, one of the principal inter-war years' 
industries. Lithuania possesses ideal conditions for pig farming: 
a good climate and ideal soil and feeding conditions. As the 
restitution issue proceeded, however, BPIC was reluctantly forced 
to admit that there was little use in investing - not only at the 
Baluspè farm, but in Lithuania as a whole. The restitution of 
part of the land was insufficient for their needs and the 
frequent amendments to the legislation did not inspire confidence 
in future investment prospects; one of the great tragedies of 
Lithuania's rebirth and an unnecessary blow to the economy.
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APPENDIX II
DATA;
Election Results to the Constituent Assembly (14-15 April 1920)
Christian Democratic Bloc 59 seatsPeasant Union and Socialist Populist Bloc 28 seatsSocial Democrats 12 seatsIndependents 2 seatsJewish Minority 7 seatsPoles 3 seatsGermans 1 seat
Source: Gerutis, A. Lithuania 7 00 Years Manyland 1984 pl93
Election Results: February 1990;
SajûdisCPLCPSUIndependents
99 deputies 2 5 deputies 7 deputies 5 deputies
Chairmanship Elections by the Deputies (9 March 1990);
LandsbergisBrazauskasAbstentions
91 votes 3 8 votes 7 votes
Source: Lieven, A. The Baltic Revolutions Yale University Press 1993 pp234-235 
Election results (bv Seats in the Seimas)
Party 1992LDLP 73Union of Christian Democrats 1Lithuanian Poles' Union 4The Centre Union of Lithuania 2Lithuanian Democratic Party 4Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party 9Lithuania's Sajudis 28Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 8Lithuanian Nationalist Union 3Independence Party 1Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners 2Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees 5Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action Homeland Union Lithuanian Conservatives (former Sajüdis)Other PartiesSelf-nominated 1
Total 141
Voter Turnout : 72%
Source: Lithuanian Embassy, London.
Membership of International Organisations :
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Council for the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Council of Europe (CE)Customs Co-operation Council (CCC)Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
199612
1
14216
12
1
13
704 3
139
53%
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European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAQ)International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL)International Labour Organisation (ILO)International Monetary Fund (IMF)International Olympic Committee (IOC)International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)International Telecommunication Union (ITU)International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (INTELSAT - non­signatory user)League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LORCS)North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)United Nations (UN)United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)Universal Postal Union (UPU)Western European Union (WEU -Associate Status)World Health Organisation (WHO)World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
Source : Jane's Information Group
Members of the Lithuanian Government in 1990 and their Previous Occupations.
Chairman :Deputy Chairman: Deputy Chairman: Deputy Chairman:
Vytautas Landsbergis, Musicologist, Professor. Bronislavas Kuzmickas, Philosopher.Kazimieras Motieka, Lawyer.Ceslovas Stankevicius, Engineer.
Council of Ministers :Kazimiera Prunskiené, Economist.Algirdas Brazauskas, Civil Engineer, First Secretary of the CPL. Romualdas Ozolas, Editor, Member of the Central Committee of the CPL. Vytautas Knasys, Agronomist, Member of the Central Committee of the CPL. Kostas Birulis, Electrical Engineer.
Culture and Education: Economics ;Energy:Finance :
Foreign Affairs: Forestry:Health;Hous ing:Interior ;
Justice :
Social Security:
Trade :
Transport ;
Darius Kuolys, Editor.Vytautas Navickas, Economist.Leonantas Asmantas, Energetics specialist.Romualdas Sikorskis, Finance specialist. Member of the Central Committee of the CPL.Algirdas Saudargas, Biophysicist.Vaidotas Antanaitis, Forestry Engineer.Juozas Olekas, Surgeon.Algimantis Nasvytis, Architect.Marijonas Misiukonis, Lawyer, Minister of the Interior of the CPL.Pranas Küris, Minister of Justice of the Lithuanian SSR.Algis Dobravolskas, Economist, Member of the Central Committee of the CPL.Albertas Sinevicius, Engineer, Deputy Minister of Light Industry, 1987-1990.Jonas Birziskis, Engineer.
Source: Romas Kinka, Anglo-Baltic Information Consultancy.
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The Lithuanian Diaspora, 1991;USA 812 000Russia 70 000Brazil 35 000Argentina 35 000Latvia 35 000Poland 30 000Canada 20 000Ukraine 11 000Belarus 10 000Kazakhstan 10 000Australia 10 000Germany 10 000Great Britain 10 000Uruguay 3 500Estonia 2 500France 1 200Others 1 000
Total : 1 106 000
Source: Department of Regional Problems and National Minorities 
Ethnic Groups in the Baltic States, 1994;
Total Populations :
EstoniaLatviaLithuania
1.552.000 2,526,0493.724.000
Population bv Nationality
Lithuania :LithuanianRussianPolishBelarussianUkrainian
Latvia :LatvianRussianBelarussianUkrainianPolishLithuanian
Estonia :EstonianRussianUkrainianBelarussianFinnishJewishTartarGermanLatvianPolishOthers
per cent
81.1 8 . 5 7 . 0 1.5 1.0
5333432
1.2
61. 5 30.3 3 . 1 1.8 1 .10.3 0 . 3 0 . 2 0.2 
0 . 2
1 . 1
Source: Beaver, P.(ed) Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States 1996 pl7
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Principal Political Parties in the Baltic States (1996]
Estonia :IsamaaModerates Electoral Alliance Estonian National Independence Movement Estonian National Progressive Party Estonian Democratic Labour Party Baltic Organisation of Young Democrats Consolidation Party Estonian Entrepreneurs' Party Estonian Green Movement Estonian Royalist Party Estonian Rural Centre Party Estonian Social Democratic Party Russian Democratic Movement
Latvia :Latvian WayLatvian Farmers' UnionLatvian National Independence Movement Harmony for Latvia Rebirth of National Economy EqualityChristian Democratic Union of Latvia Union for Fatherland and Freedom Democratic Centre Party
Lithuania :Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party Christian Democratic Party Lithuanian Farmers Union Lithuanian National Union Lithuania Social Democratic Party Polish Union Lithuanian Green Party Sajûdis
Source; Beaver, P. (ed) Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States 
op cit
Inflation; 1991-1994
1991 1992 1993 1994
216.4% 1020.0% 410.0% 189.0%
Source: The World Business Economic Review 1996, p485
Gross Domestic Product Bv Sector; 1992-1994; (Million US$/% of total GDP)
1992 1993 1994Mining/Manufacturing 300.9/35.5 688.1/24.8 981.2/23.1Electricity/Gas/Heat/Water 32.8/ 3.9 156.7/ 5.6 113.2/2.7Agriculture/Forestry 97.9/11.6 305.1/11.0 308.9/7.3Construction 78.9/ 9.3 215.5/ 7.8 370.8/8.7Trade 38.1/ 4.5 445.8/16.1 799.4/23.1Restaurants/Hotels 7.6/ 0.9 20.1/0.7 35.7/0.8Transport 59.7/ 7.1 257.2/ 9.3 327.1/7.7Communications 9.0/ 1.1 38.1/1.4 71.5/1.7Banking 52.9/ 6.3 193.5/ 7.0 162.0/3.8Finance/Insurance 2.3/ 0.3 8.9/ 0.3 27.8/0.7Other 166.2/19.6 447.6/16.1 1225.1/20.4
Total 846.6/100 2776.9/100 4,245.1/100
Source: Ministry of Industry Lithuania: Country Profile op cit, p4
Foreign Trade in 1993;
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CIS 3,332.2 / 62.5EU 717 . 9 / 13.5EFTA 250 . 9 / 4.7Central/Eastern Europe 923.2 / 17,3USA 49 . 0 / 0.9Other 62 . 6 / 1.1
Total : 5,355.0 / 100%
Imports (million Lt/%)
CIS 4,697.2 / 83.7EU 380.7 / 6.8EFTA 145.1 / 2.6Central/Eastern Europe 167 . 9 / 3 . 0USA 106.9 / 1.9Other 110 . 8 / 2 . 0%
Total : 5,608.6 / 100%
Main Trading Partners in 1993
Exports (million Lt/‘
Russia 2,318.8 / 43.5%Latvia 565.4 / 10 . 6%Belarus 388 . 0 / 7.3%Ukraine 332.3 / 6.2%Germany 318 . 3 / 6 . 0%
Imports (million Lt/%)
Russia 4,135.2 / 74 . 0%Germany 213 .1 / 3 . 8%Kazakhstan 166 .1 / 3 . 0%Belarus 144 . 7 / 2.6%Ukraine 134.2 / 2.4%
Source: Lithuanian Information Institute
The Re-election of Communist Successor Parties in Central and Eastern Europe 1990-1996 :(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania)
Cz SI Cr Lt Po Hu Bu Ro
ElectionFirst : No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 1990 1990 1990 1990
Second : No Coalit. No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes1992 1992 1992 1992 1993 1994 1991 1992 1992
Third : No1996 Coalit. 1994 - No1996 - - Yes1994 No1996 No1996
Source : Peter Bod,, Minister of Trade and Industry, Hungary, 1992- 1994
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Election Results in Russia; 1993 and 1995
1993 1995Communist 12.4% 22.9%Liberal Democrat 22.9% 11.1%Our Home is Russia n/a 9.6%Yabloko 7.9% 8.4%Democratic Choice of Russia 15.5% 4.8%Women of Russia 8.1% 4.5%Congress of Russian Communities n/a 4.3%Working Russia n/a 4.2%Party of Svyatoslav Fyodorov n/a 4.1%Agrarian 8.0% 3.0%Others n/a 3.0%
Turnout 53.0% 65.0%
Source : Reuters
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APPENDIX III 
ILLUSTRATIONS
1) "The Lithuanian School", a sculpture bv Rimsa.
This sculpture embodies the determination of the Lithuanians to preserve their national identity during the intense period of Russification between 1864-1904. It depicts a Lithuanian woman teaching her child the Lithuanian language, which had been banned, while at work, spinning. The sculpture was moved from its prominent position in the centre of Kaunas during the Soviet occupation, but was returned to its original plinth in 1991.
Photograph taken by A. Ashbourne, 19 June 19 94
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2) A Map of the Marijampolé Region, demonstrating the 1994 zoning of the land.
As described in Chapter III, land was divided into Grey, Yellow and Green zones in 1994. Grey zones could be returned to their original owners if sufficient proof of ownership could be provided; the Yellow zones were areas of questionable ownership and the Green zones, often the prime pieces of land was to be made available for purchase by local villagers. The plots, however, were marketed at a price far higher than the majority of those interested could afford and thus the land remained under state control. (The White zones indicate swamps or other unusable land.)
Photograph taken by A. Ashbourne from a map at the Agrarian Commission at Marijampolé, 28 June 1994.
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3) Cartoon: Reprinted in Lietuva, October 1989.
This was a visible sign of Glasnost: such a hostile cartoon would never have been printed in a Lithuanian paper published in Vilnius a few years previously.
•annflE T» poof
..Kieta linija"; Tu sakei, nenaucok rykSéiij. Tu sakei, duok Jlems daugiau lalsvés. Geral, Mr. Perestrojka, o kas toUau? PleSinys 1§ ,,Newsday“ (JAV)
:artoon: Gimtasis krastas, 11 November 1994
This cartoon, "Lithuania's Road" by Adolfo Uzos, clearly depicts the increasing disillusionment and dissatisfaction of many Lithuanians as the unpredicted hardships caused by the transition to democracy and capitalism became evident. The patriotism of 1988 was forgotten as standards of living declined.
Lietuvos kelias. Adolfo Uzos pies.
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ORAL SOURCES
Due to the exceptionally contemporary nature of this thesis, a considerable amount of my information is derived from oral sources. These range from Government officials in a number of states (not just Lithuania) to ordinary people, but what all the sources have in common is that they were, in however small or large a measure, able to contribute vital material to my thesis. A few of my sources are now deceased but I revel in my good fortune that I was able to share their experiences.
The gathering of information from oral sources was undertaken in a variety of ways. There were formal interviews, which were recorded on tape; interviews where notes of the conversation were taken by hand and numerous meals, notes from which were made afterwards. Other information was gleaned from normal conversations, snatched moments while travelling in cars, buses or trains and many, many hours sitting around talking, listening to people's experiences and ideas. A number of people gave me interviews over the telephone and were available to answer individual questions as they arose during the writing of this thesis. The majority of people to whom I spoke were prepared to go "on the record" and be directly quoted. There were some occasions, however, where it was requested that the information given to me, which I was welcome to use, should not be directly attributed to certain people. It is in these cases that my end­notes refer to a "Source at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" or likewise.
Having been directly involved in the process of the re- emergence of modern Lithuania, some of my end-notes are also attributed to "my own information" or "personal experience", as I witnessed personally the various stages of the rebirth of 
Lithuania.
The following is a list of all those oral sources who contributed to the thesis. Their names, especially those unknown to western readers, are accompanied by a short biographical detail, to demonstrate their relevance to the thesis. Some are not directly referred to in the text, but they were responsible for giving me information, ideas and inspiration and deserve credit for this.
In Lithuania :
Allessius, E .: Director of the Agrarian Reform Agency, Marijampolé.
Balutis. Adolfas: President of the Union of Lithuanian LargeTowns, headquartered in Kaunas.
Bernotas. Rokas: A former lecturer in Chemistry and a fluent Japanese speaker, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991, studying at the Foreign Service School at St. Anthony's College, Oxford University in 1993 and becoming Vice Foreign
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Minister in charge of Western Europe in 1994. He was appointed to the Lithuanian Embassy in Rome in 1996. He is one of the principal forces behind the reconstruction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is a campaigner for the creation and introduction of an impartial civil service. Of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff, he possesses the greatest understanding of the challenges facing Lithuania in the period of her rebirth.
Brazauskaite, Joanna: Targeted by the Soviet occupying forces for arrest and deportation in 1944, together with other members of the Brazauskas family, she evaded arrest. She worked with the partisan Forest Brothers, shielding partisans from Soviet forces. Contact with the rest of her family was broken off after what was believed to be an assault by Soviet troops and she turned instead to a religious life, caring for an elderly priest in Vieksniai, Fr. Vincentas (qy) , as it was impossible during the Occupation for her to take Holy Orders and enter a convent.
Brazauskas, Alairdas: President of Lithuania (1993-) . Leader of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), formerly the Communist Party of Lithuania.
Brazauskas. Ziamas: An architect and environmentalist in Kaunas and a campaigner for the restitution of Lithuania's independence. He has an exceptionally wise and sensible perception of events in Lithuania and remarkable political nous for someone who was not involved in the Communist Party's activities during the occupation.
Brazauskiene. Laime: Dentist in Kaunas, Married to ZigmasBrazauskas (qv) and shares his sensibilities and practical nature. During the last years of the Occupation, she treated numerous CPL officials and members of the Nomenklatura as she was able to receive western dental products, such as fillings, sent or brought by relatives in the UK and USA.
Cekuolis. Alqimantas: Journalist, writer and editor of popular weekly newspaper Gimtasis krastas. He was the principal spokesman in the West for Sajudis before the restitution of independence. Since independence, he sat on the Board of the collapsed APUS Bank in Kaunas.
Parais. Vladas: Editor, Eurovas Lietuvis. he returned toLithuania in 1993, after 50 years spent as an emigre in London.
Gaidvs. Vladas : Professor at the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, Vilnius, and undertakes research for the Lithuanian Information Institute.
Galvinas. Admiral : Lithuanian Navy.
Genvs. Kestutis: Actor and voice of Sajudis during the struggle for independence.
Greiciunas. Valentinas: Director of the State Harbour, Klaipeda.
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Hargreaves, Jonathan : Director of the European Union PHAREProgramme, headquartered in the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Vilnius.
Janulaitiene, Kazimiera; Spokeswoman for the Lithuanian Information Institute, Vilnius.
Kairvs. Jurais: Lithuania's internationally-renowned aerobatic pilot and chief test pilot for the Russian aerospace company 
Sukhoi.
Landsberais. Vvtautas ; de facto Head of State of Lithuania, 1990-1993. Elected Chairman of Sajudis in November 1988. Professor of Musicology by profession. Perceived in the West as the chief symbol of Lithuania's struggle for independence, but defeated in the elections of 1992, before regaining victory as leader of a Conservative coalition government in 1996.
Makstale, Alvvdas: Senior official in the Lithuanian PoliceForce, based in Vilnius.
Miskinis. Gediminas: Director of Macro-Economics, EconomicsMinistry, Vilnius.
01ivoviene, Vera : President of the Conservative Women'sAssociation of Lithuania, headquartered in the Seimas, Vilnius.
Peart, Michael, L.V.O.: British Ambassador to Lithuania, 1991-1994. He showed considerable awareness and understanding of the situation in Lithuania during the first years of independence.
Reklaite, Asta: Economist in Kaunas. Member of the Deportees'Association and of the Children of Lithuanian Officers'. Along with most of her family she was deported to Siberia in 1944.
Reklaitis. Vvtautas Professor of Computing at Kaunas Technological University. He was one of the first Lithuanians to travel to the West on a frequent basis and works with Manchester University on developing computer programmes.
Rutkauskiene, Zanutè: Niece of the former Chancellor of Lithuania in the inter-war years. She was deported to Siberia in 1941 for a 20 year period and is currently struggling to regain some her properties around Lithuania which were confiscated by the Soviet occupying forces.
Rutkauskaite Galè: A doctor (paediatrician) who, after her mother was deported in 1941, was born and educated in Siberia by her mother and Russian father. After Lithuania declared the restitution of her independence, she moved to Lithuania, despite having no knowledge of the language, and settled in Kaunas, where the roots of her family originated.
Saudaraas, Alairdas: A bio-physicist by profession, he chaired the Political Commission of Sajudis from 1989-1990, when he was elected to the Supreme Council of Lithuania. He first served as
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Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1990-1992 and was appointed for a second term in December 1996, after the victory of the Christian Democratic Party, of which he is Chairman.
Seduikiene. Alduté: Deputy of Palanga Council. She was widowed after her husband was frequently imprisoned for his religious beliefs, which she shares, and she applies these beliefs in her political life: campaigning for a return to "old-fashioned" 
moral, Christian values.
Stankevicius. Gediminas: Member of the Seimas 1990-. Leader of the negotiations on the withdrawal of the Soviet/Russian troops from Lithuanian territory.
Steoonaviciene. Elenuté: persecuted by the Soviet authoritiesduring the Occupation, she failed to escape to the West with her family and now lives in Palanga, where she is one of the respected elders of the town.
Vaitekunas. Stasvs: Rector of Klaipeda University
Vilkas. Eduardas: Chairman of the Privatisation Commission,
Member of the Seimas, 1990-1992.
Fr. Vincentas: An elderly priest in Vienksniai. Heavilypersecuted by the Soviet authorities during the occupation, he survived and continues to preach in the Siauliai region.
Zukauskiene. Irena: Teacher of English in Siauliai. She was the first Rotary Scholar from Lithuania to visit St. Andrews University in 1994.
In the United Kingdom:
Alkis, Jaras: Head of the Lithuanian Association of Great Britain and a vociferous campaigner for the restitution of Lithuania's independence.
Balickas, Vincas: Deputy Minister of the Lithuanian Legation in London, prior to the Soviet Occupation. He remained in Britain, residing in the former Legation building. He was finally accredited as Ambassador in 1992, but was retired in 1994 and died in December 1996.
Barber. Tonv: Eastern European Editor, The Independent.
Barker, Captain Bill: Director of the Port of London Authority.
Bashford. Graham: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Know-How Fund Desk.
Beaver. Paul: Editor, Jane's Sentinel: Central Europe and the Baltic States and a specialist in security and defence issues in the region.
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Rod. Peter: Former Trade and Industry Minister in Hungary, 19 92-
1994. Currently working at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and examining the influence of economic reform on electoral patterns in Central and Eastern Europe.
Boulton, Leyla: Moscow Correspondent, The Financial Times.
Brazauskaite. Jone: Fleeing Lithuania in 1944, she eventuallysettled in the UK in 1959 and became one of the chief spokeswomen for Lithuania in the UK. She was a BBC monitor for Lithuania at Caversham Park in the 1980s and has interpreted, both for visiting Lithuanians and the British Government, since 1990. With her family, Brazauskaite was responsible for ensuring that events in Lithuania received widespread media coverage in the West and advised Lithuania's trainee diplomats on the re-establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She worked at the Embassy in London after the restitution of independence and remains as a private adviser to Embassy personnel. She is currently struggling to reclaim some of her parents' property in Lithuania and to encourage further investment in Lithuania by British companies.
Bridge. Adrian: Correspondent, The Independent.
Brimacombe, John : a Director of Rothschild & Sons, specialising in assistance to the Baltic States,
Brown. Ben : Correspondent for BBC Television, he covered theevents in Vilnius in January 1991 as the Soviet forces attacked Lithuanian demonstrators.
Burgon. Paul: Director, Landell Mills, a consultancy group in Bath specialising in the restructuring of Lithuania's agricultural sector.
Ciubrinskas, Vvtis: Professor of Social History at VilniusUniversity.
Clark. Bruce: Diplomatic Editor, The Financial Times. He hasspent a great amount of time in the former USSR and is the author of An Empire's New Clothes, on Russia since the collapse of the USSR.
Cradock. Sir Percy: former Head of the Joint IntelligenceCommittee in the UK. He advised Lithuanian Ministers and Diplomats in the early years of Lithuania's newly-restored independence.
Daniels. Jack: St Andrews University. He established the first Rotary Scholarship for Lithuanians in Scotland in 1994.
Fischer. Brigadier General Eckhart: Defence and Military Attache, German Embassy, London. He supervised the German training programmes for Baltic forces.
Giejgo. Helen: Holder of the Medal of the Order of Grand Duke Gediminas for fostering relations between Scotland and Lithuania.
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Goddard. R .S.: Secretary, Henley Royal Regatta. He assisted the Lithuanian rowers in finding equipment and re-entering 
international competition.
Gooderhan, Peter: Deputy Head of the Security Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Harris, Anthony L.V.O., C.M.G.: Ambassador to the United ArabEmirates, but has an interest in Lithuanian affairs and advised Lithuania's trainee diplomats.
Hart. David: Special Adviser to the UK Secretary of State for Defence, he supplied the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence with its office equipment after the restitution of independence and was awarded the Medal of the Order of Gediminas in 1993.
Hindle. Richard: European Union PHARE Programme SME Adviser.
Huqau, Anita. Minister of the Danish Embassy, London, with a keen interest in Lithuanian affairs.
Ives. Alois : Board Member of the Lithuanian Association of Great Britain.
Jeziorski. Andriez: Formerly a correspondent for The Baltic
Independent and The Baltic Observer, he spent two years in Latvia after the restitution of independence. He now writes for Flight International, specialising in the expansion of air traffic in the former USSR.
Kendall. Bridget: Correspondent for BBC World Service, shecovered the events in Vilnius in January 1991.
Kilrov-Silk. Robert: Former Member of Parliament, turnedtelevision presenter and supporter of Lithuania. He devoted his programme on 15 January 1991 to a discussion on events in Lithuania with Jaras Alkis (qv) , Jone Brazauskaite (qv) , Romas Kinka (qv).
Kinka. Romas: Head of the Anglo-Baltic Consultancy service. Aleading campaigner for Lithuanian independence. Spokesman for President Landsbergis and Sajudis, 1990-1992. He still plays an active role in Lithuanian political affairs and works closely with Landsbergis.
Lacey. Robert. Chairman of the British-Lithuanian Society.
Llovd. John. Moscow Correspondent, The Financial Times.
Lorenz. Andrew. Business Editor, The Sunday Times.
Maddock. Nick. European Union PHARE Programme PIP Adviser.
Misevicius, Algis: First Secretary, Embassy of Lithuania in the UK.
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Nesavas. Antanas : Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Lithuania in the UK, 1992-1994. He had spent many years during the Soviet Occupation of Lithuania at the Humboldt University of the then East Berlin. When he failed to be appointed Ambassador upon the retirement of Balickas (qy) , he disappeared from Britain overnight, reappearing in Vilnius four months later. He remained in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was posted to Georgia, where he died in an alcohol-related road accident in January 
1995 .
Paleckiene. Laime: Married to Justas Paleckis (qv), a teacher of German literature.
Paleckis, Justas: Ambassador of Lithuania to the UK 1996-.Formerly a member of the Foreign Affairs Directorate of the CPSU, then Ideology Chief of the Communist Party of Lithuania. A personal aide to President Brazauskas (qv).
Peacock, Niael: Director of Landell Mills, a consultancy group in Bath working with the European Union PHARE programme on the regeneration of Lithuania's agricultural sector.
Petrikas. Erikas: Attache, Embassy of Lithuania in the UK.Formerly a bodyguard.
Reiackas. Raimundas: Former adviser to President Brazauskas (qv) , he was Ambassador to the UK between 1994-1996. In the 1996 elections, he abandoned the LDLP and stood on a Conservative platform as a protest against the growth of corruption in the governing party and was elected to the Seimas.
Robinson. Anthony : Russian Correspondent, The Financial Times. On 8 March 1990 he was granted a private interview with Algimantis Cekuolis (qv) at the Reform Club in London, during the course of which Cekuolis announced that on 11 March 1990, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet would declare the restitution of Lithuania's independence.
Sabaliunas. Imsrè: Head of Chancery, Embassy of Lithuania in the UK. She was one of the few Lithuanian-Americans to take Lithuanian citizenship and move to Lithuania, although she was born in the USA. Untainted with the mentality of homo sovieticus, she was an invaluable asset to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Salmon, Trevor; Professor of International Relations at Aberdeen University, formerly of St. Andrews University. A specialist in the European Union and its expansion.
Sinnerton. Bill: European Union PHARE Programme InvestmentPromotion Adviser.
Solon, Daniel: American consultant to Baltic InternationalAirlines, based in Latvia.
Tamosiunas. Klemensas : Board Member of the Lithuanian Association of Great Britain.
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Unwin. Sir Brian: Head of Customs and Excise in the UK. Headvised the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on customs regulations following the restitution of independence.
Varkala, Petras: Former Agricultural Attache of the Lithuanian Legation in London in the inter-war years. A spokesman for Lithuania during the period of Occupation, he remains a private adviser to Embassy personnel in London.
Varkaliene. Melita: Married to Petras Varkala (qv). She fledLithuania in 1944, but prior to that had lived in the Klaipedaregion and witnessed its seizure by Hitler in 1939.
Wooler. Manor Leslie: Co-Founder and Director, Friendship Link.
Zandoskv-Roddv. Paul: Active member of the Latvian Community of Great Britain and campaigner for Baltic independence until his
death in November 1993.
In the United States of America :
Ashbourne. E .J .: Country Manager for the United States' Agency for International Development and PIET.
Brvan, James: Director, the Bryan Group, working in partnership with the Lithuanian textile company Audejas.
Zailskis, Arunas: Director of the Lithuanian Research and Study Centre in Chicago.
In Germany:
Joffe, Joseph: Foreign Editor, Suddeutsche Zeitung, with a keen interest in Lithuanian affairs.
Skudra. Oiars, University of Latvia: Visiting Professor ofPolitics at Munich University, November 1996.
Elsewhere :
Kvdd, David : Head of Public Affairs, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
Lozoraitis, Stasvs: Leader of Lithuania's Government in Exile until international recognition in September 1991, a mantle he assumed upon the death of his father, former Foreign Minister Stasys Lozoraitis. He was officially accredited as Ambassador to the Holy See, but after the restitution of independence, became Ambassador to the USA. In 1993 he challenged Brazauskas for the Presidency, but was heavily defeated. He died in July 1994.
